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Assiduous readers of my 'Kurdish Supplement' sent out on Sunday may have noticed the following: A further long article, * Lifting sanctions on Iraq: Center-South vs.Kurdistan, by Alexander Sternberg will be sent separately. It gives the best case I have yet seen for taking the disparity between Kurdistan and Iraq as proof that much of the suffering in centre-south Iraq is due to lack of will, or deliberate policy, on the part of the Iraqi government. In the event I have been forestalled by Mr Sternberg hoimself who has sent the same article to the list. What follows is my own attempt to provide a reply: I have to begin with confessing some confusion as to the exact point Alexander Sternberg is trying to make. I think essentially he is arguing that the Kurds in those parts of Northern Iraq/Southern Kurdistan that are outside Saddam Hussein's control would be worse off if sanctions were lifted, despite the fact that they too are subject to them. But he sometimes seems to be arguing that many Iraqis throughout the rest of Iraq (the Centre South, or CS) would be worse off. Two different problems are, I think, being confused - the relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi government and the relations between the rest of the country and the Iraqi government (Mr Sternberg does not here raise the question of the Shi'i population or of those Kurds living outside the not very 'safe havens'). He starts by arguing that Iraqis are better off under sanctions by saying (para 3): "Before the events of 1990-91, less than 25% of Iraq¹s public wealth was dedicated to non-military or non-security services", whereas now: "a record-setting 72% of Iraq¹s primary source of public wealth, oil, is designated solely for humanitarian use". He then says (para 4): "many Iraqis actually fear the lifting of sanctions. The humanitarian goods and services many Iraqis receive under sanctions would be stopped, or taken away." That seems reasonably clear and seems to be talking about the whole of Iraq, though it is immediately followed by a specific reference to the security anxieties of the Kurds. We have learned that, prior to the Gulf War, the Iraqi government gave very little of the nation's resources to the people (the people throughout Iraq). It all went to the security forces. I might mention in parenthesis that here he is talking about the period of and just after the Iran/Iraq war. We might wonder what proportion of Britain's national resources was going to military matters in 1943. But, be that as it may, now people are all receiving lots of humanitarian aid which would be stopped if the Iraqi government recovered control of the country's resources. Having had this clear argument presented to us, it comes as a surprise to learn (in para 30) that "Prior to the events of 1990-91, Iraq [under the Ba'ath administration - PB] had arguably the best public service structure in the Middle East." It doesn't some as such a surprise to us since we're always saying it, but it seems to undermine rather the earlier argument. He then goes on to point out, himself, that this 73-5% of humanitarian aid is actually in many ways destructive to the Kurdish (and by implication the Iraqi) economy. He launches into a ferocious attack on the regime of charitable handouts, comparing it unfavourably to the Government of Iraq who [under the Ba'ath regime - PB] 'have proven capabilities (the UN bureaucracy appears non-correctable)'. In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the Government of Iraq (under the Ba'ath administration - PB) did wonders in rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure: "The rebuilding of war-destroyed public facilities throughout the country following the events of 1991 is one obvious, tangible demonstration of WHAT IRAQIS CAN DO FOR THEMSELVES, BY THEMSELVES WITH THEIR OWN RESOURCES {my emphasis - PB] ... It was almost miraculous" (para 10) Whereas, he tells us, the UN in Kurdistan "has adopted policies and procedures that undermine the structure of the regional and local authorities" - the structure which, he has just told us, had been put in place by the Iraqi government (under the Ba'ath administration). So what evidence does all that provide that Iraqis (leaving aside the specific problem of Kurdistan, and rest assured I won't leave it aside for long) will lose out if the resources are returned to this so very impressive and capable (in Mr Sternberg's eyes) government? Especially since, in para 19 he has already said: "Few realize that before the program began the Government of Iraq [under the Ba'ath administration - PB] had an ongoing free-food rationing system in the CS for every resident ..." Yes, and if I'm not mistaken it was largely because the rations had become so paltry, under the effect of sanctions, that the Iraqi government were finally obliged to agree to the humiliating terms of the Oil for Food arrangement. So far, then, Mr Sternberg has done little to justify his case that Iraqi citizens (outside the areas of Kurdistan that interest him) are better off under Oil for Food than they would be if sanctions were lifted. On the contrary. Everything he advances suggests that, given the means to do so, the Iraqi government (even the present regime) would enormously improve the quality of life throughout Iraq. Of course he would argue that they already have the means to do so. But to argue that case thoroughly means going into the whole question of what materials are allowed into the country and what are not. He says very little about that. There is a great deal of detail about it on the CASI website and in the discussions on our list but suffice it to say here that there doesn't seem to be much point in having a sanctions regime if it doesn't harm the economy of the country. My reading of the 1990-91 rebuilding was that it was possible because there was still much of the necessary material in the country. Once the material ran out more had to be imported and so the sanctions noose tightened until, eventually, the government had to accept a system (Oil for food) which it had previously rejected because it is designed to humiliate it and to put the Iraqi economy into the hands of its enemies. Now it is certain that the Iraqi government does not want this system to work and so very probable that they are not implementing it as well as they could. While the Kurds do want it to work and are trying to implement it as well as they can. That must make a difference. I have no doubt that it partly, though by no mean wholly, explains the disparity between the performance of Oil for Food in Kurdistan and in the rest of Iraq. Alexander Sternberg says that any government would care first and foremost for the wellbeing of its people; but alas, most governments, like the Iraqi government, care first and foremost for questions of national pride and sovereignty. The British and US governments would like the Iraqi government to adopt the logic of Pierre Laval. The Iraqi government fancies itself as De Gaulle. Alexander Sternberg's strongest argument is that the lifting of sanctions would pose a threat to those areas of Southern Kurdistan/Northern Iraq not under Saddam Hussein's control. Let it be said straightaway that sanctions have done no good whatsoever for those areas of Kurdistan that are under his control, nor for the Shi'i areas in the South. The draining of the marshes (oh so reminiscent of the Turkish Ilisu dam project which our government supported until the Turks ran out of money) has proceeded apace and undoubtedly been all the more brutal in the conditions of Iraq's isolation and relative deprivation. When the oil companies return to Kirkuk it appears that it will no longer be a Kurdish territory. And that too will have been facilitated by Iraq's isolation. And while all this is happening, and everyone knows it is happening, has it ever once occurred to all the indignant Baroness Nicholsons of the world to suggest that the lifting of sanctions could be related to guarantees for the security of the subject peoples of Iraq? And for the Kurds in the not very safe havens? Sanctions have nothing whatsoever to do with their security, as we all discovered in 1995, or was it 1996? It seems from what we are told that, sanctions or no sanctions, the Iraqi army could roll in any time it wants. Presumably they are inhibited by the likelihood of US reprisals, but the lifting of sanctions doesn't mean the removal of the US fleet from the Gulf. And have the 'International Community' done anything to provide a direct territorial defense, or to help the Kurds provide a defense of their own? No. And why not? Well, Mr Sternberg knows more about that than I do, I'm sure, but I imagine Turkey has something to do with it. And why do we have to keep Turkey sweet? To maintain the no-fly zones that do not, and are not intended to, provide much in the way of defense for the Kurds (whom, I might add, we are forcing to co-operate in the process of the suppression of their Turkish brothers - expulsion of peoples, destruction of villages, oh so reminiscent of the policy, more extreme in the circumstances of the Iran/Iraq war, of S.Hussein). But again, if the Iraqi government got hold of its oil money it wouldn't give anything to the Kurds. Fair enough. But again. Why should it not be suggested that a fair deal for the Kurds could be negotiated as part of a lfting of sanctions? There is an answer to that question. Because that would be a deal that the Iraqi government might accept and the US government, which has no interest in the wellbeing of the Kurdish people, do not want to propose any deals that the Iraqi government might accept. Alexander Sternberg comes close to suggesting such a deal when he says (para 15): "If sanctions are lifted, without security guarantees, and without guarantees of a fair share of Iraq¹s public wealth, it could happen all over again." And that is true and requires to be taken very seriously. We need to think about security guarantees and guarantees of a fair share of Iraq's public wealth. What a pity nobody in the US or British government seems to be thinking about these things. I am sure that once the case has been put there would be very few people on our list who would disagree with it. But it isn't an argument against the lifting of sanctions. It is simply an intelligent and serious suggestion as to the manner in which sanctions should be lifted. -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq For removal from list, email soc-casi-discuss-request@lists.cam.ac.uk Full details of CASI's various lists can be found on the CASI website: http://www.casi.org.uk