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http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/05/international/middleeast/05IRAQ.html
July 5, 2002
U.S. Plan for Iraq Is Said to Include Attack on 3 Sides
By ERIC SCHMITT
W ASHINGTON, July 4 An American military planning document calls for
air, land and sea-based forces to attack Iraq from three directions
the north, south and west in a campaign to topple President Saddam
Hussein, according to a person familiar with the document.
The document envisions tens of thousands of marines and soldiers
probably invading from Kuwait. Hundreds of warplanes based in as many
as eight countries, possibly including Turkey and Qatar, would
unleash
a huge air assault against thousands of targets, including airfields,
roadways and fiber-optics communications sites.
Special operations forces or covert C.I.A. operatives would strike at
depots or laboratories storing or manufacturing Iraq's suspected
weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to launch them.
None of the countries identified in the document as possible staging
areas have been formally consulted about playing such a role,
officials said, underscoring the preliminary nature of the planning.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld visited American bases in Kuwait
and Qatar and the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain on his most recent trip to
the Persian Gulf region in June.
The existence of the document that outlined significant aspects of a
"concept" for a war against Iraq as it stood about two months ago
indicates an advanced state of planning in the military even though
President Bush continues to state in public and to his allies that he
has no fine-grain war plan on his desk for the invasion of Iraq.
Yet the concept for such a plan is now highly evolved and is
apparently working its way through military channels. Once a
consensus
is reached on the concept, the steps toward assembling a final war
plan and, most importantly, the element of timing for ground
deployments and commencement of an air war, represent the final
sequencing that Mr. Bush will have to decide.
Mr. Bush has received at least two briefings from Gen. Tommy R.
Franks, the head of the Central Command, on the broad outlines, or
"concept of operations," for a possible attack against Iraq. The most
recent briefing was on June 19, according to the White House.
"Right now, we're at the stage of conceptual thinking and
brainstorming," a senior defense official said. "We're pretty far
along."
The highly classified document, entitled "CentCom Courses of Action,"
was prepared by planners at the Central Command in Tampa, Fla.,
according to the person familiar with the document.
Officials say it has already undergone revisions, but is a snapshot
of
an important, but preliminary stage, in a comprehensive process that
translates broad ideas into the detailed, step-by-step blueprint for
combat operations that the Pentagon defines as a "war plan."
Still, the document, compiled in a long set of briefing slides,
offers
a rare glimpse into the inner sanctum of the war planners assigned to
think about options for defeating Iraq.
"It is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to develop
contingency plans and, from time to time, to update them," Victoria
Clarke, the Pentagon spokeswoman, said today. "In fact, we have
recently issued new general planning guidance, and that generates
activity at the staff level."
Officials said neither Mr. Rumsfeld, nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff or
General Franks had been briefed on this specific document as yet.
The source familiar with the document described its contents to The
New York Times on the condition of anonymity, expressing frustration
that the planning reflected at least in this set of briefing slides
was insufficiently creative, and failed to incorporate fully the
advances in tactics and technology that the military has made since
the Persian Gulf war in 1991.
Administration officials say they are still weighing options other
than war to dislodge Mr. Hussein. But most military and
administration
officials believe that a coup in Iraq would be unlikely to succeed,
and that a proxy battle using local forces would not be enough to
drive the Iraqi leader from power.
Nothing in the Central Command document or in interviews with senior
military officials suggests that an attack on Iraq is imminent.
Indeed, senior administration officials continue to say that any
offensive would probably be delayed until early next year, allowing
time to create the right military, economic and diplomatic
conditions.
Nonetheless, there are several signs that the military is preparing
for a major air campaign and land invasion.
Thousands of marines from the First Marine Expeditionary Force at
Camp
Pendleton, Calif., the marine unit designated for the gulf, have
stepped up their mock assault drills, a Pentagon adviser said. The
military is building up bases in several Persian Gulf states,
including a major airfield in Qatar called Al Udeid. Thousands of
American troops are already stationed in the region.
After running dangerously low on precision-guided bombs during the
war
in Afghanistan, the Pentagon has said it has stepped up production of
critical munitions. The Air Force is stockpiling weapons, ammunition
and spare parts, like airplane engines, at depots in the United
States
and in the Middle East.
"We don't know when or where the next contingency will be," Gen.
Lester L. Lyles, head of the Air Force Materiel Command, said in an
interview this week. "But we want to fill up the stock bins."
The Central Command document, as described by the source familiar
with
it, is significant not just for what it contains, but also for what
it
leaves out.
The document describes in precise detail specific Iraqi bases,
surface-to-air missile sites, air defense networks and fiber-optics
communications to be attacked. "The target list is so huge it's
almost
egregious," the source said. "It's obvious that we've been watching
these guys for an awfully long time."
Dozens of slides are devoted to organizational details, like the
precise tonnage of American munitions stored at various bases around
the Persian Gulf, deployment time lines for troops leaving East and
West Coast ports for the gulf region, and the complexities of
interwoven intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance networks.
At the same time, according to the source, the document is silent on
or barely mentions other important aspects of any operation,
suggesting that there are several highly classified documents that
address different parts of the planning.
For instance, the "Courses of Action" document does not mention other
coalition forces, casualty estimates, how Mr. Hussein may himself be
a
target, or what political regime might follow the Iraqi leader if an
American-led attack was successful, the source said.
Nor does the document discuss the sequencing of air and ground
campaigns, the precise missions of special operations forces or the
possibility of urban warfare in downtown Baghdad, with Iraqi forces
possibly deploying chemical weapons.
In fact, the discussion about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is
relatively terse. The document discusses the broad threat such
weapons
pose to American forces and surrounding countries, the need to deter
Baghdad from using them, and, failing that, devising ways to counter
them.
It describes the number of Marine and Army divisions, air
expeditionary forces, and aircraft carriers. These and other forces
add up to as many as 250,000 troops, the source familiar with the
document said, but there is little detail about those forces beyond
that.
Nor does the document contain a comprehensive analysis of the Iraqi
ground forces, including the Republican Guard and various security
forces that are believed to be fiercely loyal to Mr. Hussein. This
again suggests that such analysis is either incomplete or is
contained
in another planning document.
By emphasizing a large American force, the document seems to reflect
a
view that a successful campaign would require sizable conventional
forces staging from Kuwait, or at least held in reserve there.
An alternative plan, championed by retired Gen. Wayne A. Downing of
the Army, calls for conquering Iraq with a combination of airstrikes
and special operations attacks in coordination with indigenous
fighters, similar to the campaign in Afghanistan. Relying solely on
that approach appears to have been ruled out.
General Downing resigned last week as Mr. Bush's chief adviser on
counterterrorism, reportedly frustrated by the administration's tough
talk against Iraq but lack of action.
Among the many questions the military and the administration must
address before staging an invasion is where to base air and ground
forces in the region.
Geography and history, specifically the gulf war, would suggest that
countries like Kuwait, Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and
Bahrain would be likely candidates for staging troops or air combat
missions.
Any mention of using bases in Saudi Arabia, from which the United
States staged the bulk of the airstrikes in the gulf war, is
conspicuously missing from the document, said an official familiar
with the briefing slides. The United States would need permission to
use Saudi airspace adjacent to Iraq, if not Saudi bases themselves,
officials said.
The Saudis have allowed the United States to run the air war against
Afghanistan from a sophisticated command center at Prince Sultan Air
Base, outside Riyadh, but have prohibited the Air Force from flying
any attack missions from Saudi soil.
Senior Air Force officials have expressed mounting frustration with
restrictions the Saudis have placed on American operations, and the
Central Command is developing an alternate command center at the
sprawling Udeid base in Qatar, should that be needed.
The Central Command document does not contain a time line of when
American forces could start flowing to the gulf or how long it would
take to put all the forces in place. Nor does it answer one of the
big
questions administration officials are wrestling with: how will Mr.
Hussein react if there is a large buildup of conventional forces,
such
as the United States had in the gulf war.
"The Iraqis aren't just going to sit on their butts while we put in
250,000 people," a military analyst said.
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