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[ Presenting plain-text part of multi-format email ] Nothing from David Kay's report in any way confirms the bulk of claims made about Iraq's WMD by the US and the UK governments in the months leading up to the war, but I'm sure this is common knowledge by now. Below is an interesting analysis from Jo Cirincione from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who makes the following valid points: a.. The two most salient points of David Kay's research are that "Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced - if not entirely destroyed - during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections" and that "to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material." Yet these remarks are buried in the text. b.. The very nature of the Iraq Survey Group seriously questions its credibility, as it is a team handpicked to be a salesman for the American and British claims as well as fact finder. As a result, the language used puts the findings in the best possible light, even though they discuss the existence of documents and storerooms, not actual weapons. At the risk of sounding redundant- after three months of UNMOVIC inspections and six months after the fall of Baghdad, no WMD have been found. Therefore, as Cirincione argues, analysis of Iraq's program needs to be independently verified by UNMOVIC as this body has no agenda to vindicate a political decision taken by the current occupying powers of Iraq. As he says: "Kay is stuck in a fundamental contradiction: he is both salesman and fact-finder for the administration. No matter how high his personal integrity, this dual role fatally compromises his mission and credibility. As salesman, he is compelled to put the best possible spin on his investigation. Thus his report features bits and pieces of testimony from Iraqi scientists and officials that support the administration pre-war claims that there were active programs and large, ready-to-use stockpiles of weapons. Unfortunately, even these tidbits only support the Kay conclusion that Saddam had the intention of restoring these programs if he could, not that they actually existed pre-war. Kay does not present nor discuss the widely-reported fact that all of the Iraqi scientists and officials now in custody have said that there were no active programs. This does not mean that such statements are true, but they should at least have been mentioned and evaluated in his testimony." Despite the derision and criticism of the effectiveness of the inspectors in the first three months of 2003, David Kay's ISG has found little that would discredit the operations of that group. The ISG has found nothing that would make anyone conclude that the UNMOVIC inpsections were an ineffective and frutiless operation. If anything, the findings contradict many of the claims made by the US and the UK, in particular Dick Cheny's constant false allegations that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. Of course while the report talks about intent by Iraq to restart its WMD effort, it does not discuss Iraq's capability to do, which would have been very diffcult while Iraq remained under sanctions. Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1483 provides for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to revisit their mission in ascertaining the extent of Iraq's WMD programs and capability. Full report is below: http://ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=5442 Peter Kiernan _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss To contact the list manager, email firstname.lastname@example.org All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk