Not in our names!
NO
MORE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.
THE IRAQI PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED ENOUGH!
International Herald Tribune public statement
What I would say to the US President if I were his advisor on international affairs
by Hans von Sponeck
Dear Mr. President:
Members of the National Security Council are increasingly unanimous in their perception that only a military campaign will end the threat they believe Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Party Government poses to his people, the region and our national security.
As your advisor on international affairs, I consider it my duty to add another perspective.
The Issue
Earlier polarization among governments in the Middle East on how to deal with Iraq has given way to a significantly more unified demand for a political rather than a military solution. Dick Cheney has briefed you on his recent visit to the region. The message from all governments there and from the media has been clear and unequivocal: help us to solve the Palestine conflict; we are with you in the fight against terrorism; we want to see a democratic Iraq as much as you do but we cannot support you in bringing about changes in Iraq through military confrontation. You are aware that Continental Europe and Russia have repeatedly taken similar stands. There is a growing split within the British Labour Party on this issue with over 130 Labour MPs, including cabinet members, cautioning Tony Blair against British support for a US attack against Iraq.
The challenge before you is how to strenghten those forces in the Middle East who want to see an end to confrontation and a return to political stability. The issues involved are statehood for Palestine, finding a way out in the Iraq conflict and the establishment of the Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in accordance with 1991 UN Security Council proposals.
I. Rationale for Action
The carnage and suffering in the Middle East has reached proportions no one ever imagined. Violence in Palestine and Israel and economic sanctions in Iraq have become inseparable from daily life.
You have recently re-assured the international community that you want to see an end to these conditions of suffering and injustice. Your recent statement in Monterrey at the UN Conference on Aid emphasizing that the causes of dissent and inequality must be tackled along with the direct attack on terrorism has been welcomed worldwide. This offers you a rare opportunity to embark on new policy initiatives for international understanding and human security. Promoting peace while fighting terror will give you the double pronged instrument needed to show the kind of leadership the world expects from the United States. Part of this initiative must be to seek a non-military solution to the Iraq conflict.
I would like to explain why I am suggesting such a fundamentally different approach.
Following 11 September, CIA, Defence and State were all intensively involved in intelligence analysis to detect possible links between Iraq and terrorism. Conflicting information was leaked to the public by different parties within our administration.In fact, it has become counter-productive to continue to insist that there have been links between Iraq and Al Qa'ida or other terrorist groups. None of the horrific acts of terrorism involving our embassies in Daresaalam and Nairobi, the Cole in Aden or the World Trade Centre in 1993 or 2001 has been traceable to Iraq. The same applies to the anthrax incidents in which there has been no foreign involvement after all.
Our search for the perpetrators must continue but not at the expense of US credibility. We cannot convince our allies to support a strategy for Iraq on the basis of conjectures and flawed evidence. The same applies to our assessment of Iraq's present capacity to produce WMD. Our concern over the potential threat from Baghdad is justified and shared by our friends. Yet, again, it must not translate into unsubstantiated accusations of the kind the public has heard from many of our officials and read in poorly researched reports. You may remember the report State put out in September 1999 entitled "Saddam Hussein's Iraq". Full of easily refutable contentions about sanctions and disarmament, it became a source of ridicule in the international community, particularly at the UN and, therefore, backfired.
And yet, CIA, Defence and State have done their homework. They know from UNSCOM documents, Butler and other intelligence that qualitatively Iraq has been disarmed. The systems and launching facilities have long been destroyed and Iraq no longer has the capacity to weaponize chemical or biological agents, let alone nuclear devices. You have been told that to do so would require substantial amounts of financial resources, technology and time. Saddam Hussein has had neither of these since the UN arms inspectors were withdrawn by Butler in December 1998, just before Operation Desert Fox , at our suggestion. There are many disarmament experts outside our jurisdiction who can corroborate this reality. As we have not been able to produce any evidence to the contrary, it is no longer in our interest to suggest otherwise. Governments in the region and the public have not forgotten media reports that William Cohen had briefed you on 10 January 2001 that Iraq 'no longer represented a military threat to its neighbors'.
The rationale for action must not be determined by the belief in a historic imperative to finish unfinished business in Iraq or by our fierce dislike for a dictator but by a vision for peaceful conflict resolution in the Middle East from Palestine to Iraq. This is possible, Mr. President.
II. The Options
All of the options presently before you advocate military action against Iraq. These overlook geopolitical realities as they have evolved and identify much too narrow a choice.
Iraq, first of all, can no longer be seen in isolation from the rest of the Middle East. The default of not following through on Camp David has become a historic debt of Sharon and Arafat. Palestine and Iraq cannot be tackled anymore as two entirely separate problems. To speak of the Middle East peace process has become a misnomer if it only refers to the western edge of the region.
Military options may seem plausible here in Washington but lack realism on the ground. If adopted, they would bring new and large scale losses of life and destruction to the Iraqi people including the Kurdish minority. They would also further destabilize the entire region.
As you know, in a previous appointment, I was directly involved with Iraq. I, therefore, know that the advice you have been given that military training and assistance to the Kurdish North and Shia Muslims is not an achievable proposition. You will remember that covert visits by CIA and State to Iraqi Kurdistan have confirmed that neither Massud Barzani nor Jamal Talabani want to be considered as leaders of an advance party of mercenaries for a US expeditionary force. They will not agree that the territory under their control become a northern alliance-type staging area for an attack against Baghdad.
Mr. President, it must also be remembered that this is not 1991. There will not be a coalition force available to us apart from possibly British soldiers. Even this may not materialize given the growing opposition within Britain to a military confrontation with Iraq.
"US forces would not bear the brunt of the fighting but support as necessery the rebel forces…", you were recently told. This means in plain language, that we would supply the superior war technology and others would have to do the actual fighting, at least initially. Were we to proceed in this way, we would be accused of leaving the 'dirty business' to these 'others'. Mr. President, this reflects a 'war by proxy' mentality which has already been severely criticised in our initial Afghanistan operations. Nevertheless, if for no other reasons then the sheer strength of our airforce, we would be successful were we to go ahead with an air offensive. The scale of casualties on the ground, both military and civilian, however, would be very high and could not be justified in the name of a war against a dictator. Particularly, since such a military engagement will not be short and surgical. It will have to be sustained over a long period as some else rightly pointed out to you. I fear, if such a plan is adopted, it will jeopardize your leadership in the fight against terrorism. Body bags, budget deficit and unfulfilled socio-economic expectations at home will influence the electorate; dissent of governments friendly to us and anger within the international public will isolate us further and affect our commitment to enhance global security.
For these reasons, I would submit to you that instead serious consideration be given to another option which I am putting before you as a viable non-military alternative.
III. Considerations
First of all, we must recognize that the policy of economic sanctions which the US has chosen for Iraq since the Gulf War, has not worked. It has severely punished the wrong target, the Iraqi people, and has failed to bring about the political changes we wanted to see in Iraq. Allies and members of the UN Security Council other than the UK have reluctantly gone along with our approach. They are no longer willing to do so when it comes to US plans to find a military solution to the conflict. The just concluded Beirut Summit of Arab Heads of State and the flurry of high level political contacts of Arab governments with senior Iraqi officials following Dick Cheney's visit to the region confirm that there is little support for our present plans. Our staunchest partner in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, is not even willing to let us use the Sultan air base. This has forced Defence to initiate relocation of US Gulf command facilities to Qatar. This does not augur well in proceeding with preparations for war.
IV. A Non-military Option
A shift from the present determination to find a military solution to considering a non-military alternative would constitute a formidable act of statemanship. As the leader of the most powerful democracy, you must be prepared to accept such a challenge. The time is right to do so. After many years, an Arab League Secretary General has travelled to Baghdad earlier this year. What Amr Moussa heard in Baghdad encouraged him to travel to Kuwait and Riad. The Beirut Summit is evidence that the efforts of this able diplomat have paid off. Tension has further eased between the adversaries in the Gulf. We should welcome this development and not play down its significance as did State spokesman Boucher recently. Another positive development has been the visit to Iraq of UN Human Rights Rapporteur Mavromatis in early February. This is the first contact of its kind in over ten years. It has set the stage for a serious review of the human rights situation in Iraq.
Most important of all, you have not opposed the resumption of talks in March between the UN Secretary General and the Iraqi Government. These have been the first meetings between the two sides since February 2001. On this occasion Kofi Annan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri were joined by disarmament experts of both sides. Further consultations are scheduled for later this month. State should be dissuaded to label such meetings a priori as of little value. The Iraqis, we are told, want to discuss with the UN all outstanding issues from missing Kuwaitis to lost Kuwaiti property, economic sanctions and the humanitarian exemption and, of highest priority to us, disarmament and WMD. They had been ready to discuss these issues in February 2001. Unfortunately we blocked the UN Secretary General last year from pursuing this discussion.
The current round of talks should have our full backing. Once Kofi Annan confirms to us that the talks have progressed to the point at which agreement has been reached on cooperation between Iraq and the UN in all areas of concern, the UN Security Council should take over the consultations with the Iraqis. This, again, should have our support. I am confident that Iraq will consider compliance with UN resolutions and allow renewed monitoring and verification of the state of disarmament of non-conventional weapons, if the UN Security Council provides Iraq with an unambiguous time-table for the lifting of economic sanctions and an assurance that UN personnel will not again be misused for intelligence gathering.
I am aware that Defence and State are not convinced that this will bring us closer to a solution. Elsewhere, Mr. President, we have argued that there can be no progress without taking risks. This holds here as well. Taking such an approach would be tangible evidence that our justified demand for the elimination of all WMD in Iraq had not made us insensitive to the suffering of the Iraqi people. It would also restore credibility to the UN Security Council which is seen by many today as a bilaterilized instrument of US foreign policy. Furthermore it would prove all those wrong who seem convinced that the US confrontation with Iraq has become a personalized vendetta of a US President.
Once an 'arms for peace' deal has been agreed and the weapons inspectors have resumed their duties, the difficult process of removing the effects of eleven years of sanctions would begin. I do realize that 'Gulf War veterans' in the administration would not want you to consider any of this. They will see this as a betrayal of a well established US position.They will also tell you that the worst we could do would be to lift the embargo and allow a kickstart of the Iraqi economy. Saddam Hussain, they will say, would immediately use this as an opportunity to bring forward Iraq's WMD program. I would argue that we have all the means to monitor what will happen when sanctions are lifted and we could intervene accordingly.
Incremental progress with the arms inspection should go hand in hand with incremental normalization of the economy. We would expect careful reviews by the UN Security Council as this process unfolds. Contrary to past practice, the Iraqi authorities should be invited to participate in these reviews.
A host of other complex matters would demand our attention. Among these would be how to handle Iraq's large outstanding debts and the need for eventual fresh credits, the overhaul of Iraq's oil industry and agreement on an OPEC quota for Iraq and guarantees of local autonomy for Kurdish areas in northern Iraq, to cite just the major challenges.
IV. Next Steps
The Saudi peace initiative to end the Palestinian/Israeli conflict and early signs of reconciliation from the Gulf seen during the Beirut Summit clearly demonstrate that conditions within the Arab League group of countries have significantly changed. We cannot ignore this unless we want to alienate and isolate ourselves further. This demands a shift in our foreign policy for the region. Part of such a shift must be the adoption of a non-military alternative for dealing with Iraq.
I recommend that 1. you ask a small group of eminent persons to provide you with proposals for a political solution of the Iraq conflict; 2. in view of the urgency, such proposals should be presented to you within a period of six weeks, 3. State conveys to the President of the UN Security Council that you encourage the resumed talks between Kofi Annan and Iraq and that you consider these meetings as a first step towards interaction between Iraq and the UN Security Council itself, 4. a similar message be sent to the Secretary General of the Arab League confirming US support for Arab League sponsored mediation between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, 5. once the UN Security Council and Iraq have reached agreement on arms inspection, State would announce our agreement to the lifting of economic sanctions, 6. State would also agree with the UN Security Council that the military embargo would be maintained. It would apply to the potential buyer, Iraq, as well as to potential arms suppliers, 7. the US would lend its full support to the revival of the UN arms register, 8. State would make early arrangements to replace the three Polish diplomats who are presently staffing the US interest section in Baghdad with our own diplomats to ensure that we can directly follow developments on the ground, 9. State would coordinate consultations with the EU governments, Russia and China as well as governments in the region and eventually Iraq to begin preparations for a post-sanction normalization process. .
Mr. President, I realize that I have put before you an option which runs counter to all the advice you have been given since you assumed your office. The need for peace and stability in a region which has suffered so severely and my belief that the US can and must do something about it are the justifications for these proposals.
H.C. von Sponeck is a former
UN Assistant Secretary General and
Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq