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Dear all: I am new to this list and very happy to be a part of it. Here is a contribution. Rania and Seb want to know if the calorie reduction figures cited by Lloyd in the HoC are true. They are (see details from UN Secy Gen Report cited below. However, Lloyd's claim that the reduction is due to Iraqi obstruction is not borne about by the UN's own report. The UN claims Iraqi full cooperation, and attributes the problems to shortage of money. Best wishes and keep up the good work. When I have a full draft of my paper available, I will let the list know. Eric Herring Here is a summary of relevant passages from a paper I am writing: In February 1998 under resolution 1153, the Security Council agreed to the expansion of the programme from US$2 billion in oil sales every 180 days to US$5.2 billion. [how were the figures arrived at?] The UN and Iraq agreed a revised Distribution Plan under resolution 1210 of 24 November 1998 to try to improve delivery of food, medicines, medical equipment, water and sanitiation equipment, electricity equipment and oil spare parts. US President Bill Clinton's claim that the oil for food programme 'generates more than $10 billion a year for food, medicine and other critical humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people'2 is patently untrue. Officially, only $6.8 billion of the $10.2 billion is for humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the combination of the near 50% fall in oil prices between December 1996 and November 1998 and the debilitation of Iraq's oil industry due to UN bombing and sanctions has meant that Iraq has not been able to generate anything like all of the revenue permitted. In June 1998 under resolution 1175 the UN authorised Iraq to import US$300 million worth of spare parts to enable its oil industry to produce the amount oil necessary to generate the revenue permitted under the UN programme. The funds for this are deducted proportionately from the two humanitarian aid accounts (ESB and ESC). Approval of oil industry spare parts requires an amendment to the humanitarian aid distribution plan 'or other clarifications', making this what the UN calls 'a major source of delay in processing'.3 Oil industry spare parts are not due to even begin to arrive before the end of January 1999, and the value of spare parts permitted is not expected to meet anything more than the most urgent needs.4 In the period from the start of the programme on 10 December 1996 through to 31 October 1998 - just under two years - the total amount of revenue from oil sales was $8.339 billion, while the amount allocated for humanitarian supplies was $5,222 billion.5 Overall, Clinton's figure for humanitarian aid is roughly four times the real figure. In the centre and south of the country where the programme is adminstered directly by the Iraqi government and monitored by the UN, the situation is not improving greatly. Only as of September 1998 through November 1998 has the programme successfully delivered food baskets in the centre and south of the country of a mere 2,030 kilocalories per day, and even then World Food Programme (WFP) observers indicated that almost two thirds of households surveyed claimed that the rations last at most 20 days. The poor performance of the programme is due to shortage of funds.6 The UN's assessment is that 986 has not reversed the malnutirtion in Iraq but merely stabilised 'previously rising levels'. The levels of general malnutrition (measured in terms of weight for age) are 14.7% of infants and 25% of children under five.7 Although the supply of medical drugs has increased has increased, the UN believes that these will have 'little overall impact on public health services without better facilities and statt motivation.8 Although some water treatment plants have been improved, the UN reports that there are not enough funds to 'significantly reverse the present deterioration' in access to clean water.9 The same assessment is made of agricultural production, electricity production and primary school enrolment - at most modest short-term improvements combined with overall deterioration of capabilities due principally to lack of funds and secondarily to a slow rate of approval and contracting.10 The picture is roughly same or somewhat better in the Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governates of Iraq under joint UN and local authority administration, although there is some variation.11 These areas appears to be doing worse at delivering food baskets on time, similarly at electricity production but better at reducing general malnutrition among children under five (from 25.8% in December 1994 to 15.1% in April 1998), at delivering medicines, at improving agricultural production, and at primary school enrolment. The data above are drawn from UN Office of the Iraq Programme, Oil For Food, Basic Facts November 1998; Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Praragraph Council 10 of Security Council Resolution 1153 (1998) S/1998/1100 19 November 1998 Secretary-General Approves New Distribution Plan 11 December 1998. Available online at <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/basfact.html>, <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/180day4.html> and <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/dp5pdf/sg5.html> respectively. On Tue, 26 Jan 1999 15:28:53 +0000 (GMT) Rania Masri <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: > On Tue, 26 Jan 1999, Seb Wills wrote: > > [...] > > Mr Lloyd also said "Let us look at the way in which Iraq tries to > > prioritise spending of oil for food money. The Iraqi distribution plan for > > the present six-month phase in the programme allocates less food than it > > did when the programme was worth only $2 billion; it is now worth some > > $5.3 billion. It reduces the daily food ration from 2,200 calories to > > 2,050, and reduces spending on medicine." > > [anyone know if his facts are correct and the reasons?] > > Thank you Seb, for this information. > > A few points on the OIl-for-Food deal: > (1) Iraq is not able to produce more than approximately $3 billion worth > of oil due to the lack of spare parts necessary for rebuilding the > oil-industy-infrastructure, and due to the drop in oil prices. (source: > january AP report, see http://leb.net/IAC/UNR986.html) > (2) As for the alleged-decrease in the daily food ration, I'm not sure at > all if that is true. This is the first that I've heard of it. However, if > it is true, then perhaps the difference is accounted for in the > importation of certain spare parts for infrastructure-rebuilding. The > updated Oil-for-Food program allegedly allows the importation of certain > spare parts. > > - Rania Masri > > -- > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > This is a discussion list run by Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. > To be removed/added, email email@example.com, NOT the > whole list. Archived at http://linux.clare.cam.ac.uk/~saw27/casi/discuss.html > ---------------------- Dr. Eric Herring Department of Politics University of Bristol 10 Priory Road Bristol BS8 1TU England, UK Tel. +44-(0)117-928-8582 Fax +44-(0)117-9732133 http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/Politics Eric.Herring@bristol.ac.uk -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To be removed/added, email firstname.lastname@example.org, NOT the whole list. Archived at http://linux.clare.cam.ac.uk/~saw27/casi/discuss.html