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Re: re:[casi] Dossier URL

Here is the Hansard transcript of the PM's statement yesterday, the full
debate can be found at

(The Dossier URL is at
 which is in PDF )

24 Sept 2002 : Column 1

House of Commons
Tuesday 24 September 2002
The House met at half-past Eleven o'clock, notice having been given by Mr.
Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order No. 13 (Earlier meeting of the House in
certain circumstances).

[Mr. Speaker in the Chair]
Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Mr. Speaker: Statement by the Prime Minister.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): On a point of order on procedure, Mr. Speaker-

Mr. Speaker: Order. I will take points of order after the statement.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Tony Blair): Mr. Speaker, thank you for recalling
Parliament to debate the best way to deal with the issue of the present
leadership of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.

Today we published a 50-page dossier, detailing the history of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programme, its breach of United Nations
resolutions, and the current attempts to rebuild that illegal programme. I
have placed a copy in the Library.

At the end of the Gulf war, the full extent of Saddam's chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons programmes became clear. As a result, the United Nations
passed a series of resolutions, demanding that Iraq disarm itself of such
weapons and establishing a regime of weapons inspections and monitoring to
do the task. They were to be given unconditional and unrestricted access to
all and any Iraqi sites.

24 Sept 2002 : Column 2

All this is accepted fact. In addition, it is fact, documented by UN
inspectors, that Iraq almost immediately began to obstruct the inspections.
Visits were delayed; on occasions, inspectors threatened; matériel was
moved; special sites, shut to the inspectors, were unilaterally designated
by Iraq. The work of the inspectors continued, but against a background of
increasing obstruction and non-compliance. Indeed, Iraq denied that its
biological weapons programme existed until forced to acknowledge it after
high-ranking defectors disclosed its existence in 1995.

Eventually, in 1997, the UN inspectors declared that they were unable to
fulfil their task. A year of negotiation and further obstruction occurred
until finally, in late 1998, the UN team was forced to withdraw.

As the dossier sets out, we estimate on the basis of the UN's work that
there were up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agents, including 1.5
tonnes of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; growth
media sufficient to produce 26,000 litres of anthrax spores; and over 30,000
special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents. All of
this was missing and unaccounted for.

Military action by the United States and United Kingdom followed and a
certain amount of infrastructure for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and
missile capability was destroyed, setting the Iraqi programme back, but not
ending it.

>From late 1998 onwards, therefore, the sole inhibition on Saddam's WMD
programme was the sanctions regime. Iraq was forbidden to use the revenue
from its oil except for certain specified non-military purposes. The
sanctions regime, however, was also subject to illegal trading and abuse.
Because of concerns about its inadequacy-and the impact on the Iraqi
people-we made several attempts to refine it, culminating in a new UN
resolution in May of this year. But it was only partially effective. Around
$3 billion of money is illegally taken by Saddam every year now, double the
figure for the year 2000. Self-evidently, there is no proper accounting for
this money.

24 Sept 2002 : Column 3

Because of concerns that a containment policy based on sanctions alone could
not sufficiently inhibit Saddam's weapons programme, negotiations continued,
even after 1998, to gain readmission for the UN inspectors. In 1999, a new
UN resolution demanding their re-entry was passed and ignored. Further
negotiations continued. Finally, after several months of discussion with
Saddam's regime this year, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, concluded
that Saddam was not serious about readmitting the inspectors and ended the
negotiations. That was in July this year.

All this is established fact. I set out the history in some detail because
occasionally debate on this issue seems to treat it almost as if it had
suddenly arisen, coming out of nowhere on a whim in the last few months of
2002. It is actually an 11-year history: a history of UN will flouted, of
lies told by Saddam about the existence of his chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons programmes, and of obstruction, defiance and denial.

There is one common, consistent theme, however: the total determination of
Saddam to maintain that programme; to risk war, international ostracism,
sanctions and the isolation of the Iraqi economy to keep it. At any time, he
could have let the inspectors back in and put the world to proof. At any
time, he could have co-operated with the United Nations. Ten days ago, he
made the offer unconditionally under threat of war. He could have done it at
any time in the last 11 years, but he did not. Why?

The dossier that we publish gives the answer. The reason is that his
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme is not an historic
left-over from 1998. The inspectors are not needed to clean up the old
remains. His weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and
growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass
destruction programme is not shut down; it is up and running now.

The dossier is based on the work of the British Joint Intelligence
Committee. For over 60 years, beginning just before world war two, the JIC
has provided intelligence assessments to British Prime Ministers. Normally,
its work is obviously secret. Unusually, because it is important that we
explain our concerns about Saddam to the British people, we have decided to
disclose its assessments.

I am aware, of course, that people will have to take elements of this on the
good faith of our intelligence services, but this is what they are telling
me, the British Prime Minister, and my senior colleagues. The intelligence
picture that they paint is one accumulated over the last four years. It is
extensive, detailed and authoritative. It concludes that Iraq has chemical
and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he
has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and
biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including
against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire
nuclear weapons capability.

On chemical weapons, the dossier shows that Iraq continues to produce
chemical agents for chemical weapons; has rebuilt previously destroyed
production plants across Iraq; has bought dual-use chemical facilities; has
retained the key personnel formerly engaged in the

24 Sept 2002 : Column 4

chemical weapons programme; and has a serious ongoing research programme
into weapons production, all of it well funded.
In respect of biological weapons, again, production of biological agents has
continued; facilities formerly used for biological weapons have been
rebuilt; equipment has been purchased for such a programme; and again,
Saddam has retained the personnel who worked on it prior to 1991. In
particular, the UN inspection regime discovered that Iraq was trying to
acquire mobile biological weapons facilities, which of course are easier to
conceal. Present intelligence confirms that it has now got such facilities.
The biological agents that we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax,
botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin-all eventually result in
excruciatingly painful death.

As for nuclear weapons, Saddam's previous nuclear weapons programme was shut
down by the inspectors, following disclosure by defectors of the full, but
hidden, nature of it. That programme was based on gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment. The known remaining stocks of uranium are now held under
supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

But we now know the following: since the departure of the inspectors in
1998, Saddam has bought or attempted to buy specialised vacuum pumps of the
design needed for the gas centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium; an entire
magnet production line of the specification for use in the motors and top
bearings of gas centrifuges; dual-use products, such as anhydrous hydrogen
fluoride and fluoride gas, which can be used both in petrochemicals but also
in gas centrifuge cascades; a filament winding machine, which can be used to
manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors; and he has attempted,
covertly, to acquire 60,000 or more specialised aluminium tubes, which are
subject to strict controls owing to their potential use in the construction
of gas centrifuges.

In addition, we know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant
quantities of uranium from Africa, though we do not know whether he has been
successful. Again, key personnel who used to work on the nuclear weapons
programme are back in harness. Iraq may claim that that is for a civil
nuclear power programme, but I would point out that it has no nuclear power

So that is the position in respect of the weapons-but of course, the weapons
require ballistic missile capability. That, again, is subject to UN
resolutions. Iraq is supposed only to have missile capability up to 150 km
for conventional weaponry. Pages 27 to 31 of the dossier detail the evidence
on that issue. It is clear that a significant number of longer-range
missiles were effectively concealed from the previous inspectors and remain,
including up to 20 extended-range Scud missiles; that in mid-2001 there was
a step change in the programme and, by this year, Iraq's development of
weapons with a range of more than 1,000 km was well under way; and that
hundreds of people are employed in that programme, facilities are being
built and equipment procured-usually clandestinely. Sanctions and import
controls have hindered the programme, but only slowed its progress. The
capability being developed, incidentally, is for multi-purpose use,
including with WMD warheads.

That is the assessment, given to me, of the Joint Intelligence Committee. In
addition, we have well founded intelligence to tell us that Saddam sees his
WMD programme as vital to his survival and as a demonstration of his power
and influence in the region.

24 Sept 2002 : Column 5

There will be some who will dismiss all this. Intelligence is not always
right. For some of the material, there might be innocent explanations. There
will be others who say rightly that, for example, on present going, it could
be several years before Saddam acquires a usable nuclear weapon-though if he
were able to purchase fissile matériel illegally, it would be only a year or
two. But let me put it at its simplest: on this 11-year history; with this
man Saddam; with this accumulated, detailed intelligence available; with
what we know and what we can reasonably speculate, would the world be wise
to leave the present situation undisturbed-to say that, despite 14 separate
UN demands on the issue, all of which Saddam is in breach of, we should do
nothing, and to conclude that we should trust, not to the good faith of the
UN weapons inspectors, but to the good faith of the current Iraqi regime? I
do not believe that that would be a responsible course to follow.

Our case is simply this: not that we take military action come what may, but
that the case for ensuring Iraqi disarmament, as the UN itself has
stipulated, is overwhelming. I defy anyone on the basis of this evidence to
say that that is an unreasonable demand for the international community to
make when, after all, it is only the same demand that we have made for 11
years and that Saddam has rejected.

People say, "But why Saddam?" I do not in the least dispute that there are
other causes of concern on weapons of mass destruction. I said as much in
this House on 14 September last year. However, two things about Saddam stand
out. He has used these weapons in Iraq itself-thousands dying in those
chemical weapons attacks-and in the Iran-Iraq war, started by him, in which
1 million people died; and his is a regime with no moderate elements to
appeal to.

Read the chapter on Saddam and human rights in this dossier. Read not just
about the 1 million dead in the war with Iran, not just about the 100,000
Kurds brutally murdered in northern Iraq, not just about the 200,000 Shia
Muslims driven from the marshlands in southern Iraq, and not just about the
attempt to subjugate and brutalise the Kuwaitis in 1990 that led to the Gulf
war. I say, "Read also about the routine butchering of political opponents,
the prison 'cleansing' regimes in which thousands die, the torture chambers
and the hideous penalties supervised by him and his family and detailed by
Amnesty International." Read it all and, again, I defy anyone to say that
this cruel and sadistic dictator should be allowed any possibility of
getting his hands on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass

"Why now?", people ask. I agree that I cannot say that this month or next,
even this year or next, Saddam will use his weapons. But I can say that if
the international community, having made the call for disarmament, now, at
this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away,
he will draw the conclusion that dictators faced with a weakening will
always draw: that the international community will talk but not act, will
use diplomacy but not force. We know, again from our history, that diplomacy
not backed by the threat of force has never worked with dictators and never

If we take this course and if we refuse to implement the will of the
international community, Saddam will carry on, his efforts will intensify,
his confidence will grow and, at some point in a future not too distant, the
threat will turn into reality. The threat therefore is not

24 Sept 2002 : Column 6

imagined. The history of Saddam and weapons of mass destruction is not
American or British propaganda. The history and the present threat are real.
If people say, "Why should Britain care?", I answer, "Because there is no
way this man, in this region above all regions, could begin a conflict using
such weapons and the consequences not engulf the whole world, including this
country." That, after all, is the reason the UN passed its resolutions. That
is why it is right that the UN Security Council again makes its will and its
unity clear and lays down a strong new UN resolution and mandate. Then
Saddam will have the choice: comply willingly or be forced to comply. That
is why, alongside the diplomacy, there must be genuine preparedness and
planning to take action if diplomacy fails.

Let me be plain about our purpose. Of course, there is no doubt that Iraq,
the region and the whole world would be better off without Saddam. Iraq
deserves to be led by someone who can abide by international law, not a
murderous dictator; by someone who can bring Iraq back into the
international community where it belongs, not languishing as a pariah; by
someone who can make the country rich and successful, not impoverished by
Saddam's personal greed; and by someone who can lead a Government more
representative of the country as a whole while maintaining absolutely Iraq's
territorial integrity.

We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Indeed, liberated from Saddam,
they could make Iraq prosperous and a force for good in the middle east. So
the ending of this regime would be the cause of regret for no one other than
Saddam. But our purpose is disarmament. No one wants military conflict. The
whole purpose of putting this before the UN is to demonstrate the united
determination of the international community to resolve this in the way it
should have been resolved years ago: through a proper process of disarmament
under the UN. Disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction is the demand.
One way or another, it must be acceded to.

There are two other issues with a bearing on this question which I will deal
with. First, Afghanistan is a country now freed from the Taliban but still
suffering. This is a regime we changed, rightly. I want to make it clear,
once again, that we are entirely committed to its reconstruction. We will
not desert the Afghan people. We will stick with them until the job of
reconstruction is done.

Secondly, I have no doubt that the Arab world knows it would be better off
without Saddam. Equally, I know that there is genuine resentment at the
state of the middle east peace process, which people want to see the
international community pursue with the same vigour. Israel will defend its
people against these savage acts of terrorism, but the very purpose of this
terrorism is to prevent any chance for peace. Meanwhile the Palestinians are
suffering in the most appalling and unacceptable way.

We need therefore urgent action to build a security infrastructure that
gives both Israelis and Palestinians confidence and stops the next suicide
bomb closing down the prospects of progress. We need political reform for
the Palestinian Authority, and we need a new conference on the middle east
peace process, based on the twin principles of a secure Israel and a viable
Palestinian state. We can condemn the terrorism and the reaction to it. As I
have said many times in the House, frankly, that gets us nowhere. What we
need is a firm commitment to action

24 Sept 2002 : Column 7

and a massive mobilisation of energy to get the peace process moving again,
and we in Britain will play our part in that in any way we can.
Finally, there are many acts of this drama still to be played out. I have
always said that Parliament should be kept in touch with all developments,
in particular those that would lead us to military action. That remains the
case, and to those who doubt it I say: look at Kosovo and Afghanistan. We
proceeded with care, with full debate in this House, and when we took
military action, we did so as a last resort. We shall act in the same way
now, but I hope we can do so secure in the knowledge that should Saddam
continue to defy the will of the international community, this House, as it
has in our history so many times before, will not shrink from doing what is
necessary and what is right.

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----- Original Message -----
From: Lisa Thomas <>
To: IRAQI <>; <>
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2002 5:00 AM
Subject: re:[casi] Dossier URL

> Does anyone here have the transcript of Blair's
> speech, or an outline of it - my notion from tv
> comments is that the dossier contained nothing new,
> but I'm not sure of that.  (Perhaps I should watch FOX
> news.)
> Lisa
> --- IRAQI <> wrote:
> > Dear Nermin or Ghazwan,
> > We are still waiting for the Iraqi government's
> > official comment on Blair's dossier.
> > ahmed
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Sent by Mail at, an easyGroup company.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against
> > Sanctions on Iraq.
> > To unsubscribe, visit
> >
> > To contact the list manager, email
> >
> > All postings are archived on CASI's website:
> __________________________________________________
> Do you Yahoo!?
> New DSL Internet Access from SBC & Yahoo!
> _______________________________________________
> Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
> To unsubscribe, visit
> To contact the list manager, email
> All postings are archived on CASI's website:

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