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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony

August 1, 2002 Thursday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 6282 words

COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEADLINE: MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ

TESTIMONY-BY: DR. PHEBE MARR, AUTHOR

AFFILIATION: SPECIALIST ON IRAQ

BODY:

Statement of Dr. Phebe Marr (Author, Specialist on Iraq)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

August 1, 2002

The purpose of my testimony is to provide a snapshot of what we can expect in Iraq after Saddam, should the US be successful in achieving his fall. Obviously, the means and manner of removing the regime will affect the aftermath: a relatively quick transition with a minimum of bloodshed and destruction will provide one set of circumstances; a more prolonged and destructive military operation will produce a less favorable outcome. It also matters whether the change is accomplished from within, by Iraqis, or requires a direct US military effort. Rather than dealing with the means, however, which is not my area of expertise. I would like to focus on a general political and social picture of Iraq; what we should be prepared to find in Iraq the day after, and, in particular, two key issues that will be critical for US policy and planning in post-Saddam Iraq. The first is the potential for fragmentation or fracturing, once Saddam's regime is decapitated, and, along with it, the potential for outside interference from Iraq's neighbors. The second is the issue of providing alternative political leadership for Iraq, the nature of that leadership, and the implications of the choice for Iraq's future and US policy aims.

Replacement of Iraq's leadership is a serious and ambitious project. It is a difficult foreign policy decision for the US, in part, because its potential benefits, both to Iraqis at home and to the security of the region, are high. But so, too, are the possible costs as well as unintended consequences which cannot be calculated. If the US embarks on this project, it needs to be prepared to fulfill its responsibilities, and see it through to an acceptable outcome, including a potential long-term military and political commitment to assure a stable and more democratic government. If it is not prepared to do so, the intended benefits could vanish.

Fragmentation

Iraq is a multi-ethnic. multi-sectarian country, with boundaries imposed by foreign powers at the time of its formation in 1920. Its three main demographic components, the Kurdish speaking population in the north (c. 17 percent); the Arab shi'ah population in the south (c. 60%) and the Arab sunnis in the center (c.15-20%) have coexisted over the past 80 years. and, to varying degrees, have participated in the process of building both a state and a nation. As with most such states, that process, while well underway, is still incomplete. Under the current regime, the state is controlled by a narrowly based Arab sunni minority, using the mechanism of repression to enforce its rule over all communities. except for a portion of the Kurdish population in the north, where its rule does not run.' Hence the fear that if the regime is removed, the country will fragment into its ethnic and sectarian components. How accurate is that assessment?

First, it is very unlikely, indeed inconceivable, that Iraq will "break up" into three relatively cohesive components: a Kurdish north; a shi'i south; and an Arab sunni center. None of these three communities is homogenous or shows any ability to unite under any leadership. Second, there is substantial mixture of these communities in many cities- especially in Baghdad and the center--but also in other cities in the north and south, making separation difficult. In some areas, other minorities such as Turcomen and Christian communities form substantial components of the population. Third, while some Kurds may have aspirations for independence, they are unlikely to achieve it, and many others would be comfortable in a more democratic Iraqi state. The shi'ah have never expressed separatist aspirations. Indeed, both Arab shi'ah and Arab sunnis, as well as some Kurds, have a strong desire the keep the state together and to profit from its ample resources.

However, the removal of the current regime in Baghdad, under certain circumstances, could result in a "break-down" of the central government, and its inability to exercise control over the country'. to maintain law and order; and to move the country and its institutions in the direction desired by the US. There are two dangers here. The first is short term. If firm leadership is not in place in Baghdad "the day after" Saddam is removed, retribution, score settling, and bloodletting, especially in urban areas, could take place. For example, the shi'ah in the poor Baghdad townships of al-Thawrah and alShu'alah. recent migrants from the south and over a million strong, could cross the Tigris and attack the more affluent sunni districts. such as al-'Adhamiyyah, a fear often expressed by the sunni residents of Baghdad. One a broader scale, without firm government, parochial interests could take over, both in the north and south and in the center. The Kurds, for instance, could seize Kirkuk, with its oil fields, establishing a new reality in the north. Arab sunni clans, who control military units, might struggle for power in Baghdad. The shi'ah party, SCIRI (The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), located in Tehran, could send units of its Iraqi Badr brigade across the border and attempt to seize the initiative in southern shi'i towns, repeating the mistakes made in the 1991 rebellion. Such a collapse of authority could trigger interference from neighbors. Turkey could intervene in the north to prevent refugee flows and to exert control over events in Kurdistan. Iran, through proxies, could follow suit. There could be a reverse flow of refugees, as Iraqi shi'ah exiles from Iran return home in the tens of thousands, destabilizing areas of the south.

'Over the longer term, if a new government in Baghdad fails to take hold, if it is not more inclusive of Iraq's communities, and more acceptable to its population; if a uniform rule of law cannot be established, Iraq could slip into the category of a failed state, unable to maintain control over its territory and its borders. The situation in the north of Iraq is an example. The Kurdish area is not unified; it is divided between the two major Kurdish parties. Neither has real control over its borders, and in the northeast, one party has lost control of an enclave along the Iranian border, dominated by Islamist parties and penetrated by Iran and other influences, possibly including terrorists. While the situation is not yet a serious problem, it serves as a metaphor for what could happen to Iraq as a whole, in the absence, over the long term, of a stable, legitimate government in Baghdad.

Iraq has been a state for over 80 years and for most of that time has had a tradition of strong, central government. The chief thrust of every government since its founding has been state formation and the creation of a nation from the diverse elements within its boundaries. In the process, a sense of Iraqi identity has developed among the majority of its population, particularly in relationship to their neighbors; most Iraqis, with the possible exception of some of the Kurdish population, want the unity and territorial sovereignty of their state maintained. At various times within Iraqi history, the central government has been more inclusive of its various communities, with a better balance among ethnic and sectarian components. But that sense of identity has eroded under the Ba'th, particularly since the rebellion of 1991, which was a defining moment for Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities. The sense of Iraqi identity is still there today, but it is weaker than at any time since 1945. (See attached map)

The Kurds:The Kurdish community in the north has been governing itself for a decade, in an arc of territory which runs from Zakhu in the north to Hajj 'Umran in the east to Sulaymaniyyah in the south. Much, but not all, of this territory is protected by US and UK over flights in the No Fly Zone north of the 36 '" parallel. (Kurdish self-rule is also due to the withdrawal of Iraqi government troops and administration from the zone.) While the Kurdish leadership is realistic about its prospects for independence (they are nil) and willing to live within Iraq under a federal arrangement which gives them a large measure of autonomy, their aspirations for self-government and their Kurdish identity have increased over this period. In the post Saddam period, it will be more difficult to integrate the Kurdish community into Iraq. For example, Kurdish, naturally enough, is now the language used in administration and taught in schools in the north. As a result, the Kurdish facility in Arabic, taught as a second language in the schools, has weakened among the younger generation and may make it more difficult for them to participate in national life. Despite numerous trials and tribulations, the Kurds have managed to establish a fairly respectable level of government in the north, far freer than that which exists in the south. But they have not done so without consistent support, intervention, and prodding from the West, and Western military protection.

Moreover, the problems of the Kurds may provide a metaphor for Iraq as a whole after Saddam. After Saddam's withdrawal from the north in 1992, the Kurds held a relatively free election with a view to establishing a unified regional government in the north. As is well known, the Kurdish movement was dominated by two major parties, with well established leadership and organization: the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) under Mas'ud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani. There were other political parties. including some Islamic groups (most notably the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), as well as strong tribal elements (such as the Baradostis, the Surchis, and others) who competed for a share of leadership. The Kurdish region also included a substantial Turkish speaking population (Turcomen), some 500.000 and smaller groups of Christians Nvho sought representation. But the political process was dominated by the two main parties, who between them split the vote almost evenly. (The KDP won two seats more in parliament.) But the election result was finally decided in a personal power sharing agreement between the two leaders. The power sharing arrangement was a formula for stalemate and eventually broke down. By the mid- 1990s, both parties were engaged in a virtual civil war, which lasted for several years, resulted in several thousand deaths, and substantial displacement of the local population.

The conflict ended by splitting the area they governed in two. Indeed, the intervention of the US was required to end the fighting. The KDP is now in control of the north western region, with its headquarters in Irbil; the PUK in the southeastern portion, with its headquarters in Sulaymaniyyah. Both have weak-- almost non-existent--control over their borders with Turkey and Iran. In the interim, the more radical PKK (Kurdistan Workers party), the Kurdish nationalist movement of Turkey, intruded its presence into Iraq along the northern frontier with Turkey, forming a force hostile to Turkey, as well as the KDP. While the activism of the PKK has subsided since the imprisonment of its leader, "Appo" Ocalon, Turkish military incursions across the Iraqi border, have been frequent, and sometimes massive and prolonged, over the past decade. Indeed, Turkish political intrusion into northern Iraq, and its manipulation of the Iraqi Turcomen community, as well as other Kurdish groups, indicate Turkish concern for the Kurdish issue and its ability and willingness to intervene to protect its interests.

Meanwhile, the east, the PUK has been challenged by various Kurdish Islamic groups, especially the IMIK, who had established a foothold in territory along the Iranian border, particularly in the towns of Halabjah, and Panjwin. These groups fought with the PUK, which was eventually pushed out of this territory. It is this area which has recently been in the news as a "no man's land", home to newer Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as the Jund alIslam, which have been accused of ties to terrorist groups and of recent attacks on the PUK leadership. The absence of firm PUK control over this territory, on the border with Iran, provides a sanctuary for forces hostile to the Kurds--and the West--as well as for Iranian meddling. Like Turkey, Iran has intervened across the border on numerous occasions in the past decade. It has supported the PUK, with forces, in its struggle with the KDP, including the conflict which resulted in an attack by Saddam Husayn on the north (in support of the KDP) which helped put an end to the INC stronghold in the north. It has supported Islamic groups in the border areas and elsewhere in the north.

The two Kurdish parties are reconciled to coexistence, at the moment, but this could break down in the future under pressure. In the absence of clear direction from outside, or from Baghdad, competition for resources and power could invite conflict, with potential for intrusion once again from Turkey and Iran. It should be noted that there are other potential political players in the north, including some tribal leaders, who were once part of Saddam's militia. Recently some have formed a loose alliance with Arab tribes in and around Mosul, with a view to helping in regime replacement. The Kurds also have a professional middle class, capable of administration, but without clear direction in terms of where the Kurds are going in the future, the parties have not been able to entice their exile community home. In fact, there has been a considerable brain drain. Moreover, although the Kurds have a local militia, the peshmerga, possibly numbering from 50,000 to 70,000, they cannot maintain border security, or defend against Baghdad or their neighbors. They are dependent on the restraint of their neighbors and protection, ultimately, from the US. The Kurdish model in the north, while containing many salutary features, has succeeded only where the US has been willing to intervene and exercise some responsibility. When the US has stepped back, the Kurdish experiment has faltered.

Shi'ah

The shi'ah population of the south has been in a constant state of decline over the past two decades. It was hit hard from the Iran-Iraq war which saw major fighting near a number of cities; the shelling of Basra; the shut down much of its oil industry and its ports; and the closure of the Shatt al-'Arab, its main artery to the Gulf. It then took the major brunt of the Second Gulf War, which was fought in the area. Even more important was the shi'i rebellion of 1991 and its brutal repression by the regime. This rebellion, which spread through all of the major shi'i cities and towns of the south, revealed the extent of shi'i disaffection for the regime. and the fear and distrust of the regime for the shi'i population. (The same was true for the Kurdish rebellion in the north.) The death toll in that rebellion has been estimated at at least 30,000. While the central government has restored control over the cities of the south, constant unrest and continuous, though ineffective, attacks on roads and government and party installations indicate a cowed but sullen and alienated population.

There has been some economic revival under the oil-forfood program, but in general the south has been neglected, while Baghdad and the "sunni center" has benefited. One evidence of this is the decline in the population of Basra. Once Iraq's second city and its major port, Basra is now fifth in size and greatly reduced in influence. Another evidence is the growth of the Iraqi exile population in Iran, variously estimated at anywhere from 250,000 to 1 million., many of them forcibly deported from Iraq by the regime, and still others who have fled repression. The draining of the marsh areas of the south by the regime in an effort to remove a refuge for dissidents, is another indication of the depth of distrust between the shi'i community and the government.

Nonetheless, despite this alienation, the shi'ah inside Iraq, unlike the Kurds, have no discernible local leadership or organization to support their efforts. The most notable shi'i opposition organization is SCIRI (The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), but it is headquartered in Tehran and is largely controlled by Iran. This organization, established in 1982, was originally intended to be an umbrella for various Iraqi shi'i organizations committed to an Islamic government in Iraq, but despite its organizational growth since that time, it has suffered from splits and defections, and has essentially become a vehicle for the leadership of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, a cleric from a well known Iraqi clerical family. SCIRI has a military arm, the so-called Badr Brigade, of about 4,000 or 5,000 foot soldiers ready to cross the border. However, SCIRI suffers from serious difficulties. It labors (indeed chafes) under the domination of Iran, and the suspicion and distrust this engenders among shi'ah in Iraq. Moreover, the main constituency for SCIRI is the Iraqi exile community in Iran; it is not clear how much support SCIRI or its shi'i Islamic agenda has among shi'ah in Iraq. In 1991, when SCIRI sent forces into Iraq during the rebellion, raising Hakim's picture and shi'i Islamic slogans, the move backfired, turning a number of potential supporters against the revolt. The clerical leadership of the shi'ah, centered in Najaf and Karbala' is usually its strongest source of leadership, but the regime has systematically executed or assassinated most of

its leading members in the last decade, greatly weakening the shi'i religious establishment. While the pilgrimage traffic with Iran has been reopened, it is carefully controlled by Baghdad. In fact, the shi'i seminaries have declined and the repression visited on these cities during and after the 1991 rebellion, where fighting was fierce, has been severe. The emergence of charismatic clerical leadership among the shi'ah cannot be ruled out in the future, but at the moment there is none on the horizon.

In recent years, the regime has strengthened tribal influence and leadership in the south (and elsewhere) especially among the Arab tribes and clans from which it might expect support in return for benefits. While this support is thin and based on calculations of interest, tribes or more properly clans, with their built-in kinship constituencies, may provide a potential source of leadership among the shi'ah in the future. While tribal leaders are good at rebelling, however, they are notoriously poor at constructing governments.

The Arab shi'ah of Iraq are a large, diverse and heterogeneous population. A substantial educated middle class lives in Baghdad and other cities and many work for the government. This population has never unified behind a shi'i cause, and there is now no leadership or organization in Iraq which could accomplish anything this purpose. However, the repression of the past two decades; the deepening alienation from a sunni dominated government; and economic deprivation and neglect have unquestionably deepened a sense of shi'i identity. There is, however, no expressed desire for separation or self-government; rather shi'ah clearly want a greater--indeed dominan-- share of power in Baghdad, commensurate with their numbers. In any future government, they are unlikely to accept continued sunni dominance. Their problem will be their inability to field domestic leaders and organizations to further their interests and their aims in any new political dispensation.

The Center: The Issue of Alternative Leadership

It is generally assumed that if new political leadership is to emerge inside Iraq, it will have to come from the Center. That term can be construed as political, to denote the central government in Baghdad, but is it is also used in a geographic and demographic sense to refer to the "Arab sunni triangle" which stretches from Baghdad to Mosul and to the borders of Syria and Jordan in the West. This region includes the small, but growing, cities and towns of the Tigris and Euphrates valley north and west of Baghdad, dominated by Arab sunnis (often with strong tribal and clan ties) from which the regime recruits its leadership. (Baghdad, with a population of over 4 million, has an Arab shi'ah majority and substantial numbers of Kurds. Turcoman, and Christian communities, as well as Arab sunnis.)

The issue of alternative political leadership is critical, indeed, probably "the" critical issue in the post-Saddam period, and needs to be addressed. If new leadership is to come from "inside" Iraq, it is fair to say that there at present there is no visible alternative leadership. There may be a number of potential leaders--from within the military, the clan structure, the educated elite--but they cannot emerge and demonstrate their leadership under this regime. Numerous coup attempts have been made but all have been cut down. Hence we can speculate on sources of leadership, but it is not clear what capacity putative leaders would have or what constituencies they could mobilize. One conclusion may be drawn, however. If leadership emerges from inside the regime--or its support system--the change this leadership will bring--in orientation, political culture and even foreign policy--may be too little to be supported by the bulk of the population or to meet US demands and expectations. For example, will a sunni general, raised and trained under the Ba'th, be willing to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction? Will he and the centrist coalition he may assemble be friendly to the US government? Above all, will such leadership be acceptable to Kurds, shi'ah, and even educated sunni civilians who are hoping for real change and more inclusiveness? Will he be able to mobilize sufficient support to keep law and order, or will a struggle for power erode his control at the center?

The outside opposition, on the other hand, has a multitude of leaders who have been vying with one another for years. The key figures and groups are fairly well known in Washington. These include Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iran National Congress, originally an umbrella group that included a number of opposition organizations, but is now mainly a vehicle for his leadership; Sharif'Ali, a member of the Hashimite family, advocating a constitutional monarch; the Iraq National Accord, led by Ayad Allawi, and composed of many ex-Ba'thists claiming to have ties and contacts with army officers and Ba'thists inside; SCIRI, the main shi'ah component, already mentioned; various individual generals who have defected over the years, and the two Kurdish parties who are already in control of their own real estate in the north. The main problems with the outside opposition are clear.

They have been competing and squabbling for years, and have been unable to coalesce, even around a mainstream candidate such as Ahmed Chalabi. Most have narrow constituencies, and little or no organization inside. The Kurds, the strongest component, do have organization, some military force, and a strong constituency in the north of Iraq. But the Kurds are unable, and unwilling, to take on a leadership role in Baghdad. To the contrary. The two Kurdish parties, and in particular the KDP, have illustrated time and again that their main aim is self-government in the north; not greater control or even change in Baghdad. The weaknesses and political liabilities of SCIRI have already been dealt with. As for the other groups, their main difficulty is that they are outside Iraq, and it is not clear what, if any, constituencies they have inside. Their main constituency is, in fact, inWashington.

This raises a policy paradox. Many of the outside opposition leaders have demonstrated leadership skills (Ahmed Chalabi, for example). They are westernized, and generally support US aims, including the elimination of WMD. They are more familiar with western democratic processes and are most likely to bring change in Iraq. But they will have to be put in by the US. and will likely have to be supported by us over some considerable period, if the changes they--and we--envisage are to be maintained. And as western supported elements; their legitimacy will soon be questioned.

The outside leadership--its benefits and pitfalls--are accessible and well known to us. It is the potential "inside" leadership that is most uncertain. To understand where this leadership may emerge, it is worth taking a look at what we will find, once Saddam and his inner circle are removed.

The Iraqi regime today is supported by three pillars: a kin and clan network that dominates security, the military and the decision-making apparatus; broader based institutions (the Ba'th Party, military organizations, the bureaucracy): an economic "mafia", backed by state controlled resources.

The kin and clan network. Saddam has maintained power largely by placing his own tribe and clan(the Albu Nasr/ Begat) in key decision making, security and military positions. (For all intents and purposes these two groups are synonymous). The Albu Nasr, hailing from the area around Tikrit, probably number only about 25,000, with several thousand active members available for political recruitment, but they have gradually come to occupy the strategic heights of the political system. Allied with them are a numerous, neighboring clan and tribal groupings--the Duris, the Tikritis, the Juburis, the Ubaidis, and the larger tribal confederation of the Dulaim. Almost all are Arab sunni and overwhelmingly come from the cities and towns of the Arab sunni triangle. Numerous studies have focused on this phenomenon, charting the numbers and kinds of positions occupied by these clan groups; intermarraige between and among key political families; and the relationship of various members to Saddam's own extended family. All point to one overwhelming trend. Beneath a facade of modern institutions--a political part, a military and a bureaucracy--an ever thickening network of kin and clan relations has governed the country, deeply penetrating leading institutions, especially the military. One author has posed a hierarchy of clans, led by the Begat, and followed by the Tikritis, the Duris, and the Dulaimis, and shown how they dominate the military." As kin and clan relations have grown, these primordial ties have come to replace ideology and party organization as the glue that holds the regime--and the government together. In the countryside as well, tribal leadership and organization has come to play an increasing role in providing local government services. This net work has been referred to as ahl althigah (the people you can trust)

Even when Saddam's immediate family and the core of his supporters are removed, these clan groups will remain, and so too will the kinship ties that bind them. Alternative leadership may, indeed, rise from related clans--some of whom have already attempted coups--imbedded in the military or even the security system. In this case, the leadership is bound to be Arab sunni, and a key issue is whether such a leader will be willing or able to go beyond clan politics; whether we will simply get another clan in power; and above all, whether such a change will be acceptable to the non-sunni population and the urban, educated middle class that functions outside the clan system.

The Institutions of State The second pillar of the regime rests on the institutions of state: the Ba'th Party, the various components of the military, the bureaucracy and the educational establishment. These are recruited from a broader base and include both shi'ah and Kurds as well as other communities. At secondary levels, these institutions are peopled by educated professionals; they constitute the ahl al-khibrah (the people with expertise) or the technocrats. Some are potential pools of future leadership.

The Ba'th Party has a narrow- cadre at the top but a broad base at the bottom. Full party members may constitute no more than 25,000, but applicants and candidate members may number a million. While the party's importance has diminished as the power of Saddam's family has risen, its main fiinction as a mechanism of recruitment and mobility (joining the party is essential for advancement in most professions); indoctrination at a mass level; and enforcement of regime demands is still intact. While commitment to ideology is no longer dominant, the upper levels of the cadre are infused with a sense of elitism and entitlement that comes from enjoying the privileges of rule. While the party organization is not likely to survive Saddam's collapse, much of the party cadre--which populates most institutions needed to run the state--will. While few will remain loyal to Saddam and his family, deeply ingrained attitudes toward power and authority will persist. So, too, will the strong nationalist attitudes that have been the backbone of Ba'thist ideology.

The military is not a single institution. The regular army is an institution as old as the state and is probably the military component with the greatest sense of independence and distance from the regime. Unfortunately, it is also the weakest having suffered the greatest from war, sanctions and attrition. The Republican Guard units are fewer, more carefully recruited, and, presumably more loyal to the regime. They are better trained and tougher. However, despite their privileges, many may welcome a change of regime. Within the RG, as is well known, are the units critical to regime survival--the Special Republican Guard, deployed to protect Baghdad, and the Special Security Organization and the Protection unit--designed to protect Saddam Husain and his WMD. The latter three units--dominated by his family and clan are not only likely to remain loyal but to tie their survival to his. Republican Guard members and officers in Regular Army units may well provide alternative leadership, but here the question will be, how much change they would bring and how willing they would be to embrace US requirements.

The Bureaucracy and the Educational Establishment will inevitably provide leadership for any new regime, but only at secondary levels; they are unlikely to provide the necessary leadership at the top political levels. They do not have the muscle to affect a change, and they both represent a cadre that is used to obeying orders, not giving them. The education establishment, in particular, has been Ba'thized, including teacher training even at elementary levels. However, it is important to emphasize that, despite a decade of sanctions, and a deterioration of economic, social and intellectual life, Iraq still possesses an educated, professional middle class--embedded in the bureaucracy and in higher education--capable of running the state. Many members of this class--those in the middle to late 40s or older may be educated in the West and familiar with Western ways. A larger number may have been educated in Iraq in "Saddam University", a college system designed to pick the best students, vetted for loyalty, and train them for elite positions, in government and the professions. Both cadres can be expected to be competent, disciplined and culturally Westernized. (A younger generation, it should be noted, are turning to Islam, so this may not be true of the next generation). This bureaucracy can be used by whatever political leadership is installed; indeed, it will have to be used, but it may need several years of redirection and even reeducation.

The Economic Elite The third pillar of the regime is the economic elite, often referred to as an economic "mafia". It is a product of the state's control over oil and other resources, which it distributes through a patronage system, controlled by Saddam's family and clan. But the largesse is spread into all communities, tying important Kurdish, shi'ah, and sunni elements to the regime. Most are contractors who owed their wealth to government patronage; a smaller number are industrialists. While this group can provide the support, the contacts and some of the know-how to revive the economy, it cannot be expected to provide alternative political leadership. In fact, it is not a true private sector independent of the state. Indeed, one of the best changes that could be introduced would be to separate this economic class from the state, and to move toward the creation of a true, and more independent, private sector.

This brief survey on what we can expect in Iraq the day after, leads to the following conclusions, albeit tentative:

- In the past decade, Iraq's sense of national identity has eroded, but it has not disappeared. Kurdish aspirations for self government, shi'ah self-awareness and even Arab sunni identity have increased. In any new political order, few Iraqis will be willing to tolerate a continuance of rule by a narrowly based Arab sunni minority, like the present regime. The good news is that after years of repression, Iraqis are ready for change; they seek preservation of their state and its future development as a nation. However, they have had no experience of democracy; only of a mukhabarat (secret police) state, which has created distrust, corruption and bitterness among communities. The building blocks of democracy will have to be created, including a reorientation of attitudes and practices, and this will take time.

- Without firm authority at helm the "day after", and a clear enunciation of future constitutional procedures pointing to new directions, retribution and a struggle for power are likely in the short teen. Erosion of the central authority could, in a worst case scenario, allow parochial interests to emerge in the north and the south. This will induce meddling and interference from neighbors, most likely Iran and Turkey.

- Providing alternative political leadership, and the process by which it is installed, is the most critical and difficult problem faced by the US as an outside power.

- A "coup" or change of government from within--absent US forces on the ground--is the scenario most likely to be destabilizing. While this is the least expensive option for the US in terms of troops and political investment, it could lead to a struggle for power in Baghdad and the erosion of central control, and a gradual "break down' of national unity. Inside leadership is most likely to move against Saddam if it decides the US is serious about occupation but it will need US support to prevent fracturing.

- If the US is unsure of the new leadership or unsatisfied because it appears too close to the previous regime, a period of probing and exploration could ensue, during which the US will have to make demands before providing support and recognition. In the interim the US could lose control of the situation. Identifying potential inside leaders and making US requirements clear and public, before hand, would help avoid this slippery slope.

- Introducing the outside opposition as alternative leadership would produce the most change inside Iraq in the direction the US desires. But this is the most difficult and most costly option. This opposition lacks clear indigenous support; the US would have to be prepared to install and support this opposition with troops, over a considerable period of time.

- If the US finds itself in occupation of Iraq, it will have the best opportunity, in the short term, to provide law and order, prevent retribution; and begin the processes by which Iraqis (both those outside and those inside) can refashion their political system and move toward democratic reforms. Most Iraqis would welcome that prospect, but it represents an expensive, long term commitment by the US over several years, and some troops on the ground, preferable in conjunction with allies. And before too long, if the US is not careful, it will be viewed as a foreign occupier by those inside and outside. Thus, the institution of new leadership and the procedures for establishing a new government, need to be fairly expeditious. After a short period (six months) a US--even and international presence--could be greatly reduced. Nonetheless, if the US is determined to replace the regime, it is better that it take a firm hand in the beginning to help in providing the building blocs for a new, more democratic regime; support its efforts; and plan to keep some forces and a strong advisory team in place to assure the new regime gets a solid footing.

- Among the steps needed will be:

-Removal of the of security system and the training of a new police force Establishing a new system of justice

-Re-education and redirection of the bureaucracy

Assembly of a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution Developing the building blocks of civil society (a.free press, civic Institutions, reform of education)

- Iraq has a military and a bureaucracy on which the US can rely to provide defense and help develop the country, but as this list of tasks indicates, it will require considerable effort to reorganize and reshape Iraq's institutions in the desired direction. This is no small, or short term task. If the US is going to take the responsibility for removing the current leadership, it should assume that it cannot get the results it wants "on the cheap". It must be prepared to devote some troops on the ground, advisors to help create new institutions, and above all time and effort in the future to see the project through to a satisfactory end.

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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony

August 1, 2002 Thursday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 3504 words

COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEADLINE: MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ

TESTIMONY-BY: REND RAHIM FRANCKE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

AFFILIATION: IRAQ FOUNDATION

BODY:

Statement of Rend Rahim Francke Executive Director, Iraq Foundation Washington, DC

United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee

August 1, 2002

Three premises underlie this paper:

1. That the U.S. will have a decisive role, unprecedented since World War II, to influence the outcome in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and has a correspondingly large responsibility to use its power for the good

2- That what we achieve or fail to achieve in Iraq will have a profound and enduring affect on the region

3-To the extent that the United States declares itself for democracy, and not merely change, in Iraq, it will gain the trust and cooperation of the Iraqi people.

Once the regime of Saddam Hussein is removed from power, there will be a historic opportunity to remake Iraq out of the ashes of 30 years of brutality, domestic and foreign wars, nightmare weapons, and economic collapse. But this requires a commitment from the United States and the international community to a process of nation-building in Iraq. The commitment should not be of a purely military nature-it is just as important civilian, institutional, and economic, but it must be sustained.

The situation on the day after

It is impossible to predict with precision what will happen on the day after the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, what some are calling D-Day-plus-one. Nevertheless, certain factors will derive the situation in the country:

First, Iraqis will welcome the United States as the liberator, and many will join U.S. forces in dismantling the regime's edifice. Iraqi military officers, once they are certain of the regime's demise, will want to show that they too are on board, and will defect with their troops. But the welcome will be coupled with a sense of apprehension and expectation: What will the Americans do, and what do they intend for Iraq? It is essential to assure Iraqis that the United States come to Iraq as a liberator and friend, and not as occupying force, and that the United States bears the message of freedom and democracy.

Second, the humanitarian crisis will become acute, as the disruption of distribution systems, population displacements and destroyed infrastructure leave people without access to food, water, and medical resources. There will be civilian casualties to take care of at a time when hospitals, roads and electricity are unavailable. Oil production may be interrupted for weeks, causing shortages inside Iraq and affecting the international energy markets.

Third, the system of law and order will break down, endangering public safety and putting people at risk of personal reprisals. There will be no police force, no justice system, no civil service and no accountability. In this confusion, people will be inclined to take justice into their own hands.

Fourth, there will be a vacuum of authority and an intense jockeying for power. Senior officials who fear retribution will take flight or remain in hiding. Others, including military officers, clan leaders, mid-level civilian officials, and scattered remnants of the old regime will vie for positions, and will want to ingratiate themselves with the U.S. forces to obtain political recognition and secure a role in the aftermath.

Fifth, several of Iraq's neighbors may attempts to influence the process of change and to pre-position themselves to take advantage of the outcome.

It is equally important to know what will not happen, and to dispel some common myths about Iraq. One myth is that Iraq will break apart into mini-states, that the Kurds and the Shi'a will secede, and that parts of Iraq will be taken over by, or join, Turkey and Iran. This myth was spun in 1991 principally to keep Saddam Hussein in power. and indeed Saddam may be the biggest perpetrator of this falsehood. Iraq will not split apart. Iraqi Kurds have spared no effort or words to reassure the world that they see themselves as part of Iraq and have no intention of seeking independence. The Shi'a identify themselves as quintessentially Iraqi, as Iraqis first and everything else second. All Iraqi groups have publicly committed themselves to the territorial unity and integrity of a future democratic Iraq.

A second myth that needs debunking is that Iraq will irrupt in civil war. Iraq has never had a civil war on the Balkan or Afghan model. With the exception of sporadic Kurdish conflict in the mid 1990s, inter-communal fighting among Iraqis is virtually non- existent in Iraqi history. The established pattern in Iraq is for the government to oppress communities and individuals, and for communities to retaliate against the government, and not against each other. Furthermore, there is no tradition of warlords and armed private militias in Iraq's history, as there was in Afghanistan or in Lebanon. To anticipate civil war in Iraq is to ignore or misrepresent modern Iraqi history.

For 30 years, Saddam Hussein's regime has inflicted wounds on the Iraqi people. Saddam has been liberal and equitable in his oppression. It is not only the Kurds and the Shi'a who have been persecuted; Iraqis from all social and political groups have suffered injustice and disenfranchisement. Iraq's urban middle classes, its professionals and intelligentsia, Rave been crushed, and no forms of civil society exist in Iraq. All these groups, and every individual Iraqi, seek restitution, recognition and participation in a new political order after the fall of Saddam Hussein. There is an overwhelming desire for freedom among Iraqis. They want justice, representation, accountable government, freedom from fear, freedom to speak out, and security for themselves and their families from the thugs of a lawless state. Iraqis want everything that is summed up in the single word democracy.

First priorities

Iraq will need everything in a post-Saddam period, and the United States must be willing to accept a nation-building role, assisted by other countries and national and international organizations. In some respects, Afghanistan is a case study in what not to do. The United States cannot take the path of least resistance and regard Iraq exclusively as a military campaign, to be quickly wrapped up. For both Iraqis and the United States, this must be a fight not just against Iraq's past, but also for its future.

The immediate, day one, priorities in Iraq will be:

(a) restoring law and order and preventing vigilantism (b) addressing humanitarian needs

(c) dismantling the old regime's weapons of mass destruction

In a slightly longer time-frame of no more than a few weeks, there will be additional priorities:

(a) eradicating the remnants of old regime institutions, including the several security and paramilitary organizations created to safeguard the regime

(b) ensuring the capture of leaders of the old regime, with the expectation of indictment and prosecution

(c) restoring the infrastructure of vital economic sectors (d) training an Iraqi police force

(e) restructuring the civil service (f) kick-starting the economy

These tasks will present formidable challenges of manpower, organization and command responsibility. With the collapse of the institutions of the old regime, the civil service and the police force necessary for dealing with emerging crises will be dysfunctional. For a country of 22 million, tens of thousands of people have to be mobilized to carry out the functions of distribution, communication, management and law enforcement. The old security apparatus of Saddam's regime must be neutralized and put out of commission. In its place, an adequate police force will have to be trained or re-trained. The old power structure that ran the country can no longer be allowed to continue, and the civil service will have to be reconstituted under new authority. There should be preparations of the prosecution of leaders of the old regime.

The Iraqi economy has been devastated, and Iraqis have lived in deprivation for the past 12 years. Per capita gross domestic product in Iraq is estimated between $1,500-2,500 per year, having dropped from over $15,000 in 1990. In moderately developed countries, this figure is $25,000. An important task for the U.S. from the start is to regenerate the Iraqi economy, create employment opportunities and provide a visible improvement in the standard of living as quickly as possible. To this end, the United States should announce a Marshall plan for Iraq even before the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, and proceed to put it in place once there is a change of regime as an inseparable part of the reconstruction of Iraq. This is the single most important gesture of good will that the United States can offer, and will win the trust of Iraqis desperate for economic relief.

The United States must take a major role in addressing these immediate and mediumterm needs. The United States will have troops at hand, but will also need a large contingent of civilians both from the United States and other countries who are experienced in crisis situations and institution-building. With the passage of time it will be vitally important for Iraqis to perceive the United States as a benign presence, a problem-solver and guardian of their interests, rather than merely as a military police.

Still, no matter how many American and foreign troops and civilians enter Iraq, Iraqi participation will be indispensable and decisive. For political and practical considerations, the United States will need to work with an Iraqi structure of authority to meet public security and humanitarian emergencies effectively. Therefore, the US should not allow an Iraqi vacuum of authority to endure, but must ensure that an Iraqi governing structure emerges rapidly. By necessity, the US will have to identify and deal with Iraqis who can step in to manage the country in partnership with the United States, its allies and international organizations. The sooner the United States identifies its Iraqi partners, the easier it will be to deal with the challenges of the day after. Who can the Unites States turn to in Iraq?

Traditional options for succession

The United States will have the responsibility of determining which Iraqi partners it can work with, and who can best govern and administer the country through a transition period. The choices that the US makes will reflect several factors: how well the US understands Iraqi political society; what the US thinks about Iraq's future and the future of the Middle East; how the US calculates its long term interests in the region; and how strong a commitment the US is prepared to make towards helping Iraqis build their future.

In the months following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the options for leadership within Iraq will be limited. After 30 years of repression, execution or flight of political figures, indeed the cessation of all political life in the country, there will be no political parties or prominent leaders outside the perimeter of the old regime. Inside Iraq today there are only two circles of power which see themselves as candidates for succession: the military/security complex and the provincial clans of central Iraq who supply manpower to this military/security complex and have been co-opted and exploited by Saddam Hussein for his own ends. The fact is that the extensive overlap between the two circles makes them almost identical. The Ba'th party is a hollow and compromised institution reviled by Iraqis. Without Saddam Hussein, it has no authority and no credible candidates can step forward from its ranks. As a result, in the immediate period after regime change, and for many months after, few visible and credible candidates for political leadership will emerge from within Iraq.

Once US forces enter Iraq with the explicit aim of removing the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi troops will defect and cooperate with the United States. In the ensuing confusion, it is probable that a general or group of generals will stage an 11th hour coup against Saddam Hussein, giving them an immediate claim to political leadership. At this point, the US can choose the easy and quick way out of Iraq by installing in power the group of generals, and consider its task done, more or less.

The United States must resist falling into this trap. Replacing the regime of Saddam Hussein with a military regime means a continuation of exclusionary politics and repression, a return to zero-sum game politics practiced by Saddam Hussein. A military government will be divisive for the country and lead to conflict, even to raising the specter of Iraq's dismemberment. For a start, most of the Iraqi generals who have achieved a degree of seniority will be vulnerable to charges of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, whether against the Kurds in the 80s, in Kuwait in 1990-91, or against the uprising in 1991. Moreover, the military is heavily dependent on the clans of central Iraq, and, absent Saddam Hussein and his family, these clans have no acknowledged hierarchy. Each believes it is the rightful heir to power in Iraq, and none is ready to grant loyalty to any other. Competition for supremacy will be fierce. With access to weaponry and a kinship network through Iraq's armed forces, these clans may well become the future warlords of Iraq, setting in motion a string of successive military coups as they fight for political control.

Long disenfranchised Iraqis, hoping for representation and inclusion, will simply rebel against a military government, discontent will gather momentum and invite foreign intervention. To maintain control, a military government in Iraq will have to resort to the tactics of Saddam Hussein, using military means and repression to quell opposition and challenges. The inexorable logic of militarism and violence as a tool to gain and stay in power will take hold of Iraq yet again. This will not serve Iraq or the United States well, and the negative repercussions will resonate throughout the region.

Founding a new order in Iraq

The view, unfortunately popular in the West, that Iraq should be governed by military and tribal strongmen, is a regressive (not to say racist) view that takes us back to the 1920s and ignores political and social developments in Iraq over the past 80 years. It condemns Iraq to live under an authoritarian, militarist system that has brought Iraqis nothing but disaster. By extension it also condemns the whole Arab world to archaic political autocracies that have turned the Middle East into an economically and socially stagnant swamp. At a time when the U.S. is calling for accountable government and representation in other parts of the Middle East, there is no better place to start than in Iraq, where the US will have the best opportunity of showing that it will practice what it preaches.

Another common error is to look at Iraq solely through the prism of ethnicities and religion. From this perspective, Iraq is divided into Kurds, Sunnis, Shi'a, Turkomans and Assyrians, as if these groups were static, homogeneous and uni-dimensional. This is only half true. For within these broad and simplified categories is a richer reality of multiple constituencies within each of these groups, often determined by political, not primordial, definitions. Thus it is equally valid to say that Iraq is divided into pan-Arab nationalists and pan-Kurdish nationalists, Iraq-centered nationalists, Sunni Islamists and Shi'a Islamists, leftist and socialists, and increasingly, liberal democrats of a global outlook who span all ethnicities and religions.

Saddam Hussein and his regime thrived on a paradigm of Iraq as an ungovernable society torn by ethnic and religious differences, which requires the brute force of a powerful ruler to hold it together. It would be fatal if the United States went into Iraq with the intention of perpetuating this sick model of Iraq.

We have to look for a different political paradigm in Iraq, one that takes into account the diversity of political interests brought about by social, educational and political developments over the past 80 years. Once Saddam's regime is overturned, Iraqis need to see that the old order is truly swept away, that a new beginning is made, and that the United States is a partner and a nurturer of this new beginning. Regime change in Iraq has to be change to democracy, and a transitional government supported by the United States has to demonstrate that it represents the new Iraq, and that is responsive to the political demands of Iraqis as citizens, and not merely to their religious and ethnic identities. The United States will be uniquely placed, and will have the power, to be the midwife for a new order in Iraq that will succeed Saddam Hussein.

The transitional government most likely to hold Iraq together and gain credibility and support is a national coalition that is inclusive and pluralist, and reflects Iraq social and political diversity. It alone will be able to draw the country together, give the various Iraqi constituencies, including the military establishment, a stake in the center, and ease anxieties about the future. The national coalition should not stop at ethnic and religious diversity, the regressive paradigm of Iraqi politics, but must tap into more contemporary systems of social and political identification, and include urban professionals and Iraq's intelligentsia. Such a coalition may not produce the strongest type of government in traditional Middle Eastern terms, but it will derive its strength from the political balance, rely on consent rather than coercion, and minimize distrust. The national transitional government should be held to a high standard of conduct by the United States and the international community, not to mention Iraqis themselves.

The time to start assembling this national unity government and planning operating mechanisms is right now, before the bombs start falling. For the past 12 years, the US government has been dealing with a vibrant and determined, if often fractious, Iraqi opposition in northern Iraq and in the Diaspora. This opposition encompasses many segments of Iraqi political society, including traditional and modernizing elements. The Kurdish parties, for example, represent a majority of the Kurdish population in a very tangible sense. For the others, they stand for political currents in Iraq, such as Shi'a Islamists, Arab nationalists, and liberal democrats. Relations between these groups have not always been easy, yet to a remarkable degree, they all agree on the fundamental need for democracy, rule of law, representation and pluralism. And all of them have sought the assistance and support of the United States in changing the regime in Iraq. To date, it is they who have sought a partnership, and it is the United States that has withheld it.

The United States should aim to forge the nucleus of a transitional government in Iraq with the help of this opposition. Clearly, any opposition outside Iraq cannot be the full story: on the contrary, it will have to be augmented by individuals and groups from within the country as these emerge to the foreground . For the present, it provides a base to build on, and should only form an "open circle", to be completed once change occurs and as the internal situation develops. Such a project presupposes close work with the Iraqi opposition in the period leading up to regime change. Prior planning is particularly important for the purpose of providing a framework for civil administration, management of vital sectors, and policing.

U.S. Partnership with Iraqis

The mandate and duration of the transitional unity government should be clearly defined. It should work closely with the United States and other countries to achieve the common objectives of training a police force to ensure public safety, attending to humanitarian needs, and rebuilding Iraq's civil service and administrative structure. Once these conditions are satisfied, it should have the further responsibility of preparing for its own dissolution and the establishment of a permanent, elected government. It must therefore:

(a) address the issue of accountability for the previous regime's crimes

(b) establish mechanisms for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (c) convene a constitutional assembly to draft a permanent constitution

(d) prepare for a constitutional referendum (e) prepare for national elections

(f) negotiate with the UN and Iraq's creditors for relief of financial obligations

This is a tall order, and throughout the period of transition, Iraq will need United States and international assistance and support. Again, Afghanistan should not be the model. The issue should not be merely ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein, but rebuilding Iraq as a modern, democratic state that redefines the standards of political conduct in Iraq, and set an example for the Middle East region as a whole.

LOAD-DATE: August 1, 2002

Copyright 2002 Federal News Service, Inc.

Federal News Service

July 31, 2002 Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING

LENGTH: 23237 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

SUBJECT: IRAQ

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN, JR. (D-DE)

LOCATION: ROOM 419, DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES: RICHARD BUTLER, FORMER EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, UNSCOMM, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

DR. KHIDIR HAMZA, FORMER IRAQI NUCLEAR ENGINEER, DIRECTOR, COUNCIL ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS

ANTHONY CORDESMAN, SENIOR FELLOW AND ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

BODY:

SEN. BIDEN: The hearing will come to order. We welcome everyone here this morning to what is the beginning of, I hope, for lack of a better phrase, a national dialogue on a very important question. There are very difficult decisions that lie ahead for the president and for the Congress, and I -- we think that it's important, the members of this committee, that we begin to discuss what is being discussed all over, but not here in the Congress so far.

The attacks of 9/11 have forever transformed how Americans see the world. Through tragedy and pain, we've learned that we cannot be complacent about events abroad. We cannot be complacent about those who espouse hatred for us. We must confront clear dangers with a new sense of urgency and resolve.

Saddam Hussein's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, in my view, is one of those clear dangers, even if the right response to his pursuit is not so crystal clear. One thing is clear, these weapons must be dislodged from Saddam Hussein, or Saddam Hussein must be dislodged from power.

President Bush has stated his determination to remove Saddam from power, a view many in Congress share. If that course is pursued, in my view, it matters profoundly how we do it and what we do after we succeed.

The decision to go to war can never be taken lightly. I believe that a foreign policy, especially one that involves the use of force, cannot be sustained in America without the informed consent of the American people.

And so, just as we've done in other important junctures in our history, the Foreign Relations Committee today begins what I hope will be a national dialogue on Iraq that sheds more light than heat, and helps inform the American people so that we can have a more informed basis upon which they can draw their own conclusions.

I'm very pleased and grateful for the close cooperation of my Republican colleagues: Senator Helms in absentia and his staff in particular, Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel in putting these hearings together. This is a bipartisan effort. It reminds me of the way that things used to work on this committee when I joined it, in 1973.

I want to say a word now about what the hearings are not about, from my perspective. They are not designed to prejudice any particular course of action. They are not intended to short-circuit the debate taking place within the administration. I know I speak for all members of the committee in saying at the outset that we recognize our responsibility as we conduct these hearings to do so in a way that reflects the magnitude of the decision the administration is wrestling with and the Congress will have to deal with.

We've coordinated these hearings closely with the White House. We're honoring the administration's desire not to testify at this time. We expect at some later date to convene hearings at which the administration would send representatives to explain their thinking once it has been clarified and determined. We do not expect this week's hearings to exhaust all aspects of this issue; they are a beginning.

But over the next two days, we hope to address several fundamental questions: First, what is the threat from Iraq? Obviously, to fully answer this question will require us to have additional and closed hearings on top of the hearings in S-407 and discussions we've already had with the intelligence community. Second, depend our assessment of the threat, or depending on one's assessment of the threat, what is the appropriate response? And third, how do Iraq's neighbors, others (sic) countries in the region and our allies see the, quote, "Iraqi problem"? And fourth and maybe most important, if we participate in Saddam's departure, what are our responsibilities the day after?

In my judgment, President Bush is right to be concerned about Saddam Hussein's relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that he may use them or share them with terrorists. Other regimes hostile to the United States and our allies already have or seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. What distinguishes Saddam is that he has used them against his own people and against Iran. And for nearly four years now, Iraq has blocked the return of U.N. weapons inspectors.

We want to explore Saddam's track record in acquiring, making and using weapons of mass destruction and likelihood, in the opinion of the experts that will come before us in the next two days -- the likelihood that he would share them with terrorists. We want to know what capabilities Saddam has been able to rebuild since the inspectors were forced out of Iraq and what he now has or might soon acquire. We want to understand his conventional military strength and what dangers he poses to his neighbors, as well as to our forces, should they intervene.

Once we have established a better understanding of the threat, we want to look at the possible responses. The containment strategy pursued since the end of the Gulf War -- and apparently supported by some in our military -- has kept Saddam boxed in. Some advocates for continuing this strategy believe it's exceeded their expectations, and some others advocate the continuation, coupled with tough, unfettered weapons inspection. How practical is that?

Others believe containment raises the risk Saddam will continue to play cat and mouse with the inspectors, build more weapons of mass destruction, and share them with those who wouldn't hesitate to use them against us.

In this view, if we wait for the danger to become clear and present, it could become too late. It could be too late. Acting to change the regime, in this view, may be a better course.

But a military response also raises questions. Some fear that attacking Saddam Hussein would precipitate the very thing we're trying to prevent: his last resort to weapons of mass destruction.

We also have to ask whether resources can be shifted to a major military enterprise in Iraq without compromising the war on terror in other parts of the world.

My father has an expression, God love him. He said, "If everything's equally important to you, Joe, nothing is important." How do we prioritize?

What is the relative value? What are the costs? We have to inquire about the cost of a major military campaign and the impact on our economy. As pointed out yesterday in one of the major newspapers in America, in today's dollars, the cost of the Gulf War was about $75 billion. Our allies paid 80 percent of that, including the Japanese. If we go it alone, does it matter? Will we encompass and take on the whole responsibility? What impact will that have on American security and the economy?

We have to consider what support we're likely to get from our key allies in the Middle East and Europe, and we must examine whether there are any consequences, if we move, for regional stability.

Finally, the least explored, in my view, but in many ways the most critical question relates to our responsibilities, if any, the day after Saddam is taken down, if taken down by the use of the U.S. military.

This is not a theoretical exercise. In Afghanistan, the war was prosecuted exceptionally well, in my view, but the follow-through commitment to Afghanistan's security and reconstruction has, in my judgment, fallen short. It would be a tragedy if we removed a tyrant in Iraq only to leave chaos in its wake. The long-suffering Iraqi people need to know a regime change would benefit them. So do Iraqis' neighbors. We need a better understanding of what it would take to secure Iraq and rebuild it economically and politically. Answering these questions could improve the prospects for military success by demonstrating to Iraqis that we are committed to staying for the long haul.

These are just some of the questions we hope to address today and tomorrow and in future hearings and no doubt in the fall. In short, we need to weigh the risks of action versus the risks of inaction.

To reiterate my key point: If we expect the American people to support their government over the long haul when it makes a difficult decision, if the possibility exists that we may ask hundreds of thousands of our young men and women in uniform to put themselves in harm's way, if it is the consensus or a decision reached by the administration that thousands or tens of thousands of troops would be required to remain behind for an extended period of time, if those measures are required, then we must gain, in my view, the informed consent of the American people.

I welcome our witnesses today. We have a group of extremely competent people, one of whom got on a plane in Sydney and traveled 24 hours straight to be here for this hearing, and others who've come from a long distance as well. These are men and women of stature, background, knowledge, academic and practical understanding of the region and the country. And we're anxious to hear from them.

I'd now like to ask Senator Lugar if he would like to make an opening statement. And although we usually reserve opening statements just to the ranking member and the chairman, I would, since we only have a few people here at the moment, invite my other three colleagues if they would like to make a, quote, "short" -- not as long as the chairman, short -- when you get to be chairman, you can make long statements -- "short" statements.

Senator Lugar.

SEN. RICHARD LUGAR (R-IN): Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership in organizing these hearings and for a comprehensive statement that really does set forward the major issues we must discuss.

I was an outspoken advocate for United States military action against Iraq that culminated in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

I urged President Bush at a very early date to seek congressional authorization for deployment of troops and the use of force in the Persian Gulf.

At the time, many in and out of the administration feared the possibility of losing that vote. I believed all along the votes would be there, but had the votes for authorization not been there, it would have been far better to have known this at the beginning, rather than to be surprised down the road that the nation was not behind the president. A few weeks later, the House and Senate did vote to authorize President Bush to use military force against Iraq, and the administration benefited immensely from this overt decision of the American people.

If President Bush determines that large-scale offensive military action is necessary against Iraq, I hope that he will follow the lead established by the previous Bush administration and seek congressional authorization. The administration must be assured of the commitment of the American people in pursuing policies and actions in Iraq after focused and vigorous discussion and debate.

It is unfortunate that today, some 10 years after the Gulf War, we still face threats posed by Saddam Hussein. This did not necessarily have to be the case.

On April 18, 1991, I wrote to President Bush urging him to send our forces to Baghdad and to complete the job. He was gracious enough to receive me in the White House to discuss that letter. I believed that while we had the forces present, we should end the regime of Saddam Hussein and build a democratic Iraq.

And for a number of reasons, our president chose instead to pursue a policy of containment. Those important reasons for that decision, then and now, include our plans for the future of a post- Saddam Hussein Iraq and future stability of Iraq's neighbors.

We must estimate soberly the human and economic cost of war plans and post-war plans. I am under no illusion that this will be an easy task.

The president and the administration will have to make the case to the American people regarding the threat posed to United States security by Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction he appears intent on producing, and potentially utilizing against Americans and other targets. But the president will also have to make a persuasive case to our friends and allies, particularly those in the region.

Simply put, Saddam Hussein remains a threat to United States allied and regional security.

However, the situation on the ground in the region has changed since 1991, and it is not at all clear that the tactics of that campaign should be employed today. Ten years ago, the United States had done the military and diplomatic spadework in the region. We had developed a war plan. Allies in the region permitted United States forces to launch attacks from their territory. We had collected a coalition of willing and able allies. Our allies were willing to pay for $48 billion of the $61 billion cost. We were prepared to utilize the force necessary to defeat Iraqi forces. And most importantly, we had the support of the American people.

We have not yet determined if these same conditions are present today. They might be, but we have not yet engaged all the parties necessary to ensure a successful outcome. At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the agreements surrounding the ceasefire included an Iraqi commitment to destroy the stockpile of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the ability to produce them in the future. I fully supported this endeavor. Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction represents a potential threat the world cannot ignore. On several occasions since the end of the war, the United States and our allies have resorted to the use of military force to counter the threat Iraq poses to its neighbors and to the United States' vital national-security interests. Saddam Hussein has demonstrated his ability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction and spread instability through military force against his own people and neighbors.

Unfortunately, the overriding priority of his regime has been the maintenance of his own power. These hearings seek to shed light on our policy alternatives. The administration understands that ultimately, it will have to make a case for its policy decisions. This is not an action that can be sprung on the American people. Leaks of military plans are dangerous to our security. But public debate over policy is important to the construction of strong public support for actions that will require great sacrifices from the American people.

I look forward to working closely with the chairman to lead this debate and to lay some of the foundation of the coalescing of administration and congressional thinking and support that will be essential for a campaign against Saddam Hussein.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you.

Gentlemen, I've just been informed that there are going to be four roll-call votes in a row, starting at 11:00, so I am going to rescind my offer, and if you want to put your statements in the record or make a one-minute statement, literally, do that, but we'll never get to our witnesses.

Would anyone like to make a very brief opening comment?

SEN. PAUL WELLSTONE (D-MN): Mr. Chairman, I just ask unanimous consent that my statement be included in the record. I was a teacher, and I'm used to 70-minute classes. I don't know how to do it in one minute.

SEN. BIDEN: (Chuckles.)

SEN. WELLSTONE: I'd like to thank the panelists for being here today. And I would like you to ask unanimous consent that a statement by Phyllis Bennis at the Institute for Policy Studies be included in the record.

SEN. BIDEN: Without objection, it will be. And every senator's statement will be placed in the record, if they have an opening statement. I sincerely apologize for that.

Do you want to make --

SEN. CHRISTOPHER DODD (D-CT): Well, Mr. Chairman -- no, I'll ask you the same thing -- unanimous consent that a statement be included in the record.

I think this is tremendously important what you're doing. I think this is tremendously valuable. I know there are those who question the motivations behind all of this, but I can't think of any more valuable function that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can perform than do exactly what we're doing here. I think it not only educates our colleagues, educates ourselves and the American public; it gives the administration an opportunity to focus its ideas and policies. I think one of the best debates that ever occurred in my 20 years in the Senate was the debate surrounding the issue of the Gulf War, back in '89. And so I thank you for doing this. This is a very, very valuable service, and I hope our colleagues pay good attention to what we hear.

SEN. SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS): Mr. Chairman?

SEN. BIDEN: Yes?

SEN. BROWNBACK: If I could, for just a quick moment, I want to thank you for holding the hearing and second what Senator Dodd had said on the importance of these. And I know the administration looks with importance on these hearings, is engaging the country.

I would just note, I think, to our panelists and to others, I don't think there's a question but that we've got to at some point in time deal with Saddam Hussein. Many would have argued we should have done it 11 years ago. Some would have argued we should have done it five years ago. I think the question now becomes, should we do it now, and if so, how? And what does it impact throughout the region?

And so I hope our panelists can really address that issue, because I think there's pretty strong unanimity in the Congress that some point in time we're going to have to deal with this guy. Is now the time, and what's the way? And I hope can get at that through these hearings.

SEN. WELLSTONE: Mr. Chairman, I know everybody's being very brief, but just given the comments of a colleague that I work with, could I just say something in 30 seconds? I used 30 seconds before.

SEN. BIDEN: Sure.

SEN. WELLSTONE: Which is, I do not believe, as a senator, that the administration has yet -- has yet -- made the case for military action against Iraq. And I think that before any decision is taken about whether or not we go to war, we need to have a careful and deliberate and substantive discussion, not only here but with people in our country. And we'll see whether the case has been made.

And I think these hearings are extremely important. This is why I wanted to become a United States -- to be a chance of -- to be a part of a discussion about a question that so crucially affects the world that we live in.

And I think that your putting these hearings together is one of the best things you've probably ever done as a United States senator.

SEN. BIDEN: All right, thank you.

Let me just say, to reinforce one point, yesterday at the White House, at the signing of the corporate responsibility bill, the president came up to me in the audience and shook my hand and thanked me for holding these hearings. I want to make it clear; the administration has told me they have not made a decision yet. I take them at their word. They've indicated to me there's nothing in the near term. I take them at their word. And we have not given them a veto right on how we proceed, but we've asked for their cooperation, offered input, as we did from others, any witnesses they would like to have. And so, so far, this is as I think it should be; the beginning of an open discussion in a bipartisan way to examine the major issues we've outlined here.

Let me begin with our first panel. And as I referenced by indirection, Ambassador Richard Butler, and I sincerely thank him for literally getting on a plane in Sydney and coming. He obviously thinks these are important or he wouldn't have made that trip.

Richard Butler has served as the executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, the so-called UNSCOM, from '97 to '99. He was also the permanent representative of Australia to the United Nations from '92 to '97. He's currently a diplomat in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations, and one of the most articulate men in the world actually, on the subject of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. And we're delighted he's here.

Dr. Hamza. Dr. Hamza is a director -- am I pronouncing it correctly, Doctor? -- is director of the Council for Middle Eastern Affairs in New York. He was a top Iraqi nuclear engineer working on Iraq's nuclear weapons program until he defected in 1994. He is the author of the book, "Saddam's Bombmaker." And we appreciate him being here and look forward to his testimony.

And a man we often see on television, and who's been kind enough to share his wisdom with this committee on many occasions, Professor Anthony H. Cordesman. Professor Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He's also a national security analyst for ABC. And we thank him as well for being here.

Gentlemen, if you could proceed. And I realize -- we told you five minutes. I'm not going to hold you literally to five minutes, what you have to say is so important. But if you can keep it in the range of 10 minutes, because we want to be able to engage you. And we will -- and you've all been before -- maybe Dr. Hamza hasn't -- we're going to have to break about probably 10 after 11:00 and be gone for 40 minutes. With a little bit of luck, we will be able to get this panel finished, or if we're still engaged, we'll ask you to hang around if we can.

But with that, why don't I now yield the floor to you, Mr. Ambassador. And again, thank you for the effort and your service.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of this committee, I'm greatly honored to have been invited to be here.

This is an important debate, and I hope I can make a useful contribution to it.

Mr. Chairman, having worked within the Australian Parliament, I'm well aware of the division bells and roll call votes and so on, and I appreciate your duties in the chamber. I will, therefore, come straight to the point and try and speak with dispatch.

My subject, as allocated to me by you and your staff, is Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. I'll make these opening remarks and be happy then -- the paper has been circulated, and I'll be happy to take part in whatever discussion --

SEN. BIDEN: Your entire statement will be placed in the record for our colleagues.

MR. BUTLER: Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, Iraq's stated position is that it has no weapons of mass destruction. As recently as last week, two senior Iraqi officials, the deputy prime minister and the foreign minister, reiterated this claim.

It's more than interesting that in his public statements, Saddam Hussein never claims to be disarmed. On the contrary, he threatens a degree of destruction of his enemies which implies his possession of mighty weapons.

It is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam's representatives that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction is false. Everyone concerned, from Iraq's neighbors to the U.N. Security Council to the secretary general of the U.N., with whom Iraq is currently negotiating on the issue, everyone simply, Mr. Chairman, is being lied to.

It is now over 10 years since Iraq was instructed by the U.N. Security Council to cooperate with action to, and I quote, "destroy, remove and render harmless," unquote, its weapons of mass destruction. Those weapons were specified by the Council as these: all nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and the means to make them, and missiles with a range exceeding 160 kilometers.

The Security Council's instruction to Iraq was binding under international law. And all other states were equally bound by law not to give Iraq any assistance in WMD, weapons of mass destruction.

From the beginning, Mr. Chairman, Iraq refused to obey the law. Instead, it actively sought to defeat the application of the law in order to preserve its weapons of mass destruction capability.

The work of UNSCOM, the body created by the Security Council to take away Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, had various degrees of success -- varying degrees. But above all, above all, it was not permitted to finish the job. And almost four years have now passed since Iraq terminated UNSCOM's work, and in that period, Iraq has been free of any inspection and monitoring of its WMD programs.

Now, I've given this briefest of recollection of that history because, Mr. Chairman, I put to you and your colleagues, it shows two key things. One, Iraq remains in breach of international law. Two, it has been determined to maintain a weapons of mass destruction capability at all costs.

Now, we need to know, as far as we can, what that capability is today. First of all, nuclear weapons, although sitting on my left here, Dr. Hamza, is far more expert than I am in that field. But I'll say quickly what I believe is the case.

Saddam has sought nuclear weapons for two decades. Ten years ago, he intensified his efforts in a so-called "crash program." The Gulf War put an end to this. Subsequent inspection and analysis by the International Atomic Energy Agency and UNSCOM showed that in spite of relatively deficient indigenous sources of uranium, Saddam's program was, in fact, when stopped, as close as six months away from making a crude nuclear explosive device. Of the three components necessary for a nuclear weapon -- materials, equipment and knowledge -- Iraq has the latter two. On the relevant equipment and components, Iraq actually refused to yield them to the IAEA and UNSCOM inspectors.

The key question now is, has Iraq acquired the essential fissionable material, either by enriching indigenous sources or by obtaining it from external sources? And I don't know the answer. And I will say throughout my remarks, Mr. Chairman, what I don't know as well as what I think is the case. I don't know the answer to that. It is possible that intelligence authorities in the West and Russia -- and you all know why I mention Russia in particular -- may know the answer to that question. But what there is now is evidence that Saddam has reinvigorated his nuclear weapons program in the inspection-free years. And over two years ago, the IAEA estimate was that if he started work again on a nuclear weapon, he could build one in about two years.

Now I turn to chemical weapons. Saddam's involvement with chemical weapons also spans some 20 years. He used them in the Iran- Iraq war in the mid-'80s and on Iraqis in the north who challenged his rule in 1998. UNSCOM identified an array of chemical weapons agents manufactured by Iraq. This included the most toxic of them, VX. Iraq's chemical weapons program was extensive, and UNSCOM was able to destroy or otherwise account for a substantial portion of it, of its holdings of weapons and its manufacturing capability, but, Mr. Chairman, not all of it. It was particularly significant that, following UNSCOM's discovery of Iraq's VX program and the fact that Iraq had loaded it into missile warheads, together with other chemical and biological agents, it was particularly significant that Iraq then strengthened, in 1998, its determination to bring UNSCOM's work to an end.

Now I turn to biological weapons. Iraq also maintained an extensive biological weapons program with an array of BW agents. Its attempts to conceal this program were most elaborate, implying that BW, biological weapons, are, in fact, particularly important to Saddam. I often thought that there was a relationship here. The extent of their attempts to prevent us from finding something demonstrated the degree of importance of it. And if that rule applies, BW is very important to Saddam.

Iraq weaponized BW. For example, it loaded anthrax into missile warheads and continually researched new means of delivery: spraying devices, pilotless aircraft. UNSCOM's absolute refusal to accept the transparently false Iraqi claims about what it called its primitive, failed, unimportant BW program, and UNSCOM's examination of the possibility that Iraq had tested BW on humans, these also contributed to Iraq's resolve in 1998 to terminate UNSCOM's work.

Finally, missiles: Iraq's main prescribed ballistic missile was the SCUD that had been imported from the USSR. It also sought to clone those indigenously and continually sought to develop other medium- and long-range missiles. UNSCOM's accounting of Iraq's SCUDs was reasonably complete. A good portion of them had fired or destroyed during the Gulf War. But the disposition of a number of them, possibly as many as 20, was never unambiguously established.

In addition, Iraq was working while UNSCOM was still in Iraq on the further development of a missile capability which would breach the 160-kilometer limit. I asked them to stop that work, but the general in charge of it categorically refused. And there was another issue in the missile field which also contributed to Iraq shutting us down in 1998. I had asked Iraq to yield to us 500 tons of fuel that would only fire a SCUD engine, and they refused.

Now what do I derive from this sitrep, Mr. Chairman? Quickly, six main points:

We do not know and never have known fully the quantity and quality of Iraq's WMD. Its policies of concealment ensured that this was the case.

Two: We do know that it has had such weapons, has used them and remains at work on them.

Three: What it has been able to further achieve in the four years without inspections is not clear in precise terms. That is the inner logic of inspections: You cannot see what you are not permitted to look at.

Four: Saddam Hussein knows what he is working on -- he always had -- and the assets he holds in the WMD field. His refusal to allow inspections to resume has nothing to do with notions of Iraqi sovereignty. It is designed to prevent the discovery of and to protect his weapons of mass destruction program.

Next, intelligence agencies might know more than they are able to say in public. Certainly, what has been published of defector and intelligence reports confirms that during the past four years, Iraq has been hard at work across the board to increase its WMD capability.

Finally, there are a number of deeply disturbing possibilities within Saddam's WMD program which need urgent attention, but especially these: Has he acquired a nuclear-weapons capability by purchasing it from former Soviet stock? I think that's an important question. And second, is he working in the BW field on smallpox, ebola and plague?

Now there is a question as to why does Saddam want these diabolical weapons. Why has he defended them at such great cost to the Iraqi people? In many respects, Mr. Chairman, he's told us himself, in his various outbursts, they make him strong; they help him stay in power at home. They help him fight what we thinks are his enemies outside Iraq. But even more disturbing than those so-called goals and his view of the world is his apparently cataclysmic mentality. He surely must know that especially following September 11, any use by him and, indeed, any threat of use of WMD against the United States or possibly its allies would bring a terrible response.

It would be intelligent for him to now recognize that his WMD capability is an insupportable liability for him and his regime. Yet, Mr. Chairman, he shows no sign of such intelligent judgment, and this is perhaps the ultimate pathology of the man.

Will he make his WMD available to terrorist groups? Again, I don't know. We do know that Iraq has trained terrorists from around the region and has mounted terrorist actions of its own as far afield as in Southeast Asia. I have a personal experience of that.

But I have seen no evidence of Iraq providing WMD, as such, to non-Iraqi terrorist groups. I suspect that especially given his psychology and aspirations, Saddam would be reluctant to share with others what he believes to be an indelible source of his own power.

On the elemental question, therefore, the one put to me, Saddam and weapons of mass destruction -- that is, does he have them, et cetera; what's the state of affairs? -- contrary to his assertions that he has none, in addition to what I've put to you, I would refer this committee to the traditional test of whether or not a person can be judged to have committed a crime. And this is, did the accused have the motive, the means and the opportunity? And Mr. Chairman, Saddam plainly has all three and has demonstrated this fact.

What should be done? I was told that's not my issue for this morning.

SEN. BIDEN: Well, we still would welcome your --

MR. BUTLER: Well, clearly -- clearly -- an ideal situation would be the resumption of arms control in Iraq, inspections and serious arms control, but Mr. Chairman, not if that means the shell game -- phoney inspections, more deceit, more concealment. That would in fact, I suggest, be deeply dangerous, providing an illusion of security.

So if the decision has to be taken to remove Saddam, then I just say this: Do it for the right reasons. As you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, have this debate, and make clear to the world what this is about. It is about weapons of mass destruction, but please do not leave out Saddam's hideous record in terms of human rights violations -- he should be on trial in The Hague alongside Milosevic -- and secondly, the fundamental violation by his regime of international law -- something which trashes the system of international law and harms us all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you. I particularly agree with your last point. I've been pushing for eight months. He should be indicted as a war criminal. Even if we cannot get him, he should be indicted as a war criminal, so the world understands.

Doctor, welcome.

MR. HAMZA: Thank you.

SEN. BIDEN: The floor is yours.

MR. HAMZA: Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, yesterday Saddam met members of the atomic energy -- what he called "mujaheddin" -- that is, people who put extreme effort and may sacrifice themselves for their work -- and this is what he had to say. That's yesterday. "The Americans and British say that if Iraq is left to its own means, it might make such-and-such weapons." He didn't name them, but it's clear what he meant. "They mean to harm us. It is to prevent any Arab or Muslim from progress." He call it "progress."

"This is the evil program of the West, and especially the Americans, assisted by Zionism and their supporters." That's a clear -- now, at this critical junction, his meeting with atomic energy, exhorting them to do their national duty, is Saddam back at his own old games of trying to create at least the impression that he is a dangerous man and a menace and should not be trifled with.

The last meetings of the Iraqi delegation with the U.N. relevant personnel on resuming inspectors, their work in Iraq, the Iraqi government decided, after they failed to agree on the -- make the U.N. agree to their terms of getting the inspectors back -- they wanted some concessions, they declared that inspectors' job is to disarm Iraq and leave it defenseless against an American strike, since the Americans will never remove sanctions. So, the whole game they thought the inspectors are charged with is to disarm Iraq. Since the inspectors are charged only with dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their facilities, this was an admission that Iraq may possess these weapons and also an implied threat that facing an invasion, it might use them.

If we go back to the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Iraq built its own weapons of mass destruction technologies indigenously, with some foreign help. It understood that its main assets were not the equipment, but the scientists and engineers that make these weapons. The Saddam government kept a tight lid on its science and engineering military teams at the same time it allowed UNSCOM and IAEA to demolish some of its weapon production sites.

That these science and engineering teams were capable of rebuilding the program was made manifestly clear in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Within less than a year, these teams rebuilt successfully most of Iraq's services infrastructure, this including rebuilding power stations, major telephone exchanges and oil refineries.

Elated by their success, Saddam kept these teams as contracted entities to the government for the civilian sector with a much reduced load and assigned them the rebuilding of the needed facilities for the weapons of mass destruction program. This provided them with a cover of civilian contractors with actual work to prove it, but at the same time, their weapons of mass destruction work continued unhindered.

Thus, the computer we used for the nuclear weapon design is now located in a hospital in Saddam City at the outskirts of Baghdad. If an inspector should arrive at the site, he or she will be shown contracts for the civilian sector. The only indication that things are not what they seem is that it is headed by a man who worked extensively on the Iraqi nuclear weapon design and that most of his staff are former workers in the nuclear weapon program.

Legally, and according to the current mandate of UNMOVIC, the new U.N. inspection body, the burden is on the inspectors to prove otherwise.

Thus, Saddam as managed, from the experience of the last 11 years, to create the perfect cover and in effect turn the whole Iraq science and engineering enterprise into a giant weapon-making body. And since they do actually accomplish civilian tasks, the economic burden on the government is also reduced.

Saddam valued his people more than equipment, and while he initially allowed the U.N. teams to destroy some of his equipment and facilities, Saddam kept tight control over his scientists and engineers. Thus, defections were kept to a minimum. This was helped by well-publicized cases of defectors seeking help and were turned down. One of them was killed in Jordan by Iraqi agents while waiting for the U.S. embassy to grant him an entry visa. Not a single high- level defector left the regime since the botched defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, to Jordan in 1995. This kept the information flow out of Iraq to a minimum, increasing the opacity of the WMD programs.

Iraq is well into CW production and may well be in the process of BW production. With more than 10 tons of uranium and one ton of slightly enriched uranium, according to German intelligence, in its possession, Iraq has enough to generate the needed bomb-grade uranium for three nuclear weapons by 2005. Iraq is using corporations in India and other countries to import the needed equipment for its programs, then channel them through countries like Malaysia for shipment to Iraq. Germany already black-listed some of these companies for violating sanctions imposed on Iraq.

Iraq is importing directional control instruments for its missiles of much higher precision than those needed for the allowed 160-kilometer missiles under U.N. sanctions. Thus, Iraq is gearing to extend the range of its missiles to easily reach Israel. The type of equipment imported indicate that Iraq is in the process of creating its own foundation for the production of needed materials, thus avoiding detection if these materials are on the watch list of the exporting countries. Following this logic, Iraq is or will be able to produce its own growth media for the biological weapons program and many of the precursors for its chemical weapon program. The same can be said for local uranium production from phosphates, thus remove many limitations on production and allow Iraq to accelerate its own programs.

The inspection regime in Iraq had a mixed history. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. body charged with ensuring that nuclear facilities are not used for nuclear weapon purposes, failed in its task with regards to Iraq before the Gulf War.

The International Atomic Energy Agency remains basically a weak organization beset by its international composition and multiple loyalties of its workers, though within its sphere it is quite successful in accounting for and keeping a tab on essential components of the nuclear fuel cycle. But it has limited leverage with the states and works best in a cooperative and (a malleable ?) environment. Against determined states such as Iraq, it is at a great disadvantage. Thus, it failed again after the Gulf War when it declared early that it took care of basically all of Iraq's nuclear program. It took the defection of Kamal, Saddam's son-in-law, to force the Iraqi government to declare the actual scope of its nuclear weapons program and force the inspectors to start all over again unraveling what has not been declared before.

We are talking about now a two-stage process, dismantling what is there and monitoring after that that it does not get rebuilt. With Iraq's aggressive behavior toward the inspectors and the cat-and-mouse game it continuously plays with them, monitoring becomes problematic at best in the later stage of keeping Iraq disarmed. So even if some equipment are dismantled, getting them from not rebuilt again will be problematic in any future program. Iraq could just at any time stop cooperating and it might be just too late to stop it from continuing its work on its program.

If the inspectors go back now, there is very little human intelligence that will help them locate the new weapon sites. Spread widely among the government infrastructure in smaller, hard-to-detect units, the inspectors will have a hard time locating all the program's components. A recent defector with credible information asserted that all units are built with a backup. If one is detected or is in danger of discovery, all activity is immediately transferred to the backup facility.

The new UNMOVIC inspection body do not have the support and free hand UNSCOM enjoyed. With Russia and other states that favor removing sanctions keeping the pressure, the onus now is on the inspectors to prove that Iraq is in violation. Not finding a smoking gun after a series of inspections is over, the Russians and the French need to declare that the U.S. has no case and sanctions must be lifted. The U.S. case will be considerably weakened and more voices will rise against U.S.-Iraqi policy as baseless if the inspectors go in and find no smoking gun that Iraq is making weapons of mass destruction. This is a danger that must be carefully examined before inspection teams are allowed back possibly to divert an invasion.

Many voices declared that Iraq was not pursuing nuclear weapons before the Gulf War. This included the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, that declared Iraq clean in many statements. This happened even after the German publication Der Spiegel reported Iraq's successful attempt to acquire classified uranium centrifuge enrichment technology from Germany. However, the U.S. knew better and used the Gulf War setting as a way to dismantle Iraq's nuclear weapon program.

But its dismantling process ignored the knowledge base acquired over the years that can be used easily to rebuild what was destroyed. A similar insistence on proof before taking serious action will be allowing Saddam to achieve his goals unchallenged.

With no large, easily distinguishable nuclear sites and little or no human intelligence, it is difficult to see how any measure short of a regime change will be effective. Saddam is totally indifferent to the human suffering of his people and, with his threats of reprisals against the families of weapons of mass destruction workers, has managed to stop defections among his personnel, despite the fact that a large number of Iraqis from other walks of life manage to escape.

With a Soviet-style economy that's basically geared toward war and its requirements, Iraq is currently the only Arab state that all Arab extremists look at as the future challenger to Israel and U.S. interests in the regime. Thus, if Saddam makes it in the nuclear arena, he will be the region's undisputed leader in Arab eyes. It will then be much harder to agree on the needed concessions for a peace process, and a viable peace will be impossible to achieve under any terms. Saddam has used and will continue to use the Palestinian issue to rally the Arabs around him as he did when he used the Arab leaders meeting in Baghdad to challenge the peace treaty of Egypt with Israel that President Sadat agreed to.

Saddam and Iraq imperialism. Saddam Hussein has a long history of involvement in international terrorism, from assassinations of Iraqis abroad in the '70s and '80s, to support for radical anti- Western groups in the '80s and '90s, to links with Islamic fundamentalists today. His track record speaks for itself.

Always the opportunist, he has used the bin-annual Islamic conferences held in Baghdad since the 1980's as a recruiting ground for Islamic radicals from around the Muslim world. A former Iraqi intelligence officer now in Europe has described how he would dress as a cleric and approach Islamists from key countries to put on the Iraqi payroll for special operations. He was tasked, that is the intelligence officer, to recruit Pakistanis, Indonesians and Malaysians, while other officers concentrated on Palestinians and Arabs.

We know from credible sources that Osama bin Laden was a frequent visitor to the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum, when bin Laden was a resident of the Sudanese capital until 1996. It is no coincidence that Khartoum is one of Iraq's intelligence service's largest foreign stations.

It has also been confirmed that the Iraqi ambassador in Turkey, Farouk Hijazi, traveled to Afghanistan and met bin Laden in December, 1998. It is revealing to note that prior to being appointed ambassador to Ankara, Hijazi was head of foreign operations for Iraqi intelligence service. Incidentally, the same Hijazi, who was hurriedly pulled out of Ankara on September 29, 2001, has recently resurfaced as Iraq's ambassador to Tunisia.

There have been several confirmed sightings of Islamic fundamentalists from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Gulf states being trained in terror tactics at the Iraqi intelligence camp at Salman Pak, 20 miles south of Baghdad on the Tigris River. Three former intelligence officers have reported that they were surprised to find non-Iraqi fundamentalists undergoing training at the facility. The training involved assassination, explosions and hijacking.

All the three reported that there is a fuselage of an old Tupelev-154 airliner used for hijack training. This was later confirmed by satellite photographs.

Iraq's military capability has been considerably degraded since the Gulf War. Part of the drive to rebuild larger weapon-of-mass- destruction stockpiles is to make up for this depletion in military capability. Iraq now has practically no air force, a much-degraded air defense system, and particularly no new tanks, heavy artillery or armored vehicles.

What is left functioning from the Gulf War arsenal is basically in the hands of the special Republican Guards, and the rest of the armed forces are basically armed with light weaponry. With a highly corrupt officer corps, the Iraqi army suffers from a large number of absenteeism, poor or non-existent medical care -- (inaudible) -- and little or no pay.

It is estimated that Iraq has no more than a quarter of the fire power it possessed at the onset of the Gulf War. With the original Bath Party members mostly murdered or in jail, Saddam's government now is purely a personal dictatorship of Saddam and his clans. The original rhetoric of the Bath Party no longer carry any weight with the population.

Iraq WMD are under the control of the special security organization. This is the same group that are charged with Saddam's security. This feared and ruthless organization is mainly composed of conscripts from Saddam's hometown and very loyal tribes in the adjacent areas. They have an observer in all major military meetings, and they are present at the headquarters of all division commanders, and they report directly to Saddam's younger son, Qusay.

Any operation to disrupt the central authority of the Iraqi command structure, and especially the handling and deployment of weapons of mass destruction, must target this organization. Precision bombing and strict enforcement of no-drive zones should eliminate most, if not all, of the dangers of Saddam possibly using his CBW against U.S. forces. Past defections from this -- (inaudible) -- group indicate that it is not as tightly controlled as was earlier thought, and the defection rate may increase considerably when faced with an imminent invasion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much, Doctor. Professor Cordesman.

MR. CORDESMAN: Thank you, Senator. Let me begin with a caveat. It is very easy to be arrogant about trying to predict a war that no one has ever fought, in the face of the kind of information you can obtain from unclassified sources. And I think it is very dangerous to make quick, sweeping generalizations about the military capabilities of Iraq.

As a result, I would like to enter into the record a net assessment of Iraq's capabilities, those of the U.S. and the other forces in the region, and call the committee's attention to that statement as something to look at, as perhaps a reference as your hearings proceed.

SEN. BIDEN: Without objection, the entire statement will be placed in the record.

MR. CORDESMAN: I would make one point that I think needs to be made very clearly. Iraq might be a far easier opponent than its force strengths indicate. But it also is potentially a very serious military opponent indeed. And to be perfectly blunt, I think only fools would bet the lives of other men's sons and daughters on their own arrogance and call this force a cake walk or a speed bump or something that you can dismiss.

I see every reason for the reservation of the American military and the joint chiefs, and I think efforts to dismiss the military capabilities of Iraq are dangerous and irresponsible. These forces do have serious defects, but Iraq is still the most effective military power in the Gulf.

It still has active forces of over 400,000 men. It still has an inventory of over 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, 2,400 major artillery weapons. It still has over 300 combat aircraft in its inventory, although perhaps less than half of these are truly operational. And it certainly still has some chemical and biological weapons.

This is not a force that can be dismissed. It has, out of its 23 divisions, a core of perhaps six Revolutionary Guard and six regular army heavy divisions, plus some significant special forces which have a long record of combat capability and which I believe U.S. experts indicate have reasonable levels of manning and readiness.

Having said that, I should note, Iraq has at least 23 division equivalents. Probably half of these have only limited effectiveness, manning levels as divisions of under 8,000 men; that out of the regular army, most of its units probably have manning levels of 70 percent or less. And we saw during the Gulf War that infantry units and other elements that were dependent on Shiite, Kurdish and Turkoman conscripts or low-quality reservists did not fight well or with great confidence.

It is a fact that Iraq has had no major new arms deliveries in a decade. It does, however, still have 700 relatively modern T-72 tanks, 900 BMP-series armored infantry fighting vehicles, and significant numbers of self-propelled artillery weapons and multiple rocket launchers. It has a significant number of modern anti-tank guided weapons and it can still operate a significant number of attack helicopters and a large number of utility helicopters.

At least in urban warfare, the fact that there are nearly 120,000 other men in the security, border and other paramilitary forces has to be taken into careful account. And the special Republican Guards units and some Republican Guards units themselves, plus Saddam's bodyguards, are trained for urban warfare.

The air force is certainly the weak link. Out of the 300-odd combat aircraft, they can often fly very intensive sortie raids, but there are no great signs of meaningful training for air combat or air- to-ground combat or of organized use of air forces in effective ways. The air force performed badly during the Iran-Iraq war. It performed only minimally during the Gulf War.

It is also an air force without modern intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, without modern electronic warfare capabilities as airborne assets. It is not an air force which perhaps can do more than fly limited penetration raids, and those would only be meaningful if it used weapons of mass destruction.

I would be more careful about its surface-based air defenses. It has no modern surface-to-air missiles, nothing like the S-300 or S-400 series. Its basic force structure is dependent on SA-2s, SA-3s and SA-6s, which date back in design to the 1960s. But it has one of the most dense air defense networks around its urban areas and populated areas in the world, much more dense than any around Hanoi at the time of the Vietnam War.

It has made real progress in many areas of its command and control. It has deep buried shelters, an excellent survivable communication system. It has learned to adapt to things like anti- radiation missiles. It uses tactics like pop-up and remotely-linked radar activity, decoys, ambushes, deployments in civilian areas.

And it was sufficiently effective to have advised Serbia at length during the fighting in Kosovo, and I think anyone in the U.S. military would say it had considerable success. It is a reality that this system can probably be suppressed but will survive. And we have learned that to our cost since Desert Storm.

While sanctions have cut off arms imports, I would note that Iraq maintains a very significant import network, which it uses for the weapons of mass destruction, as has been described by Ambassador Butler and Dr. Hamza.

The only really disturbing aspect of this that has been made public is an increasing flow of weapons out of Eastern and Central Europe through Syria. This flow is known to have included engines for MiG aircraft, new tank engines, and equipment for the land-based air defenses, plus spare parts. At this time, however, I suspect that it has had only limited impact on the overall readiness of Iraqi forces.

The thing that would bother me most is not whether we can win, but whether we are honest about the intangibles in this war in Iraq's military capabilities. Let me just mention a few of those very quickly.

It is easy to talk about the unpopularity of the regime and to assert that units are not reliable. People did that throughout the Iran-Iraq war, and they were wrong virtually every time. We did not see mass defections in the Gulf War until Iraqi forces came under intense pressure. The Republican Guards units and the heavy divisions were treated in good order.

We talk about tyranny, and repression violence is part of this regime. But so are incentives in bribery. It is impossible to know who will take these bribes and incentives seriously. Saddam has been in power during the entire life of some 80 percent of the Iraqi people. To say that he has had no impact, that he does not have loyalty, that there are factions that will not follow him, is reckless and dangerous.

Uprisings can be meaningful in some areas. But uprisings are very unlikely in the core areas of Saddam's strength -- Baghdad, Tikrit, and the cities in the center. And urban warfare is a dangerous and uncertain structure.

We do not know whether he has reduced the rigidities of his command. It seems very doubtful, and that does mean that the possibility of striking at the core of his power and ignoring the flanks is a possibility. I should also note, when I talk about urban warfare, that it is one thing to train for urban warfare with the kind of training the Iraqis get, and quite another to fight it. They did not do well during the Iran-Iraq war in this area.

At the same time, their ability to use decoys, human shields, to use civilian buildings as cover, is a well-proven capability. And our precision air power did not, even in Afghanistan, demonstrate the ability to strike with such precision that you will not inflict significant civilian casualties and collateral damage.

Iraq does have one strength. Its combat engineering is good. I'll leave it to other witnesses to comment on the quality of our bridging and water barrier crossing capabilities. But one uncertainty here is whether it could use its helicopter mobility at all, and we have great helicopter mobility.

The problem is not whether we can suppress their air defenses, but how long it will take and at what cost. And certainly over Baghdad, without stealth, we could take serious limits.

We do not really know how cohesive their maneuver capability can be in the face of our air power. And the ability to bring units together and concentrate in one area to deal with limited U.S. attacks could be critical. People talk about their capability to execute asymmetric warfare and their support of terrorism. I think this is an area where the committee should pay very careful attention to the American intelligence community and put little faith in outside reports.

Other witnesses have commented on weapons of mass destruction. I want to make a caveat here, and I want to go back to my own experience as the one-time manager of DARPA's program on chemical, biological and theater nuclear weapons. Very often we confuse the ability to proliferate with war-fighting effects. In the case of nuclear weapons, those effects are fairly well-known. In the case of chemical and biological weapons, this is not known.

Very minor issues in engineering and in the method of delivery can affect the lethality of chemical and biological weapons by two orders of magnitude or more. That is 100 times. And you can go, as was the case with Aum Shinrikyo, from anthrax attacks with zero effect to anthrax attacks with near-nuclear effects, depending on how the agent is presented, deployed, the quality of the manufacture.

It is very unlikely that we will know the answer to those issues until a war takes place. It is a certainty that Iraq lacks the sophistication to conduct training and testing and know the lethality of its own weapons in these areas before it uses them, an uncertainty we need to remember very carefully.

Let me just say, in conclusion, that I do not regard this as a massive force that can make use of most of its assets. But I think it is incredibly dangerous to be dismissive. It is very easy to send people home unused and alive. It is costly to send them home in body bags because we did not have sufficient force when we engaged. And to be careless about this war, to me, would be a disaster.

I am reminded of a quote about 2,000 years old by Pliny the Elder. "Small boys throw stones at frogs in jest, but the frogs do not die in jest. The frogs die in earnest." This is not a game, and it is not something to be decided from an arm chair. Thank you.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much. Why don't we, in the interest of time, limit our questions in this first round, if there is a second round, to five minutes. Let me begin.

The thrust of your statement, Professor, is that if we're going to go, we should go at Saddam with a serious force; that this idea being discussed of inside-out and a relatively small number of people and decapitation, I would assess from your comments, you think would not be a prudent way to proceed. Am I misreading you?

MR. CORDESMAN: Senator, I think that, first, you can always try a decapitation strike and you might get lucky. Though I don't think it was made a big issue, we thought we'd killed Saddam during the Gulf War, and there actually was a celebration of the fact. It didn't quite work out that way, as General Horner would be the first to tell you.

Is it worth trying? Of course. Can we count on it? No. Is it possible, when we talk about this inside-out strategy, that a combination of major amounts of air strikes preceding the attack, concentrating our armor and attack helicopters, thrusting at Baghdad and the core of Saddam's power, leaving aside the Shiite areas, which may well not support him, leaving aside much of his order of battle, which might not support him -- is that a possible option, particularly if we can bring massive amounts of air power to bear? Yes.

But I believe that that option, as described, involves some 50,000 to 80,000 men. That is not a light, careless issue. And I would say to you, as I would say to many reporters, as long as you are reporting on total numbers of men, you are reporting a meaningless option. What counts here is the amount of armor, the amount of airpower, the attack helicopters, the force mix, and the basing. And when we talk about this kind of option, we're talking about access to major bases. And while we might not need 2,800 sorties a day, as we flew in the Gulf War, to be able to mount less than 1,000 to 1,500 would be reckless.

SEN. BIDEN: Now, Doctor, let me ask you, in your book, you discuss the merits of helping scientists working on the regime's weapons of mass destruction to escape Iraq. Based on your experience, what was the missing ingredient, if there was one, in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, its human expertise for research, its design and production, or raw ingredients, for example highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons? What was the -- what was the weakest link?

MR. HAMZA: Senator, the weakest link was research. That is research that could resolve the bottlenecks in the program. For example, in uranium enrichment, which you need in the bomb core, you need some bomb-grade uranium, so you need to enrich natural uranium using enrichment processes, we were held for five years because we could not develop an enrichment barrier, so called, that will separate the heavy from the light uranium. So, the bottlenecks in technology were the hold-up. The same goes for the calutron process to enrich uranium using the electromagnetic method. We were held up by simple technologies here, but to us were insurmountable problems of --

SEN. BIDEN: Do you have any reason to believe they have surmounted those bottlenecks?

MR. HAMZA: They declared they did. In 1993, Iraq surmounted the bottleneck in the diffusion barrier technology, and declared it in its full, final and complete declaration. So, Iraq did declare that some of these bottlenecks, for example in the diffusion process, were resolved. But still, it leaves a very small core of researchers to be the really critical part of the program. If these small cores of researchers, that's what I mention in the book, were taken care of, the program will be probably hindered.

SEN. BIDEN: How much does Saddam rely upon the expertise of scientists, foreign scientists, such as unemployed Russian scientists and others? How much of the scientific research and development is done by non-Iraqis?

MR. HAMZA: We had two experiences. We had, when I was transferred to the military industry to start the nuclear weapon program, we were ordered by Kamel, the other group, the (enrichment ?) group, to use the Germans. Our original intent was that using foreigners is a leaky process. We always get -- you know, information leaks out -- (inaudible). Using the Germans, for example, in 1989, Der Spiegel published a detailed report on what the Germans gave us and what kind of expertise we got.

So that was a sobering experience. And I believe after that, Iraq will use scientists in a very limited way. I believe some scientists were used in the chemical -- in rejuvenating the chemical weapon program, but not many in the nuclear. I believe Iraq still relies on its own scientists to develop its own weapons program.

SEN. BIDEN: In conclusion, how confident are you about your assertion you used in your statement, saying that by 2005, you believe the Iraqi government will have enough fissile material to build three nuclear weapons?

MR. HAMZA: This is the German assessment I mentioned. As I mentioned in the report, I took up parts of the statements to save time. But this is the German (BMD ?) assessment based on what it observed from Iraqi defectors and Iraq capabilities.

SEN. BIDEN: When was that assessment made?

MR. HAMZA: It was made last year. And there are reports that they repeated it this year again. It was February in 2001.

SEN. BIDEN: My time is up.

Senator Lugar?

SEN. LUGAR: Dr. Cordesman, much of the argument about preparation now for attack on Iraq is really based upon the thought Dr. Hamza suggested that nuclear capability is in the cards in 2005, or even Ambassador Butler's comment that at the end of the Gulf War or thereabouts, Iraq may have been within six months of development of at least something that could create a nuclear event.

If that is so, and even given the point you've made that the efficacy of biological and chemical weapons is very difficult to estimate, depending upon the circumstances, the case for continuing so-called containment strategy is that essentially to this point, Iraq has not been able to develop these weapons in a way that could have been used offensively, and as a matter of fact, the strategy apparently, as we see it, is that Saddam would use these weapons defensively and simply threaten the rest of the world with retaliation if an event occurred that attacked him.

However, what is your judgment -- leaving aside intelligence reports that may help the committee or, more importantly, the president and others to determine the imminence of Iraq's capability -- what is the case against simply continuing as we are now, perhaps with some additional amendments to this; namely, if it appeared that some testing or some other activity with regard to development, outside of a covert situation, came, that we would reserve the right for preemptive strikes or take action to try to eliminate that? Is there a big enough threat that it cannot be contained?

And then secondly, if we adopt that strategy, is it possible we could line up, then, our NATO allies, the countries in the neighborhood, with the thought that in the event Saddam did develop and did strike somebody, that we all come down together, as opposed to the current situation in which apparently almost all the neighbors plus our NATO allies are highly skeptical of the efficacy of our initiating a strike at this point absent certainty that Saddam has the weapons, uncertainty about the time of development, and worried simply that in the process of doing this, we might trigger off the use of whatever Saddam has, much to the detriment of his own people and those that he could hit?

I'm just sort of asking you for a general summation on the efficacy of containment as we know it.

MR. CORDESMAN: Senator, the first assignment I had when I came out of graduate school in the Office of Secretary of Defense was to work on a study of proliferation. That was back in the 1960s, and I have been working on them ever since. And the ability of people to predict who would really develop a nuclear weapon at a given time over four decades has been so poor that I think what we really have to say to ourselves is, we can't make those predictions. I would not put any great faith in BMD. I'm not sure that we can ever predict this. You ask the intelligence community how soon they can do it, and the answer always tends to be two to three years unless you have positive evidence that they have done it.

But the fact is that with areas like centrifuge technology, you never will really know. They are relatively easy to conceal. As Ambassador Butler pointed out, UNSCOM found that both the calutron effort and centrifuge effort -- the more they looked into it, the worse it was deigned. But that was 10 years ago. And to say that nobody has changed in 10 years and we can detect it is not realistic.

In biological weapons, the problem really is not the agent; it is whether you can convert it to a very small powder of exactly the right size, coat it and find a nonexplosive or nondestructive way to disseminate it. Iraq's designs for chemical weapons and biological weapons at the time of the Gulf War bordered on the actively stupid. I mean, they did not represent a lack of technology; they were just miserably executed: contact warheads, binary chemical weapons which ignored technology that Iraq had obtained from Chile. I mean, there was simply no reason to do anything this badly. But again, as Ambassador Butler pointed out, we haven't found the sprayers. We don't know what they've tested. You don't need to do this in the open. And a lot of it could be done clandestinely.

So in the biological area, let me make a very clear point here: They may have anthrax weapons today with nuclear lethalities. If they have smallpox -- and they were among the last countries to have a smallpox outbreak -- that is a weapon which has nuclear lethalities. Our problem here is, the more time goes on, the more the timelines give Saddam the ability to get there.

And it is far from clear that anyone will ever be able to answer your questions or know when or where or how these kinds of weapons will be used. You talked about the risk of going in and striking at these weapons. If they have the kind of weapons we think they have -- primarily wet agents, old bombs, limited-delivery systems -- that risk is acceptable today. But there could be collateral damage. They might use them on ports, our bases or our forces.

We can't dismiss those.

I do not believe that any amount of airstrikes suddenly executed will help. I invite the committee to look at the battle damage for Desert Fox and ask very probing questions about the sources of that battle damage assessment data and the quality of that damage assessment data. I would remind people that we flew some 2,400 sorties trying to suppress the Scuds once dispersed in the Gulf War. We saw some 48 plumes. We hit nothing. In spite of claims by some British Special Forces people, the entire Special Forces effort was a waste of time. It did not produce a single meaningful target. And these are realities I think we have to live with. The fact is, the time lines move toward and more risk, as both the previous witnesses have pointed out.

SEN. BIDEN: Senator Dodd.

SEN. DODD: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I think the statements by our witnesses and the responses already to these questions make the case of the value of just having these hearings, and appreciate immensely your participation.

Let me pick up again, just on a -- and to follow up a point that Senator Lugar was making, Professor Cordesman, on the -- that you -- that I'd like you to address, if you could, and that is the importance in the prosecution of a military option of international support or regional support. You mentioned in your statement the necessity of having bases of operation. Being able to place supplies in the forward positions and the like would be very important.

We at least hear today of the criticism that's coming from allies, as well as regional -- powers in the region who are -- at least call themselves allies. Could you please give us some sort of an assessment of how important that factor is in the successful prosecution of the military option?

MR. CORDESMAN: I think we have to be prepared for the fact that if we do this, it will in many ways be our first preemptive war. We will not have a clear smoking gun. There will not be a simple cause.

I think we have the support of the British government. Most of our NATO allies will at best be reluctant and seek, if anything, to delay it, to use the U.N.

But we had some of those problems during the Gulf War. Remember, the French defense minister resigned basically just before the fighting began. We didn't get our aircraft into Turkey until 48 hours before the authorization was given by the Turkish government, and that was 48 hours before the air war began. Coalitions perhaps take on a cachet in retrospect they never had at the time.

But there are some realities here. You are going to need Turkish air basing far more, because the center of power is a lot further north. If you cannot get Saudi airspace, that will be critical. So would Saudi bases, if possible.

There were really 23 airfields and air bases at the time of the Gulf War. We used every single one of them to capacity, put Marine Corps aircraft into unimproved strips because there were no areas left, and 11 of those bases were in Saudi Arabia.

If we are going to fight this one, you, at a minimum, are going to need all of the capacity of Qatar, of Bahrain and Kuwait. You're going to need to be able to stage through Oman. You probably are going to have to use most of your carrier assets, at least initially, because of a lack of basing, unless you can get Saudi Arabia.

So any assessment of relative capability and scenarios is based -- determined not so much by what our European allies do, but what we can actually get by way of support in the region.

SEN. DODD: Do I have time for one more question?

SEN. BIDEN: You sure do.

SEN. DODD: Let me jump back, if I can, Dr. Butler, to the -- Ambassador Butler, to the efforts of compliance. Is there any sense or any scenario which you can conjure up which would cause Saddam Hussein to -- and his government, to take a different view towards inspections? Or is that, in your view, an option that has been exhausted, and past events have proved the futility of trying to have the kind of cooperation necessary to pursue that avenue of dealing with this issue?

MR. BUTLER: Well, Mr. Dodd, my -- Senator, my answer, I'm afraid, will be a pessimistic one. In the concluding part of my remarks I said that I believed it was essential -- if one asked the gut question of what is needed here, my answer is arms control and disarmament. What that implies is -- and others tended to agree -- was that it is in theory essential that we have Iraq brought into conformity with the law, which is that it must cooperate with a full- scale international effort to A, take away the weapons that it made in the past and which already exist; and B, institute a system of long- term monitoring that Dr. Hamza referred to, for example, to ensure that those weapons are not reconstituted in the future.

Now, central to such a structure is the cooperation of the government of Iraq, and it never gave it. Remember, at the beginning of my statement I concluded from the brief history of UNSCOM, incredibly brief, that there were two points. One, the first point was that Iraq never obeyed the law, and the other was that it's always been utterly committed to having weapons of mass destruction.

Now, I must, I'm afraid, give a pessimistic answer to your very pertinent question: Are they likely to do it? No, they're not. Does it mean that we should, therefore, now stop trying to get that restored? No. I think we've got to go a little further way, if for no other reason than to make clear to the world that we went the full distance to get the law obeyed and arms control restored before taking other measures.

SEN. DODD: May I ask you quickly, what specific avenues would you pursue to take this the final yard or two, as you've described it?

MR. BUTLER: I've said many times before, Senator, and I'll repeat it here, the pathway lies in cooperation with Russia. It is Russia, and to some extent France, in the Security Council in 1998 and '99 which brought our efforts -- I don't mean United States' efforts, I mean UNSCOM and the civilized and interested community that wanted to see this horrible problem of weapons of mass destruction and Saddam's mind and behavior brought under control. It was Russia's split with the United States, Russia's decision that it had greater interests in sticking with Saddam, that brought our effort down.

Now, it follows logically from that, and indeed, there is a lot of practical evidence for it as well as mere logic, that the way ahead would be through and with Russia. If we could get Russia and then France -- the U.K., of course is a given -- I don't mean that disrespectfully to them; they've been stanch on this. If we could get Russia to work seriously with us in Baghdad to make very clear to the Iraqis that, "This is it, this is it. You will do serious arms control or you're toast" -- to put it simply -- we might have a chance. But absent that, we won't.

SEN. DODD: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much.

Can I ask for a point of clarification, Professor? Without Qatar, without Bahrain, without Kuwait, is it possible to launch successfully a military action that has a high probability of success and a relatively low probability of high casualties for American forces?

MR. CORDESMAN: You can conduct a very destructive bombing and air campaign. But, I mean, short of having a McGuffin, in other words, "Yes, I will avoid that, but will go through Jordan or Turkey," the answer would be I think not. And I think it would be devastating to risk the lives of the Kurds or the Iraqi opposition or U.S. Special Forces on some kind of operation which might conceivably succeed, but which would have no probability of succeeding, and where we could never back it up by bailing them out.

SEN. BIDEN: All right, thank you. I appreciate the indulgence of my colleagues.

Senator Hagel.

Obviously, we don't have the vote at 11:00 yet, so we're going to just keep going till we -- (bells sound indicating a vote). (Laughter.)

Well, why don't you proceed anyway, Senator, and we'll go through this round.

Will you all be able to stay? Again, they said four votes, which means it will at least be --

SEN. LUGAR: At least 50 minutes.

SEN. BIDEN: -- at least 50 minutes. Are you able to do that? (No audible responses.) We may have to go through lunch here because we have very important panels to follow you.

SEN. LUGAR: We ought to make -- maybe the back room available to the witnesses.

SEN. BIDEN: Yes, we would make the room available -- we don't want to call it the "back room," but we would make the anteroom here available to you all, and maybe we can get you something to drink, coffee or a cold drink of some kind.

Mr. Hagel -- Senator Hagel.

SEN. CHARLES HAGEL (R-NE): Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Thank you each for your contributions this morning.

I'd like to ask each of you this question. In light of your testimony, in light of what you have heard your other colleagues discuss this morning, is it each of your opinion that the policy of containment is now exhausted, and we now must face the reality that it does not work?

Some of the testimony that was given this morning by each of you, some more direct than others, regarding, if I understood this in your case in particular, Dr. Hamza, that any further inspection regime would essentially be meaningless and useless. So, if that, in fact, is where you are, and I don't know where the other two are exactly, then containment doesn't work, inspections are useless, and we are just continuing to march around the bush here, so therefore we must face the reality of what we are dealing with, if this is the case, and move to another policy. Then, if that is the case, what is that policy? Do we have no other option than the military option? bassador Butler?

MR. BUTLER: I'm not prepared to say that containment has failed outright. I think, Senator Hagel, one has to ask, where would we be had we not behaved as we have in the last decade? Had UNSCOM not existed, Saddam Hussein would now be armed to the teeth with all three forms of weapons of mass destruction, would be an awesome situation. I think the same logic is true for containment. Had we been less determined to contain him and his efforts in various ways, we would face an appalling situation.

I think your question, though, by stating it as an absolute, has containment failed, does highlight the fact that to really solely on containment is actually folly. So, I would argue that what we need is a combination of continuing behaviors by us and others that serve to contain this outlaw regime. I've emphasized legality several times. We're essentially dealing with an outlaw regime here. And those behaviors have to do with trade in strategic goods, for example, other sources of comfort to the man and his weapons aspirations.

Now, in addition to those measures of containment, we need very specific things directed at the specifics that Iraq and Saddam present to us, and that is, that has been in the form of inspections. The regime of inspections was unique in history. We'd never seen such a thing before.

Why was that done? Because he's unique. This is something -- this is a point that I would like to particularly put to this committee. This man is different.

If you look around the world -- and I was deeply impressed by the approach that Professor Cordesman yet again took this morning. I think it was hardheaded and right. He's worked all his life in nonproliferation. If you look around the world, of 180 countries, you see 160 who basically behave properly. And there's about 20 who don't.

Three of them, extrasystemic to the Nonproliferation Treaty, have nuclear weapons -- India, Pakistan and Israel. That's not good.

But in numerical terms, the world in that sense has basically -- for 40-odd years, the period since the Second World War, has behaved more or less well. When you get down into analyzing those who haven't one sticks out beyond and above all others, and it's Saddam Hussein and what he has done to his country and to those around him.

Now that means, in my view, we need to continue fundamental elements of containment. Should we -- this is your question, I think -- should we rely on that as the answer? No, because in and of itself it doesn't work. Do we discard it altogether? No. We need some elements of containment.

But we also need a specific solution to the specific problems posed by this particular and, I suggest, unique outlaw.

Now maybe resumed inspections would never be successful, as Dr. Hamza has said. I don't think we'll actually get to there, because, as I've already said, I suspect the Iraqis might even let them begin. But then if that is the case, we have to consider something else, and that's what I think these hearings are about. What is that other thing to deal with this unique problem? I don't yet know the answer. Senator Biden has started a process with Senator Lugar of finding that answer, and I just think we've got to press on and find it.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I had begged indulgence of the committee --

SEN. BIDEN: Please. Go ahead.

SEN. HAGEL: -- to ask the other two witnesses for a short answer to their -- to the question.

SEN. BIDEN: Sure.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you very much.

Dr. Hamza?

MR. HAMZA: I agree with Ambassador Butler. Containment did keep Iraq from accelerating its production, limited its -- what is available to it, destroyed most of its weapon depository.

But in the end, it's not the answer, for the simple reason -- Iraq restructured its science and technology base around the containment policy. So it created a new international network for purchasing, redistributed its scientists and engineers so that they will not be very visible to airstrikes and to possible inspectors if they go in. So in the end, Iraq is working to defeat containment, and in the end, it will achieve its purpose.

So containment did delay -- yes, I agree with the ambassador -- considerably Iraq's -- Iraq would have been now in possession of nuclear weapons without containment, and a much larger stockpile of chemical and possibly much more biological weapons.

But in the end, we need something else with containment. My suggestion, as I stated earlier, is that regime change as the stated U.S. policy would be the correct way to deal with this problem.

SEN. HAGEL: Professor Cordesman?

Thank you.

MR. CORDESMAN: I would have to agree largely with the previous witnesses. I think we should remember, however, what containment means. It isn't just sitting there. Are we really aggressively going to try to stop arms transfers? In which case I have heard no one in this country point out the fact that Syria has become a serious conduit.

What happens if we detect proliferation? Remember that we could go to war tomorrow if we had a U.S. or British aircraft shot down, in terms of repeating another Desert Fox. Are we really willing to go to war immediately if there's a violation on missile testing, if we detect a biological facility, if we have the confidence?

Containment is not pacifism. It is not simply reliance on arms control. But to say containment is exhausted - you can only say that when you are really ready, Senator, to do something else. And that means we need a critical minimum of allies and bases, a national commitment to using real force and a willingness to win the peace as well as the war. And I think that until nation-building becomes a bipartisan term and one where there is a serious commitment to what could be years of peacekeeping, economic effort and help in building a democracy, we aren't ready to say containment is exhausted.

Thank you.

SEN. BIDEN: We're going to come back. One of the things I'm sure we're going to be asking you is, to the extent that Saddam Hussein is a unique element in this picture, what is Iraq without Saddam Hussein? How dangerous is it even if it were merely -- if he dropped dead tomorrow? How would that -- that all by itself. Nothing else. Just Saddam Hussein -- how would that alter the situation, if at all?

(Sounds gavel.)

(Recess.)

SEN. BIDEN: (Sounds gavel.) The hearing will come to order. I thank our witnesses for their indulgence -- of all days to have four votes back to back it was today. I apologize for that. Let me now yield to Senator Feingold. I think he's next in line here.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for holding these hearings. And I want to offer my gratitude to all the witnesses, and particularly this panel. We had a long time voting there, but I can tell you a lot of people commented on how excellent this panel has already been. So I appreciate what you have done.

In April I chaired a related hearing of the Constitution Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, and much of that earlier hearing focused in detailed legal terms on the authority of the president to launch a military operation against Iraq. And after listening to many constitutional experts, I certainly concluded that the Constitution requires the president to seek additional authorization from Congress before he can embark on a major new military undertaking in Iraq.

Today these hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee begin the important work of considering the complicated policy issues that are at stake, gathering information, and coming to some informed conclusions about what we will and will not authorize with regard to U.S. intervention in Iraq. And after listening to many constitutional experts, I certainly concluded that the Constitution requires the president to seek additional authorization from Congress before he can embark on a major new military undertaking in Iraq.

Today these hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee begin the important work of considering the complicated policy issues that are at stake, gathering information, and coming to some informed conclusions about what we will and will not authorize with regard to U.S. intervention in Iraq.

I want the committee to know that a number of my constituents have contacted me prior to today's hearing, and they have delivered one very clear message. They want to be certain that this committee carefully considers a range of views and informed perspectives on Iraq, and they want to be certain that we do not accept as fact any one set of subjective assumptions about Iraq. They are right to insist on a sober and honest effort. And given that much of the rhetoric surrounding U.S. policy toward Iraq in recent months has suggested that American families should be prepared to send their sons and daughters to war, we do hold the American people nothing less than a thorough examination of the situation before us, and a careful consideration of our policy options. And I again thank the chair for the role these hearings will play in that process.

Let me ask all of you this. All of us here would agree that the president has the constitutional authority to launch a preemptive strike in self-defense in advance of an imminent attack by Iraq on the United States. And this is especially true in the face of an imminent attack on the United States with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. But the key here is to assess the level of the threat and the imminence of the attack. The war powers solution creates a high threshold for unilateral presidential action -- action which must be authorized in any event within 60 days of any preemptive strike.

So I'd like to ask you do any of you believe that we have already reached that level of threat, that we now face an imminent attack on the United States? Mr. Butler? Ambassador Butler?

MR. BUTLER: An imminent attack upon the United States by Iraq in the 60 days -- you are talking about 60 days' notice. Look, senator, my simple answer is, no, we do not.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Doctor?

MR. HAMZA: Surely what we are talking about here really is a preemptive strike for a possible future danger which is much larger than we have right now. And would it be much costlier in the future or not? Yes. If we do it much later it would be a much costlier strike than what we do now.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand that. But you don't believe there is an imminent threat of attack on the United States?

MR. HAMZA: No, what I believe is it is much easier now at much less cost and less danger to the U.S. to do it right now than after the window closes on --

SEN. FEINGOLD: That's not the question I'm asking, but I appreciate the comment. Professor?

MR. CORDESMAN: Senator, I do not believe that in a classic sense it is imminent. But I have to issue a very strong caution. I don't think you will ever get that kind of warning. As we learned at the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon, the idea that you have enough warning to tell you an attack is imminent, on the United States or our allies, particularly from a man like this with biological weapons or nuclear weapons. This is not the world we are going to live in. And I have to say that if that is the interpretation of the War Powers Act, it is so fundamentally obsolete that it has become irrelevant to asymmetric warfare.

SEN. FEINGOLD: These are simply the threshold questions I think we need to determine to figure out what procedure we should follow in terms of dealing with this issue. Ambassador?

MR. BUTLER: Thank you. Could I just say I agree with what my two colleagues have said. Dr. Hamza of course answered a different question. But I want to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to make this point. This was a very specific question from Senator Feingold. I gave the only answer I could give. I also agree in particular with Professor Cordesman that that is not to say we don't face a danger.

I want to say this: I have searched my mind thoroughly about my Iraq experience and what the inner meaning of what the last 10 years have been since the end of the Gulf War until now. And I put this to you, Mr. Chairman, and to your colleagues: If there is an inner meaning to what we now face, it is this, and it is one of life's great principles, I submit: that is, if you defer, put off to another day the solution to a serious problem, it will only be harder and costlier in the end.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I think there's a lot of force to all those comments, and I don't necessarily disagree with them. What I am trying to do here is determine the basic assumptions that we can share with our colleagues and the American people. What is the threat? And I think the first thing you ask is, Was there a threat -- is there an imminent threat to the United States being attacked directly? The answer is no, but that doesn't necessarily lead to any other conclusion about whether it's advisable to move forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much. Senator Lugar.

SEN. LUGAR: Mr. Chairman, I don't have further questions.

SEN. BIDEN: I have just a couple, and I won't trespass on your time much longer.

SEN. NELSON: And I have one too.

SEN. BIDEN: Oh, I beg your pardon. I didn't realize you were back.

SEN. NELSON: You go ahead.

SEN. BIDEN: No, it's your turn. I've already asked questions. Please go ahead. I apologize.

SEN. NELSON: Give me your opinion what would be the possibility that there is an uprising from within if we were to have some kind of external attack with some internal clandestine operations? Is Saddam Hussein's control on the leadership of that country so tight that it's very difficult to have that uprising from within?

MR. HAMZA: Is that to me? To us?

SEN. NELSON: To all of you, please. Doctor, go ahead.

MR. HAMZA: I believe the experience of an attack from outside that caused an uprising was there in the Gulf War, and it gave us an example of what could happen. I believe the circumstances are even better right now for an uprising done while the Gulf War. I mean, we had sanctions then of less than a year. And we had a very strong uprising that took off the Saddam government in more than two-thirds of the country. What we have now is a country that is under the sanctions for 11 years and under Saddam oppression for all this period. The Iraqis are by now given up hope of any possible change unless they get rid of that man.

So I believe if there is a serious U.S. intent to remove him, and there is an attack, the Iraqis will join the U.S. forces -- like what happened in Afghanistan -- and there will be an uprising, and there will be a great support for any invasion from inside Iraq.

MR. CORDESMAN: If I may, senator, I would --

SEN. NELSON: Yes, professor, or Mr. Ambassador --

MR. CORDESMAN: -- be, I think, very cautious, because one thing is what kind of uprising and for what? I don't believe that you are going to see the Kurds rush out to take adventures and risks at this point in time. And that has been fairly clear from a great deal of discussion. There are problems certainly for the Shiites. They have many reasons to rise up. But if they rise up in the south, they also are now dealing with a much better structured security force. Saddam has adapted as well, and I am struck by the fact that while there are some claims about what happened here, to the extent I have seen any really organized efforts they have come from SARI, or SCIRI, or however you wish to use the acronym. They have had more and more operational problems. I have seen fewer and fewer indications that claims of operations actually have reality. And if this uprising happens in the south, and we have not the strength to get rid of the regime in Baghdad and its core, then we may see again that we expose people frankly to becoming martyrs or victims. So I think that certainly we are not going to see a united Iraq. But if we don't have the strength to deal with this, you might well see something happen that could be just as bad as what happened in 1991.

SEN. NELSON: I want to come back to a follow-up, but I would like to get opinion as well.

MR. BUTLER: Senator, just very quickly, I think the Iraqi people are a fairly decent people. I think they have been the first victims -- the most evident victims of a brutal, homicidal dictatorship, and I think if they saw the possibilities that that would be taken away they would welcome it. How that would occur -- a spontaneous, democratic, cheerful uprising -- is something that I agree with Professor Cordesman you'd have to be very careful about, whether instead the coming demise of Saddam would be seen by various factions in the country as providing them with an opportunity to take power for their own ends is something that could be a source of difficulty.

The question really is about who would replace him, and I think that's a very important question. But as far as the Iraqi people are concerned, yes, they know what they have suffered under for a great long time, and in that elemental sense I believe in the end they would feel good about being relieved of the burden of Saddam Hussein.

SEN. NELSON: May I follow up? To the professor -- the fact that we have basically air cover over two thirds of the country in the north and the south, how do you utilize that to your advantage to provoke the uprisings, even before you go into the center core one- third that we don't have the air cover on right now? And can you utilize that in a way to stir the rebellion before you have to move in on Baghdad?

MR. CORDESMAN: Senator, I would have to say that there are no conceivable conditions under which I would do that. To try to minimize our casualties and level of force we use by risking the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians is simply not to me an option. And that would be the effective result. Now, can we use air power to isolate areas in Iraq where we have reasonable intelligence that there would be strong support for our operations? Yes, if we can absolutely guarantee that we can secure them, and if in an emergency we can concentrate sufficient force, which might take things like Rangers or U.S. ground troops to protect the people.

But I think we have to certainly make every effort to use the Iraqi opposition. We have to make every use that we can of isolating troops -- perhaps getting them to defect. But the scenario that you suggested bothers me deeply, because it doesn't imply that we can guarantee the protection of the people involved that we will have sufficient force. And I have been -- I was stationed in Iran in the early 1970s. I visited the Kurds in Iraq then, and I watched them abandoned after 1975. And I think you might find that the Kurds would feel they have been abandoned since. Once is enough.

SEN. NELSON: Thank you very much.

SEN. BIDEN: I am going to ask a couple of questions. Then I'll yield to my colleague. And I'll try to do this quickly. Mr. Ambassador, I share your view that Saddam at all costs will agree to no inspection that may cost him his weapons of mass destruction. But I have a different question. Is it possible to construct an inspection regime that if it were agreed to -- we both agree it is not likely to be -- but if it were that it would be efficacious, that you would have some -- how intrusive would it have to be in order to have some significant expectation that you would be able to root out the bulk of his biological, chemical and/or potential nuclear capacity?

MR. BUTLER: Mr. Chairman, the conduct of inspections is entirely within our technical and intellectual capability. If we were allowed to go anywhere anytime, we can do the job. We can do it well, competently and completely. What it relies on is the willingness of Iraq to allow us to go anywhere anytime. Absent that it will never --

SEN. BIDEN: Some in our Defense Department make the argument that notwithstanding the fact you theoretically can be allowed to go anywhere anytime. And over the last four years the regime has been able to, through mobilizing if you will -- making mobile their biological weapons laboratories -- and digging deep into the ground in places where we don't know that even if we were free to roam we would still not be able to do the job.

MR. BUTLER: Yeah. I've read and heard, with great interest of course, the mobilizing and burial arguments -- as recently as in the last 24 hours by a very distinguished member of the administration. I think they can be overstated, quite frankly, and I am a bit concerned about the stridency with which some of those things are said -- almost as if to justify a coming invasion.

I repeat: it can be done. No arms control inspection or verification is perfect. Anyone who has been in that business will tell you that. I've been in it for a quarter of a century, and I'll tell you straight up there can be errors and mistakes. But, senator, there is an enormous gap between an inspections regime that is given full access and one that is cheated upon. Now, given full access -- now, technologies and intelligence are such that we can do a very, very good job. I don't think it serves our purpose well -- that is, the purpose of getting to the clear truth of things -- to say this work is inherently flawed. It isn't. What is its big problem is refusal to allow it to be done.

SEN. BIDEN: That's why I asked the question. I want to get -- yes, Tony -- Professor?

MR. CORDESMAN: Senator, I would just, -- I agree in broad terms with what Ambassador Butler has said. But going anywhere at any time means the manpower, the mobility, the resources, the monitoring, and the more you have to do the more of these you need. And you have to have a base, which means at some point you would have to survey and inspect Iraq again, knowing that you will no longer have audit trails to the time of the Gulf War. But, beyond that, I don't know of anyone at CDC and USAMRIID -- and I would suggest you ask them -- who believes that if a country is willing to use infectious agents or genetic engineering, that can be found through inspection. There are other ways to deter it. But the facilities involved are so small, so easy to scatter, the amount of agent that is needed is so limited, and the corridors in which you can deliver are essentially covert or use human capabilities. So you may end up if you do this without putting the resources in, pushing people into biological options and into the worst possible attack scenarios. And that risk should be kept firmly in mind.

SEN. BIDEN: I acknowledge that -- understand that. That is able to be done by Iraq, even if Saddam is gone.

MR. CORDESMAN: Yes.

SEN. BIDEN: And so I think we should be -- look, we are looking for here -- at least I am looking for the broadest, most rational understanding of what our options are and what we can and cannot be certain of. And the truth is there's a lot of things we can't be certain of, but everything is probabilities as we move down this road.

I realize my time is up. I am going to follow up though, with the permission of my colleagues, on one question, and that relates to nuclear capability able to be married to a missile, a medium-range or longer-range missile. Both of you who have been involved in the inspections side of this in the past, and you, Doctor, who are involved in the production side, if you will, to use the phrase loosely, would be as qualified as any witnesses we are going to have to answer the following question, and that is that if Saddam were successful in building an intermediate-range missile or a missile that is much further than 160 kilometers, and if he were able to provide a nuclear warhead on that missile -- as we all know, it's a heck of a lot easier to put a chemical or biological warhead, for no other reason for the laymen out there, other than the pure weight of the object.

Would we be able to have enough notice of that, not in terms of whether they develop the capacity on the nuclear side, but on the missile side? And would we be able to preemptively move against that system, that nuclear delivery system, as others have on other occasions? Do you understand my question? Ambassador Butler or --

MR. BUTLER: Why don't you start?

SEN. BIDEN: -- Doctor?

MR. HAMZA: There are two stages, Senator, for the delivery system to be successful. One is that the nuclear weapon itself has to be hardened to withstand the missile itself, which can --

SEN. BIDEN: What you mean by that is it has to be hardened enough so the vibration and the thrust and the force can -- the warhead can sustain that to stay intact. Correct?

MR. HAMZA: Yeah. Iraq has not done that. Until I left -- now, I'm talking about eight years since I left -- we had no, as I said, high-level defector to tell us what is going on down there. In any case, I expect -- because that was defined as a defined project, and work to be done. So Iraq needed to do that at the time. I don't know if it has been done. I don't think the inspectors found anything in that direction up to 1998. They are in a better position to answer that. My impression, they did not find any trace of serious Iraqi work in that direction. Whether it happened since 1998 till now, my guess it would.

The second stage is mating that to a missile. The Iraqi missiles have a problem; that is, the payload gets much smaller with increased range, because what they are doing is not --

SEN. BIDEN: And I'm translating here -- by payload, you mean -- I know -- I mean, it's important, I think, if this is being listened to by the American people -- the payload means the actual weapon that sits on top of that missile --

MR. HAMZA: Exactly.

SEN. BIDEN: -- and that the heavier that payload, the less distance that same missile could travel.

MR. HAMZA: Exactly.

SEN. BIDEN: If it had a light payload, it can travel further; if a heavier payload, it travels less far. Correct? That's what you mean.

MR. HAMZA: Exactly. And the problem with the Iraq missile system is that Iraq did not develop a medium-range missile. It took short-range missiles and extended the range. And that meant the payload will be smaller eventually. So we had that problem; we faced it when I was there. And that was one of the things -- that wasn't -- I don't know if Iraq resolved that either.

So the problem of delivery of a nuclear warhead by a missile remains to be questionable by Iraq. So one has to look at other options that Iraq could use to deliver its missiles. But my belief right now, Iraq does not have this capability yet.

SEN. BIDEN: Mr. Ambassador.

MR. BUTLER: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I'll try and keep this short because of the time factor. What Iraq was doing in my time there was trying to increase --

SEN. BIDEN: For the record, your time ended when?

MR. BUTLER: Last time I was in country was '98. My job ended in '99. They were attempting to increase the fuel loading on a given missile to make it go longer. That is another way to make a missile fly longer is to increase the amount of fuel. But if you do that, you reduce the amount of space left for the size of the warhead.

In our experience then, Iraq had loaded chemical and biological agent into warheads, and it seemed to be more interested in that. I think the ultimate goal of Saddam is to have a nuclear weapon deliverable by missile. That's a very effective way to deliver a nuclear warhead. It's by long distance. You're well away from where the explosion will take place.

And it's very dangerous, very effective. But that requires a certain kind of missile, one that will fly a good distance, carry nuclear weight at the top, and have a good guidance system. I don't believe that Iraq is near that yet. Does he want it? Yes. I think what they were contemplating --

SEN. BIDEN: My question is, where do you think they are?

MR. BUTLER: What they were contemplating was delivery of a nuclear weapon by other means.

SEN. BIDEN: In the past -- and Professor, I'd like you to respond as well -- in the past -- I've been doing this arms control strategic doctrine issue for 30 years now -- when we were talking about Russia, we used to always say Russia would never deploy what they haven't flight-tested; Russia would never rest -- no nation would rest its security based upon a missile or a system that hadn't been tested.

I assume we're operating on a different premise relative to this fellow. But would there not -- add to your answer, if you would, whether or not there would be a requirement for some. Or is there it required for any flight testing in any way for this guy to engage in the contemplated use of that combination of a missile and a warhead that's nuclear?

MR. CORDESMAN: Senator, I think we are talking -- all I can do is give you a worst case, because I think Dr. Hamza and Ambassador Butler are completely correct. If you could obtain small Russian nuclear weapons, if you could get these in ways which allowed you to bypass the Russian security systems -- and it is a matter of public record that some of these systems are relatively primitive and non- destructive --

SEN. BIDEN: Again, for our listeners, we're talking about a whole system. We're talking about an intermediate or a short-range nuclear missile. We're not talking --

MR. BUTLER: No, I'm talking only about something like a nuclear device, whether it is a small tactical nuclear weapon or the kind of thing that might be used in a MIRVed missile. It would be a nuclear device, however, that had sufficiently low weight so it could still meet the very real constraint that Dr. Hamza raised. And some of those simply were not designed to be protected against intrusive arming.

Now, if you took that and you got the weight and size exactly, and then you started firing what they can fire, which are missiles with a range of 150 kilometers or less, you might be able to conduct the test without it being detected. And if you put that on a longer- range missile and you are willing to strike at a city-size target, it is just possible that you might be able to do this without extensive testing or with that kind of testing.

To me, it would be at the absolute margin of risk. But Saddam went in and used chemical weapons that were manufactured in laboratories early in the Iran-Iraq war with no testing whatsoever. He went directly from the lab to the battlefield.

SEN. BIDEN: Isn't that a difference, though, between testing a chemical agent and relying upon testing -- I mean, using, without having tested at all, a nuclear warhead on a missile?

MR. CORDESMAN: As Ambassador Butler pointed out, what makes this man different from all other proliferators is his proven history of risk-taking. And the fact that the nuclear weapon might never get near its intended target --

SEN. BIDEN: Would be irrelevant to him?

MR. CORDESMAN: -- will not always be reassuring. Let me just add one other point about biological and chemical weapons. It is extremely difficult to put useful biological and chemical weapons on a missile warhead. It requires exact fusing and a non-destructive mechanism to do it. Nothing Iraq had -- and I will defer to Ambassador Butler and Dr. Hamza -- in 1998 that was discovered by UNSCOM came close to that. They were sort of solid warheads, filled warheads with contact fuses.

The only problem I would give here is a lot of that fusing is becoming commercially available, and the best non-explosive dissemination device, unfortunately, is the air bag used in cars. So you can't rule that possibility out.

SEN. BIDEN: If I can translate what you just said, it's difficult and it's important. And I have one concluding question, and I'll yield a longer round to each of my colleagues if they have it. If we operate on the premise -- and I have been corralling men and women like you for the past year who are experts in your field and having them -- boring them to death with questions for hours on end in my office, trying to gain as much knowledge and background as I can.

And one of the things, whether people are, quote, "for moving or not moving," one consensus I seem to get from whomever I speak, wherever they are in the equation of moving sooner than later or not moving at all or containing or whatever, is that this is a different breed of cat, this fellow, and that if, in fact, he is cornered, if, in fact, his regime is about to come to an end, that's the place at which he is the most dangerous. That's the place he's most likely to use whatever it is that he has that can be the most destructive.

And they also, I am -- the thing that I hear most often stated is that the issue is whether or not he will preemptively use any weapon of mass destruction, whether he will use it only in response to an invasion, or that he will use it as a last-ditch effort to save himself by either broadening this to a regional war or whatever.

Why -- what evidence do we have that contained, and beyond what we've provoked so far, unprovoked beyond this point, is that he would offensively, without further provocation, use a weapon of mass destruction when, in fact, the rationale offered by all of you is that this is a guy whose first and foremost desire is to stay in power?

Explain that, what seems to me to be a bit of a conundrum here. Why would he offensively -- for example, the discussion now is we'd better move now, not because he'll have weapons to blackmail us, as they get more sophisticated, but that he may very well deliver these weapons into the hands of terrorists to go do his dirty work, or he would preemptively strike Israel, strike American forces in the region, strike neighbors, et cetera.

Why would he do that? What in his past would indicate he would do that, knowing that, as one of you said, he would invite an incredible response? That seems certain to me he would invite an overwhelming response. A lot of innocent people would die in the interim. But any comment on that? And then I'll yield to my friend from --

MR. CORDESMAN: If I may, Senator, I felt exactly the same way after the Iran-Iraq war, which was the first time he showed he was willing to take incredible risks. He did invade Kuwait. He used chemical weapons against his own Kurds, admittedly with not the absolute guarantee of retaliation or the risk of it that I think other people might have seen, in attacking Iran or attacking the Kurds.

But the problem I think we all have is we're trying to read the mind of one person or a very narrow group of people and figure out how they might behave under stress or over time.

But I would add one note here. Wars of intimidation in the Gulf can be very, very important. If he can really lever Saudi Arabia and other countries, we do have to remember that 60 percent of the world's oil reserve is here, and our own forecasts are that the world's economy will be dependent on the Gulf for twice as many oil experts by 2020 as it is today.

MR. HAMZA: The whole idea that Saddam will use a nuclear weapon and just attack, I don't think comes into play here. What happens here is that nuclear weapons at least will be the deterrence he needs to have a free hand in the region. That's the fear, not the fear that he will put nuclear weapons on a missile and shoot it at Israel or the U.S. We know what kind of response he will get, and he knows it well.

What will happen next is that if he gets the deterrence he needs to have a free hand in the region, what shape of action do we need to take against him and what kind of situation would we be in in the future? That's the danger.

SEN. BIDEN: I appreciate the answer, because I'm not trying to make a case; I'm trying to understand a point, because my instinct, talking to so many people, is that the real concern is his being able to leverage that capability, as opposed to him preemptively waking up one morning and saying, "You know, I'm going to take out Riyadh or I'm going to take out Tel Aviv or I'm going to take out Ankara," assuming he had the range to do that, which he doesn't at this point.

But, at any rate, do you want to conclude? I've really gone beyond my time.

MR. BUTLER: Just very quickly, Senator. I think one must acknowledge that it's extremely uncomfortable for us to know that he's there with these weapons. But one has to draw a distinction, I think, between that discomfort and a rational calculation of what he might do. And if you accept that one of his fundamental imperatives is to stay in power, then it's hard to think that he would wake up one morning and decide, "This is the day that I'm going to go and attack the United States," because he knows that that would be suicide.

So I think that's a very important distinction to draw. No one is comfortable with his weapon status. And why should we be? But one has to keep clear eyes about what he might calculate is in his interest.

SEN. BIDEN: I thank you. And I thank Senator Chafee for his indulgence. Fire away, Senator.

SEN. CHAFEE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This panel is -- the topic is the threat, and I guess that's probably the most important place to start is the threat. And then in subsequent panels we'll talk about possible responses, regional considerations, the day after and national security perspectives. But, of course, I do think the threat is the most important one, of course.

And there was a recent story in the Washington Post, a Sunday story, which says that many senior U.S. military officers contend that President Hussein, Saddam Hussein, poses no immediate threat and that the United States should continue its policy of containment. I know Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel have talked about containment.

But some of the other quotes from the article are that this approach is held by some top generals and admirals in the military establishment, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And some of the quotes are, "In my assessment, the whole containment and sanctions policy has worked better than it's given credit for." And another quote is, "We've bottled him up for 11 years, so we're doing okay."

And I do think that it would have been good to have that perspective on this panel for a better balance. I think we've gotten from this panel a perspective that the threat is very real, very immediate. And I maybe would ask you to comment on some of these senior military officials, including, according to the article, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their --

SEN. BIDEN: If the gentleman would yield just for a moment. I apologize.

SEN. CHAFEE: Excuse me.

SEN. BIDEN: But the senator from Florida is going to chair the hearing. I have to leave for a few minutes. And after this panel is over, we'll recess for -- how much time for lunch? -- 45 minutes for lunch when this panel -- I'm not suggesting we finish now. When the panel is finished, we'll recess for 45 minutes.

And I assure you, Senator, there are other witnesses coming along who think the policy of containment is just fine. So I hope you'll find this is extremely balanced when we finish the whole two days of hearings. But I thank you for letting me interrupt, and I'm turning the gavel over to --

SEN. CHAFEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I'll put my question specifically to Ambassador Butler, because one of the quotes from this article was that senior officers believe the policy has been more effective than is generally recognized. And as evidence, the top brass said the approach has deterred Hussein from threatening his neighbors and from backing terrorist organizations.

And in your testimony, you said the opposite. You said, "We do know that Iraq has trained terrorists from around the region and has mounted terrorist actions of its own, as far afield as Southeast Asia." And I think you mentioned that he had some personal experience in that. So I'd maybe ask you to expound on that experience you have with Hussein training terrorists.

MR. BUTLER: Dr. Hamza gave more detail of that, and there was no prior consultation between him and me before we started work today. He referred to the terrorist training center at a place called Salman Pak outside Baghdad.

There are detailed accounts available now of the through-put through that center of a variety of nationalities, most of them from countries in the Middle East. But the point is not just Iraqis but a multiplicity of nationals being to that school, trained by Iraq in techniques of terrorism.

The incident that I referred to in Southeast Asia, when I said I have one personal experience of the reach of Saddam, was that during the Gulf War, Saddam sent a terrorist hit group to Bangkok, Thailand when, at that time, I happened to be Australian ambassador to Thailand.

The existence of that group was identified by intelligence authorities. And their plan was to make an attack upon the embassies of the United States, Australia and Israel in Bangkok. Australia got this happy mention because we were a participant in the coalition of 29 countries that then sought to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

There was a bit of a crisis in Bangkok. I had to ask assistance of the Thai Army. They lived in our embassy compound for a month --- some several hundred soldiers and so on -- until the threat abated.

The end of the story is that the cell involved was found. It was heavily armed, and it did indeed have detailed plans for a military attack upon those three embassies.

Dr. Hamza referred to other instances where Iraq has conducted assassinations and so on well away from Iraq. That was the -- those were the sorts of activities to which I was referring. Sorry, is there another part of your question that I've left out?

SEN. CHAFEE: No, that was it. Your testimony was of that experience in Southeast Asia --

MR. BUTLER: But I do -- I just want to say I do --

SEN. CHAFEE: It sounds like you are taking great exception to the Washington Post article and some of the quotes in there.

MR. BUTLER: Sorry?

SEN. CHAFEE: It sounds as though you are taking exception to some of the quotes in that article that -- well, the one I just read, "Senior officers believe the policy of containment has been effective -- more effective than is generally recognized. And, as evidenced, the top brass said that the approach has deterred Hussein from threatening his neighbors" --

MR. BUTLER: Yes --

SEN. CHAFEE: -- "and from backing terrorist organizations."

MR. BUTLER: I would like to address that. Saddam Hussein has backed terrorism in a general way. What we don't know is the nature of his involvement, if any, in September 11th. There is some circumstantial evidence that suggests there has been some involvement.

I don't agree with what you've quoted. I think that -- I have already said this morning that a policy of containment was an essential weapon. It's been well used. But by itself it's not enough. We had other weapons as well -- arms control inspections and so on. And I think it's not appropriate or complete to say that that will serve us well into the future. The continuing existence of Saddam Hussein with his weapons of mass destruction activities and his continually throwing petrol on the fire of political problems in the Middle East is something that I think is very dangerous in world politics. And that is not addressed simply by a policy of narrow containment of him.

SEN. CHAFEE: Yes. I know my time is expired, but I will just say that I think that's the key here, is the existence of the threat. And there's some dispute. And you yourself recognize since we haven't been able to inspect we just don't know. And I think that's really the key. It would be great to hear from some of those officers or anybody else that has a different point of view on this, what is the threat. And I think the three of you have said very strongly the threat is immediate and it's real. And I think for the benefit of our study it would have been good to hear an opposing point of view.

SEN. NELSON: Professor?

MR. CORDESMAN: I don't believe you were here when the question was asked whether containment was exhausted. And I think the answer that both Ambassador Butler gave and I gave was no. Now, I do have to say, senator, I get very disturbed when people quote the Joint Chiefs by anything other than name. And it is always easy to find somebody in the joint staff who will say virtually everything if you keep calling. So I do not deny that containment can go on; but at least from my own view one thing we have to understand is there will never be a point certain at which this risk reaches unacceptable levels, unless Saddam attacks or threatens somebody else very visibly.

The other thing to remember is what containment really means. It means a ruthless effort to stop arms imports, transfers of technology, the willingness to be in place and strike if he openly violates in terms of weapons of mass destruction, as we have done in the past, and to go on with a low-level war with his air defenses. If that is sustaining containment, then we are doing a great deal. But there is not a neat dividing line between resting in place and throwing Saddam out of power.

SEN. CHAFEE: Well, yes, I couldn't agree more. In fact, you were the one that quoted Pliny and talked about body bags, and that's why I think the key is the threat, and that's what we have got to really get to the bottom of. And I believe I was here on the question about containment and that we haven't exhausted it. But exactly what's taken place in Iraq is I guess a mystery.

SEN. NELSON: Senator Feingold.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As one of you referenced, on Monday Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that, quote, "The Iraqis have a great deal of what they do deeply buried," unquote, suggesting that air power alone might not be enough to destroy Iraq's nonconventional weapons facilities. We hear a lot about these bunkers. And I want to just focus for a minute on the issue of the underground sites themselves.

Writing four years ago on the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr. Hamza suggested that the Iraqis, aware of the success of satellite remote sensing and uncovering underground facilities, decided not to build underground facilities. Do we have reason to believe that the Iraqis altered their policy on this issue? And, if so, why? And we'll start with you, doctor.

MR. HAMZA: Yes. Apparently the nuclear facilities themselves are above ground mostly. But what happened is that now Iraq shifted, according to one civil engineer who defected recently, shifted into building smaller underground facilities, and to cover that. They understood the satellite angle quite well -- that if you dig underground, this is a flag and everybody would be watching -- every satellite buzzing by will making tapes of what you are doing. So what happened is they started doing that in the existing bunkers and in the bungalows. So they had a surface cover to do it, according to that engineer. And they do it also in duplicate, so that if one side is compromised they can go back to the backup sites. So the policy has been changed -- and this is a very credible report he's giving us -- it has been verified here.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Do either of you have a comment on that?

MR. CORDESMAN: I think one comment first -- I don't think the secretary of Defense would say this carelessly, but it a mixture of what you harden and how many things you harden, how many dispersed soft targets you have, how quickly you can move your assets when you feel you are about to be seriously under attack, and how well you can use decoys and deceive.

We know the Iraqis use all four of those techniques. We know they have refined them steadily since the attack on Osirak. It is simply a reality that you are not going to be able to target a lot of their assets. We flew, as I said earlier, some 2,400 sorties the last time, suppressed them probably at least in part. Get some? Yes. But the idea of sort of having the perfect target mix at the right time strikes me as simply impossible.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Let me ask a -- thank you -- let me ask a different question. Some of the rhetoric about Iraq suggests that the primary concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction -- the notion that the government of Iraq is willing to provide such weapons or the means to make them either to the highest bidder or to groups that share some element of the government of Iraq's world view. And of course the precise nature of the proliferation to non-state actor scenario is not entirely clear. But if this is the case, then it seems to me that countering that threat means securing materials in widely disperse sites, some of which we may not know about and some of which we may not. If an invasion were to begin, if the government were to be toppled, wouldn't there be some degree of chaos for some period of time along with use-it-or-lose-it pressures, can't we expect perhaps self-interested individuals to start selling off whatever they can to the highest bidder, or taking materials of concern out of the country for purposes of such sales? In other words, isn't less control arguably even more dangerous in the current situation?

I would also like you to address could this scenario argue against the so-called inside-out approach that was detailed in Monday's New York Times? Professor?

MR. CORDESMAN: I think you hit on a very real risk, just that striking some of these weapons might cause collateral damage. But several points to bear in mind. It is going to get steadily worse, not better. And, if it gets bad enough, then the ability to use the systems to intimidate, or to be able to sort of sell or proliferate them without credible retaliation will grow in time -- not again with any clear point at which this occurs. My guess -- and it's only a guess -- would be that this risk at this point in time is limited, perhaps in part because those countries that wish to disseminate chemical and biological weapons, or wish to have them, are already doing pretty well on their own, and they incremental effect here might be limited. But your last question to me is one of the most important. I think that you may be able to defeat the core of Saddam's operation by focusing on the core of his power. But certainly you have to be ready simultaneously to go into other parts of the country and do what UNSCOM couldn't finish. You can't simply rely on the opposition to turn it over to you.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Other responses, if I could, Mr. Chairman?

SEN. NELSON: Yes, ambassador?

MR. BUTLER: Yes, just very quickly, senator, on your last question about things underground -- when I heard the recent focus on that issue, I was utterly unsurprised, because our experience in UNSCOM was elaborate use of underground facilities. I just would add this additional concept, which is underground but under buildings, because that prevents you from seeing the tunneling from the air. It's the tunneling is under buildings, including presidential palaces. And that is a concept that you will remember from a few years ago.

Now, I agree with what Professor Cordesman has said with respect to your last question. It is a very bad situation in Iraq. And were he to be removed, it's possible of course that there could be a period of relative chaos or even a spot of anarchy, and people getting stuff and selling it off and so on. It's not necessarily a good situation. What that means is that we must know who would replace him, and hopefully a bunch of people who are free of the weapons of mass destruction mind-set. Before we stopped for the votes, the chairman put the question to us about the removal of Saddam. Is it just about this person? And, remember, I'm one who has argued this country is unique in its present circumstances, and that uniqueness is indivisible from the fact that the president is Saddam Hussein.

I think in some measure it is him. But it's also a mind-set. And we would need to be sure that the group that replaced him was not in possession of the same mind-set. Now, I would caution against the reasoning that says this is a very bad situation, and were we to try to deal with it it's going to create some bad circumstances, like hitting weapons which would then disperse them, chemical or biological, or a situation where people are selling on the black market bad stuff that has been made by Saddam and so on, and therefore we shouldn't do it, because that just puts off the evil day. I agree with Professor Cordesman, if we don't find a solution to this soon -- which ultimately must mean a group of people in control in Iraq who do not have his mind-set with respect to these weapons -- it's going to be harder in the future.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Those are very helpful answers. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. NELSON: Senator Lugar?

SEN. LUGAR: I have no further questions.

SEN. NELSON: Give us your opinion about the complicity of Syria in avoiding the U.N. sanctions. Who would like to start? Professor?

MR. CORDESMAN: Senator, I think that we have perhaps found ourselves in a position where because Syria has cooperated in some aspects of dealing with al Qaeda and certain types of Islamic extremists, we have been a little reluctant to point out the fact that there is an increasing flow -- not so much of major arms but critical parts. We know things like jet engines, tank engines, some aspects of armored spare parts are beginning to move through Syria in very significant deliveries. I think, however, to get down to the details is something that really only people in the intelligence community can tell you.

SEN. NELSON: Any other comments?

MR. BUTLER: Not much to add to that except that Syria has increasingly been a willing participant in Saddam's breaking of the sanctions and running a black market in oil and so on. And so they have given comfort to him in financial terms. And a good deal of the money that he raises that way outside of the U.N. escrow account and oil-for-food and so on of course fuels his military and other activities.

SEN. NELSON: The first downed pilot, through a series of mistakes, we left down. Commander Scott Speicher. Since then we have credible evidence of a live sighting of Commander Speicher being taken to a hospital. Do any of you all have any information with regard to the whereabouts or the condition of Commander Speicher? Mr. Ambassador?

MR. BUTLER: It would be pretentious of me to say that I do in any positive way that would help those concerned about him. But let me say, senator, that I am aware of his case and have formed the view on the basis of information put to me -- and there's no secret there. It's not complete information. But I formed the view -- and it's only a personal opinion -- that the possibility that he is alive is not small, and I therefore do not believe that we should give up on him.

SEN. NELSON: And why do you come to that conclusion that he might be alive?

MR. BUTLER: Because -- well, I am not referring to the idea of a live sighting. What was found and not found in the investigations of the crash site in the desert is one important series of factors, and that there hasn't been a body. There's not been any mortal remains of the man -- and some other anecdotal evidence of the kind that you have just added to of saying now there's apparently a live sighting. I've got no possible way of assessing that. But there are individuals who are interested in his welfare and who keep a dossier on all of this, and I have seen all of those materials. And I think it behooves us not to give up on the possibility that he is alive.

SEN. NELSON: Well, I take every opportunity to ask that question, whether I'm meeting with the king of Jordan or the president of Syria or the prime minister of Lebanon meeting with various governmental officials here, because there is a family that is going through agony in Jacksonville, Florida on not knowing what is the status of their family member. So thank you for your questions? Senator Lugar?

SEN. LUGAR: Senator, let me just ask this of this panel. Is there any evidence that Saddam Hussein is giving weapons of mass destruction information, parts, weapons themselves, to terrorists, broadly defined, whichever group. And, if he was doing so, would there be any fingerprints of this? How would we know? Does anyone have a comment on that?

MR. CORDESMAN: I would just say, Senator, that I would certainly hear other views, but all of my experience tells me this is one of the areas where you are coming to the absolute core of the intelligence community. One of the great problems you have is that when you have an extraordinarily unpopular man you will have report after report of internal division, support of terrorism -- whatever contributes to taking military action against him. Sometimes these will be real, and sometimes they need careful verification. And one of the most disturbing things -- not of what Dr. Hamza said, but I have heard from others -- is the tendency to assert a conspiracy theory without citing the fact that there are many other equally valuable ways of doing it.

Finally, if you have a really good intelligence service, it doesn't take much to conceal something as small as, say, smallpox in a transfer to a potential agent, and you probably will never know until it happens.

MR. HAMZA: According to Richard Desperzal (ph), who is the chief inspector of the Iraqi biological weapon program -- I talked to him several times -- he is of the opinion that a type of anthrax, especially the one that appeared in Senator Daschle's -- the envelope addressed to him -- is a type that would have an Iraqi fingerprint on it, and that the type of powder used and the technology used in loading the anthrax spores on the powder is -- would indicate that Iraq is a possible source of this type of anthrax. He was not convinced that it is a single individual who did it alone or somewhere. He thinks it is a joint effort, part of an expert team with a lot of technology under its disposal. So that would be just about the only indication so far that there is a possible terrorism source from Iraq using its weapons of mass destruction under its disposal.

SEN. NELSON: Ambassador Butler?

MR. BUTLER: Senator, I've already said this morning that I think it would defy rationality for Saddam to supply WMD technology to terrorists or other groups. Those weapons are identified by him as his indelible source of power and authority, and I find it hard to think that he would behave in that way.

But on your direct question, Is there evidence? No. What do I think? I think there will have been conversations between the Iraqis and their various friends about the exquisite business of how to make certain biological and chemical weapons and so on -- conversations of a technical character. But there is no evidence that I know that they have actually transferred such weapons or technology.

SEN. LUGAR: And as Professor Cordesman has said in ascribing these theories of conspiracy, why we really need to find the evidence, or you could base whatever action our government wants to take on something that is simply a supposition, however well founded, as some have argued in the press I would say on this particular issue. And that's why I raised the question of each of you, and I appreciate your responses.

SEN. NELSON: Any further questions of the committee? On instructions from the chairman, who will return at two o'clock, we will have a short recess and the committee will resume with panel two at two o'clock.

SEN. LUGAR: Mr. Chairman? The chairman suggested I think a dispensation of 45 minutes.

SEN. NELSON: But since then he has sent new instructions --

SEN. LUGAR: Oh, all right --

SEN. NELSON: -- and he will return at two o'clock.

SEN. LUGAR: Truncated the -- very well.

SEN. NELSON: The committee stands in recess. (Sounds gavel.)

END

LOAD-DATE: August 1, 2002

Copyright 2002 Federal News Service, Inc.

Federal News Service

July 31, 2002 Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING

LENGTH: 39186 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: IRAQ

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN JR. (D-DE)

LOCATION: 419 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES: PANEL II: GENERAL JOSEPH HOAR (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND;

ROBERT GALLUCCI, DEAN, SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY;

DR. MORTON HALPERIN, SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS;

CHARLES DEULFER, VISITING RESIDENT SCHOLAR, MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES;

LT. GEN. THOMAS MCINERNEY (RET.), FORMER ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF;

PANEL III: DR. SHIBLEY TELHAMI, PROFESSOR AND ANWAR SADAT CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND;

DR. FOUAD AJAMI, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY;

DR. GEOFFREY KEMP, DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NIXON CENTER;

MARK PARRIS, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, & CALDWELL

BODY:

SEN. JOSEPH BIDEN JR. (D-DE): The hearing will please come to order. Can I thank all of our witnesses for indulging this unusual schedule. Most of you have been around here long enough to understand it. I know, Mr. Ambassador, you have. It's always dangerous to schedule serious hearings the last week the Senate is going to be in session for a while. But I felt this was so important, as did Senator Hagel, that we should move forward. So again I apologize for interruptions.

Our second panel is an equally significant panel and will shed a good deal of light on the issues we're discussing here. Our first panelist is Ambassador Robert Gallucci. He is currently dean of Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. I want you to know, Dean, that I almost made a mistake when I spoke at your school or spoke over at Georgetown, I was presented with a Georgetown chair. It's sitting in my office with a Georgetown seal on it and as we were about to file my financial disclosure, I was sitting on the chair and my secretary said, "Are you sure you filed everything?" I said, "Everything I know." She said, "About what you're sitting on?" It had not been in the thing. So I might have been before the Ethics Committee, had I not been sitting in that chair.

But at any rate, you've served as ambassador at large from '94 to '96, assistant secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from '92 to '94 and deputy executive chairman of the U.N. Special Commission from 1991 to 1992, overseeing the disarmament of Iraq better known as UNSCOM.

We also have Mr. Charles Duelfer -- now I'm pronouncing that correctly. He's briefed me in the past and I've been ingracious enough to mispronounce his name. He's currently a visiting resident scholar at the Center for Strategic International Studies. He's served as deputy executive chairman at the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq from '93 until its termination in 2000 and for the last several months of UNSCOM's existence, he served as acting chairman.

General Joseph Hoar (Ret.). General Hoar served as commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command from 1991-94. He was deputy for Operations for the Marine Corps during Desert Storm. He retired in '94 after a 37-year career in the Marine Corps and we appreciate you being here, General.

Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney retired from the Air Force in 1994. Prior to his retirement, Lieutenant General McInerney served as assistant vice chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force. He is currently a consultant.

And Dr. Morton Halperin. Mort is currently a senior fellow at the Council in Foreign Relations and the Washington Director of the Open Society Institute. He was director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State from 1998-2001. He served as special assistant to the president and senior director for Democracy at the National Security Council from '94 to '96 and was a consultant to the secretary of Defense and the under secretary of Defense for policy. He also, in an earlier incarnation, was the man who I went to most for advice relating to civil liberties issues.

Welcome to you all and I would invite you in the order you've been called to give your statements if you would.

Welcome again, Mr. Ambassador.

MR. ROBERT GALLUCCI: Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, I'm pleased really to have the opportunity to appear before you today and address the critical issue of American policy towards Iraq. I would request, please, permission to provide a written statement for the record.

SEN. BIDEN: Without objection.

MR. GALLUCCI: I would begin with the premise that the only way Iraq poses a critical threat to the United States or our allies is through the use of weapons of mass destruction in one of two scenarios. First, if Iraq were to transfer chemical, biological or nuclear weapons to a terrorist group and second, if Iraq were to use these weapons against American or allied forces or our homelands in order to prevent or impede an American led invasion aimed at overturning the Iraqi regime.

Let me put this another way. If Iraq can be prevented from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and I say particularly viral biological weapons or nuclear weapons, then Iraq poses no special threat to America or her allies. If Iraq does acquire WMD, the threat still does not rise to a critical level because our deterrent, our threat to retaliate in the event of Iraqi use of WMD is both credible and effective.

However, if Iraq acquires and clandestinely transfers WMD to a terrorist group or if the United States should move to overthrow Saddam Hussein, then we should not expect our deterrent to be effective either in preventing terrorist use of WMD against us or Iraqi use against us in an effort to prevent regime change.

This line of reasoning leads us to ask about Iraqi WMD capabilities that were addressed this morning. I would submit that no one outside of Iraq knows with high confidence what those capabilities are today. However, based on seven years of inspections and four years without inspections, the only prudent assumption is that Iraq has or will have chemical and biological weapons at some point relatively soon.

The nuclear weapons issue, I think, is more complicated.

But since Iraq has already done the signature work to design and develop the triggering package for a weapon and the acquisition of HEU or plutonium from states of the former Soviet Union cannot be ruled out, we cannot have any real confidence that Iraq is not now or will not become soon a nuclear weapons state.

In light of the threat posed by Iraqi acquisition of these weapons, the unfulfilled requirements of the 1991 U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, the likelihood that Iraq will continue to acquire such weapons and the character of the Iraqi regime, I do not think it would be prudent for the United States to leave Iraq free to pursue WMD acquisition indefinitely.

This assessment stands even if we lack any intelligence that Iraq would in fact transfer WMD to a terrorist group. It is also an assessment that leads some analysts to favor military action against Iraq aimed at overturning the regime, which is one of the two circumstances in which deterrents could be expected to fail and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction used against America or her allies.

It seems to me therefore that, if the United States is to block Iraqi acquisition of WMD, it should look for ways to do so short of such a war for this if for no other reason. And the other reasons -- loss of life, severe budgetary consequences, alienating friends and allies in the region and around the world and avoiding the challenge of post-conflict regime reconstruction and maintenance are important as well. The question is then can a politically plausible inspection regime be designed as put in place that would offer sufficient assurance of preventing Iraq from acquiring WMD over the long term? And could such a regime be forced upon the current Iraqi government in the near term without first going to war against that government?

Fortunately seven years or so UNSCOM inspections give us some insight into what a desirable regime would look like and what pitfalls need to be avoided in designing one. First: we can assume that any regime that appeared as though it would be effective in blocking Iraqi WMD acquisition would also be resisted by Iraq. Therefore the only way to impose such a regime, short of war, would be to pose to Iraq the creditable alternative of a prompt invasion and regime change if the inspection regime is resisted. Just as clearly, Iraq must be convinced that accepting such an inevitably intrusive inspection regime permanently would indeed protect it from invasion at least by the inspection regime sponsors.

Second: it should be clear to all by now that an inspection regime that fails to give us high confidence that it is successfully uncovering and blocking any serious WMD development is worse than no regime at all. Such a regime gives a rock cover and gives it the initiative, protects it from invasion and in some circumstances would supply it with hostages. Third: it is probably true that an inspection regime that is too robust, that is one accompanied by substantial supporting military units deployed to the region, would inevitably be taken by friends and allies as well as Iraq as a step to invasion. Desert Shield masquerading as UNMOVIC plus.

Fourth: We are therefore in search of the Goldilocks inspection regime. One that it is balanced just right to be effective, acceptable and sustainable. Some obvious elements of such a regime are the following: inspectors who have unrestricted, unlimited and immediate access to any site in Iraq. There can be no sanctuaries or exceptions. Inspectors must be chosen for their experience and expertise without regard for geographic balance. Inspectors must be free to receive, exchange and discuss intelligence with government as necessary to conduct their missions. Inspectors must be able to take whatever steps are necessary to maintain the security of their communications and their operational plans.

Inspections must be undertaken in an environment free of Iraqi movements of any kind, air or ground, in the area of the inspection -- and here is a key element: inspectors should have the option of conducting inspections supported by a specifically configured and prepositioned military unit to assist it in entry, prevent loss of containment at an inspection site and to manage any spontaneous civilian opposition. On the last point the inspection regime thus must be capable of inspecting any designated site and overcoming any Iraqi non-cooperation or resistance except that mounted by a significant military unit.

In short, if an inspection fails it must do so in a way that creates a clear casus belli. There will be many with international inspection experience who would only participate in an inspection regime that presumed host government cooperation and who would oppose a regime that had a military force organic to it as I propose here. There are good reasons for adopting such a position as a rule but our past experience with UNSCOM provides ample reason to treat Iraq as an exception to that rule. This inspection regime would be designed to prevent Iraq from manipulating the inspection process. It would aim to strike the right balance linking the inspection regime to an invasion if Iraq fails to cooperate without being so robust as to appear in an inevitable move to overthrow the Iraqi government.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much.

Mr. Deulfer.

MR. CHARLES DEULFER: Again, thank you for asking me to be here today and I'd like to have my statement entered into the record as well.

SEN. BIDEN: It will be.

MR. DEULFER: My comments will draw up on my experience as Deputy of UNSCOM from 1993 until 2000. I came to know many Iraqis and their organizations quite well. They saw me both as a U.N. official and also as an American with whom they could talk and sometimes quite candidly. Let me state from the outset that I support the objective of creating the conditions where the Iraqi people can establish new leadership in Baghdad. There is a strong case for this when you consider the growing risks posed by the current regime in contrast to that with what Iraq could be under normal leadership.

The talents and resources that can design and build nuclear weapons under Saddam can help Iraq be the leading economy and culture of the Middle East under a new government. Until that happens the Iraqi people will never achieve their enormous potential. Of course, getting there is the issue. I have a differing opinion from Dr. Gallucci. In my opinion weapons inspections are not the answer to the real problem, which is the regime nor can they even fully eliminate in perpetuity Iraqi weapons of mass destruction so long as this regime is in power.

And I want to make another comment here in terms of terminology. Earlier this morning there was a lot of talk about arms control. But what we're discussing with respect to Iraq is coercive disarmament. Iraq initiated a war. They lost. And part of the terms of the cease fire agreement were that it was supposed to get rid of a large part of its arsenal. And that was to be verified by UNSCOM. That is not really arms control in the classical sense where two parties enter into an agreement because they think it's in their common interest. Iraq steadfastly does not believe that it's in its interest to get rid of these weapons.

Here I come to a key problem as I see in the whole dynamic and that is that the forces are all wrong. The Security Council writes resolutions demanding Iraq give up weapons of mass destruction capabilities which the regime believes are essential to its survival. UNSCOM was created to attempt to implement this objective. We did a lot. Bob Gallucci did a lot. Richard Butler did a lot. All of our experts on the ground, they did the most. But, ultimately, Baghdad had vastly more resources than we did and much more endurance than the Security Council. Ultimately the Security Council was not willing to commit the resources to enforce compliance.

Saddam very cleverly divided the council with threats, rewards and ultimately by holding his own people hostage. He created a situation where council members did not want to see more pain fall on innocent Iraqis as a consequence of support to inspectors. This will, no doubt, happen again. And here again I would point out that the same dynamic occurred after World War I. The Versailles Treaty obligated the Germans to disarms. The international community created a bunch of inspection teams. They had the same problems. They lasted about the same length of time and it ultimately failed.

But even if you can imagine a radically different approach to inspections with a sizeable military force, I don't see how that would work over the long term. Can we keep forces deployed to support inspections for ever? Are we really prepared to give back to this regime control of their oil revenues? And pursuing this approach does nothing to the innocent Iraqis trapped under this government.

In essence, inspections in my opinion are only a short term palliative and do not address the fundamental problem. Saddam knows this and if he concludes we are really preparing for regime change, he will offer the concession of allowing inspectors in under some conditions. This will only be a tactical retreat on his part.

I want to make a second point now before I conclude. Finally, and this has to do with regime change, there is a central point that's simple but it's a central point under regime change and that is that it's fundamentally a political objective not a military one. Military commitment will be essential to convince various audiences we are serious this time and Saddam's days a numbered. However creating conditions for new leadership in Baghdad demands a political strategy to guide potential military action. Moreover, what we do in a non- military realm before potential conflict will directly affect the extent of possible military conflict and the amount of damage to Iraq and ourselves. In this light, it is essential that Iraqis in Iraq know that their lot will only improve when the regime is gone.

Iraqis and key institutions in Iraq should understand that their interests are not served by defending Saddam and his clique. We can make a good case that intervention is justified given the unique and dangerous characteristics of its regime. My guess is that with sufficient work and consultations we can build international support to create conditions for regime change and a consensus on characteristics we expect a new government to achieve. Moreover we can make decisions about such matters as relieving sanctions, establishing security relations and debt relief, based on how the new government progresses towards higher standards. But I reiterate our highest priority should be convincing Iraqis in Iraq that they'll be better off when Saddam is gone and that he will be gone.

Iraqis and their institutions will be making vital decisions about their future without Saddam. The Iraqi people are the greatest threat to Saddam's regime. If they are convinced Saddam and his clique are doomed, they will make decisions that are in their interest and our interest and any ultimate use of force can be minimized.

Finally, I'll just make a comment, a personal comment. I remember asking a senior Iraqi once whether he served his country or Saddam. It wasn't possible for him to answer but he definitely understood the difference. In essence, we need to make it possible for the Iraqi people to act in the interests of their country and not Saddam Hussein. Thank you.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much.

General Hoar.

MR. JOSEPH HOAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address the committee.

I am in favor of a regime change in Iraq. What is at issue is the means and the timing. The issue has four key components, all of which deserve our discussion and indeed a national debate because of their implications.

First is a change of policy after a period of over 50 years in which we depart from the principle of deterrence to one of preemption. The second is the need for support from the countries in the Middle East, Asia, as well as our traditional allies in NATO, Japan, Australia, and elsewhere, as we contemplate combat operations against Iraq. The third is the problems associated with mounting a military campaign against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and then finally assuming success of this military campaign, the implications for war termination, most especially the requirements for nation building.

First, the issue of deterrence and preemption. For more than 50 years deterrence has served us well. Up to and including Secretary of State Jim Baker's warning just before Desert Storm in Geneva to the Iraqi regime about the use of weapons of mass destruction. Deterrence is still the best option until operations against Al-Qaeda have turned the corner and major progress with U.S. leadership has been made on the Israeli Palestinian issue.

Let me now frame some questions about a preemptive strike. How will we know that Iraq is planning to pass weapons to terrorist organizations? Poor intelligence remains a problem. In 1990 there were 1,800 technical and professional people working in the nuclear program in Iraq and we did not know it. Or is simply possession of weapons of mass destruction among the nations of the Axis of Evil sufficient? Will Iranian nuclear power plants be next? Does it apply just to nuclear weapons or do chemical and biological weapons deserve the same treatment because a number of Islamic and Arab countries possess chemical and biological capabilities? What are the red lines? What will we need and what process shall we use before a preemptive strike?

I would hope that it would be based on more than the circumstantial evidence that we have available at this time. May the president declare an intent to strike without a declaration of war from the Congress of the United States? What effect does this policy have on other countries with whom we might have disagreements in the future, for example, China?

Secondly, if you believe as I do that the United States has a moral responsibility as the world's only super power to provide leadership to at least assure stability if not peace, why can convincing virtually none of the European countries, let alone the Arab countries, of the need for an attack on Iraq? My sense is the Arab countries will not support a campaign of this type without significant movement towards peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

On a more practical level, we need bases, over flight, intelligence, search and rescue support from Arab neighbors in the vicinity of Iraq. And, from our allies, the financial and troop support for nation building that would follow a successful military campaign. With respect to the military campaign, war in the Middle East, now as before, depends on logistics. Even with the astonishing technical gains exhibited in Afghanistan, logistics is still the most challenging aspect of this campaign. Strategic lift, both sea and in the air, was my number one priority on the integrated priority list when I was the commander in chief at CENTCOM. It was at the top of Norm Schwartzkopf's list before me and I expect it is still high for his successors today.

Getting to the region with troops, equipment and supplies and most important, maintaining them through an operation of any size will be key. There is no doubt we would prevail but at what risk. Risk in the military is simply the cost of American men and women serving in the military who would be killed or injured in an operation like this. The Iraqi campaign is a risky endeavor. To think that you can support an operation of this type without control of ground lines of communications and support from the sea, seems to me to be remote. For example, any logistics buildup would require an antimissile defense for our troops. A Patriot Missile Battalion requires over 250 C141 sorties from the United States or from the European theatre. The size of the force, how it will be deployed, where will the logistic buildup be located, and the time frame needed are all critical to success.

Finally, assuming a successful military campaign, we need at the policy level in government a war termination plan. This is something we did not have in Desert Storm. In short, how do we achieve a political status acceptable to our government? After the expulsion of a regime of Saddam Hussein, the requirement of war termination will include the establishment of a new government, the executive, legislative and judicial branches, a newly reorganized armed force and a police force; what has been basically described as nation building. Who will do this? Will there be a Marshall Plan for Iraq, a nation of 25 million people? Where is the analysis of that cost? The people and the funds and the equipment will bear that cost. All of these components need to be discussed both in open and closed hearing to be sure that a preemptive strike on Iraq is the correct course of action.

I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you, General.

Lieutenant General McInerney.

MR. THOMAS McINERNEY: Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Thank you for this special opportunity to discuss a war of liberation to remove Saddam's regime from Iraq.

I will not dwell on the merits of why he should be removed. Suffice it to say we must preempt threats such as those posed by Saddam Hussein.

We face an enemy that makes its principal strategy the targeting of civilians and nonmilitary assets. We should not wait to be attacked by terrorists and rogue states with weapons of mass destruction. We have not only the right but the obligation to defend ourselves by preempting these threats.

I will now focus on the way to do it very expeditiously and with minimum loss of life in both the coalition forces, the Iraqi military and people themselves, and at the same time maintain a relatively small footprint in the region. Access is an important issue and we want to minimize the political impact on our allies adjacent to Iraq that is supporting the coalition forces. Our immediate objective will be the following: help Iraqi people liberate Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and his regime, eliminate weapons of mass destruction and production facilities, complete military operations as soon as possible, protect economic infrastructure targets, identify and terminate terrorism connections, establish an interim government as soon as possible. Our longer term objectives will be to bring a democratic government to Iraq using our post World War II experiences with Germany, Japan and Italy that will influence the region significantly.

Now I would like to broadly discuss the combined campaign to achieve these objectives using what I will call blitz warfare to simplify the discussion. Blitz warfare is an intensive 24-hour, seven days a week precision air centric campaign supported by fast moving ground forces composed of a mixture of heavy, light, airborne, amphibious, special, covert operations working with opposition forces that all use effects-based base operations for their target set and correlate their timing of forces for a devastating violent impact.

This precision air campaign is characterized by many precision weapons, upwards of 90 percent using our latest C2ISR or command and control intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets, such as Joint STARS, Global Hawk, Predator, human intelligence, signals intelligence, et cetera, in a network centric configuration to achieve less than 10 minutes per timed critical target.

Using the Global Strike Task Force and Naval Strike Forces composed of over 1,000 land and sea based aircraft plus a wide array of air and sea launch Cruise missiles, this will be the most massive precision air campaign in history, achieving rapid dominance in the first 72 hours of combat, focused on regime change targets. These are defined as targets critical to Saddam's control. For example, his command and control and intelligence assets, his integrated air defense, his weapons of mass destruction, palaces and locations that harbor his leadership, plus those military units that resist or fight our coalition forces.

All the military forces will be told to do the -- all the Iraqi military forces will be told through the opposition forces in our information operations campaign that they have two choices: either help us change regime leadership and build the democracy, or be destroyed. In addition, commanders and men in weapons of mass destruction forces will be told that they will be tried as war criminals if they use their weapons against coalition forces or other nations.

In a multidirectional campaign, coalition forces will seize Basra, Mosul and most of the oil fields, neutralize selected corps of the Iraqi army and destroy the integrated air defense zone, command and control weapons of mass destruction locations and Iraqi air using our Stealth, SAM Suppression and air superiority assets.

This will enable coalition forces to achieve 24/7 air dominance quickly which is critical to our success. The expansion of our beach heads in the north, south, east and west regions and the air heads seized with alarming speed, will allow the opposition forces to play a very significant and decisively important role with our special, covert operations and the Iraqi army and air force to determine their status, i.e. are they friend, foe or just disarmed.

The political arm of the opposition will communicate intensively with the Iraqi people, letting them know they are liberating them from 22 years of oppression, and that they are now controlling large amounts of territory. Humanitarian missions will be accomplished simultaneously with leaflet drops, et cetera. U.S. and other coalition forces are helping us to liberate and change the regime is the mantra. You, the Iraqi people, must help us to do this quickly and with minimum loss of life.

This IO campaign must be well planned and executed, working closely with the opposition forces. This means that the administration must move very quickly now to solidify the opposition forces to include the opposition military forces, and set up a shadow government with aggressive assistance and leadership from the United States.

In summary, the Iraqi forces we are facing are about 30 percent equivalent since Desert Storm, with no modernization. Most of the army does not want to fight for Saddam, and the people want a regime change. Let's help them to make this change and liberate Iraq from this oppressor. President Bush has accurately said inaction is not an option, and I am in support of his position.

I await your questions, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you.

Dr. Halperin.

MR. MORTON HALPERIN: Mr. Chairman, it's a great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to appear before this committee on this urgent subject.

We've been asked to focus on options, and in my view there really are only two realistic options. One is what I call containment plus, and the other is preemptive use of military force. I thought, where we all thought with the proposition, that we would be better off if we could have regime change. But I would insist that our critical national interest in terms of Iraq is to prevent the regime from using weapons of mass destruction, or of providing weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups. And as we consider these two options we need to ask ourselves which option will make it more likely that nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction might be used against American forces, against allies, or against civilian populations.

The strategy of containment plus would build on the new sanctions regime which the United States worked very hard to get the United Nations Security Council to adopt earlier this year. Its goal would be to tighten the embargo against Iraq, focused on materials which would assist the Iraqis in either building up their conventional military capability or further developing their capability to produce weapons of mass destruction. And it would seek to prevent them from getting hard currency which they get by the increasing black market trade through the neighbors of Iraq.

And at the same time we would be working to strengthen the deterrence of Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction, or transfer of those weapons to terrorist groups by seeking a consensus, an international consensus, that military action would follow swiftly if we had proof of either of those contingencies. This option would also involve continued support to Iraqi opposition groups both inside Iraq and outside, and an effort to try to get them to come together and to articulate what a post-Saddam regime in Iraq might look like.

Rather than pressing the neighbors of Iraq, as we are now doing, from military bases to conduct combat operations, we would under this option be pressing them to make the embargo work. We would be pressing them to end the black market trade, we would be pressing them to stop permitting the flow of oil outside the U.N. sanctions through their territory, and we would be using a small amount of the vast sums that a military operation would cost to compensate countries around Iraq for their financial losses for implementing the embargo, something that, in fact, states are obligated to do when there is a U.N. Security Council imposed embargo.

The question is whether this will succeed. I think that if pursued vigorously with the same kind of determination that other options are being considered it will, in fact, succeed in preventing Saddam from using weapons of mass destruction or supplying them to terrorist groups. His primary goal is clearly to remain in power. And if he comes to understand clearly that he will not be attacked if he does not cross these leaden lines, but will certainly be attacked if he does, that strikes me as -- to wait.

Let me turn briefly then to the alternative option of military action. It appears that every day we are presented with a new scenario, either by somebody inside the government who likes the scenario, or somebody inside the government who does not like the scenario. And I would not presume to evaluate the possible effectiveness of any one of these.

But what I would suggest is that we need to proceed with a sense of caution and conservatism, which means that we cannot assume that it is possible to have a short and immaculate war with few casualties, which then miraculously puts in place a democratic regime which effectively runs the country and consolidates its power without a continued massive American military presence.

I would suggest that the opposite is very likely, and that the only responsible thing to do is to assume that if we adopt this option that we are prepared to put in the region enough military forces, including ground forces, to march to Baghdad, to fight the war in the streets of Baghdad which may well be necessary, and to accept the risk of very substantial casualties not only for American military forces and those of our allies who may join in the attack, but also on the civilian population of Iraq and that of neighboring countries including Israel. And we must acknowledge that this attack may trigger precisely that use of weapons of mass destruction against our troops or civilians that the policy overall is said to be trying to avoid.

We must be prepared to occupy the country and stay there for a very long time at very great expense in treasure but also in risk to lives. There can be no question that the military cost of this option will be enormous, and equally clear that Saudi Arabia and other countries will not pay for it as they did at the time of the Gulf War. I think we are entitled to know what these budget costs are and whether the administration proposes to pay for them by running ever larger deficits, by increasing taxes, or by reducing domestic spending. And we also need to acknowledge that the price of oil is likely to go up and that this may well trigger another recession and a substantial incline in the value of the dollar.

Finally, in my view, we need to consider the implications of implementation in Iraq this new policy of preemption which President Bush has announced. It is not clear to me whether the administration is arguing that somehow this policy is consistent with our obligations under the U.N. Charter or whether the president is saying that we can no longer be bound by the restrictions that the U.N. Charter puts on the use of force by all states. If he is arguing the first then I think the case needs to be made of how one squares the language of the charter, the interpretation that all of our presidents have put on the charter with the notion that we now can implement the use of military force.

And if the president is saying that we no longer should be bound by the charter, then that is a profound change in American policy which I think needs a full debate. I think all these costs and risks need to be put on the table. They may be worth taking but certainly not before a full public debate and certainly not, in my view, before Congress authorizes the use of military force.

Now, finally I want to reiterate again my view that it is not at all clear that this option will accomplish the most important purpose of preventing terrorist attacks, both conventional and with weapons of mass destruction, against Americans. I think there is certainly a very grave risk, certainly if we move before there is a Palestinian settlement, that the very opposite will occur, that what we will stimulate is a large number of people in the Arab world who will be willing to take up a terrorist attack on the United States and on Americans around the world if they see us in launching a military attack against Iraq.

Finally, I would ask that we consider the opportunity cost of this policy. This policy of military action against Iraq has already come to take a very substantial amount of the attention and energy of senior officials of this government. There is only so many things an administration can do at one time. The attention of top leaders is a very scarce resource. But so is what we can ask our allies to do and other countries and the Congress and the American public. And there are limits to how much money we should spend.

In my view, we should be devoting these scarce resources to nurturing the worldwide coalition against terrorism, to helping to settle disputes between Israel and Palestine, between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and to help countries like Indonesia and Nigeria cope with ethnic conflict. We also should be staying the cost in Afghanistan, and that means nation building and helping the security of that country. And we should be working to reduce poverty in developing countries in the world and getting our own procedures at home right for how to deal with terrorism and how to improve our intelligence to deal with terrorism threats.

These are all daunting tasks, but I would argue that in terms of preventing terrorist attacks on Americans they are much more central, much more urgent and much more important than launching military operations against Saddam Hussein. In my view, we should allow containment plus to keep Saddam in the box while we pursue these more urgent tasks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much. We have a good attendance. We'll try to keep this to five minute rounds first time around.

Let me begin by asking you, Dr. Halperin, if you had -- if you were still in the government and you had clear and convincing proof that Saddam had a nuclear capacity that was capable of being launched on a missile platform, would that change your view? In other words, the containment plus -- I assume the containment plus is designed to diminish the prospect that he gains that ultimate capability. I think we both say that was the worst capability. Assume that you were convinced that existent. Would that change your priorities?

MR. HALPERIN: Yes, at least to the extent that I would think we should undertake military action to destroy those nuclear capabilities and those delivery systems --

SEN. BIDEN: Which leads me to the next question. Do you think that were he able to build/buy/steal but possess that nuclear capability able to be delivered by a missile, is there a -- do you have any degree of confidence that that could be destroyed absent a military invasion of feet on the ground, troops on the ground?

MR. HALPERIN: I mean, certainly I think the missile delivery system, certainly if it was long-range missiles, could be destroyed without troops on the ground. But if troops on the ground were necessary to destroy an active nuclear capability, I would think we could get the support of the countries in the region and of the U.N. Security Council for action of that kind, and the way that we were moving to get it against the North Koreans when they were moving in that direction. So I think that is a different scenario that I think we're confronting now.

SEN. BIDEN: And how would a successful containment plus policy solve or deal with the potential of Saddam giving weapons of mass destruction to terrorists?

MR. HALPERIN: Well, I think it deals with it only be making it absolutely clear to him that if that line is crossed we will in fact launch operations. I think if the president has evidence that he is linked to and supported Al-Qaeda, that he has the authority to use military force, both from the Security Council and from the Congress of the United States, and I think he should act on that. You cannot always be sure you will get the evidence of that, but my view is that he is in fact extremely unlikely to do that unless he concludes that we're going to try to take him out of power anyway.

SEN. BIDEN: Let me ask any of you who wish to respond this question. All of this discussion that we're having today and we'll have in the future and that we've had in the past comes down to related risks and tradeoffs. You all have said, to one degree or another, that it matters whether we have a place from which to stage our invasion if there is an invasion, whether it's a relatively small number of forces or it's a quarter million forces, whatever it is and in between.

You've all indicated that if in fact Saddam possess more capability relative to the weapons of mass destruction than we know that he has, and we're not sure what he has, that that presents a serious threat to us.

You've all indicated that it would be better if we had others with us than go it alone, either before, during or after, and so it all comes down, it seems to me, to vastly oversimplify it, is tradeoffs here. If we go alone now we tradeoff the possibility we allegedly -- not allegedly -- we would, depending on -- no one knows the cost -- but we would succeed, we would ostensibly change the regime, we would hopefully be able to destroy the weapons of mass destruction that exist over a period of time in a country, but we may very well radicalize the rest of the world, we may pick up a bill that's $70 billion, $80 billion, we may have to have extensive commitment of U.S. forces for an extended period of time in Iraq.

And if we don't do that, we find ourselves in the position where we increase the possibility he could destabilize the region preemptively himself, he could move and use the weapons of mass destruction as leverage for blackmailing actions in the region and so on. So in weighing the risks and the tradeoffs here, how important is it that -- and to what degree do each of you feel you have to be certain he possesses the weapons of mass destruction that can be effectively delivered, whether it is a chemical weapon, whether it's a biological weapon or whether it's a nuclear weapon. How important in each of your calculus is that question, that he has or is close to having or it's not worth the risk of determining any longer, waiting any longer, whether he has weapons of mass destruction that are deliverable and efficacious? Because you heard the testimony earlier and I know you all are very sophisticated, some, the mere fact you have the ability to produce a chemical weapon and/or a biological agent doesn't mean you can effectively disperse it, doesn't mean it can have the efficacy that it would in our hands, for example.

So how much of your calculus is dependent upon his -- your sense of his capacity to possess and deliver these weapons?

General?

MR. HOAR: Mr. Chairman, during the Gulf War, we believed that he had the capability to deliver chemical weapons against us. And in fact, in the run up, General Al Gray and I went down to Quantico one Saturday to look at a simulation that had been done regarding the two Marine divisions that were going to be in the attack into Kuwait, and there were some estimates of casualties that ran in the order of magnitude of 10,000 if artillery rounds with chemical weapons were used. So the issue is, are these strategic weapons or are they tactical weapons? Could they be used on troops in relatively short distances of, say, 30 kilometers or are we talking the cities of Israel and the major cities in the Arabian area? I think there's a big distinction there.

I would also say that while in my mind it will be always be murky, the degree to which the regime has acquired these kinds of weapons, particularly at the strategic level, that thus far we haven't seen him use this. The current regime has boxed him in. I think the possibility of him using it goes up considerably if, in fact, the regime is about to fall. And I think certainly that's a grave risk to take in the event of an invasion.

SEN. BIDEN: Anyone else?

MR. DEULFER: Yes, just briefly add not all weapons of mass destruction are created equal. Chemical and biological agents present one level of concern, but when Saddam gets a nuclear weapon, and he has had this intent, he's devoted enormous resources over two decades to do that, then everything will change. We would not be sitting here talking about the potential for military action against Iraq if we suspected he had a nuclear weapon. He knows that. I've had this discussion with very senior Iraqis. They know that had they invaded Kuwait after they possessed a nuclear weapon, it might be a very different outcome. So I think that's a key inflection.

The other thing, picking up a bit on your analysis of the dynamic of the issue. What we're seeing here is, you know, it's very easy to quantify, identify, calculate near term costs. It's very difficult to firmly identify and calculate long term benefits and long term risks. Budget analysts, politicians, go through this problem all the time and the fact that we're here, and my colleagues here saying well, there's a lot of near term risks. That's true, we can see those. But ultimately, there is a very long term concern which is very, very big and that's, I think, what characterizes much of the debate.

SEN. BIDEN: Dean?

MR. GALLUCCI: For me, there's a huge difference between chemical weapons and bacteriological or biological weapons that are toxins and, on the other hand, viral biological weapons and nuclear weapons, that that's where the break comes in terms of casualties and death and destruction. And you can have these overlaps depending upon a lot of manipulating assumptions.

I assume, notwithstanding the careful statements I tried to make here and in writing, I assume that Iraq has -- not will have, might have, has the VX, a very serious nerve agent, certainly sarin in a deliverable form. I assume it has both anthrax and botulinum toxin as it did before. It had four years to regenerate and I don't believe UNSCOM could be confident it destroyed it all. So I believe that's extant right now. I don't know about the smallpox, and that to me is a huge, huge concern, and I think the nuclear weapons falls in that same category.

The problem is, of course, I think that getting evidence of this is going to be very hard. I think we have to ask ourselves a question of whether we want to wait for that evidence, and we start getting on that slope that Charlie was just talking about, about trying to figure out what this looks like in terms of long term costs, because if near term costs are so easy -- force themselves upon us.

When I try to net this out, I think I come down and conclude that we don't have right now an urgent need to act as we might if we saw a facility under construction or that missile you talked with Mort before, that's not in front of us right now nor do we have the evidence that they were complicitous in 9/11, in which case I don't believe this government would have any choice whatever but to act. So we don't have that kind of pressure on us. But we don't -- we have no confidence that we'll see anything like that before we're confronted with something we wish not to see.

So I end up thinking myself, I net this out and say this is not something we should try to live with for a long period of time. We need to get ourselves at a position to cut this off. That means we've got more time than just the next six months, year or two years of -- might be thinking about with invasion. That's why I come down looking for some option other than an invasion and this very aggressive inspection regime which can only work if the invasion isn't a viable option to force Saddam in that direction.

But I think you are right to try to push at the edges here, to make us think through what would cause us to find it prudent to take -- to pay the costs and run the risks of action sooner rather than later.

SEN. BIDEN: I'll conclude by saying the question for me is, do we have enough time to do this right? By doing it right means we could, in my view, work arrangements with Russia, we could, in my view, deal with the situation in the Middle East much better than we have now, we could in fact be much better situated if we did some very important things over the next six to eight months, that if we don't -- that we don't have time to do now, and the question is how much time do we have? But anyway, I've trespassed upon your time.

I'll move to Senator Lugar.

SEN. RICHARD LUGAR (R-IN): Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm struck, listening to the testimony this afternoon, by some parallels with thinking after September 11th in this extent that many of us went into a crash course on Islam and what had been going on in several countries of the world where we hadn't paid much attention for a long time as to what had been going on in the last two centuries, for that matter. And trying to gain some idea of why people do the things they did, what the motivation was. Beyond that, we have been involved and the distinguished senator from West Virginia has taken leadership in this and will take some more next term, to find out what deficiencies we have in our intelligence systems in general, all of them, as to why we would not have known more, why we were not better informed.

Here we have a situation which clearly we need to know much more. We're all saying today that we haven't found the evidence but somebody has to ask why not? You know, given the resources of this country, extraordinary abilities that we have, there really is an imperative need. The same question as Dr. Gallucci noticed in North Korea, has been asked for a long time. The usual comment was that people didn't understand the language, they couldn't insinuate themselves in the country, all the sorts of dodges and weaves.

But here the life of the country is at stake. We're about to take very, very important action. And it just appears to me that it's not entirely the role of this committee but each one of us probably had best become much better informed about Iraq. And I'm struck by your comments, Mr. Deulfer, that it makes a big difference who succeeds. I'm even quering the question what are the alternatives? Who knows that much about the internal politics of Iraq these days? Now, there are Iraqi exiles who meet frequently in this town and elsewhere and maybe among them are leaders that first of all will have the backing of the Iraqi people. To come to the conclusion that somehow or other, ipso facto, the Iraqi people are going to condemn Saddam, condemn fighting for their country and what have you, perhaps.

But as we heard this morning, Dr. Cordesman, we didn't find that was always the case in the past. They were surprised by nationalism, feelings of patriotism, however despicable the leaders, because they didn't trust us either. In other words, on what basis do we believe or what must we do to have a constituency in Iraq that really wants democracy at any remote form, like the kind that we try to produce in this country or in Western Europe. And who might have at least the backing? And the way that Mr. Karzai is apparently through this process of loya jirga in Afghanistan gotten some consent but still has all the warlords around him and other people that constrain what he is going to do.

Now, absent some analysis of what the politics are and who is there, then we really do have a rather long occupation. You know, the thought of a parallel between Japan or Germany is a real leap in terms of the institutions that are available. It might bring about some semblance of Western democracy. So I -- you know, I sort of raised the question how do we get up to speed, what are the resources academically, governmentally, what have you in this country that are likely to identify for an informed argument, the post-Saddam situation. Or how do we even gain a sense in terms of public diplomacy of enlisting the Iraqi people to understand life will be better if in fact we intervene or if we stay or if we try to produce capitalism, democracy or whatever we want to do there.

Mr. Deulfer, I've sort of started with you. Would you respond to that?

MR. DEULFER: Thank you very much. I think these are fundamental issues. In essence, what needs to happen is Iraqis in Iraq need to conclude that it is in their interest and it is patriotic for them as proud Iraqis to change their leadership.

SEN. LUGAR: And how do we do that, how do -- what brings that about?

MR. DEULFER: Well, I think the international community can make a case that this regime is a danger to the external world, it's also a danger to the internal world in Iraq. We should not be prescriptive as to whom should lead Iraq, but I think we can say that there are certain standards, ideals that we would expect a follow-on government to embody, to a greater or lesser degree. This also has the important advantage of avoiding identifying groups or people within Iraq who would very shortly fall onto the list of Saddam's most wanted people.

But if we identify characteristics and ideals which no one can dispute, pluralism, you know, perhaps elections, fixing the financial system, getting rid of weapons of mass destruction. These are ideals which the external community would support and patriotic Iraqis could also support.

SEN. LUGAR: Why do we think they would? Why wouldn't maybe an Iraqi say we need a strong government? Saddam is a bad leader, but on the other hand, we need somebody who knows where to go. Are the institutions that this degree of participation and vigorous debate and so forth that much a part of this thing?

MR. DEULFER: My experience in talking with lots of Iraqis is that they recognize Saddam's their leader but they also recognize his shortcomings. They would like nothing better to be reconnected to the rest of the world. They see enormous benefit in that. But I don't think they're going to be wanting to see someone impose a leader on them. There are very delicate balances, which you'll from in the next panel, within Iraq, the north, middle, south, clans, military, various institutions. But I think, you know, there is a solution set there.

I think we should make it clear that we want to change as much in Iraq as possible, meaning the top leadership, and as little as possible, at least, you know, from the outside. In other words, cause as little damage to the infrastructure as possible. We ought to make it clear that most Iraqis have everything to gain and little to lose by a change in management.

SEN. LUGAR: Does anyone else have a comment, either on intelligence or how we gain people in Iraq? Yes, general.

MR. McINERNEY: Well, I think, Senator, that clearly there are two million Iraqis in the United States that have fled Iraq. They are a valuable source of understanding the people and the communications back there. The opposition forces are in daily and weekly contact with the military and other people in Iraq today. That is certainly a good starting point and that's why I think we need to organize this opposition to understand the problem.

The forces I'm talking about are enabling forces. Now, you can debate whether it's 50,000 or 250,000 or one million. We're talking about an enabling force to help Iraq people take their country back. And understanding these people, who I think are probably one of the most sophisticated, if not the most sophisticated, in the Middle East in education and understanding, and they had a middle class and still do, will be a lot easier than people realize.

I use the model of Japan and Germany after World War II. I was a boy there. We had -- in 1948 we had one division. One division in all of Germany, or at least in the U.S. sector, and the others had more. There wasn't a large predominance. Once you got rid of the Nazi leadership and Hitler, then the people wanted to take this path. I think the people in Iraq will want to take a path. I think the neighbors will not want them to take a path towards democracy and that will be one of our biggest challenges. Democracy does not flourish in the Middle East and we must be sensitive to that.

SEN. LUGAR: And the neighbors are a real problem, as you pointed out.

MR. McINERNEY: That's correct. Who are our allies and who are vital to this construct that --

SEN. LUGAR: We're trying to enlist -- get involved --

MR. McINERNEY: Getting their help.

SEN. LUGAR: Yeah. Well, thank you very much.

Senator Kerry.

SEN. JOHN KERRY (D-MA): Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Let me just in the chairman's absence, thank him for these hearings.

I was not able to be here this morning but I do think that these are obviously very important hearings and I think this is what this committee is supposed to do, and it's good as a member of this committee for 18 years now to see it in advance of decisions doing its work this way. And I think probably every committee member probably feels affirmative about that. I think the way the chairman has constructed it is good. I think it is right not to have the administration here at this point and that we sort of lay some groundwork here.

I was in the region earlier in the year and met at some length with Saudis, with Crown Prince Abdullah, the foreign minister and others, with King Abdullah, with their intelligence agencies, President Mubarak, his intelligence people, and came away with a sense that most of them believe -- I mean, at least they expressed this, that we are sort of over-exaggerating and overly worried about some aspects of Saddam Hussein, though they don't like him. I mean, they acknowledge that. But they certainly interpret some of the threat differently.

President Mubarak, I might add, quite dismissively believing that we sort of build him up in some ways. I'm not sure I agree with them. I mean, they live there, but if you assess what we believe he may or may not have -- you know, I don't think anybody believes he has nuclear program today that I've heard with any great conviction. We know he had about 7,000 people that were working on the program once upon a time, but our estimates are today that he may have at least a couple of dozen top flight nuclear scientists and engineers. But there's probably no doubt he's working on it, and I think most of us have to make the assumption that he is.

Secondly, he's got some continued shorter range missile development that he's been doing. That could help with longer range missile but it's not a direct long-range missile program. And we estimate that he has somewhere up to two dozen scuds or so, and obviously that has some potential for menace with respect to Israel, particularly if we were starting to engage in some way. But I understand from Israeli authorities not so much that they don't believe the overall value of changing the equation in the region isn't worthwhile.

So there's a lot to sort of balance here. I am of the opinion that under the right circumstances, it's not that difficult. I think I tend to agree with General McInerney and I think there are, according to the intelligence sources that I've listened to without revealing any of it, capacities for significantly more internal activity than maybe some people anticipate.

So I think it's achievable. I think the question is that we need to think about is when and how and what's the process, what brings you to the point of pulling the trigger, what makes you reach that point when you made the decision that you exhausted the doctrine of remedies, if you will, in the context of international war and of going to war. Certainly one of the lessons of prior conflicts is that it helps to have the American people fully supportive, fully educated, fully involved and clear about the objectives and prepared to stay the course.

There is nothing in what we have done to date that prepares the American people for that or that even lays out on the international stage a sufficient level of rationale, evidence, public diplomacy that might bring you, I think, to that legitimate trigger-pulling stage. It seems to me that we're sitting -- and I want to ask you particularly, Dean, about this but I'd like others to comment on it. I mean, there's a process here that it seems to me has been avoided to date. The rhetoric seems to be far ahead of our capacity and we seem to be ignoring and dismissive of the need for friends and allies and understanding on a global basis of why we might ultimately choose to do this.

Now there is in place a very forceful cease-fire agreement which Saddam Hussein signed and agreed to and it includes the full destruction of these weapons and the full inspection. Does it not make more sense in terms of all of these sensitivities that I just laid out, gentlemen, in terms of gaining the legitimacy of the American people, the consent of the American people and their assent, gaining the support and understanding of the world as to why we would be doing this, to go back to that process even though we know he will refuse to live up to it?

Certainly, if he has the things that he doesn't want us to find, he will not live up to it. So those who want the justification to go in will get the justification. But in the absence of that, we don't have a chance of having exhausted that doctrine of remedies in a way that I think answers the question to Mom and Pap in America as to why their young child may come home in a body bag.

Now, is there a process that has been avoided, Dean, beginning with you, that we should go through that would better position us with respect to the potential of this? And the opposite of that question is we lived with Russia for almost 50 years with the capacity to destroy us many times over and a policy of containment worked there. Why could not a policy of containment also work here at least while you build up to that point of legitimacy?

MR. GALLUCCI: Thank you, Senator. I'd like to take a shot at a few of those questions or observations that were in your statement. First, I can't help going back to the nuclear weapons observation because it troubles me. I don't know that Iraq has nuclear weapons but I do know, for a fact, that there is a workable design in Iraq which, in the days of UNSCOM we picked up, and it was an implosion system, an unsophisticated design. But they did more work after that and I also know that we have a real problem with accounting for material, fissile material coming out of the former Soviet Union.

I think I also know that we should have no confidence -- we should have no confidence that we will know if fissile material finds its way into Iraq from one of those countries. We might know but we might not. What I'm getting to here is a very troubling sentence and that is I don't understand how someone fully familiar with all our intelligence capabilities and our knowledge could say with high confidence that Iraq does not have a nuclear weapon now or will not have one for six months or six years. Not when they have done the work on an implosion system and there is fissile material to be had. I don't understand how one could say that. So that's point one.

Second, when we come to the question of time, do we have time and would we want time to use it for something useful, for example, to build the necessary consensus domestically and internationally, to make this a more politically plausible successful operation? I think there's a risk there because of what I just said about the nuclear issue, because for me, the key issue here is, is Iraq plausibly capable of transferring a viral biological weapon or a nuclear weapons capability to a terrorist group and it even could not be deterred? I don't know the answer to that but I don't like sitting around a long time hoping it does not happen.

So I think that's what makes me uncomfortable with the simple containment and just wait and see because what we may next see is some devastating event in the United States that can be traced back to Iraq. I would then say, well I guess that calculation was wrong, waiting and seeing. So I'm uncomfortable with that sort of indefinite postponement.

However, if you were to say, "But do we have time?" I guess I think it's important enough to get this right that we take some time and for me again, I think there may be an inspection option. It's not UNSCOM, it sure is not UNMOVIC. It is another kind of inspection that's much more aggressive that could not be put in place unless the Iraqi regime saw an invasion as the alternative. So I like the idea of trying to find another way to grapple with this and even if you must do an invasion, to take the time to get it right.

The chairman referred to doing some missionary work, I think, with other countries particularly Russia and we've had a concern for a period of time with the position of France within the Security Council. There's much to be done in the region and you will hear more about that. So, yes, I think we can take the time but I don't think indefinitely. I'm troubled by the simple containment option in which you wait for something that would be a trigger.

What the administration is talking about is not preemption as I understand it. It is a preventive war. Preemption is the anticipation of an act by the other side. We don't see that. This would be looking way down the road and saying we're not going to allow that situation to emerge. That's a very forward leaning posture and I think we have the time to get ourselves ready before we take --

SEN. KERRY: But there's a certain visible logistical period of time under any circumstances here during which time you could certainly provide a sufficiently more powerful ultimatum than existed previously, with respect to inspections.

MR. GALLUCCI: I think not only could you but you have no hope of getting successful inspections unless you took the antecedent steps, the Desert Shield -- if I can be allowed that -- period of time, took some of those steps and began to put forces in place and began to take the political steps that made the invasion a very credible option, something that we intended to do. And I think we would be believed this time where we were not believed 11 years ago.

SEN. BIDEN: Senator Hagel.

SEN. CHARLES HAGEL (R-NE): Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And to our panelists, thank you. We appreciate your contributions today and the contributions you've made, each of you, to our country.

Senator Lugar focused on something that I think we have not all focused on enough and that is, after we have heard your testimony and you heard our speeches and you might even hear an interview or two after this, we are all for virtue, democracy, good government and all things right. But how do we get there? And that, I think, was Senator Lugar's point. And I'd ask each of you to focus on a couple of areas and if you wouldn't mind responding to this question.

General Hoar and Doctor Halperin in their testimony ask a lot of questions back and they each laid out a number of dynamics and factors that we should pay a lot of attention, if, in fact, the military option is the option and as we drift along, containment is not particularly attractive and we've gone through that for 11 years and we still have Saddam and we still have uncertainty and we still have problems. So therefore, what is the option? What should we do? And there are various versions put forward. And I would hope that, General McInerney, when you respond, would deal a little bit with the opposition groups and forces that you keep talking about, which I'm not aware of, but they may be there.

But what I'd ask the five of you to focus on is the economic dynamics of this, the opposition dynamics, the allies, how all that integrates into something. Or maybe it's not important. Maybe a unilateral strike along the lines of what General McInerney is talking about, clean, crisp, sophisticated, go in and get it done. And maybe that works.

Then what happens afterward? Who governs? Do any of you have any idea of an exiled government, of any individual, any groups that you could put forward to us today as to what happens after we take this bold strike in the interests of virtue and all mankind. Now, what follows on, I think General Hoar got into some of those points in his testimony.

So with that, each of you, thank you, and we are always grateful for your consultation and input. And we would start with you, Dean.

MR. GALLUCCI: I think I have to go. I don't know, Senator, that I can add, on the three points that you made, the economics, the opposition and the allies, to what has been said. I liked General Hoar's list of things we ought to think about, and particularly those things that we ought to think about being able to do the day after, as well as the things we ought to put in place so that we do this in the most politically plausible way. That was, I thought, a very nice list. And I would associate myself with that.

I guess, from my moment here, I would say that I worry, and I will be listening to General McInerney as well, to talk more about that option. I have in my ears ringing the words of Tony Cordesman this morning about assuming too much about what might happen with the opposition going in too light, taking the risks of -- I don't know that he was speaking specifically about the blitzkrieg type operation, but it seemed that he was speaking to that, and worried about that being the concept of operations rather than a heavier more traditional approach.

And that troubles me. So I guess I still remain to be persuaded that that option really is viable, and that you've got that kind of support, and that the regime is that fragile and can be overturned. It may well be true, but I think the point this morning was that's a hell of an assumption to make, or a risk to take. And right now I would not, based upon what I know, I would not be there myself in making that calculation.

Of all the things that I think, in this list, that I would worry about most at this point, for me, we are doing this mostly because we want to avoid the transfer of this capability to terrorist groups. We want to reduce, in other words, the vulnerability of the United States of America today to suffering a 9/11 event with a weapon of mass destruction. Then I want to ask myself, if we do this unilaterally, and we have not taken care with allies in the region, are we going to create a situation which worsens that. That, for me, is the key question. Mort Halperin's comments went to this. And that, to me, is very, very important.

Unfortunately, it's a soft point, and if I can put it that way. It's a hard one to assess. But if we do this the wrong way, and we create, Senator Lugar what you were talking about before about, a situation in which we can ask ourselves, "Gee, I wonder why we are not appreciated the way we think we ought to be" then we will have really made a tragic error. So I think that's the kind of calculation, very hard to make. And we look to regional experts to help us.

SEN. HAGEL: Mr. Deulfer.

MR. DEULFER: I tried to get a little bit at the points you were raising when I said that what we need to do ahead of time is prepare political groundwork. And I mean both with respect to Iraqis in Iraq, Iraqis outside of Iraq, the opposition, but also with some key capitals on this.

And I think a discussion about the characteristics of a follow-on government that we would expect to see is one mechanism for involving a lot of important voices, some overtly, some perhaps not overtly, into you know putting forward a picture of what we expect Iraq will be on the other side, but without being prescriptive, in other words, not being a position where we're trying to impose something on the Iraqi people. But I think, you know, there's a delicate balance and delicate work that has to be done politically which includes people in Iraq. And that, obviously, is something you know is not necessarily that we can be discussing in an open session.

But none of this is guaranteed. There are enormous risks to, you know, economic risks, oil interests, all that sort of thing. You know, there is a big risk that Saddam will be able to characterize what we're doing as trying to put in place a puppet. And nothing will solidify the Iraqi people to oppose us, nothing will cause more bodies to come back in bags ultimately, if the Iraqi people are put in a position where they see supporting Saddam as being the patriotic act.

What we need to do is carefully separate Saddam from patriotic acts for regular Iraqis, Iraqis in the army, Iraqis in the Republican Guard, even the special Republican Guard, even the security services. We need to make Saddam feel very lonely. I think there's a strategy out there which can do this, both with allies, with capitals. I think it rests on creating -- causing audiences in various locations, most especially in Iraq though, to think about their relationship with the next government in Baghdad. And when they start doing that, Saddam will be very lonely.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

General.

MR. HOAR: Senator, I think you've touched on some very complex issues. First of all, I don't believe that the Iraqi opposition can be depended upon. I think, from my own experience in the region, that they weren't worth anything during that time. Tony Zinni who followed me, twice removed, felt the same way up to two years ago. And what the Iraqi opposition needs is a charismatic person that is doing something to make the case for a regime change. And that certainly is not Mr. Shalabi in Mayfair sending faxes to Iraq. That's the first thing.

Secondly, those people that have chosen to stand up and fight, on the two occasions, the Shi'a in the south and the Kurds in the north, have both been left in the lurch by the United States government. So until we are on the ground and winning, don't expect any help from them, if that's what we're going to do.

How do we get allies into this game? I would say that Pan- Arabism, as a political movement, and as an economic movement, is dead. But not as a cultural movement.

From Morocco all the way across the Arab world there is still a good deal of sympathy for the Iraqi people, not the regime, but the people. We have to make the case, as a government, through public diplomacy and otherwise, and we have not made that case to the Arab people, the Arab street as it is frequently called, why the change has to be made, and why it would be useful. And, clearly, as Mort suggested, if there were some movement on the Israeli-Palestinian side we would move a long way, because most Arabs feel that's a far more pressing issue than the Iraqi issue.

With respect to cost, the sort of thing that is contemplated up to and including large numbers of people on the ground, assuming a military victory, would be very costly. Desert Storm, the Saudis paid $17 billion as their share of that bill. Prince Abdullah told me that he had been deceived, his word, by a senior administration official on how the bills would be split up. There's very bad feeling there. I am sure that the Kuwaitis, because of their special circumstance, would help any way they can if we put pressure on them. But it will not be easy.

I think that all of the things that we've talked about here need doing. But it requires a concerted effort on the government's part, and I don't see that that work is being done at this time. I would finally add that bringing the Russians into the equation, and perhaps the Chinese because that's the source of some of this weapons transfer material, would help indeed. And shutting down the oil that goes from Iraq to Turkey -- $2 billion worth a year -- and providing another source for the fuel that goes to Jordan at a reduced cost pressure on the Iraqi government.

SEN. HAGEL: General, thank you.

General McInerney.

MR. McINERNEY: Senator, I think the important thing is the opposition group must be developed. The fundamental tenet that we've got to operate from, and I won't personalize this, but there are people out there that our government can actively work with. They'll not meet the boy scout sniff test. They won't do certain things but they will be part of a group that will have credibility within in Iraq and it has the right objectives and the right motives. Nobody loves Saddam in Iraq. Every family -- I've been told by Iraqis -- every family has been hurt by this man either in the Iranian war, the Gulf War, or personal prosecution that he has made against them.

And so we need to capitalize on that and there is a sweet spot. I can't give you that answer now but I do know that thoughtful people can resolve that issue and once you have that and have a credible one, then everything else starts to roll with it. And so that is to me extremely important. And I would just agree with the comments that General Hoar made about on the allies.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

Dr. Halperin.

MR. HALPERIN: Senator, I think that is the critical question. I'm extraordinarily skeptical that we have a clue of how to bring into existence a combined Iraqi opposition that could take over the country. We've been trying for a very long time under three American administrations now and I don't believe that there is a solution to that problem. Moreover, I would say that while many and maybe most Iraqis hate Saddam, I would say that it is extraordinarily unlikely that a group that came to power which was patriotic Iraqis would give up the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

They live in a world that's surrounded by nuclear states. Pakistan, Iran, Israel. That is not a Saddam policy that is a policy I believe that most Iraqi leaders would follow. Moreover, I think it is extraordinarily unlikely that the group that came to power in Baghdad would be for the kind of autonomy that the Kurds tell us is the precondition for their cooperating with us. And I think we have failed to honor our commitments to them twice now and to promise them that in the face of what is likely to be a government in Baghdad that has no interest in it is, I think, an extraordinary commitment to make.

I would think that whatever government comes to power, unless it is following along American occupation, is not going to be anything like a democratic government. There are no others there. It is hard to imagine why this would happen overnight in Iraq. I think we also have to be enormously humble about our ability to help friendly governments in the region do the right thing. It is not an accident that most of the terrorists came from countries deeply friendly to the United States that we have worked with for a very long time. And I think the danger that, if we have a friendly Iraqi regime, it will become for the first time a breeding ground of people who go elsewhere and plot to kill innocent Americans, is not only a risk but in my view is extraordinarily likely.

A democratic Iraq of the kind that we talk about after Saddam will come about only if we are prepared to stay there for a very long time, accepting, in my view, very great risks of casualties and a threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq because a democratic regime is not going to have the capacity to keep that country together unless there is an American military force in the country that insists that it stay together. And we have to think about whether we really want to be the instrument --

SEN. BIDEN: Does anyone disagree with that point? Does anyone disagree with the point just made? Repeat the last please.

MR. HALPERIN: Keeping Iraq together and democratic will require American military forces dedicated and committed to that, including denying the Kurds the kind of autonomy that they will demand and assert. And those, in my view --

SEN. BIDEN: Stop right there, please. Does anyone disagree with that specific point? And, if so, how?

MR. McINERNEY: I think that the opposition groups clearly want to keep, except maybe the Kurds, keep Iraq as Iraq. I mean the Shi'ites in the south, whatever. They don't want to --

SEN. BIDEN: "Except the Kurds" that's like saying "Keep the United States together except the Southwest.

MR. McINERNEY: Yes. Well, and that will be one of the entry points that, because it's in our interests to have the Iraq that we have there today and not a fragmented society and that's I think how we enter this argument and get our support. And that's extremely important. Again, the size of the military, it's more the influence of the United States to keep that than a large occupation force. That I don't see the requirement. It is the influence and the staying power of our influence there helping to shape that democracy.

MR. HOAR: Sir, I believe in one sense the two principal leaders of the Kurds have made a deal with Saddam Hussein already. Both of them have gone on record recently as saying that they're fairly comfortable with the relationship. I think that could be done again, but Mark's point is well taken. There is no tradition of democracy in that area. Iraq is the instrument of our post-colonialism. Cut up by the British cutting across ethnic lines.

SEN. BIDEN: I'm not trying to start an argument. I'm trying to determine throughout these hearings where there are points of consensus on major, major questions. And a major question is to me at least "What after?" And that's why I asked question. But I yield to Senator Feingold.

SEN. RUSSELL FEINGOLD (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask one of Mr. Deulfer and Dr. Halperin. There are obviously a number of diverse points of view in the foreign policy community about the right course of action in Iraq. No one disagrees with one basic premise though. The Iraqi people have suffered terribly from years of deprivation and that they have been consistently told that it is United States support for U.N. sanctions that is responsible for their plight. And I think, Mr. Deulfer, that you were already getting into some of this a moment ago, but I'd like to hear a little bit more from you and then from Dr. Halperin.

What kind of reaction can we expect from Iraqi people if the U.S. moves to invade their country? If widespread civil conflict threatens to break out in the wake of regime change, staving off chaos in Iraq may require, as we've just talked about, a very significant presence over a significant period of time. Aside from the obvious resentment this will provoke in other parts of the Middle East, is there any reason to believe that the Iraqi people themselves would tolerate such a presence?

MR. DEULFER: Senator, it's for exactly those points that you're raising that I emphasize that we need a very well thought out set of -- or political organizing principles in this sense. There are national institutions in Iraq that hold the country together. The regular army. There's departments of agriculture, irrigation. There's a civil service. There are clans which span the length and breadth of the country and they need to feel that their interests will be preserved in what comes next. But it's very important that whatever we do not be seen as imposing something upon them, but simply allowing them to replace their own leadership.

You know, if they wind up in a position where Saddam is saying here comes the Americans. They want to destroy the great nation of Iraq and put in place a puppet. Then I think we're headed for a big mess. But, again --

SEN. FEINGOLD: Are you suggesting that these institutions will be able to overcome the connection that people may feel between the humanitarian crisis and what has happened in the past?

MR. DUEFLER: You know, I think if we posit that, we will judge the next government in Iraq based on how it proceeds towards behaving more normally towards pluralism and say, you know, we're going to make our decisions about security relations. About debt relief. About adjusting the sanctions. We need get out of this box that we're in and I have no idea how we got in it. Where the notion of changing the management in Baghdad is seen as something anti-Arab.

I mean, Saddam has done a great job in speaking to Arabs in the street, via Al-Jazeera and other mechanisms saying that United States is against the Arabs because the United States wants me out of power. I mean, logically, there is nothing better I can imagine for the Arab people that if Saddam left and the Iraqi people were able to achieve their enormous potential, which there is enormous agreement that they have enormous potential.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you.

Again, Dr. Halperin, what I'm getting at is the relationship between the humanitarian crisis and the reaction of the Iraqi people.

MR. HALPERIN: Well, I think part of that, Senator, goes back to the spectacular failure of the United States so that we got to this point where the world believed that somehow we were responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Iraq rather than Saddam Hussein. When Secretary Powell came in, I thought committed to changing that both by more effective public diplomacy, but even more important by changing the nature of the embargo. That is, by allowing Iraqis to import much more of various kinds of things than we had permitted in the past, by allowing them to rebuild their oil industry and export as much oil as they could consistent with the economic situation, and focusing the embargo only on things which contribute directly to their weapons of mass destruction or conventional military capability.

We now have that resolution from the U.N. Security Council. As far as I can tell, having worked very hard to get it, we've done nothing to implement it. I think we need to implement that in a way that turns that tide, so that we begin to demonstrate to the world that if there's a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, it is Saddam Hussein's fault and not the fault of the U.N. embargo. And that's part of my proposed containment plus strategy.

If you talk about a regime that comes in afterwards, the natural course of events in Iraq, in my view, would lead to a regime which suppressed the Kurds, which denied political freedom to people, and which continued to develop weapons of mass destruction. And it would still be better than Saddam in some ways and not as crazy and not as bad for the people of the country. But that's what it will be unless we are prepared to stay there for a very long time, in a very unnatural way and actually try to change that country. And I think we're talking about 20 years of many American troops in the country. The alternative is that we will, in fact, not live up to the commitments we will make to the Kurds to get them to cooperate in this endeavor. And I think there are very serious moral and real political issues of once again promising them something that we're not going to deliver.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, doctor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Senator Chafee.

SEN. LINCOLN CHAFEE (R-RI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A couple of witnesses have said that first we have to solve the Palestinian issue before we move here and I suppose we could have weeks of hearings on that issue. But I'm inclined to agree and it seems to get worse every day instead of better.

I do have a specific quick question. It seems as if some of the Islamic fundamentalists are using to their propaganda advantage the presence of our military bases near the holy sites of Mecca and Medina and technically in relation to the value of those bases to us strategically in the Gulf and the disadvantage to us on the propaganda front. Where does that fit in, these bases that we have and both the generals have had experience with?

MR. HOAR: Of course the bases in Saudi Arabia are a legacy from the Gulf War. You'll recall that King Fahd agreed to that when Mr. Chaney and Mr. Wolfowitz and Norm Schwarzkopf went over right after they briefed the president. With the requirement to conduct Southern Watch, the air campaign over Southern Iraq, we needed bases in the area and those bases existed in Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia agreed to pay the vast majority of the costs associated with them. But this has been very difficult for many conservative Muslims in Saudi Arabia. As you know, the Wahabi sect of Islam is very xenophobic and so as a result there has been continuing pressure. Osama bin Laden used this theme in his program but he has used a variety of themes directed at different populations in the Arab world that are not all consistent. I think that the only problem, the only place that you would find that problem is in Saudi Arabia with that particular group of people.

SEN. CHAFEE: How critical are they to our presence in the region?

MR. HOAR: Well, the bases are being replicated in Qatar right now, so that there are other options but I would say, in terms of contemplating military action in that area, U.S. military action, airspace over Saudi Arabia is critical. If you were to not have the ability to use Saudi airspace, the problem would become extremely more difficult.

SEN. CHAFEE: General McInerney, have you anything to add?

MR. McINERNEY: No, I agree completely with General Hoar.

SEN. CHAFEE: Thank you, gentlemen.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you, very much.

Gentlemen, would you like -- didn't you want to take a five minute break or -- we've got a little more -- if your constitutions are admirable.

Senator from Florida.

SEN. BILL NELSON (D-FL): I'd yield to the senator from West Virginia.

SEN. BIDEN: Excuse me. Senator from West Virginia. A gracious man. He was here before everybody and I was getting to him last which I apologize.

Senator from West Virginia.

SEN. JAY ROCKEFELLER (D-WV): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm struck, I guess, by listening to this conversation this afternoon about the enormous variety and range of uncertainty which is expressed by all of you. And it's not that people are keeping all options open because you are all experienced professionals and that is not your purpose. But the effect of what you're saying gives that impression, that we need to keep all options open. So the concept of uncertainty interests me. For example, people talk about galvanizing the people in some way. Well, I mean you know, they talked about that in Indonesia when Sukarno was in charge and nothing happened until something eventually did after decades. And Asad the same thing, what was he, a seven-year term, something of that sort.

And now we have Hussein and people are talking about well, if we could only figure out a way to get the people going. To me the Pan- Arabism argument followed, as Senator Lugar indicated, by our total inability to understand what Islam is and getting off all the signals that we don't. And then even in conversations like this where there is a sort of sense of uncertainty about the development of American foreign policy or potential American foreign policy, military or diplomatic, is just wrapped in uncertainty. I mean, I think that one can speculate that it's a lot easier to use intelligence to find out, for example, what's going on in the chemical world with emissions and effluents than it is in the biological world, which is much more discreet.

You say that the nuclear thing -- if we were really sure about the nuclear thing, I can't imagine that we wouldn't go in and yet my understanding this morning was that there was a feeling that each day that goes by the threat gets greater and then we get back to the threats which is the subject of all of this. So I guess the question I would ask you is, there's an extraordinary polemic involved in this because the stakes are so high, the consequences. Senator Kerry mentioned are we preparing the American people. And that's as if Iraq existed by itself as a problem in the world and of course it doesn't. There are 60 Al-Qaeda nations. We have our own problems and there are uncertainties everywhere now which encourage each other, compound therefore. So I'm just sort of interested in -- what is a resolution process? I mean if we are stuck with uncertainties and then we can go from here to here and we're rational here and we're rational here, we make sense here and we make sense here and we're right here or right here.

So we describe all the options but time closes in, Dean said so. And that every day that passes gets more dangerous and then this not insignificant point that if, purchase, we wait three days too late and either from that country through others and some people said no, they won't do it through others because they want to keep it for themselves because they give them power, but then who knows about that too? And then some day all of a sudden a series of terrible things happen in this country and then the whole concept of body bags takes on a very different concept.

So I guess the only question, certainly the only question I have time for, is that we can deal with uncertainties because we're an honest nation and we tend to, we tend to be very open in expressing our views and our concerns and our worries and that's fair to the American people, part of the democratic process. Unique in the world, I might say, we're that way. But at some point, there comes the point of a resolution of what you're going to do and you can't talk about uncertainties because you don't have all the answers and you never will have all the answers, and we all know that we'll never have all the answers. And so sort of a collective sense from you gentlemen of how one deals with the process of going from continuing uncertainties on very, very large issues to the point of decision, and obviously, it rests in the hands of the president of the United States.

MR. GALLUCCI: I'd like to take a brief shot at that and go back to a point that was made earlier, that we, the Coalition, fought a war against Iraq and won and there was a resolution to the war that was captured, U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, but it's still outstanding and is not being implemented. So as an opening proposition to your -- Senator, your statement that we have all this uncertainty, what are we going to do with this great range? Let's say that that was a resolution that really deserves to be implemented, based also on everything else we've said, and that we're dedicated to getting from here to there which is to say Iraq, that does not have weapons of mass destruction.

And so the question is how do we get there? Well, do we have to urgently, now, invade immediately? I'd say no. Is that something we want to leave alone for a long period of time? I'd say no, too risky, for the reasons we've all talked about. So, in the near term, it seems to me, one of the things we've got to do is build a consensus around the need for action. We should have hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this and we should address all this and American people should be listening.

And then we should start to do those things, some of which have been laid out by some of my colleagues at the table, that would build a consensus domestically and internationally, in order that we be in a position to take military action when either we are forced to because of some bit of information that's delivered to us by George Tenet or some other way or because we've come to the point where we think we now are in a better position in terms of our status with allies and friends and domestically. And maybe if you took the advice I was offering, you also wanted to check the box of really trying to see whether an aggressive inspection regime was put in place.

But there's a deliberate process, I think, that we can move and implement but starting with the proposition that that U.N. Security Council resolution deserves to be implemented and hasn't been for the last -- you could pick the year, but certainly probably five or six years is not a bad number.

SEN. BIDEN: Doctor.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that your premise is absolutely correct. What dominates this is uncertainty. It dominates almost all international problems. They're all much too complicated to have any real certainty about what to do. And if we think we have certainty, it's because we bring to it an ideology that filters out the things that produce the uncertainty.

The answer to uncertainty in my view is the American Constitution. I think the way to resolve this question is the way the Constitution intended, that is to say, if the president concludes that he wants to implement an option, particularly one that involves the initiation of the use of military force, I think he has an obligation to come to the Congress and ask for a resolution authorizing him to do that. I think he has an obligation to weigh out his understanding of the costs and gains and how he resolves these uncertainties. And then I think the Congress has to debate those. And if it authorizes the president to go, then I think he then has the ultimate responsibility to decide when to initiate it.

You can do all that without eliminating the tactical surprise of a military operation. And that's why I think these hearings are so important, the consensus that seems to me to be developing on both sides of the aisle, in the Congress and outside, that this is a situation in which the Congress' authority is needed to use military force, is an important step forward, and I think this country will stand together, whichever we decide to do, as long as we do it with our eyes open, understanding the uncertainties and the costs and we follow the procedures of the Constitution.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much.

Senator Brownback.

SEN. SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank the panelists too for your presentations, your thoughtfulness. Several of you I've had in front of panels when we were going this exercise, I believe, four years ago, looking at Iraq.

I want to go at one narrow question, one broad question. Several years ago when we were looking at regime change, when that was the terminology that was developed at the time on the Iraq Liberation Act, supporting outside groups, what we could do to remove Saddam Hussein, there was broad consensus that this is a bad actor, Saddam Hussein, we'd be better off if he's not there, is now the time and what are the means? And that's the same question we're hearing with today.

One of the issues that came up at that time was a -- it wouldn't be a containment plus strategy as you described it, but one was described as saying we have a no fly policy over certain portions of Iraq today that Saddam cannot enter air space and we'll enforce that, was to expand that no fly to a no fly, no drive policy, and try to allow opposition forces to build up in further areas of Iraq. The Kurds already control a good portion of the north, try to expand that in the south and to have Saddam become more of a mayor of Baghdad than controlling the entire country. I'd like, perhaps if we could, one of the military members to respond to the thoughts of trying to do something like that today and whether or not you feel like that is a meritorious type of policy trend to support?

MR. HOAR: Tom poked me, I think that means you go first.

(Laughter.)

MR. HOAR: Senator, I don't think Tom and I are going to agree with this but I think Tony Cordesman's thoughts this morning about encouraging resistance without direct affirmative assistance on the ground is at best an unethical and perhaps an immoral approach, given what has happened in the south to the Shi'a before. I don't think that you can build that kind of support in the south without a firm commitment on the part of the government to come to their aid.

SEN. BROWNBACK: On the ground?

MR. HOAR: On the ground.

MR. McINERNEY: I would agree with General Hoar on that. The opposition must be developed outside the country and must be credible and then working covert operations back in. But only when you put U.S. and Coalition forces in harms way, in that country, in such a force enabling force size that you can enable them to survive because, in the final analysis, the Coalition forces will be the ones that make this successful. It is not the opposition forces. The opposition forces bring political to it. Iraqis retaking Iraq -- you're helping them do that. And number two, they also bring a dialogue with the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Army, and that's where we need to focus. But I would agree 100 percent with General Hoar and Tony Cordesman that do not let anything try to do it, them start by themselves.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Just with air superiority and using the air superiority you have at U.S. ground?

MR. McINERNEY: I don't think air alone can do that.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Thank you for directly responding to that. The second is a broader question and a maybe a bit of a wild card. But it struck me as an interesting point, a gentleman that's far more knowledgeable than I am on these issues in the region was assessing the War on Terrorism, and I think to date the Bush administration has done a marvelous job in the War on Terrorism. I think they've done so very focused, very intense, and going sequentially, focus on Afghanistan, next, removing and been involved in the Philippines where troops are coming out, Georgia, troops in Uzbekistan, building alliances up in Central Asia, I think this has been, to me, a very good, solid, sequential strategy.

My question is now that in the War on Terrorism, what is the appropriate next target to go at? If you just back up and ask yourself what's the best place to go at? And this person was asserting that if you look at it that way and you're trying to get your biggest, most problematic targets first, an analogy to dealing with cancer where you go and you dig the big nodes out before they metastasize, you go at Afghanistan, you've got to dig and pull this one out, that your next big country that's supporting and sponsoring terrorism, that's putting money into it, that's putting troops in into it, that's training, is Iran. That that's the country that's supporting and sponsoring more terrorism, supporting Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, shipping weapons, providing training to a number of countries in that region. Is that the more likely intense focus that one should go at on a sequential battle in the War on Terrorism?

MR. MCINERNEY: My feeling is, is that Iran will take care of itself once Iraq goes. Iraq has violated the U.N. accords, it's violated everything, it tempts to shoot down every day airplanes in the northern fly zone, the southern fly zone. If they hit one of them that's an act of war, isn't it? Will that be -- that doesn't seem to bother him because I think he flat says, they just don't have it. They just don't have the guts to come after me. And every day they fire at our planes and every day we put them in harm's way. Now, that's why I think Iraq should come before Iran. What you said about Iran is exactly correct. Although I think once Iraq goes, that Iran will self correct.

MR. HALPERIN: Senator, let me sum it up in two points. One, I think the only way to stop Iran from supporting those terrorist groups is to settle the Palestine-Israeli problem. I cannot imagine even a different regime in Iran which would not provide support to those groups as long as the Middle East problem is the way it is. So the solution to the Iranian terrorism, which as you say is focused on the Middle East and on Israel is to settle the Middle East problem. You can't settle it by regime change in Iran.

Second, I agree with you that we need to go through a sequence, but I think we've skipped the first step too fast. Afghanistan is not over. Afghanistan is still going to require for a very long time a very substantial American military presence. And I think before we look for another place to use American military force we better make sure that we don't leave behind in Afghanistan, which in two years from now is supporting terrorist groups again, not of the central government, but from pockets around the country.

MR. MCINERNEY: The only thing I would say is that Afghanistan is not developing weapons of mass destruction, and that's why the priority must shift. We clearly must stay and work the Afghanistan problem more, and I agree with you 100 percent.

MR. GALLUCCI: I, Senator, think Iran is a serious problem for us, but I don't think -- I hope it is not on our list of countries which we would plan to invade anytime soon in a preemptive act.

SEN. BROWNBACK: And I've not heard anybody suggest that.

MR. GALLUCCI: That's good. I think there's a question about how best to deal with Iran. I guess I would disagree with General McInerney, I don't think that addressing the Iraqi problem is necessarily going to help us with Iran. I think certainly if the Palestinian-Israeli issue were resolved, that would go a long way in taking away one of the issues that causes difficulty. Iran's drive to weapons of mass destruction independent of its support for terrorism I think is a much more deeper rooted desire in Iran, and I don't think it's connected particularly to this regime. I think it's traceable to the Shah and I think this is a strategic issue that we -- only when we get a dialogue with Iran we'll be able to address successfully.

Right now I think the key to dealing with Iran is dealing with Russia rather than Iran because we don't have much going on with Tehran. If you -- to go back to your first question about where do we go next, I would be putting energy working on the Mort Halperin theory that governments in the United States only have so much energy. I'd be putting energy on working on South Asia and Pakistan in particular. And I worry greatly about the stability and coherence of that country and its relationship with India over Kashmir.

SEN. BROWNBACK: Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much.

Senator Nelson.

SEN. NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, I agree with what you've said about what after, and a good example of that is Afghanistan. And we're not even into the what after, we're still in the middle of it. And yet we're not going to have success for the long run in Afghanistan unless we have a major presence there to help them. And you've pointed out the distinction between Afghanistan and Iraq being the potential weapons of mass destruction.

Now, if we got involved in Iraq militarily, what is that going to do to logistical and personnel support in other parts of the world, particularly in central Asia? Is that going to stress us to the point that we're not going to be able to supply what we need to over there in Afghanistan and in the surrounding area and out there in the Arabian Sea? Give us your comments on that.

MR. HOAR: Thank you. I think that what little I know about the plans that are contemplated about military action in Iraq, I think the problem is always scarce assets, the intelligence, the JSTARS, the Rivet Joint airplanes, tankers, those things. I think there are adequate forces on the ground. I think that carrier battle groups and that sort of thing, given this current state in Afghanistan, has slowed down from the early days. Whether or not you could sustain it, given the requirement for forward deployment and so forth, I think there probably would be some shortage.

I read in the paper that some of the smart weapons were used extensively in Afghanistan but now those supplies have been reestablished. And I think there would be some problems but I don't think they're show-stoppers. But I would again point out the much larger problem is from where do you launch these operations and with whose help and so forth.

MR. McINERNEY: I would agree with General Hoar, and the key thing is where we launch them. It would stretch us but it's throughout the world because this would be a major regional contingency. But it is within our capability.

SEN. NELSON: Both of you were talking about the forces that would have to be brought to bear from the outside. Do you have a sense from your military experience as to how many troops we're talking about?

MR. HOAR: Well, I think from Tom's comments, he believes that a good deal more can be done with the new technology that is available to us than I believe. I think that as Tony Cordesman said this morning, you may be able to do this on the cheap, but in the event that it doesn't work you need to be prepared with a fallback position. The old military belief is you make an assumption, then you have an ultimate plan to make sure that if the assumption doesn't work that you in fact have another choice.

It seems to me that at the end of the day you're going to have to put people on the ground. The Republican Guard divisions, their loyalty to the regime, it seems to me that you can't do that on the cheap. Having said that, the very things that Tom has mentioned, particularly with smart bombs, the command control communications and so forth, had improved enormously and would be much, much easier than it was in Desert Storm, but I'm afraid you still have to put a fairly large number of folks on the ground.

SEN. NELSON: And not doing it on the cheap and putting large numbers on the ground, we're really talking about a quarter of a million troops, aren't we, having the backups that you're talking about? If things go wrong you've got to have that capability of backup.

MR. HOAR: I'd be reluctant to put a number on it because I don't know what people that are much closer to this problem than I. But I'd say it's in that ball park, yes, sir. It is certainly not the 70,000 that we heard from time to time.

SEN. NELSON: And, Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things that we have to explore here is cost. And I'm as much of a hawk as anybody but let's get it out on the table with what we had in the Gulf War, roughly a half a million, the cost, total cost was about, in today's dollars, about $80 billion. So if you're going to have a force half that size and you're talking about the same duration, in today's dollars that's in the range of $40 billion. Now, maybe we have to spin that, but let's understand that and let it be a part of the dialogue.

MR. HOAR: I think you have to also consider, Senator, the cost to the economy. The price of oil went to $40 a barrel during the Gulf War. There's every reason to believe that some similar disruption would take place to the American economy.

MR. MCINERNEY: I would say, and I won't give a number, but it's a smaller force, and let me give you a few reasons why. Number one, we have added certain technology in our bomber force that we did not have in the JDAM where you can have a B-2 hit 16 targets at once, a B- 1 can hit 24 at once, and a B-52 can hit 12 at once, I think. It enables them to stay up over the target so the ground forces, through binoculars, lays designate and up in -- they got a bomb on target in 10 minutes, in all weather. So that is a quantum job.

The Global Hawk, the Predator where you have 24/7. We had two Joint STARS in Desert Storm 1. They were prototypes. They fly at night and the contractors would rewrite the code in the daytime. Today I think we're at 14 Joint STARS, which can sanitize a box on any movement.

The other things I would say, Senator, are he doesn't train his divisions in a division size exercise. Their readiness is so far down and I think we all agree he doesn't have an air force. Whatever you say, if he takes off, he's going to die because AWACS will pick him up in a take-off role and our airplanes will be up. So he's going to be under constant attack.

Now, we definitely need ground forces and I say we need heavy, we need light, we need air mobile but that rolled up with the opposition, the opposition talking -- because the opposition know the division commanders, they've got their phone number. They know the core commanders and there is something there that we need to do better on and I'll leave it at that. And I know we can. Do we have it right now? I would agree with General Hoar, we don't have it right now.

But all that rolled up in with a very important campaign which speed and the simultaneous -- remember we had 38 days or whatever it was. Many would still like to have that. There is a powerful synergy between simultaneous land and air because when you put ground in, he has to mass his forces. And if anything we have invested in was taking tanks out on the central plains of Europe and that's got to be his main force. And again you play back to that IO campaign to the Iraqi people, "We are not after you nor your military." That is an extremely powerful tool that we need to work on.

SEN. NELSON: Clearly we have the new systems -- by the way that Joint STARS, Mr. Chairman, is built in my home town of Melbourne, Florida.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one more question. This is a very delicate question. You were not here before when you had given me the opportunity to chair the hearing and I raised the issue of the downed pilot from Jacksonville, Florida from the Gulf War and all of these folks were sitting in the audience and heard my questions to the previous panel. And my question to you all would be, if Commander Scott Speicher is alive, they're obviously going to use him in some way as a shield, as some kind of wedge to try to get us not to do certain things or go certain places.

That, of course, from a human standpoint with a family that's gone through what they've gone through in Jacksonville, if he is alive, is just an awful contemplation. Can you all give to us, to me any insight into how we would have to go about that? Do we just have to be cold hearted and put the national interest first? What would you recommend?

MR. HOAR: Senator, there are several hundred Kuwaitis that were captured and there's no trace of them as well. This is clearly a national policy. There have been just Iranians that have been repatriated recently from the Iraq-Iran war. I think we need to continue to press in every possible way. But it would seem to me that again, using the good offices of other countries, specifically the Russians, maybe others could help as well, in the long run I don't think any of us could speculate about what role this particular tragedy would have in terms of national policy.

SEN. NELSON: I couldn't expect you to answer any other way.

Yes, Mr. Deulfer.

MR. DEULFER: You raise a very important point both with respect to an individual but with respect to a general problem. And I've had over the years some serious conversations with Iraqis about, you know, what Americans target and what they do and so on and so forth. It might be useful to just say what their impression is. Their impression is Americans can't take casualties. This is part of their motivation for weapons of mass destruction.

I had a discussion on September 18th, 1995 late at night when Iraqis first discussed with us their concept of use of weapons of mass destruction and what they did prior to the commencement of the conflict in 1991. And it's been said before but I think it bears on this. They deployed weapons, they filled them, they pre-delegated the authority to use them, if the United States went to Baghdad. And they believe that that contributed to the decision not to go to Baghdad. Again, the notion is the U.S. can't take casualties. But more than that, they also saw what happened at the end of the Gulf War when we ended the fighting after 100 hours.

Why? One of the factors which they saw was, here's television pictures of the road of death. So not only can Washington not stand to take casualties itself, they don't even like it when Iraqis are casualties. If you add to that the experience of the last decade, whereas I mentioned in my testimony, Saddam has taken his own population hostages, the international community can't sustain its will because Saddam is causing his own people to pay an enormous price.

Now, all of this philosophy is going to weave itself into how they defend themselves against a perceived attack including collocating civilian and military targets such that no weapon no matter how smart is going to be able to distinguish between the two. We just have to be able to take that into course.

SEN. NELSON: Thank you.

SEN. BIDEN: You are an extremely valuable panel and we have one more panel but I can't resist. I have two more questions and I ask my colleagues if they have one or two more. This is too important to let you go.

Each of you has a slightly different prescription as to how to proceed. To speak to the point made by Senator Rockefeller, there is necessarily uncertainty in all of the prescriptions. What I have gleaned from you all that you all seem to have in common, although slightly different ways of approaching what you would propose to a president, for example, at this moment, is that none of you seems to think that the ground work that's needed to be done has been done thus far for your individual approaches. Each one of you. There are all different, slightly different, different in degree.

But what I have gotten so far this morning and this afternoon is that, whether it is containment plus, whether it is a robust regime with a ready force demonstrating that we need it or what's in between, is that the spade work necessary to be able to successfully bring to fruition each of your suggested courses of action has not been done yet. Is that correct? Has any of you -- for example, were Senator Lugar president and tomorrow he turned to you and said, "Okay, I'm about to implement full blown your proposal." Any one of you, would all of you say, "I'm ready to go. We're ready to go right now"? Or would you say, "By the way, we've got to do a lot more work. We haven't done this with the Russians. We have not done this with the Kuwaitis. We haven't moved this with the Europeans. We haven't done this with the -- " Am I right or am I getting this wrong here? I mean, there's more that has to be done for every one of the prescriptions, right? In terms of the spade work?

MR. (?): It's a leading question, Mr. Chairman. But I think you lead us in the right direction.

SEN. BIDEN: It's intended to be.

(Laughter.)

It's intended to be because I don't want to make any mistakes here not because I want you to reach the same conclusion. I just want to make sure I understand it because, look, gentlemen, I want to make it clear this is maybe the best way, in simple terms, that folks in my home town of Claymont will understand. I think our obligation at the end of the day, whenever that is -- I don't mean today -- is to say to the American people, "Here are the choices. You pay your money and this is the chance you take." The upside, the downside is clear. If he has to take the one side nuclear weapons, today, tomorrow, six months or six years from now, it's a very bad thing. If he has the ability to deliver that over a range that is longer than a couple of miles, that's an even worse thing. And because of his previous mode of action, because of what the perception on the part of Iraqi military and civilian leaders around him is about our ability to absorb pain and suffering, the consensus seems to be he would likely at some point use, either preemptively or in response, these weapons. And therefore we should do something about this.

And if we did something about it and were able to wipe him out in the sense of take him out and get rid of those weapons, it would be a very good thing because the potential for things in the region to get better would be there. That's the upside, the danger and the upside. But don't we have to say to the American people -- and it may be -- I'm truly -- I have not reached a conclusion about this. But if, for example, we were struck with a weapon preemptively, we would respond. And wouldn't we have to say to the American people, these are the likely consequences of our responding or preemptively moving.

One would be there will be loss of life, loss of American life. It's not likely that we are going to be able to do this without something between a couple and maybe 10,000 lives lost, depending on the ability and the efficacy of the chemical or biological or weapons he may have. The second thing we're going to have to say to them is that we're going to have to mobilize on a grand scale. Say goodbye to daddy for Labor Day and mommy for Halloween, because the Reserves and the National Guard are going to have to be mobilized. Does anybody think we can do any of what we're talking about without mobilizing the Guard and the Reserves to a degree beyond which they are now?

So we have to tell people that so they're not surprised about it. It seems to me we have to tell them that we spent months and I spent hours with the president -- literally one occasion, two hours with the president in the Oval Office, and the only discussion was, in Afghanistan, the Arab street. And our concern about -- we went through this torturous process in Afghanistan, which was cake compared to this, worrying about what this means from Jakarta to Tunisia. What about out interest in the rest of the world? We'd have to tell people we don't know, right? We don't know what the response would be.

We'd also have to tell them that there's going to be a spike in oil prices. The idea that this could occur without us -- maybe we should pay all these prices, but we have to tell them there's going to be a spike in oil prices. May be temporary, may be long-lasting, but there's going to be a spike, it's going to have economic consequences.

And thirdly, if we do it by ourselves, we can't expect the rest of the world to pick up 80 percent of the tab, whether it's $40 billion, $80 billion, $100 billion, $10 billion, whatever it is, right? And we are going to have to say that it could impact upon -- it will impact upon -- well we know, you may not -- on the deficit. There will be a deficit or some of my friends will have to give up a tax cut, right? I mean, they're the choices we have to make.

SEN. CHAFEE: For spending increases.

SEN. BIDEN: And lastly, that there is at least a serious prospect that we're going to have to keep a lot of Americans in place for a long time in an area of the world that may mean they're not going to come home for Christmas, this Christmas anyway, and probably for a while. Is that a fair statement?

So I'm not suggesting that we shouldn't act at this point, I don't know enough to know yet. But I am suggesting that one of the objectives and the reason I'm so thankful for you all giving us your time and the panels that will come is I think we have an obligation to say to the American people, I for one, for example, if I knew he had these weapons and the Lord came down and sat up here and said, Joe boy, he has them and he's going to move, I'd say we've got to pay all these prices, we've got to pay them all. But I have an obligation to tell the American people that this is going to be the cost, this is going to be the cost, the parameters of the cost.

And so I hope that we can and you'll continue to be available to us, because I am convinced the president is taking this very seriously. I realize he talks a lot about regime change and some people think he talks about it very blithely. I do not think he is unaware, the deeper he gets into this, that this is very consequential.

And so I think that if we continue this -- I hate the word, particularly in the foreign policy context, dialogue, that usually means saying nothing. But if we continue t his discussion as a nation, we'll arrive at the right answer. We'll arrive at the right answer and we'll have the consent of the American people.

But the puzzle for me is, among other things, is it sure would be nice if we got more people in on the deal. It sure would be beneficial if we had more cooperation. It sure would be useful if we could cut some of the risk, which I think if we have enough time and enough ingenuity, we could. And so one of the things we're going to be exploring with the next panel, who are experts on the region and on the culture and on -- for example, I'll end with this, in Iraq.

I mean, you know, there are three centers of power. I mean, there historically has been three centers of power in Iraq. They are based on tribal and ethnic differences. They have significant ramifications. It matters whether or not -- how they react and how neighboring countries react to them. And so we're going to get an opportunity to get into what some of what Senator Lugar raised today about how much do we know. How much do we know about the culture, how much do we know about the consequences, how much do we know about the responses that are likely to come, based on certain actions.

But I just -- the reason I bothered to say that before you leave, and I'll yield to my colleagues for questions for you, is that I just want you to know that which I hope is obvious to you, I think you're making a significant contribution here. I mean, I think this is what we're supposed to be doing here, is going through this as methodically as we can within the timeframe, and we all think it's a slightly different timeframe we have, to be able to make as informed a judgment as we can make, and that ultimately that the president of the United States is going to have to come to us, not because we're making him but it's the system, come to us and say, here's what I propose, this is why I propose it, these are the potential costs.

And I for one think that have we the time, we should and could make the case about weapons. I mean, I guess I'll go into this. I do have one question and this will be it. Why is it that the rest of the world does not sense the same urgency that we sense? Why is it that the Europeans, who are physically closer, who have more -- maybe it's because they have more at stake in terms of energy, why is it that they don't sense this urgency? And why is it that the Arab world doesn't? Is it because they doubt our resolve and therefore they don't want to get into a deal?

I mean, what is it that when I speak to European heads of state, foreign ministers, defense ministers, parliamentarians, members of royal families, members of governments in the Middle East, why is it that almost without exception they say we're exaggerating the threat? Is it because they don't have the intelligence? What you said, Dean, you said, "Look, you were there. It was obvious everybody knew. You know, at UNSCOM they knew. They had the model." Why is it that Europeans talk when you say nuclear, they say, oh, no, don't worry about that. What's the deal? Why are they not concerned?

MR. GALLUCCI: In my over 20 years of working with nonproliferation problem, it has always been so that we have always been making the case. And less in London, but in Paris and Bonn, in Rome and Tokyo, these are with our closest allies that the threat -- the spread of these weapons of mass destruction is something that affects us all, and they always have been closer geographically.

But it is also true that we are the superpower, that our interests are everywhere, that we are expected, in fact, to take upon this burden -- take on this burden, and they do not see themselves, I think, as quite in harm's way as we see ourselves and our interests. And indeed, I think one can make a pretty good case that we are more of a target than they are.

SEN. BIDEN: We have the bulls eye on our back, they don't. Is that the explanation?

MR. HOAR: Sir, may I offer an explanation with respect to the Islamic world?

SEN. BIDEN: Sure.

MR. HOAR: There are three things going on simultaneously right now: our efforts in Afghanistan, our obvious concerns about Iraq and the peace process. And those three are connected in the eyes of the Islamic world. And if we lose track of that, we lose track of the sense of justice, whether you believe it or not or whether you feel it is justified, that all of these things are indeed connected and that, as Mort has said and as I have said, if we were to make progress on the peace process, many things would be possible for us. For example, disarmament in the region after a peace process would be a much easier hurdle to vault than to try and do it now.

SEN. BIDEN: Some of the people I respect who don't necessarily agree with it at the Defense Department make the opposite argument -- that if you take care of Iraq, the rest will fall in place including Israel and the Palestinian issue.

MR. HOAR: I disagree with that violently, sir.

SEN. BIDEN: Anyone agree with that proposition?

MR. McINERNEY: I think it will have a lot more significance. Saddam gives about $950 million this year to the PLO. He is bonded himself with that issue where before he wasn't. But I also think General Hoar has got a very -- it has gotten to such a point over there that it is obscuring a lot of the other things.

The only thing I would say about Europe, they had the same problem in 1939, Senator.

SEN. BIDEN: That's a good point.

MR. HALPERIN: Senator, can I just make one -- I go back to Senator Rockefeller's point about uncertainty. I mean, remember it was not too many years ago when we were the leading exponents of the notion that one could get along with Saddam Hussein. He was still developing nuclear weapons, he was still doing terrible things to his people and we were arguing with our allies, we can come to terms with him.

They are very great uncertainties, I think, that affect all of these decisions. But I just wanted to comment on the part that you started with. It seems to me it is very uncertain what we should do. There are no clear answers, there are no easy answers. And therefore, it seems to me, that I come back to what you're emphasizing, is that the process is key to this. And I would hope that we would not have from the administration what we had on the reorganization of the government, which is opposition silence and then a proposal and a demand that we do it in two weeks or two months.

If we're going to do this, we need a long period of debate after the president lays out the case. I think Congress has not only got to insist that it has a role to play, but it has a role to play that can't be stampeded by a sudden announcement that we need a decision in two weeks.

SEN. BIDEN: Senator.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me try to offer a degree of certainty, at least with this kind of a road map. What if we took the position that the panel this morning mentioned, especially Ambassador Butler and many of you have mentioned today, that it seems that we fought a war successfully militarily. The U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, but unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, Iraq did not comply, and in due course anticipated that we would not enforce compliance which we have not.

But we -- leaving aside whether Saddam is on the bubble of getting a nuclear weapon or what have you, we sort of go back with our U.N. Security Council friends and others and say we believe we ought to take that seriously. And so whether it's containment light or containment heavy, essentially we might try to enforce what Secretary Powell has negotiated or we might be pretty hard-nosed about it and say really we're going to stop anything coming in and out of Iraq as far as we can. We're going to enforce the no fly zones almost to the point that we occupy in the air those two zones, so you are squeezed. In other words, leaving aside all of the speculation over intelligence we don't have, we do those things which are ordained now by the U.N. and by all of our friends.

Now, secondly, we carve out $80 billion for potential operation. That is a large sum of money.

That's twice the bill that we were debating today on prescription drugs for the elderly, for two years. Now, we could -- so it's a big sacrifice, but we understand that that's what we're going to do, we carve that money out. But then at the same time, we adopt, as President Bush did before, a United Way campaign to try to fill in who is going to pay for $80 billion. We take for granted that we're all going to do it this -- this is what is required and we're all in this together, we're in the U.N., we fought a war and we have a problem here.

And finally, do it the best we can intelligence wise, either reform or in some way really put an emphasis on this as well as educating all of ourselves, including members of the Senate, about Iraq: internal politics, options, who's there, what might happen and so forth, so that we have at least some reasonable idea if something did happen to Saddam, or if there is pressure, what the alternatives may be.

Now, at the end of the day, Saddam pressured in all these ways, and given the fact of our resolution, now we're setting aside the money, we are thinking in terms of hundreds of thousands of people, if required, we are getting the bases together. We will have to have the bases. The thought of trying to work together without air space and so forth, as we heard this morning from Mr. Cordesman, really is not going to work. We used all the bases last time. We overused 23 bases, as he described it. So in order to be credible, they've got to be available again. So we put very great pressure upon everybody now that we are credible to open up these places. Or maybe Saddam gives up but probably he doesn't, and so in the course of all of this, ultimately something happens.

But we've already now come to a point where we've done a lot of planning and we have some people in motion. We have congressional support by this time. Some weeks have passed, we've had some more hearings, we've had some more contra-feelings back and forth. The thing that I worry about at the end of the day is not that Saddam would fall in the process of all of this, if we are prepared for it and we have the bases and we have the money, but still this aftermath of what comes. I'm not discouraged today, maybe this is sort of an enlightened aspect of this hearing, that there aren't people in Iraq that may be prepared for democracy as we know it. Suggestions are, in fact, liberal democracy might even lead to more terrorists being spawned out of the process.

What if, in fact, we have liberal democracy as we now have in India, for example, and they developed a nuclear weapon anyway, despite all of our protests. Well, we'd say, well, they're friendly, unlikely to use that on us. But they might use it on Pakistan and so a lot of diplomacy is trying to prevent that. Ditto for the Pakistanis. Why do they develop one? Why is Iran's development any more benign, as Senator Brownback brought up? Well, we think it is in a sense because they've had a long time program.

The question that I have is at the end of the day, if we end up with a regime in Iraq, that in fact because of a sense of nationalism, defense of their country against Iran, for example, the same way India and Pakistan are involved, the best we can hope for is something more friendly and therefore unlikely to use it on us, that is a very, very queasy objective, much like the end of the last war with this resolution that was never enforced.

Now, that's why I think we need much more concentrated thinking, Mr. Chairman, on what are -- what is an alternative at the end of all this, after we've sketched out how we win the war, how we get the allies, what do we have left? And, you know, I really don't understand from anybody yet except hopefulness, that there is a charismatic figure somewhere in Iraq today or outside of Iraq that might come in, or several of these people, who somehow or other might bring about a different style of life for people.

Now, we're experimenting with this in Afghanistan now, and I think well to point that out. This is a big change, women going to school, women having any rights at all. This change is the whole concept that half of population of most Muslim states is interested in franchise and out of the picture. As you pointed out, if all this began to occur in Iraq, what do the neighbors think? How about the Saudis? How about anybody in the neighborhood? Do they accomplish this? In fact, how many years, how many people do we have to have there to make certain those who are doing these incipient democratic things have time to do it? And so that's a part of this situation I think we need to sketch in some more, Mr. Chairman.

The military side of it is not un-complex and clearly most Americans are not prepared for $80 billion and several hundred thousand people in readiness and all the diplomacy. But that we can do. We have been through those traces before. What we have not come to is a successful conclusion in the internal politics of Iraq or at this point certainty even in Afghanistan. And that seems to me to be critically important.

SEN. BIDEN: That's why I almost switched my registration and voted for you in the primary but anyway.

(Laughter.)

SEN. LUGAR: I really don't ask for anybody to comment. This is sort of my own editorial unless someone has any comment on it. Would anyone like to comment?

MR. HALPERIN: Well, let me say, Senator, I'm ready to sign up for your first part of your policy which is a vigorous enforcement of what the international community already supports with the notion that if Saddam resists that we then push further with the use of military --

SEN. LUGAR: Because that's our entre back into the international community.

MR. HALPERIN: The only thing I would add to what you suggest is let's take a little bit of that money you set aside and spend it to make the embargo work. If we're prepared to compensate the Syrians, the Turks and the Jordanians for the consequences of honoring the embargo and if we insist that they honor the embargo, I think we can make that happen and I think that would have a very --

SEN. LUGAR: That's an interesting idea -- compensation of these people.

MR. HALPERIN: The U.N. Charter entitles countries which enforce embargoes mandated by the Security Council to be compensated by the international community. We did it to some degree with the countries around Serbia, not fully, but to a significant degree. And we have not done that in this area and that is a lot cheaper than a military operation.

SEN. LUGAR: Good idea. Well, thank you very much.

MR. HALPERIN: Thank you.

SEN. BIDEN: Gentlemen, do either of you have any more questions? Gentlemen, I can't thank you enough. This has been very helpful. This is the start of this undertaking and I warn you, we're like poor relatives, when we're invited we show up. You've invited us to ask you again. I'm warning you, we may ask you back. I thank you very, very much.

We have one more panel. A very important panel. But what I would like to suggest is that -- I realize it's 5:00 but we're going to take a little more time. Thank you very much, Dean.

Professor Telhami, Professor Ajami, Dr. Kemp and Ambassador Parris are our next panel and we appreciate their waiting so long. Please, gentlemen, I don't know where they've put your name tags but if you would pick a seat and the tag will find you.

Professor Telhami is an analyst and Anwar Sadat professor of peace and development at the University of Maryland and is a non resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He's made himself available to this committee, to me, many members of the committee and we truly appreciate his making himself available.

Professor Ajami is a professor and director of Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies and he has recently been elected to the board of the Council on Foreign Relations. Again he's been incredibly generous with his time and advice.

Dr. Kemp is director of regional strategic programs at the Nixon Center and from '83 to '85 he served as both special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council.

And last but not least, Ambassador Mark Parris who has served as the U.S. ambassador to Turkey from '97 to 2000. He served as a special assistant to the president and as senior director of the Near East and South Asia at the National Security Council from '95 to '97.

Again, I thank you all for being here and I thank you for your patience. Maybe if you could proceed in the order you've been introduced and then we can get to questions. You can see we have an interested panel on this side. So I appreciate your time and I hope we don't ruin your dinner.

MR. SHIBLEY TELHAMI: Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks again for inviting me.

I'd like to make some very brief opening remarks and I'd submit my written statement for the record with your permission.

SEN. BIDEN: All your statements will be placed in the record to the extent that you do not do the whole statement.

MR. TELHAMI: What I'd like to do instead is just highlight a few points. And I would like to address more specifically the issue of regional impact of a possible war and how the region, broadly, looks at policy toward Iraq.

I think it is clear from what you've heard already that there is pervasive opposition to a military campaign toward Iraq in any foreseeable future. And it's very important to understand what the calculations are in the region that lead to this kind of opposition.

I'd like to begin by saying that while a lot of that has to do with an assessment of public opinion in the region and the pressures that they face from their own public. Much of that calculation is not based only on public opinion, some of the calculation is based on very specific, strategic calculations that these leaders and these governments make. We have to first be clear. Not each one of them has the same calculation. The calculations of Turkey, Jordan, Iran, Syria, the GCC states are different. But they have some things in common. They all worry about the consequences of what happens after.

First, it is clear that they don't see the threat in the same way that we do. They do not believe that Iraq today poses a serious military threat that they have to worry about and they see our focus on it as out of place. They have other priorities that they would like to address in the region and they see this as taking us and them away from other priorities such as the Arab Israeli issue. And, in that regard, they fear that this will disrupt very important priorities. They also fear that after the war, first and foremost, there may be more instability than we are planning for. They might be optimistic about our capability to bring about a desirable outcome in Iraq that would be a stable outcome for each one of them, especially Turkey, Syria, but even Iran and the GCC states. And in that regard they are not confident about our own assurances, that we intend to spend the time and the money and the energy and the military clout to be there for as long as it takes to bring a desirable outcome about.

First and foremost, I think they fear instability at the strategic level. But consider even the happy outcome, from our point of view, which is an outcome which says that we will put the necessary resources to bring about a better government in Iraq, a stable situation in the region. So, therefore, they don't have to worry about the issue of instability. Then we can only do that by putting forth significant forces that would turn Iraq essentially into an American base and an American ally in a way that clearly disrupts the strategic calculus for many of them in a way that is worrisome for many of them even aside from public opinion. Not all of them, but many of them worry about it.

But ultimately it boils down to another factor which is public opinion. They do worry about it. There is a pervasive resentment of the United States today in the region. There is a sense of public power that has not been exhibited before in the region. And much of it is directed not so much at the United States only, it is really a pervasive sense of frustration, humiliation with an existing order that many people in the region do not support. But they see the U.S. as an anchor of that order and clearly the highlighting of the pain on the Palestinian/Israeli front of the last few months has exacerbated that resentment in a way that is putting pressure on these governments.

I do not want to exaggerate this and say that governments are weak and cannot contain it. Clearly, the governments have been able to contain pressure before and clearly, even in the recent crisis, they have done so in a way that diminished the impact of public resentment and public pressure. The real issue for them is at what cost? Even if they succeed, at what cost and can they do it?

I know that there's a school of thought that is dominant in some of the public debate today which says who cares about public opinion in the region or who cares even about the positions of these governments who are opposing the United States. The assessment is that we're powerful enough to do it on our own and when they see that we're going to do it anyway, they're going to jump on the American bandwagon and they're mostly authoritarian governments. They're going to find a way to bring the public along and therefore why should we care, why should we pay attention to that? Let's do what we need to do and they're just going to jump on a winning American bandwagon.

I'm not going to address the military side of that. You've heard a lot about it. But the political side of it, I think it's a mistake to make that argument. I have no doubt that some governments will jump on a winning American bandwagon. No question about it. I think people don't like to be on the side of losers and they don't want to be on the wrong side of the U.S. especially if they are assured that the U.S. is going to win. And I think that militarily, there will be no doubt. The real question is at what cost and what are the consequences.

But I think if the U.S. is willing to put a lot of resources into it, the equation is -- there is no doubt about the military equation of it. And so, there is no doubt that some will do it. But I would submit to you that the calculations have changed since 1991 and clearly, we can't be assured that all of them, or even most of them, those who joined the coalition in '91, are going to have that jump on the bandwagon attitude.

Let me tell you why and I'll give you a couple of reasons. One is there isn't -- the situation has changed, not only in terms of the perception of Iraqi threat. In 1991, clearly they saw Iraq as a threatening state with military capabilities. Today, nobody really believes that Iraq is a serious threat and they see it mostly as a victim. So the logic of the Iraq issue is different. While in 1991 there may have been doubts, particularly by radicals in the region, about the U.S. military capability and staying power, that was made a reality after the 1991 victory. It is clear that today, no one has doubts about the U.S. Most American attitudes are really derived by a perception that America is actually very powerful, that America is perhaps too powerful for them, too domineering in regional politics. So the perception is not exactly the same perception that preceded the 1991 and therefore the logic of the psychology is very different.

From the governments' point of view, most of them probably will do what they have to do to resist public opinion, if public opinion tries to disrupt a policy of supporting an American campaign in Iraq or at least sitting on the sidelines of an American campaign toward Iraq. Many of them will probably succeed. Most of them don't have much certainty as they did back in '91 that they could succeed. The absence of certainty is in part a function of a new reality, which is that they no longer control the flow of information, they no longer control perception.

At least in that dimension, there is a sense that the public will get information that is going to be disruptive to government agenda in a way that the governments cannot control. That is new to them. They don't know whether it means a lot and they don't know whether it means a little. But they know that it presents some uncertainty about their ability to control.

And second, there is a sense of empowerment in the region that is, I would say, a public disgust with states in general, with their own states, with international systems, with international organizations and certainly with the U.S. And in that sense, to the extent that there is a public that is willing to be mobilized, it's not mobilizing behind a possibility that Iraq might have victory or behind a government that is going to advocate their causes. It is the extent to which they are going to be able to do something on their own or rally behind militants. The source of inspiration today is not states. It is militants, anti-state.

And the extent to which, therefore, to succeed is not a function of the strength of any particular state including Iraq and in that regard, I think, what we will have even in a successful campaign and even if the governments do succeed in repressing the public, you're going to have two clear outcomes.

One is they are only going to succeed if they are more repressive. And I'm talking about governments outside of Iraq. They will succeed only through repression and they have probably the capacity to do so. They will stretch themselves to the limit. But if we have any illusions about this, then transforming the Middle East into democratic place, I think, let's think about that a little bit more. And second, it is undoubtedly, in my judgment, going to increase the motivation for terrorism in the region. Maybe we can reduce some aspects but clearly, there will be more motivation. We have to understand that those are dynamics that will be out there regardless of what the outcome will be actually in Iraq itself.

But let me end with a question pertaining to the nuclear threat. I think that it is interesting -- we've had that discussion before about whether or not the region sees Iraq's nuclear potential or potential in weapons of mass destruction as threatening to them. I mean, they are the ones that have to fear Iraq most as its neighbors. Why aren't they worried about Iraq so much? And I think ultimately it is really a different interpretation of the threat. Most of them first don't think Iraq is close to having a nuclear capability. They think we're exaggerating.

But more importantly, I think they have a different assessment of Saddam Hussein. They think he's a ruthless dictator but not suicidal. They think he's sensitive to deterrents and they think that he goes against weaker but not stronger opponents. And therefore, regardless of what he does, they think he is containable. They have a different idea about the sort of threat that he poses. And in that regard, they see the choice essentially as being a choice between being willing to live with him or not being willing to live with him.

And I think ultimately -- and in fact, in our debate, we have confused the two issues frankly -- if the issue is about terrorism, then we have to remind ourselves that this is not likely to eliminate the motivation for terrorism in the Middle East. It may even increase it. If our aim is to bring -- to limit Iraq's nuclear capabilities, weapons of mass destruction capabilities, we may succeed in Iraq in particular. But we will succeed if --militarily, but we might have a political option, if our aim is not also to overthrow the regime and I think what we have done is, in essence, link the regime change option with the elimination of the weapons of mass destruction option. That is the political attempt to try to put controls in place that would get Iraqi cooperation on weapons of mass destruction has always been linked to the idea that we also want regime change.

And so, the Iraqi reluctance, in part at least -- at least they have not been tested enough -- has been the assumption that we are after the regime as well as minimizing their capabilities. Therefore, I think we have not tested the political option that splits the two, that says, "Let's test the choice for the regime between survival and having nuclear weapons. Let's test the political." And I think there it is very clear that for his survival, Saddam Hussein is willing to give up almost anything. At the same time, if his survival is at stake, there is no doubt that he is willing to do almost anything. And I think that is very important to remember in thinking about how we might design a policy that would be effective toward Iraq.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much, Professor.

Doctor.

MR. FOUAD AJAMI : Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a great honor to be here and I commend you and the members of the committee on this hearing. It's always a kind of -- when I came in in the morning and I sat through, I was confident of everything I was going to say and by 5:15, by the time I'm called on, I'm less confident. But I have some things to share with you and I think when one is called upon before this kind of panel and with this kind of talent that you have available to you, you always wonder what your comparative advantage is.

And I think my comparative advantage is something of a knowledge of the Arab political --

SEN. BIDEN: I think it's your beard.

MR. AJAMI: Yes, exactly. That too.

Of the Arab political experience and had your rules permitted it, there were a couple of times when you asked some questions, Mr. Chairman, I was really tempted to intervene from the back.

SEN. BIDEN: Feel free to respond to them now.

MR. AJAMI: Yes, exactly. It's like we now -- if we go into this campaign against Iraq, we are clearly heading into a region which bears us ill-will. We understand that. And in all the months after September 11 and all the travel I did and all the reading of the Arab world I've done in the last year, I came across something I want to share with your committee. It's something that a friend of mine, a very talented Egyptian playwright, named Ali Saleem, said to an American journalist about why is there such malice in the Arab world, in the Muslim world towards the United States and it's interesting to note that in this decade behind us, American power was used three times in favor of Arabs and Muslims: in favor of Kuwait in 1990, in favor of Bosnia in 1995, in favor of the Kosovars in 1999 and yet there was no gratitude there. Very few people spoke about the usage of American power in favor of these Muslim populations.

Now, I understand that the case of Kuwait was complicated because there is an argument possibly that Saddam would have won a free election in the Arab street in 1990, had he really contested the election. But the case of the Bosnians in which you and Senator Lugar and a number of your colleagues were quite active, and the case of the Kosovars, I think they're very interesting.

So here's Ali Saleem on this kind of anti-Americanism we're going to, in many ways I think, mop up and run into and face when we go there. "History is cruel" he says. "It's trying to drag American backwards. In this case history is right. We here need to be more progressive" -- meaning in the Muslim world -- "but you need to take a step back. If the bureaucrats in your airports were just a little more paranoid like us it would be a different world. Really America is a beautiful place. No one even asked why all these guys wanted flying lessons. You should learn to be suspicious. A little backwardness would be healthy. People say Americans are arrogant but it's not true. Americans enjoy life and they are proud of their lives and they are boastful of the wonderful inventions that have made life so much easier. It's very difficult to understand the machinery of hatred because you wind up resorting to logic. But trying to understand this with logic is like measuring distance in kilograms."

Measuring distance in kilograms. These are people who are afraid of America, afraid of life itself. These are people who are envious. To them life is an unbearable burden. Modernism is the only way out but modernism is frightening. It means we have to compete, it means we can't explain everything away with conspiracy theories. Bernard Shaw said it best, you know. In the preface to St. Joan he said that Joan of Arc was burned for no other reason except that she was talented. Talent gives rise to jealousy in the hearts of the untalented.

So we shall go into the Arab world, into the Muslim world. We should launch this campaign in the face of this kind of sentiment about America. Now, this will not be Desert Storm, I think we must understand that. Because in Desert Storm there were even Muslim jurists, Muslim jurists in Saudi Arabia and Egypt who argued that Saddam was a menace to his world and a tyrant, and the resistance to him is legitimate, the issued Fatwa's ruling opinion in that direction. So we went with that and there was -- at the time there were jurists who even ruled that you can have Arab and Islamic, and quote, unquote, "other friendly forces." We got in under that loophole. Half a million men under the "other friendly forces."

It will not be this way this time around, we understand that. So ideally for the regimes in the region, what they want for Desert Storm of a decade ago I have written in the statement I submitted to you, Mr. Chairman, is they now want the perfect storm. And this is really what they want, a swift war, few casualties, as little exposure by themselves as possible, the opportunity to be rid of Saddam without riding in broad daylight with the Americans and without being brought to account by their people. It would be great if they could get that.

But the political world never grants these kinds of favors.

The fog of war is what it is. And there will be risks run by these regimes and there will be risks run by ourselves. I agree partly with my colleague Shibley on one point that I think -- and I would elaborate by saying this will be a war in the time of the satellite channels, so a lot of this will be in the open. And I think this is the nightmare of these regimes, that we would call upon them to make commitments in the open.

So my feeling is that we will end up not with a very brilliant position but not with a bad one if we choose to draw the sword, or if you want your metaphor, to pull the trigger. That there will be people who would associate with us quietly in the Peninsula, in Kuwait, in Qatar. And there will be people who will associate with us even in Jordan, though the case of Jordan requires, I think, focus and discussion. But they will dread having to be brought out into the open.

Will the Arab street greet us warmly? It will not. But I'll tell you one thing, the one street that will trump all streets, and this I think is a very important point to put on the record, the one street will be the street in Baghdad and Basra. We shall be mobbed. We shall be mobbed when we go there, by people who are eager for deliverance form the tyranny and the great big prison of Saddam Hussein.

Some months ago I did a piece on Al-Jazeera Television and I watched very closely Al-Jazeera Television for hours and hours. And I thought one of the most interesting and one of the most difficult days for Al-Jazeera came was during the liberation of Kabul. When the Afghanis whom we thought would greet us, if you will, with this war that was going to frustrate us and we were going to be thwarted and they were going to do to us the damage that they had done to the Brits in earlier times and to the Russians, when in fact we were greeted with kites and boom boxes.

We shall be greeted, I think, in Baghdad and Basra with kites and boom boxes, and we should understand this. And the embarrassment for those in Nablus and Cairo who will then protesting -- will be protesting an American war or an Anglo-American war, whatever label you put on that war, will be enormous. I think we go into Iraq and there is some --

SEN. BIDEN: The embarrassment will be enormous?

MR. AJAMI: Yes, to them. The embarrassment will be enormous.

I think we now -- and just in terms of wrapping just this part of my intervention. We go into Iraq and I think we should see Iraq for what it is, it's a tormented country, it has been violated by this despot. There are three communities, as we know. There are the Kurds, there are the Shi'a Arabs who are the majority of the population, and there are the Sunni Arabs, who have believed that political power was their due, the Takriti gang and the people around them.

A decade ago we were unkind to the Shi'a because we thought they would be a satrapy of the clerical regime in Iran. We do not know Iraq Shi'aism. And I'll tell you one of the things, Mr. Chairman, I did a book called "The Vanished Imam" on one Shi'a cleric in Lebanon and studied the Shi'a clerical culture in Lebanon, in Iran, in Iraq. These Iraqi Shi'a are Iraqi patriots and we should do them the honor of understanding that when the wheel turns, that they just want a piece of the political life of their land. We paralyzed ourselves in 1991 by saying that there would be a regime that would emerge in Iraq that would simply be a replica of the Iranian revolution. Well, the Iranian revolution has fallen on hard times. Its power to attract other people in the region is no longer what it used to be a decade or two decades ago. And we now can see, I think, Iraq in a whole new light.

And we should understand one thing about Iraq. If we're really looking for a place where maybe American ideals may work, this place may be as good a candidate as any.

Thank you very much for your indulgence.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you, professor, I'm anxious to ask you some questions.

Dr. Kemp, welcome.

MR. GEOFFREY KEMP: I'd like to add my appreciation, Mr. Chairman and your colleagues, for hosting this extremely important set of hearings. I've been asked, as you know, to do a rather strange thing -- talk about the likely response of Iran on the one hand and then Europe on the other to a war against Iraq and I'll try to do it in about nine minutes.

Iran has a long agenda of unresolved problems with Iraq including border disputes, the Kurdish question, religious quarrels, terrorists/liberation activity, Iraqi Shi'a refugees in Iran, and there are hundreds of thousand of them, and of course the continuing aftermath of the brutal Iran/Iraq war. Iran has a huge stake in the future of Iraq and therefore is going to be watching very, very carefully what we do and what happens. Iran remains extremely suspicious of Saddam Hussein and most Iranians hate his regime, I am certain as much as Fouad, my colleague, says the Iraqis do.

However, and this is the point I want to stress, at this point in time the Iranian regime is more worried about a U.S. war that calls for regime change. It regards this to be inimical to its own interests. From an Iranian perspective, the status quo, that is to say a contained Iraq, suits their interests much better. They acknowledge Iraq's potential to re-emerge as a regional threat. But the United States is seen as the greater threat.

The president's State of the Union speech designated Iran as part of the Axis of Evil. Iran's hard liners have taken this very seriously, including the frequent calls from the administration for regime change in the region. And they wonder at what point their Islamic republic, which is in trouble, will be a candidate for American action.

All Iranians, irrespective of whether they're hard liners, soft liners, moderates, conservatives, worry about a failed or messy U.S. operation that would leave the region in chaos, they would then be on the receiving end for possibly millions of new Iraqi Shi'a refugees and they worry about the enormous disruptions a messy war would have on world oil markets and their very fragile economy.

SEN. BIDEN: Doctor, can you tell us how large the Shi'a population is in Iraq?

MR. KEMP: It's about 60 percent of the population, and if you think --

SEN. BIDEN: About 14 million, 15?

MR. KEMP: About that, yes, I would think so.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you.

MR. KEMP: Now, Iranian fears which I have just articulated are one thing, but what in reality is the Iranian government likely to do in the event that's a war? Some analysts, and very good analysts I would add, believe that Iran has already embarked on a proactive policy to delay any U.S. attack on Iraq by stepping up support for terrorism against Israel and stirring up trouble in Afghanistan. The greater the violence in either area, the more difficult it will be for the president to take on Iraq.

On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Iranian-based Shi'a opposition groups, this is the one that Tony Cordesman was talking about this morning, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, may be open to support from the United States, particularly air power, to topple Saddam provided we don't send in ground forces. Now, that would suggest that the Iranian government is at least prepared to blink or wink in the event of a limited U.S. operation that does not involve huge ground troops.

In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, if the United States has serious support for military action, including U.N. backing, EU backing, some moderate Arabs on board, Turkey on board, and the Russians -- very important, I think the Russians are moving more in our favor -- Iran's likely to keep its head down and not take a strong position against the United States during the war.

However, if international support is weak, Iranian protests will be loud. Much will depend upon how this administration approaches Iran in diplomatic channels.

In my judgment, its current policies toward Iran suggest that the leaders of Iran are likely to be warned rather than wooed in the event that we decide to go off to Iraq. The problem here, I think, is that Iranians could react unpredictably to what they would regard as a belligerent U.S. posture. The regime, for instance, might decide to place Iranian military forces on high alert. Under these circumstances, there's a danger that there could be military incidents between United States and Iranian maritime forces in the Persian Gulf and that that could lead to miscalculation and escalation.

Now, in thinking about Iranian behavior the day after the war, much will depend upon the nature of the new regime in Baghdad. It's not inconceivable that Iran might be willing to work closely with the new regime and reach an agreement to resolve outstanding issues relating to the Iran/Iraq war, the POWs for instance, and this longstanding dispute they've had with Iraq over the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. But if U.S. forces have to invade an occupied Baghdad, this will mean trouble for the hard liners, and they will clearly be eager to exploit regional resentments of this new Pax- Americana, of the kind that my two previous colleagues suggested might happen.

Assuming no radical shift in the political balance in Tehran, it could be expected and I think this is important -- and I'm glad that Bob Gallucci talked about this in the previous panel -- Iran will make greater efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. It's possible that a quick U.S. victory over Iraq could result in a new bout of pragmatism in Tehran leading to a deal with Washington. But this outcome is by no means certain. A perceived to be arrogant, victorious America could well find it disliked by Iranians who regard themselves as reformers and pro-west.

Iranians are very proud of their independence as well as their desire to have a more democratic system, and we should not be unaware of the fact that while they may hate -- a lot of them may hate their own regime, and like us at this point in time, that can change. The fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, a number of geo-political realities are going to face any new regime in Baghdad and ultimately better relations between Iran and Iraq will be very, very important. The fact of the matter is Iran will be Iraq's neighbor long after U.S. troops have left.

Now, just two or three minutes on Europe -- I know that sounds strange but that's the way these things work out. Look, frankly, Mr. Chairman, direct European support for U.S. military action against Iraq is highly desirable but frankly not essential. However, cooperation with the United States would be essential if this war was protracted. We would conceivably have a major energy supply problem and working with the Europeans to resolve that is essential. And the European support, in my judgment, is going to be essential to make sure that the post-Saddam Iraq and the whole Middle East remains relatively stable.

Officially, cooperation between United States and Europe on the Middle East is relatively close, that is to say cooperation between the governments. The EU as you know, now has a common policy on the Middle East and this makes coordination with the Washington much easier than in the past. But the EU itself is not a state. As a consequence, its Middle East policy inevitably reflects compromise on contentious issues.

I think it's fair to say the key European governments all share the U.S. view that Saddam Hussein is a menace, that he's determined to reconstitute his WMD and that if he obtains nuclear weapons, he will flaunt them and attempt to change the balance of power in the Middle East. However, regime change, a phrase now frequently used by the administration in the context of the war against terrorism, is quite another matter for most European governments and parliaments.

Indeed, without the cloak of the U.N. legitimacy, European governments will find it difficult to carry public opinion. Though this does not mean they will not cooperate with us if in the last resort the United States decides that war is the only alternative. Europe obviously worries about the cost of the war as we do, particularly one that does not go well. The Europeans tend to have a more gloomy prognosis as to the region's susceptibility to a quick fix American military option that many seem to have in this administration. They ask how long the United States will have to occupy Iraq for? How long and what size force? When pressed, European officials are not prepared to say that they would contribute to a post-Saddam Iraqi occupation, unlike by the way the situation in Afghanistan when they volunteered more military forces than the U.S. thought necessary.

And while we're on the subject of Afghanistan, the Europeans do worry that the United States has no quote, "staying power". Therefore, absent a casus belli, a linkage between Iraq and Al-Qaeda or deliberate outright flaunting of WMD by Saddam, most European governments, I believe, would argue it would be unwise to take on Iraq while Afghanistan and also the Pakistani regimes remain precarious.

So I would just conclude on these two points, Mr. Chairman. Iran will not be able to prevent a U.S. attack on Iraq. It will likely remain neutral during the war while intensifying its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Its greatest leverage will be during the post-war period. Its population and geography assures its interests must be taken into account, irrespective of who is running Tehran.

And on Europe, in the last resort, the European governments will support the United States if it uses force. I doubt very much whether this will involve troop contributions, except in the case of the Blair government which, as I understand, it shares all our concerns about Iraq except the issue of regime change as an objective.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much, Doctor.

Mr. Ambassador.

MR. MARK PARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for the opportunity to appear before you on this very timely and important subject. The last time I sat in this chair was during my confirmation hearings when you grilled me on Turkish policy toward Cyprus. All things considered, I think I'd just as soon talk about Turkish policy towards Iraq.

(Laughter.)

I don't think there's any question that Turkey's attitude will be critical in the event the United States seeks to remove Saddam Hussein through the use of force. In the interest of time, I'm not going to recite the many reasons why that is so. All one has to do is look at a map and consider the options to realize that you really can't exercise any of them without Turkey.

What do the Turks think about the prospect of direct military action to topple Saddam Hussein? The short answer is they hate the idea. The Turks' dread of a new war against Iraq stems from their negative experiences with the last one. In security, economic and strategic terms, Turkey emerged the loser from the last Gulf War and its aftermath. From a security standpoint, Saddam's suppression of the Iraqi Kurds' short-lived uprising in 1991 and the coalition's subsequent expulsion of Iraqi central authorities from the north had a profoundly negative impact across the border in South East Turkey. PKK terrorists exploited the situation to expand their operations exponentially. It took most of the 90s, thousands of lives, lots of money and frequent interventions into northern Iraq itself for the Turkish military to get the situation back under reliable control.

From an economic standpoint, U.N. sanctions against Iraq cut off Turkey's access to what had been its largest trading partner. The impact was of the order of what would happen here if the U.S.-Canada border was sealed from one day to the next. Turks estimate the cost over the last decade at between $40 and 80 billion and that may be low. From a strategic standpoint, Ankara saw the emergence in northern Iraq of local administrative organs to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Iraqi central authorities as a step towards the establishment of a de factor Kurdish state. Preventing such a development had long been and remains a cornerstone of Turkish regional policy, reflecting concern for its impact not just on Turkey's Kurdish population but on the interests of up to two million Turkmen of northern Iraq, a people ethnically and culturally very close to the Turks.

Over the past decade, Turkey has found ways to cope with most of the consequences of the Gulf War. It is not now uncomfortable with the status quo that has emerged in the area in and around northern Iraq. Would it not be better for Turkey if Saddam were gone? No question about that. The Turks are not insensitive to the potential advantages especially from an economic standpoint of Saddam's removal and of Iraq becoming a more normal neighbor. But for most of them, the appeal of such gains is outweighed by misgivings over what could go wrong this time around.

Based on their experiences since 1990, Turks lack confidence that the United States understands Iraq's internal dynamics well enough to give meaning to our repeated commitment to maintain its territorial integrity. They worry that even if we do understand the situation better than they suspect, the process of replacing Saddam could at some point lead the United States to make trade-offs at Turkey's expense. And they remain concerned that if things don't go according to plan, the U.S. will not see the project through leaving Turkey again to face a neighbor that is either hostile or in chaos.

Now, seen from this perspective, we should probably not be surprised that Turkey's highest leaders including its president, prime minister and defense minister and senior military have publicly and repeatedly expressed deep reservations about the wisdom of seeking forcibly to remove Saddam Hussein. The Turks are realists. And in virtually all conversations that I've had with the Turks on this subject, their bottom line is a realistic one. It boils down to this. If the United States does go after Saddam, Ankara will not have the luxury of sitting this one out.

There would simply be too much at stake in terms of Turkey's interest. Turkey would want to be in on the planning and execution of any operation to ensure that those interests were factored in and that there was no deviation from an original agreed concept once things get started. And Turks who think about these things understand that the price of this kind of access and this kind of transparency is some degree of cooperation. It is clearly in the interests of the United States, if we move against Saddam militarily, to maximize the extent of Turkish cooperation and to minimize the possibility of surprises once the operation begins.

The key to making Ankara part of the solution rather than a potential problem is early and honest and detailed consultations. What will the Turks be looking for in those consultations? On the most general level, they will want to see that whatever we have in mind is serious. Given the history, they will need to be convinced that we will finish the job this time around, that we can do it with dispatch and that we will do whatever it takes to get their neighbor back on its feet in one piece and as a member in good standing of the family of nations.

But the Turks will also have more specific things that they will want to see addressed. They will first of all want to be sure that they do not again pay an economic price for being on the right side in this war. I will therefore not be surprised to see Turkey seek to lock in before hostilities start concrete specific commitments from the administration in terms of debt forgiveness or additional economic or military assistance. I would also expect Ankara to seek assurance of continued U.S. support in the IMF and other international financial institutions to the extent action in Iraq adversely affects Turkey's economic recovery program.

But it is on issues relating to northern Iraq that U.S.-Turkish consultations will be most important because what happens there very simply may well have defined Turkey's role in the broader conflict. There have been some provocative, but I think ultimately fanciful, things written in the U.S. press about what role will be. I think you can forget about Turkish tanks rolling to Baghdad. It is simply not going to happen. Nor is anyone in Ankara sitting around and counting the revenue that Turkey might gain by seizing the oil fields around Mosul and Kirkuk.

My impression is that the Turks are deadly serious about maintaining Iraq's unity and territorial integrity. Indeed I believe that seriousness underlies what will be Turkey's primary goal in the event the United States moves against Iraq. That is denying the Iraqi Kurds any gains that might enhance their ability, in a post-Saddam environment, to press for independence for its functional equivalent. Now, that imperative has certain practical implications that U.S. planners will ignore at their peril.

One hears a lot around this town, for example, how the United States will, quote, "improve the military capability of the peshmurga, the Kurdish militia, as part of an effort to topple Saddam." I suspect that a more capable peshmurga force is not something that most Turks would be wildly enthusiastic about either now or on the day after.

Another area of potential tension has to do with the nature and mission of U.S. military and other personnel who may be deployed in the north. The Turks have spent a decade developing an ability to monitor and, to an important extent, to control developments there. They're likely to be suspicious of and may resist any presence that dilutes that ability by establishing direct links to the local Kurdish leaders.

And what about the Iraqi opposition? Turkey has traditionally been skeptical of Iraqi exile organizations and has a notably rocky relationship with the Iraqi National Congress. To the extent the United States intends to rely on such groups, particularly in the north, Ankara might have other ideas.

Finally, what would the Turks really do if Iraqi Kurds attempt to seize Mosul and Kirkuk? The Turks clearly fear that possession of these politically important cities and their associated oil well would put the Kurds in a powerful negotiating position on the day after. Turkey's press in recent months has been full of credible reports that Turkey would itself seize those cities rather than allow that to happen.

Mr. Chairman, I raise these examples not to suggest that they reveal irreconcilable differences between the United States and Turkey that would keep us from cooperating in an effort to change Iraq's leadership. I don't believe that to be the case. But I think they do underscore the importance of honest, detailed discussions before any balloons go up.

Thank you very much.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Parris.

Let me begin by asking Mr. Telhami, how would you test the choice between regime change and nuclear weapons? I mean, you drew what I think most Americans would think is a false distinction here, that in fact everyone we've heard from so far, most everyone you hear who is reputed to be informed, says that there's no way of separating Saddam from his nuclear or weapons of mass destruction and it is a foolhardy exercise to attempt to do it and therefore regime change is the only alternative. What you're suggesting is the possibility that Saddam stay in power but not have his weapons of mass destruction -- a deal that I think you'd find an awful lot of people ready to accept probably. But I mean I don't quite understand.

MR. TELHAMI: Let me just put it this way. There's clearly a difference in terms of how people in the world, in Europe and the Middle East see the priorities in Iraq. To the extent that the priority is eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, they see that as being more important than the issue of regime change. I think in our debate it is clear that we've articulated a policy of regime change from the very beginning, even when it was not an explicit policy, it was an implicit policy.

The real question is, if in fact our priority is eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction potential, above regime change, one of the avenues we certainly haven't explored is whether that tradeoff will lead us to more intrusive international presence that would assure Iraq's compliance.

SEN. BIDEN: That's interesting but during the Clinton administration where there wasn't at the front end an explicit judgment made on regime change, there was virtually no cooperation from Europe on tougher inspection and tougher -- well, inspection regime to deal with weapons of mass destruction.

I mean, I've had repeated discussions during, all during the '90s, with European leaders who always had some, from my perspective quite frankly, lame excuse why it really wasn't a problem and so I'm wondering why you think that there's any prospect that if we went back to the Europeans and assume the president said to the French and to others, look, here's the deal, you help us get rid -- you get full blown inspections in there that are real, robust, genuine, allow us to go and -- to go wherever and if we're convinced that we've got rid of the weapons of mass destruction, we're out of there?

MR. TELHAMI: Well, I think that the question is, we really haven't tested it. Because if the tradeoff, if they're truly fearful of the military option and they see that as an alternative to the military option and the Iraqis see it as an alternative to the military option, it's worth testing and at a minimum if it doesn't work we will be in a better moral position to make a different kind of argument. So clearly --

SEN. BIDEN: Do you think then what Senator Lugar and myself, and I think to some degree Senator Hagel have been saying, that we should be, for reasons relating to diplomacy if not substance, pushing as hard as we can for a more robust inspection regime and put the Iraqis in the position where they resist, it's clear they're resisting and it's clear why? Is there a difference in what you're saying? Am I missing a nuance here?

MR. TELHAMI: No, it is essentially in the same spirit of what you're saying. I think the difference is that we have to be very explicit in our own thinking. That ultimately what we would then be advocating is, essentially we can live with the regime if it doesn't have weapons of mass destruction. That does affect the strategy because one of the fears that we have had in terms of the level of intrusions, when we went into Iraq and say well but if we remove the economic sanctions he's going to be able to have more political power in Baghdad or in Iraq. Well, unfortunately that may be the case if you pursue the strategy that is one consequence that we have to think about. I'm not suggesting that is the strategy to pursue but I think that that is the implication of this kind of strategy.

SEN. BIDEN: Dr. Kemp, if you were in your old job down at the White House, what advice would you give the president about what signals he should send to the Iranians now, if any, about any move against Iraq on our part?

MR. KEMP: Well, I'm not quite sure what the current policy towards Iran is, quite frankly, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it, in the period leading up to the war against the Taliban there were meetings with Iranians, multilateral meetings with the Iranians in the Six by Two Forum and the Iranians were relatively cooperative during the war against the Taliban and then in the immediate aftermath of the war, there were State Department people who were in Bonn, acknowledged that the Iranians were useful in putting together the Karzai government, interim government. Then things of course went down hill, very badly, climaxing with the Karine A incident, the ship that was caught moving arms to the Palestinians and the president's State of the Union speech. So now the problem is we do not have the sort of relationship with the Iranians we had last fall.

My own personal view is that if we contemplate a major war against Iraq we at least have to make an effort to resume some dialogue with the Iranian government however unpleasant its activities are in other theatres.

I happen to believe that what the Iranians are doing in the occupied territories, their support for Hamas and Hezbollah is linked to their fear that we are going to go after Saddam Hussein and that they have got to know that if we are truly determined to get rid of him, they're going to have to make a calculus that they can either cooperate with us in a passive way during that campaign or they can be against us and if they're against us then they're likely to be very much in our cross-fires. So my advice, if I had my old job and assuming I survived more than a week down there in this climate, I would essentially suggest we rethink our Iranian strategy as we get closer towards a war with Iraq.

SEN. BIDEN: Last point, Professor Ajami. You indicated that if we move against Iraq the people in the region, who were looking for this perfect storm, but people in the region, heads of state in the region, will associate with us but not want to be seen with us, not want us to kiss them in public here. What does that mean as it relates to the use of, what you heard the last panel of military, two military guys saying, without Qatar, without Bahrain, without Kuwait, there is no reasonable way in which we could sustain a massive U.S. military engagement. Does your note about, we'll associate with this but very quietly, does that mean they will not be able to give us access?

MR. AJAMI: I think they can give us access. I think sometimes people underestimate the power, the coercive powers of these governments and the power, I think, to live with a certain cognitive dissidence shall we say. Some of these states, maybe even Jordan, it may have to have shades of the perfect Musharraf situation. President Musharraf, let's give him credit. He's stared down the Islamics and he's stared down the street and he associated himself with American power and for the sake of all kinds of arguments that this regime was destined to fall if we were actually to associate itself with us and if we were to be a base for the war against Afghanistan. He did it. And the way he did it was to say look, this is the choice for Pakistan's modernity. That either we are a pariah among the nation or we actually join this coalition and he sustained his case. And I think it will come to this, for example, for the King of Jordan. Imagine now the nightmare of this young King of Jordan, Abdullah II.

Now, it's kind of interesting, if you will, if you like a story of irony. Last time around it was the two fathers, Bush senior and of course, King Hussein and at that time, those two men went separate ways. King Hussein decided he feared the street in his own country more than he feared the United States and he actually, that's right, that when the guns fall silent we would actually rehabilitate him and would give him a seat at the table. We invited him as we did to Madrid and we forgave him the choice he made because we understand that the difficulty that the Hashemites have in the realm. So I think we can sweeten the pot for some of these rulers. In the case of the King of Jordan we will have to add Jordan economically. There's already been talk of compensating Jordan on this panel today for what Jordan may have to do.

Some other countries have an easier call to make. In the case of Qatar, clearly everybody knows and the Qatari regime seems to have this amazing ability in many ways to do things in broad daylight. It even has Al Jazeera there and it just does it its own way. And we are building a presence in Qatar and I think that presence could be easily used. Bahrain, that could also be easily used. I think the Bahrainis, the domestic situation is not as acute, for example, as the case of the Jordanians. In the case of the Kuwaitis, it's easiest of all. They know the bandit for what he is. He has their national archives. He has 600 of their people. Incidentally, about whom now he's -- he's now saying, well, we're willing to discuss them even though they didn't exist a few months ago, or a year or so ago.

So, I think in the case of the Kuwaitis, their body politic could bear this kind of presence and could bear this kind of war. So we shouldn't exaggerate the weakness of these states. There shall be demonstrations against us to be sure. We shall not convince anyone, Mr. Chairman, that we're there to deliver the Iraqis out of their misery. And one point I want to make, already, there are large numbers of people in the Arab world who believe that we are keeping Saddam there because it is convenient for us, it is convenient for us, that that's why we never removed him. Because he allows us, if you will, this extensive presence in the Gulf, and he allows the Americans to get these joint exercises in the Gulf and to have these extensive weapon sales. So there are these kind of conspiracy theories that Saddam --

SEN. BIDEN: Your play makes reference to conspiracies in the region. By the way, I've heard that when I was in Bahrain, I mean, that was -- you guys warned me. Well anyway, you've clarified for me your statement about they'd be willing to associate but not want to be seen.

Senator Hagel.

SEN. HAGEL: Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you to our panel this afternoon after a long wait. We appreciate you hanging in there with us. I apologize for missing some of the opening statements. So I may ask a question here that some of you developed in some detail.

Dr. Kemp, I heard it said recently on the Iranian dynamic, if we should invade Iraq, or liberate Iraq, however way we will phrase it, that the two options for Iran would be a negative neutrality or a positive neutrality.

And I think that is not a bad way to say it. I would ask each of you if you could give me your opinion on what has been suggested in previous panels today, that there is a very clear and defined link between the Arab Palestinian issue and Iraq. Is that true or not? If it is, how deep? Is it part of the dynamic if we would go into Iraq? And I've heard some of you mention it, but I would like very much for each of you to give me your thoughts on that.bassador Parris.

MR. PARRIS: Well, I think, there's no question that it complicates any assessment by the administration of how you would implement a policy of regime change which they have declared to be the policy. There's a question in my mind whether it's a showstopper, as some of the other witnesses have suggested. I think we sometimes underestimate the ability of some of our friends in the Arab world to deal with issues arising from discontent in their streets.

These are pretty -- these have proved to be pretty robust regimes when they need to be, regimes who understand their dynamics and have been able to dominate them over the years. And my guess is that if the administration were to do this in a way which provided adequate consultation which satisfies many of the concerns that have been expressed here and in previous panels, that those governments have shared with us and are likely to share with us in the consultative process, that it would be possible to carry out the kind of operation that we're talking about without resolving the Arab Israeli dispute first which after all is going to take a long time. There's a real question of whether or not, based on some of their earlier testimony today, we have that kind of time.

SEN. HAGEL: So, you don't see it as a serious impediment?

MR. PARRIS: I think it is certainly serious, and it is certainly an impediment. But I'm not convinced that it would stop this effort in its tracks if it were done properly and intelligently and with full concern for the sensitivities that our potential partners have expressed.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

MR. TELHAMI: I think it clearly is, Senator, a complicating factor in some places. I mean, I think that Mr. Ajami's point was right about 1991, when -- 1990-91 when the king of Jordan decided essentially that the pressure from his public was too much to bear, that he had to stay it out, even though he was one of the friendliest leaders to ordain the United States of America. He made that choice and obviously he made it because he felt the heat from his public.

I think that it is -- the link is not direct. I think that what's at issue is that the resentment toward the U.S., which is broad based and it's linked to a lot of issues, but it's focused, highly focused, on this issue because of the escalation that we see, and therefore there will be an automatic link about an American design for Iraq.

I agree with the idea that these states are robust. I think they have proven to be robust before. They calculate on real politic basis. They have to do what they have to do to survive. And if that means that have to go with America, they ultimately do, even if they don't like it, they ultimately do. But I think we should have no illusions about the points that I tried to make earlier, one of which, that now they have more uncertainty about their ability. They've been stressed to the limit in the last few months because of this pressure and because they don't have control over this information, that is, that they're scared of it. It doesn't mean they can't do it but they have more uncertainty.

But the more important point is they can only succeed in containing the public discontent is through repression, and the net outcome will be is that we're going to end up with a Middle East that's more repressive. And we can't and shouldn't have any illusions about it. And I would argue, and here, Mr. Ajami, I may have a disagreement and I -- but he has not addressed it, but it is about the extent to which this would be a factor in additional motivation for terrorism. I happen to think that that is an issue. I happen to think it's very important. Even aside from whether the public has the capacity to overthrow regimes. I think revolutions are scarce in history and they clearly have been scarce in the Middle East. It is still a state system. We often forget that.

But there are -- even authoritarian governments have to be sensitive and responsive to their publics and there are new channels and avenues available to the public to express their discontent in a way that has not been expressed, and unfortunately through militancy. And I think it would be very easy to conceive of an argument that the militants would exploit and would be able to do more of it than before a war with Iraq.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

Dr. Ajami.

MR. AJAMI: Now, on the issue of terrorism and the connection between -- I'll get to your point, Senator Hagel, but on the issue of terrorism and the connection with the Palestinian question, it's interesting to note that the trail of terror, the trail of terror that dogged American throughout the '90s, that is the World Trade Center truck bombing in 1993, the bombing in Riyadh in 1995, the Khobar Tower in June of 1996, the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in the summer of 1998, and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000. They all happened during one of the most accommodating American diplomacy toward the Palestinian question, under the presidency of Bill Clinton, where Bill Clinton was courting Yasser Arafat. And the terror paid the Palestine question no heed. Indeed, the masterminds of Al-Qaeda paid the Palestinian question in every statement they made, no heed. Two men, two men came together in 1998, Osama bin Laden in a position much more interesting for the purposes of terrorism, Aiman Zawahiri, who is an Egyptian and a foe of the regime of Mubarak, they came together and gave us this trail of terror.

The Palestine question was the issue de jour just recently for the bin Ladens in the region. So that's the connection to terrorism. Terrorism paid no attention to what we were doing on the Palestinian question. Terrorism had no regard for the peace of Oslo. And when Yasser Arafat had more visits to the White House than any head of state in the world during the Clinton years, the Qaeda people thought he was of no relevance to the kind of grievances that they had.

So, we come now to Iraq and the question is still a question of linkage. You know, can we do Iraq without doing Palestine? There is a kind of a view of the Arab world I don't share, that all issues, that Palestine is the end-all, be-all of Arab politics. I don't agree with this. I think the Gulf is very important. I think Iraq is very important. I think the faith of 22 million Iraqis is extremely important. And I think the idea that we can't do anything in the region short of quote, unquote, "solving" the question of Palestine, whatever that term means, is not very persuasive to me.

I think what we can say, we are in this war because of September 11 and we have to make a linkage between September 11 and Iraq. And I think the linkage is indirect but we must make it. And we have to insist on our right to prosecute this war. And we can also say that the president has in place his plan for regime change as well, not only in -- we're using regime change in Iraq, but regime change in the Palestinian territories. And that there is a promise to the Palestinians that they can have a state provisionally in three years if the terror comes to an end, and that ultimately anyway the Israelis and the Palestinians are doomed to an accommodation west of the Jordan River.

But the issue of suspending the liberties and the reform of the Arab world and keeping it hostage for the question of the Palestinians is not persuasive. I think the Iraqis have their claim on us and I think this is the kind of claim that we are to pay attention to.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

Dr. Kemp.

MR. KEMP: Well, the one clear linkage, it seems to me, between Iraq and the peace process, the Arab-Israel conflict, whatever you want to call it, is Saddam Hussein. What did Saddam Hussein do in January 1991? He launched scuds against Israel with the sole purpose of bringing Israel into a war that would then disrupt the alliance that George Bush senior had put together. It didn't work because the scuds weren't effective and the Israelis showed remarkable constraint.

Saddam more recently has, of course, been upping the ante by paying these bounties to the families of suicide bombers in the Palestinian territory.

The scenarios that you've been hearing about this morning and read about every day in the paper include the possibility that in extremis Saddam Hussein will launch his WMD directly or indirectly against Israel in order to bring the linkage into effect.

And perhaps the most disturbing possibility of all, which there is now quite some speculation about, is that Saddam Hussein in extremis would do whatever he could to destabilize the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. And it's interesting that everybody on this panel who has slightly different views, we all seem to agree that, you know, the Saudis will ride it out, the Egyptians will ride it out, the Qataris will, but we're all a little worried about the king.

In other words, we talk a lot about regime change, but actually what we have to worry about is regime survival, particularly the survival of King Abdullah, because if anything happened to Jordan under his rule, promoted by the Iraqis, and they can be very, very unpleasant, this is an immediate threat to Israel, and Israel will respond. That's the linkage that worries me.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

SEN. BIDEN: Sorry. Senator Sarbanes.

SEN. PAUL S. SARBANES (D-MD): Mr. Chairman, I regret very much that my schedule was such that I've not been able to be here with you through the day, but I want to commend you for scheduling these hearings at a very busy period, just before the recess. I think it's extremely important that you've undertaken this effort. And we're having another full day tomorrow, as I understand it.

SEN. BIDEN: That's correct.

SEN. SARBANES: And that you're also contemplating resuming the hearing process when we come back in September. I think it's imperative that we've launched on this enterprise. Every day we got a new report in the national press about U.S. policy toward Iraq and its implications. Sunday we had a headline in the Washington Post, quote, "Some top military brass favor status quo in Iraq: containment seen less risky than attack."

Another in the New York Times just yesterday, "Profound effect on economy seen in a war on Iraq. U.S. may bear most costs. Experts weigh likelihood of an oil price shock and other disruptions of markets." And then even today, the Times had its lead story, "Air power alone can't defeat Iraq, Rumsfeld asserts. Secretary sidesteps question of sending in U.S. ground forces to oust Hussein." So we -- you know, which then of course draws you into the debate, can you do it with air power alone or can you not do it with air power alone, et cetera?

Now, it seems to me imperative that there be a broader examination of all of these questions and, you know, this current brutal regime in Iraq raises major and complex questions for U.S. policy. And how they're answered will have consequences for the region, for our own country, and more broadly around the world for a long time to come. And obviously we need to embark on the process you've launched sooner, I think, rather than later. We have to have well-considered, well-informed policies and we have to take into account the full measure of potential benefits and risks and they have to be fully explicable to our people.

In that regard, I was very much taken by the op-ed piece, as you and Senator Lugar have in today's New York Times, and I'm very strongly supportive of the approach contained therein, including your statement. Without prejudging any particular course of action, we hope to start a national discussion of some critical questions. I think that's extremely important. And I therefore again commend you for undertaking this careful examination of the situation.

You and Senator Lugar set out there some questions which I think have formed the framework for these hearings. What threat does Iraq pose to our security, how immediate is the danger, what are the possible responses to the Iraqi threat? Third, you know, what are our responsibilities if Saddam is removed? Fourthly, what would it take to rebuild Iran economically and politically? And I know you're trying to do these panels, I think, focused on particular aspects of that question, but if I could go outside of that --

SEN. BIDEN: Well, they -- believe me, these guys can go anywhere you want them to go.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, I know. Well, let me then just close these observations.

SEN. BIDEN: I mean they're capable of dealing with any subject, I didn't mean to imply anything else.

(Laughter.)

SEN. SARBANES: Let me close by putting a question to them then.

SEN. BIDEN: No, take your time. Take your time.

SEN. SARBANES: What would we have to undertake afterwards with respect to Iraq? I mean, how long are we talking about being present, and what kind of resources would we have to commit. And as you answer that question, could you put it in the context of our staying power, what we have reflected on that question in Afghanistan?

You know, we went into Afghanistan and we did an important military operation with considerable success, but we're left with problems afterwards. Now, how adequately are we addressing that, and how commensurate has our commitment been? And as you look at the Afghanistan situation, what questions may that raise about the Iraqi situation post Saddam Hussein? That's the question I'd like to leave with this panel.

SEN. BIDEN: Very good question, I'm anxious to hear their answers.

MR. KEMP: Can I start?

SEN. BIDEN: In any order you'd like.

MR. KEMP: As I understand it, the U.S. Army began preparations for the occupation of Germany in 1942. Currency was being printed for the occupation. I think we've got a long way to go in thinking about this problem of occupying Iraq. I gather tomorrow morning you're going to have some very, very good people who have looked at this in great detail, so I wouldn't want to pre-empt anything they say. But if you're talking about the occupation of Iraq, you're talking about tens of thousands of U.S. troops for a long period of time. Kabul, you know, is the only area that we're really protecting in Afghanistan, and that is a relatively small city. It is not Baghdad, it is not a city of six million.

So I think the idea that we can just win the war and go away would be extraordinarily irresponsible. The idea that there will be a government in waiting ready to take over the administrative tasks of Iraq, I think, is utter wishful thinking.

And furthermore, there may be people cheering us on, and I'm certain there will be, but there's also going to be a lot of recrimination and a lot of violent acts that will be committed in revenge. Some people have said that the southern Baghdad suburbs, predominantly Shi'a who have been suppressed for years and years by this regime, are not going to kiss and make up the day after. This is going to be worse than Paris in 1944 when, as you know, more people were killed in the three weeks after the liberation than had been for many, many years before.

So I think it is a terribly serious problem and I am delighted that you are going to have a special panel on this because it is the least thought through element of this extremely polemical debate that we see in the press, that really I think has been so over simplified and so underestimated the complexity to the problems. I think we're just beginning to get into this and let's start here.

SEN. BIDEN: With the permission of my colleague, if I can add a complicating factor to the extent that you spoke about Iran. The degree to which we settle the matter and keep peace in Baghdad and other places by being in place and occupy it, does not that raise the ante in Tehran that we in fact are seeking a permanent basing and a permanent station there?

MR. KEMP: Yes, it does. And some people of course would argue that's all to the good because that would put the fear of God into the bad mullahs and the good mullahs will take over. But I'm not quite so confident that that's what will happen.

SEN. BIDEN: Please, Doctor, if you'd follow through with the question.

MR. AJAMI: Well, first of all, let me just take this opportunity to thank Senator Sarbanes because he's been looking after my pension and for his great -- (laughter) -- for his great work on corporate reform, we really commend you. You're a great figure and I think that if you can handle corporate reform, you can handle Iraq very easily.

(Laughter)

Now, I agree with everything that Geoff Kemp said, and I teach a class with Geoff Kemp and I've been doing it for many years and this is probably one of our first agreements in a long time. I think we are going to be there in Iraq but I don't think we should be frightened necessarily or we should think that it will be drawn out, it will be extensive and that we are going to take the plunge into imperialism in a very deep way. There are several things -- I'm just echoing some of what Geoff said.

We want to know about Iraq. This is a country that has the second largest reserves of oil after Saudi Arabia. It has enormous social capital. Like Afghanistan, it has an educated and technically competent middle class. So making a stand there will not necessarily be bad for us. I think Geoff is right. There are these grievances and historical accounts to be settled in Iraq. They will be things that we should be good at. There will be truth and justice commissions. There will be war criminals. There will be people we can't protect and maybe even we shouldn't protect.

So it won't be easy. But I think we operated on the assumption -- I think, again, the chairman has given us good marching orders and I think Senator Lugar was very clear on that as well -- we have to take this and say, "Is this worth doing? Is this worth doing?" And that's what everyone of us really has to make -- that's the decision that has to be made, whether it's in Wisconsin or Maryland or Connecticut or anywhere. You have to really argue the case and sustain the case, that it's really worth it, that this is a very volatile part of the world. It is the oil supply of the world. It is a very notoriously bad man and that even though we are a reluctant umpire. You know we are reluctant about imperial burdens. We don't undertake imperial burden willingly and that's good.

When sometimes people say that they heard from the joint chiefs of staff and they are against this military intervention or that military intervention, one is reassured that we don't have a military ready and eager to go everywhere and pull the trigger. So it's really all that what that national discussion is all about. That's what your hearing's and that's what the debate is all about.

SEN. BIDEN: Are you talking about the same numbers Dr. Kemp is? You're talking about tens of thousands and if you are, we are obviously talking about billions of dollars. Tens of thousands troops translate over in comparatively short periods of time into billions of dollars.

MR. KEMP: Right. But as my colleague Fouad said, there are ways for the Iraqi government to pay for those troops. They have a lot of oil.

SEN. SARBANES: What period of time do you envisage?

MR. KEMP: I would think years. I mean --

SEN. SARBANES: Five years? Ten years?

MR. KEMP: Minimum of five years, I would think.

MR. TELHAMI: Senator, if I -- first of all, also let me thank you for looking after my interests too. I am one of your constituents in Maryland.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, you guys didn't thank us for anything.

(Cross talk.)

MR. TELHAMI: Well, you've got a problem. You've got a disadvantage. So I'm one of your constituents.

SEN. SARBANES: But he pays attention to the chairman of the Banking Committee, you know. I mean --

MR. TELHAMI: No, banking is not my --

SEN. SARBANES: I'm joking. It's a bad joke, sir.

MR. TELHAMI: Maryland is in this case. I do worry about the consequences. I think it's a major issue to be concerned about. I don't think that any of us knows how the public is going to react. There's no question that the regime is despised, that we have no doubt about. But we should have no illusion that that is going to translate into love for America. We should have no illusion about that. In some instances it may, in others it may not.

We should also be very careful not to miscalculate in the early days, when people do face liberation from repression where they do celebrate their liberation. We may translate that as a welcoming mat for us and that could become a real problem. The Israelis made that mistake in South Lebanon when they thought early on that the fact that they undermine the PLO influence in South Lebanon and translated into a welcoming mat. And clearly that turned out some of the same people who were happy to see the PLO go were then among the fiercest enemies. So I don't think, first of all, we know exactly how the public is going to react and clearly we could find ourselves in a situation where we overstay our welcome.

Second, I think it is clear that every one in the region is going to have a stake in what happens in Iraq and those are people who live right next door and have resources and contacts far better than we do. Be it the Turks, as Mark pointed out, if we don't coordinate with them, they can make our lives miserable. And that is true about the Iranians and is certainly true about others in the region. And so it is clear that they have resources, they have the interest and obviously the abilities and therefore, depending on whether we coordinate, we cooperate, whether it works with the rest of the region, in terms of coincidence of interest, it matters a lot.

And finally, I want to say that I do think that no matter what happens even if we have a relatively successful outcome in Iraq, which we all pray for, and even if -- and I agree by the way with Fouad about Iraq's potential -- I mean, clearly Iraq has tremendous potential. It is a country with an infrastructure, industrial history, a secularized country, oil resources. Clearly -- actually in 1980, when it started the war with Iran, it stood on the verge of greatness in the region and unfortunately, it has been taken on a disastrous route that lost it for two decades and killed hundreds of thousands of its own people. So it has suffered a lot but it certainly has potential.

At the same time, even if the Iraqi people have a happy outcome, I believe that most people in the region will see this as American imperialism. Most people in the region will see it as American imperialism and whether we can live with that is a question. I mean it may be true that the sentiment is we're powerful, we can do it. They're going to have to do what we want regardless. I think most will undoubtedly. Think if you apply that same strategy and principle to your own lives and your social relations or domestic relations or relations with other people or business relations, how long that can serve you, if you take that attitude as a strategy of winning, where you don't take people's wishes in consideration and calculations into account, where you do things unilaterally because you're powerful enough to think that they're just going to have to see it your way and they will? And how much resentment builds up awaiting the right moment? And unfortunately, there will be a right moment.

I'm not so optimistic about the Musharraf model in Pakistan, as some people have suggested earlier. I think -- I applaud Mr. Musharraf for taking the position he took. It was tough to do, to stand out and tell people they have a choice. I agree with that, that was the right thing for him to do. I am not sure he will succeed. I am less confident he will prevail. And I am worried about what is going to happen five years down the road in Pakistan in relation to us and in relation to militancy pertaining to us, and I am worried about Afghanistan.

And so, looking at that, I say to myself, do I want more of that in the region? Or should I follow a different route that affects the motivation of people, that affects the interests of people, that makes sure that my policy coincides with the interests of others, not goes against them because they have to follow my lead? And that is -- they're a different approach, different philosophical approach. And I think it -- I am less certain about a unilateralist approach that relies on brute force as a way of getting through in the Middle East.

MR. PARRIS: My colleagues have made excellent points, and I'm not going to try to belabor them by repeating them, other than to underscore what Jeff said, which is that this is the part of the problem that deserves the most attention. He will be doing that in detail tomorrow. So much of it is scenario dependent. And I think you'll find there's an enormous difference of opinion as to what we can expect when and if we finally get in there. But I would like to make one point, and to play off something that Mort Halperin said.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank him for your pension.

(Laughter.)

MR. PARRIS: No, I'm a Virginia resident.

SEN. BIDEN: Okay, good.

MR. PARRIS: It's to play off something that Mort Halperin said in the previous panel, which is that to be sure that there will be a democratic regime in Iraq over the long term we'll have to stay there for 20 years. I think that -- and, you, senator, asked the panel whether there was anybody who disagreed with that statement. It's a profound question. And basically nobody was prepared to take it on.

I think it merits parsing. Because what Mort said was to ensure a democratic regime over the long term, and that suggests that, you know, there's one quality of democracy. If our objective is to create the Federal Republic of Germany in Iraq, we may very well have to stay there as long as we did in Germany. But there are shades of democracy around the world, many of which represent close friendships and allies of the United States, and would be remarkable improvements over the status quo in Iraq. And I think it would be presumptuous of us to sit here and suggest that, you know, unless they meet the standard that we do in this country we shouldn't -- the game is not worth the candle.

It seems to me that if you take a different approach, if you accept the proposition that there may be a different standard than ours, you may take less time, it may be less resource intensive, some of the downsides that have been discussed here might be less acute.

SEN. BIDEN: Senator Chafee.

SEN. CHAFEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Mr. Kemp, you mentioned that there's a worst case and a best case scenario. And your worst case scenario, I wonder whether there's something even worse than what you might have suggested.

MR. KEMP: Probably.

SEN. CHAFEE: I think Dr. Telhami was kind of going down that road in talking about the power of the public. And if there's public resentment, then comes repression, and it's a spiral that leads to something that did happen in 1979 in Iran, the shah was topped so quickly that we didn't even get our embassy people out and they took over our embassy and kept them hostage. It can happen so fast.

Is it possible that this conflagration, this spontaneous combustion, can take place where these regimes are toppled in the neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan of course you've mentioned. And even those that aren't neighbors, I mean, Turkey is a neighbor. But even those that aren't neighbors, Egypt, and we've talked about Pakistan a little bit. Is that possible, just a spontaneous combustion of anti-Americanism, and a toppling of regimes, which ultimately, if you want to talk about a worst case scenario, is the entire oil, the majority of the oil production for the world.

MR. KEMP: Well, there are a lot of worst case scenarios that, even beyond that, obviously, even in the conduct of the war. I mean, if we're right, that -- if some of the panelists that you've heard before were right about the fact that there is uncertainty about the degree to which Iraq may even have nuclear weapons, and if we're all right about the ruthlessness of the leader if he knows he's going to go down the drain in an American attack, if he knows that this is going to be a war against him, it's certainly the case that he's going to use whatever is at his disposal. Because this is not going to be a deterrence issue any more. He knows he's going down, and he's going to use everything at his disposal.

I have no doubt that in a war, in a full war, where our aim is to bring down the government, and obviously that's going to be the aim of the war, that he will use everything at his disposal. I don't know what that is. But I have no doubt, and one can paint scenarios as to what these are, maybe he doesn't have much. But the issue is if we think that there is uncertainty, there is even a -- there are scenarios of this sort, the scenarios of pre-emption, of attacks even prior to the American attacks, if war is imminent, that could be done.

But the public uprising and the revolution, it's always possible. And I think we have to remind ourselves that at the time of the overthrow of the Shah many of our own government officials, as well as the academics, argued that the Shah is very stable. In fact, that same year a famous professor at the University of California at Berkeley, an Iran expert, wrote a book making the argument that Iran was one of the most stable countries in the world. And then we had happen what we witnessed.

I don't think that that is a highly likely scenario. In part, because I do think that revolutions are scarce in history. They just don't happen very often. States have learned a lot, unfortunately mostly through repressive mechanisms. But you can't rule it out. You can't rule it out. And I think neither -- none of these governments are ruling it out as a potential in their dealings with the contingencies that they have to deal with. And that is why I'm even more worried about the after, what happens within these countries, which is what is likely to be the case. Their worry about such a scenario is going to lead to a lot more repression than we have seen. And if our aim in part is to popularize democracy, we should have no illusions.

And today in the trade-offs in relation to Pakistan when we ask what do we want more, is it to see less repression of Pakistan or cooperation in the war on terrorism, because we have a priority of national security pertaining to Afghanistan, it is clear what our answer is. And it is likely to be the case when our priority will be to maintain stability in Iraq, to worry about what happens in Iraq, that we're going to put a lot of other priorities on the sideline to get the maximal cooperation to be able to succeed, at least in the intermediate period up to five years or whatever it takes, to do so. So we should go in with open eyes about what actually is likely to happen in the region in terms of dynamics, if we go that route.

MR. AJAMI: Senator Chafee, just one -- I mean, on the issue of -- an issue has arisen that has kind of great deference to the street. I'm reminded of the slogan of Kemalism. The Kemalist project in Turkey, the principle of it was 'for the people, despite the people'. So sometimes you just do things for the people, despite the people, you modernize them. You tell them the truth, you tell them about the world.

So now to the issue of whether these -- none of the governments in this neighborhood that we're talking about, none of them, I repeat, none, has a genuine modernizing project today. So they offer these the people, if you will, this kind of road rage of the anti- Americanism, the steady diet of the anti-Zionism, and they just get away with it.

Now, there's a good answer to the question that Senator Chafee asked about whether these regimes could survive, could there be a revolution. And I think the Muslims have a great, great answer to that. They always would say about something that's completely unfathomable, Allah e'halum (ph) "Only God knows." We don't know. We don't know. We do know the record.

Here is the record. Al Saud have been around now since the middle years of the 18th century.

You'll always get the Saudis to tell you about that. The Sabah in Kuwait have been around for approximately the same time. The Hashemites in Jordan in a very, very truncated volatile realm have been around since 1921. And even Gaddafi has been around since 1969. And the Egyptian revolution of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak has been in the saddle for now half a century, and there is no evidence that anyone could overthrow these governments. They know. That's the one thing they know, is how to stay in power.

The combined GDP, we are now told, of the Arab world is $60 billion less than Spain. Less than Spain. Twenty-two Arab governments. So they don't know how to develop their populations. We know they don't like to give them modernity. But they know how to stay in power. We should trust that. We should -- you know, that's what the game is all about.

MR. KEMP: Just on this, Senator Chafee, I mean, how do we -- an even more worse case. Look, I think the one bit of good news is that in serious Middle East crises 1967, 1973, our worst case was a U.S.- Soviet confrontation. We were worried about a Soviet nuclear threat, in both the '67 war -- that's gone.

So, to me, the worst case would be a nuclear war in the Middle East, which is possible under certain circumstances. That I think would have a devastating impact on the oil markets. And then I think these regimes that up to now have been extraordinarily resilient would be facing a day of reckoning, because what we have not really discussed because it wasn't their mission. But there is a demographic bulge moving through this region of young people who cannot be employed because they do not have jobs. It's getting worse by the year.

The Arab world, Iran, Pakistan, are entering into this window of where they have to create more jobs a year than they possibly have the resources to. That's where I think you could get an explosion. I don't think it will be a single explosion. It won't be like 1848 in Europe and all the rotten monarchies collapsed, but sooner or later some of these regimes have to crack. Whether it's Iran first or Egypt, I don't know, but they cannot keep going at this rate of depression.

SEN. BIDEN: Gentlemen, I just have -- I hate to do this to you, just a couple more quick questions. Do you have another question?

SEN. CHAFEE: No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank your panel.

SEN. BIDEN: The premise that the question -- the question is, if Saddam is taken down, how long will we have to stay? The way you answered was premised upon the notion that we had no cooperation from anywhere else in the world, we didn't have the Europeans in the game, no one else got in the deal here. Can you give me your best educated guess as quickly as you can as to whether or not, given that circumstances, that is Saddam has been removed, American forces are in the region in large numbers, where it may be part of the calculus of our European friends in the EU that they be part of the process?

And would it make a difference if they -- it obviously makes an economic difference to us, but would it make a difference if they were part of the process in terms of the reaction in Iran, the reaction in Turkey, the reaction in other parts of the world -- of that part of the world? As quickly as you can. It's an awful long -- I mean profound question, I'm sure.

MR. KEMP: It would make a very important difference if part of the occupation force also includes bringing in UNMOVIC, the U.N. inspectors that you discussed this morning. That will also give more legitimacy to it. The more this is seen as an international operation with cooperation from the U.N. and the Europeans, the less the chance that we will be pigeonholed as merely imperialists. But we've got a lot of work to do.

SEN. BIDEN: Anyone disagree with that?

MR. AJAMI: No, I agree with Geoff.

SEN. BIDEN: Now, the second, I think more difficult question at least I haven't resolved is what do you believe would be the calculus that our European friends would engage in to determine whether or not it was in their interest to participate?

MR. AJAMI: I think if we -- you know, their logic would be if we succeed, we succeed together, if we fail, we fail alone. I mean, I'm reminded of like soon after September 11, Le Monde had this famous headline, "Nous Sont Tous Americain," (ph) "We're all Americans." And a few weeks later it became "Tous Americain?" with a question mark. All Americans? Not quite. That they believed that we were using September 11 as a way of expanding our authority in the world and in the region.

I think Iraq is rich, we go back to that. Iraq is a good market. And I think when we go in, a lot of these countries will come with us because they'll want to be part of the reconstruction of Iraq. I mean, this will be fundamentally important for the French, it would be important for the Russians, it would be important for the Brits and for the others, for the Germans. So I don't think we will necessarily be alone. It's just the fate of a great power sometimes to be alone when the hard work has to be done.

SEN. BIDEN: Quite frankly, if I had a choice of being alone after the hard work was done, the way you phrase it, or being alone getting the hard work done, I'd rather be alone getting the hard work done because I think the really hard work is after.

MR. TELHAMI: But let's have a little word of warning, though, Senator, which is that these are democratic countries we're talking about. We're not talking about the Middle Eastern countries.

SEN. BIDEN: I agree.

MR. TELHAMI: We are talking about countries that are differentiated, that have their own domestic political considerations. And in that regard, if you look at public opinion so far, only in Britain is the public about evenly divided on Iraq. There is not a single country in which there is a majority support for Iraq, most countries --

SEN. BIDEN: I would suggest that was the case in Bosnia.

MR. TELHAMI: Perhaps. Or almost any other.

SEN. BIDEN: And they all came along after the fact. I remember pushing President Clinton very hard, as hard as I could, politely or otherwise, about moving to bomb in Kosovo. He said, "What about the French?" I said, "I promise you, if you go, they'll come." I have -- I quite frankly am more uncertain about it as it relates to Iraq. My instinct is that -- and again, I'm not the expert, that's why we have you here. But my instinct, Professor Ajami, is that if we succeed they will be willing to take a piece of this.

I would -- let me ask you if there's any parallel here. I was very disappointed, and I've been public about this, in the failure of this administration to expand ISAF in Afghanistan, especially on what I believe are not completely accurate grounds that the Europeans weren't ready to. The Europeans that I spent time there -- I spent time with Europeans. They were totally prepared to until we said we wouldn't be part of it. And as one European said, "If the big dog's not there, the little dogs don't want to play."

And so I was under the distinct impression in everything, and I have followed this very closely, that had we been willing to lead to expand ISAF, not even with numbers, just lead with commitment, that ISAF would have -- we would have gotten significant support from Europe to expand ISAF in raw numbers.

MR. TELHAMI: That's right.

SEN. BIDEN: Is that able to be -- can you extrapolate from that that a similar -- assuming a military success in Iraq, is it your -- is there any relevance to their willingness in Iraq -- I mean in Afghanistan and what they may be willing to do in Iraq?

MR. KEMP: Well, I would just say that if we're not prepared to go much further in Iraq than we have gone in Afghanistan, we're doomed from the start.

SEN. BIDEN: I agree.

MR. KEMP: So that I think the sort of premises for, I think, the Europeans would be, you're going to have to get in in a big way and we ultimately are going to have to help you. And one important reason is they would see this as a way to help diffuse then the Arab-Israeli conflict, which in the last resort the Europeans worry about primarily because of migration and a whole string of European issues which we haven't gotten into today. So if we don't lead in Iraq then it's all over, it's a hopeless case.

MR. TELHAMI: Unfortunately, many of them will be worried about the splitting of the spoils of war. I have no doubt about it. I think that the issue of the oil contracts is going to become an issue in the thinking of a lot of them, and I think, you know, that is going to be a part of the calculus --

SEN. BIDEN: I would argue that's the way -- I don't know why this isn't a win-win situation with the Russians. I mean, I actually had a conversation that he asked not dissuade at me for mentioning, with President Putin. You know, they think they got $32 billion waiting in the bank in terms of developing those oil fields which they can't develop. That's the contracts they value, roughly that amount. They're owed about $11 billion. I thought it was nine, when I said nine he looked at me and said 11. When you have a total federal budget of $30 billion, $41 billion seems like a lot of money and people say, well, you know, it's not -- you're not going to get it.

Well, it's a little bit like having, you know, a very rich aunt that you don't like and you know she has $40 million in the bank. You may not have a relationship with her but you're not going to give up on it, knowing she has it in the bank. These folks have it in the bank. And there is even a feeler put out by Gazprom, and what's the other oil company?

MR. (?): LUKOIL.

SEN. BIDEN: LUKOIL -- that they would be interested in a consortia with U.S. companies. One of the things I found the Russians are worried about is we go in, take out Iraq, they lose their contracts. I can't imagine why this isn't a win-win situation if we were smart about this, but I don't get any sense that there's any movement on this by anybody in the administration.

MR. PARRIS: I think one of the problems is a structural one, and it's certainly the case with Turkey up until very recently, which is that if you're talking point is there's no plan on the president's desk and you're not prepared to go beyond that, you can't get very deeply into conversation with people who would just assume frankly not accept the premise in the first place. I mean, you know, the Turks and others I'm sure are not standing in line to talk about the day after.

SEN. BIDEN: Yeah.

MR. PARRIS: And they'll only -- you'll only get their attention when you're prepared to describe in some detail what you're going to do in what timeframe and what your vision of the day after is.

SEN. BIDEN: I kidded the president when he asked what I would do. I said, "Mr. President, part of this is the vision thing, and I'm not sure what the vision should be." Gentlemen, with your permission, I have rather than take more of your time. It's almost 7:00. You've been so patient and helpful. I have about two or three questions that I'd like to submit to each of you in writing. There's no urgency in terms of time getting them back. And I'd ask you publicly to embarrass you into having to say yes, would you be willing to come back if we continue this process.

MR. PARRIS: Yes.

MR. AJAMI: It would be a great honor.

SEN. BIDEN: I thank you all very, very much and we are adjourned.

(Adjourn)

END

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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony

July 31, 2002 Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 1534 words

COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEADLINE: MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ

TESTIMONY-BY: RICHARD BUTLER, FORMER EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN

AFFILIATION: UNSCOM

BODY:

Statement of Ambassador Richard Butler Former Executive Chairman of UNSCOM Diplomat in Residence, Council on Foreign Relations

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Iraq's and Weapons of Mass Destruction

July 31, 2002

Iraq's stated position is that it has no weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As recently as last week, two senior Iraqi officials - the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister - reiterated this claim.

It is more than interesting that in his public statements, Saddam Hussein never claims to be disarmed. On the contrary, he threatens a degree of destruction of his enemies which implies his possession of mighty weapons.

It is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam's representatives, that Iraq has no WMD, is false. Everyone concerned, from Iraq's neighbors to the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General of the UN, with whom Iraq is currently negotiating on the issue, is being lied to.

It is now over ten years since Iraq was instructed by the UN Security Council to cooperate with action to "destroy, remove, or render harmless" its weapons of mass destruction. Those weapons were specified by the council as: all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; the means to make them; and missiles with a range exceeding a hundred and sixty kilometers.

The Security Council's instruction to Iraq was binding under international law. All other states were, equally, bound by that law to deny Iraq any assistance or cooperation in the field of WMD.

From the beginning, Iraq refused to obey the law. Instead, it actively sought to defeat its application in order to preserve its WMD capability.

The work of UNSCOM, the body created by the Security Council to implement its decisions on Iraq's WMD, had varying degrees of success. But, above all, it was not permitted to finish the job. Almost four years ago the Iraqi's terminated its work. Iraq has been free of inspection or monitoring since then.

This briefest of recollections of relevant background history reveals two salient facts: Iraq remains in breach of the law; it has been determined to maintain a WMD capability.

We need to know as far as is possible, Iraq's current WMD status.

Nuclear Weapons

Saddam has sought nuclear weapons for some two decades. Ten years ago he intensified his efforts, instituting a "crash program." The Gulf War put an end to this. Subsequent inspection and analysis by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UNSCOM, showed that in spite of relatively deficient indigenous sources of the fissionable material needed to make a nuclear weapon, Saddam's program was as close as six months from yielding a bomb.

Of the three components necessary for the fabrication of a nuclear explosive device: materials, equipment, knowledge; Iraq has the latter two. On the relevant equipment/components, Iraq refused to yield them to the inspectors.

The key question now is has Iraq acquired the essential fissionable material either by enriching indigenous sources or by obtaining it from external sources?

I don't know the answer. It is possible that intelligence authorities, in the west and/or Russia do. But, there is evidence that Saddam has reinvigorated his nuclear weapons program in the inspection-free years.

Over two years ago, the IAEA estimate was that if he started work again, Saddam could build a nuclear weapon in about two years.

Chemical Weapons (CW)

Saddam's involvement with chemical weapons also spans some twenty years. He used them in the Iran-Iraq war in the mid-eighties and on Iraqi's who challenged his rule, in 1988.

UNSCOM identified an array of CW agents manufactured by Iraq. This included the most toxic of them - VX. Iraq's CW program was extensive. UNSCOM was able to destroy or otherwise account for a substantial portion of Iraq's CW holdings and manufacturing capability. But, not all of it.

It was particularly significant that following UNSCOM's discovery of Iraq's VX program and the fact that Iraq had loaded it and other CW and BW agents into missile warheads, Iraq strengthened its determination to remove UNSCOM from Iraq.

Biological Weapons BW)

Iraq also maintained an extensive BW program with an array of BW agents. Its attempts to conceal this program were the most elaborate, implying that BW were particularly important to Saddam.

Iraq weaponized BW. For example, it loaded anthrax into missile warheads and continually researched new means of delivery: spraying devices; pilotless aircraft.

Unscom's absolute refusal to accept the transparently false Iraqi claims about its "primitive, failed and unimportant" BW program and its examination of the possibility that Iraq had tested BW on humans also contributed to Iraq's resolve, in 1998, to terminate Unscom's work.

Missiles

Iraq's main proscribed ballistic missile was the SCUDs it had imported from the USSR. It also sought to clone those indigenously and continually sought to develop other medium and long range missiles.

Unscom's accounting of Iraq's SCUDS was reasonably complete: a good portion of them had been fired or destroyed during the Gulf War. But the disposition of a number of them, possibly as many as 20, was never unambiguously established.

In addition, Iraq was working, while UNSCOM was still in Iraq, on the further development of a missile capability which would breach the 160 kilometer range limit. I asked them to stop that work. They refused.

There was another issue in the missile field which also contributed to Iraq shutting down UNSCOM in 1998. I asked Iraq to yield some 500 tonnes of fuel which would only drive Scud engines. It refused.

It is very important to make the following points:

- We do not know and never have known fully the quantity and quality of Iraq's WMD. Its policies of concealment ensured this.

- We do know that it has had such weapons, has used them, remains at work on them.

What it has been able to further achieve in the four years without inspection is not clear, is precise terms. That is the inner logic of inspections- you cannot see what you are not permitted to look at.

- Saddam Hussein knows what he is working on and the assets he holds in the WMD field. His refusal to allow inspections to resume has nothing to do with notions of Iraqi sovereignty. It is designed to prevent the discovery of and to protect, his WMD program.

- Intelligence agencies might know more than they are able to say in public. Certainly what has been published of defector and intelligence reports confirms that, during the past four years, Iraq has been hard at work, across the board, to increase its WMD capability.

- There are a number of deeply disturbing possibilities within Saddam's WMD program which need urgent attention, but especially these: has he acquired a nuclear weapons capability by purchasing it from former Soviet stock; is he working, in the BW field, on smallpox, plague, ebola?

Why is Saddam so deeply attached to these diabolical weapons and defended this attachment at massive cost to Iraq and its people?

In many respects he has told us himself, in his various public outbursts. They make him strong against enemies within and without Iraq. They support his posturing to lead the Arab world against its enemies.

Even more disturbing than Saddam's goals and view of the world, is his apparently cataclysmic mentality. He surely must know that, especially following September 11, any use by him and indeed any threat of use of WMD against the United States, or possibly its allies, would bring a terrible response.

It would be intelligent for him to now recognize that his WMD capability is an insupportable liability for him and his regime. Yet, he shows no sign of doing so. This is perhaps the ultimate pathology of the man.

Will he make his WMD available to terrorist groups?

I don't know. We do know that Iraq has trained terrorists from around the region and has mounted terrorist actions of its own, as far afield as in South East Asia. But I have seen no evidence of Iraq providing WMD to non-Iraqi terrorist groups.

I suspect that, especially given his psychology and aspirations, Saddam would be reluctant to share what he believes to be an indelible source of his power.

On the elemental question of whether, contrary to assertions authorized by him, Saddam possesses WMD, I would refer to the traditional test of whether or not a person can be judged to have committed a crime: did the accused have the motive, means, and opportunity? Saddam plainly has had and continues to have, all three.

What should be concluded from these facts?

The resumption of arms control in Iraq is urgently required. But, it would have to be serious. If Iraq again refused to cooperate, then to pursue compromised inspections would be dangerous.

If it is decided to take military action against Saddam it will be crucial for it to be for the right reasons. There are, in fact, three: Saddam's flagrant violation of human rights; his continuing refusal to comply with international law as expressed in binding decisions of the Security Council; and, his violation of arms control obligations and treaties.

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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony

July 31, 2002 Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 769 words

COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEADLINE: MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ

TESTIMONY-BY: CHUCK HAGEL, SENATOR

BODY:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Committee on Senate Foreign Relations

HEARING ON IRAQ

July 31, 2002

"I would like to congratulate the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding these timely hearings on Iraq. I agree with my colleagues that we need a national dialogue on what steps we should take to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Americans need to be informed about the complexities and consequences of our policies in Iraq.

I look forward to listening to and learning from the distinguished witnesses before us today about the nature and urgency of the threat we face from Iraq, including their evaluations of what the best policy options may be for meeting this threat; the prospects for a democratic transition after Saddam Hussein; and what the implications of our policies in Iraq may be for the stability of the Middle East and our security interests there.

Much of the debate by those advocating regime change through military means have so far focused on the easy questions. Is Saddam Hussein a ruthless tyrant who brutally oppresses his own people, and who possesses weapons of mass destruction that have the potential to threaten us, his neighbors and our allies, including and especially Israel? Yes. Do most Iraqis yearn for democratic change in Iraq? Yes, they do. Can Saddam be rehabilitated? No, he cannot.

In my opinion, complicated and relevant questions remain to be answered before making a case for war, and here is where these hearings will play an important role. What is the nature, and urgency, of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and Iraq's neighbors? What do we know about Iraq's programs of weapons of mass destruction? There have been no weapons inspectors in Iraq since December 1998. Is Iraq involved in terrorist planning and activities against the United States and US allies in the Middle East and elsewhere?

What can we expect after Saddam Hussein in Iraq? '%chat do we kno=w about the capabilities of the opposition to Saddam inside Iraq? Whlie we sutiport a united and democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein, the arbiters of power in a post-Saddam lraq will likely be those who reside inside, not outside, the country. And these individuals and groups we do not know. Who are they? And where are they? These are the Iraqis we need to understand, engage, and eventually do business with.

What will be the future of Iraqi Kurdistan in a post-Saddam Iraq?

How do we accomplish regime change in Iraq given the complexities and challenges of the current regional environment? The deep Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues; our relations with Syria are proper though strained; we have no relationship with Iran; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan have warned us about dangerous unintended consequences if we take unilateral military action against Iraq; and Afghanistan remains a piece of very difficult unfinished business, an unpredictable but critical investment for the United States and our allies.

I can think of no-historical case where the United States succeeded in an enterprise of such gravity and complexity as regime change in Iraq without the support of a regional and international coalition. We have a lot of work to do on the diplomatic track. Not just for military operations against Iraq, should that day come, but for the day after, when the interests and intrigues of outside powers could undermine the fragility of an Iraqi government in transition, whoever governs in Iraq after Saddam Hussein.

An American military operation in Iraq could require a commitment in Iraq that could last for years and extend well beyond the day of Saddam's departure. The American people need to understand the political, economic, and military magnitude and risks that would be inevitable if we invaded Iraq.

There was no such national dialogue or undertaking before we went into Vietnam. There were many very smart, well intentioned professionals, intellectuals, and strategists who assured us of a US victory in Vietnam at an acceptable cost. Well, eleven years, 58,000 dead, and the most humiliating defeat in our nation's history later we abandoned South Vietnam to the Communists.

Let me conclude by saying that I support regime change and a democratic transition in Iraq. That's easy. The Iraqi people have suffered too long, and our security and interests will never be assured with Saddam Hussein in power. The tough questions are when, how, with whom, and at what cost. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses over the next two days on these critical questions."

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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony

July 31, 2002 Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 908 words

COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEADLINE: MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ

TESTIMONY-BY: RUSS FEINGOLD, SENATOR

BODY:

Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold

Committee on Senate Foreign Relations

Hearing on Iraq

July 31, 2002

I want to start by thanking Senator Biden for holding these important hearings. They come at an important time in our struggle to respond to worldwide terrorist threats, and they offer a critically important opportunity for the Congress to begin to gather information and come to some informed conclusions about what we will and will not authorize with regard to U.S. intervention in Iraq.

I also want to offer my gratitude to all of the witnesses who will help us think through the difficult issues and options that confront us today. A number of my constituents have contacted me prior to today's hearing, and they have delivered one very clear message - they want to be certain that this committee carefully considers a range of views and informed perspectives on Iraq, and they want to be certain that we do not accept as fact any one set of subjective assumptions about Iraq. They are right to insist on a sober and honest effort. Given that much of the rhetoric surrounding US policy toward Iraq in recent months has suggested that American families should be prepared to send their sons and daughters to war, we owe the American people nothing less that a thorough examination of the situation before us.

As we begin these hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, I would note that I chaired a related hearing in April of the Constitution Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. Much of that earlier hearing focused, in detailed legal terms, on the authority of the President to launch a military operation against Iraq. The Judiciary Committee hearings in April followed an important precedent that was first established in January 1991, as the former President Bush was threatening to launch a similar military operation against Iraq, again without seeking congressional authorization. At that time, Senator Biden chaired a hearing before the Judiciary Committee in which prominent scholars questioned the authority of the President to authorize the use of force in Iraq without congressional approval. Based in part on the 1991 Judiciary hearings, former President Bush ultimately sought and received congressional authorization for operation Dessert Storm. That was an important victory for the Constitution and for our constitutional structure.

It was based on that 1991 precedent, then, that I organized a similar hearing on war powers and the case of Iraq in the Judiciary Committee in April. At that hearing, after listening to many constitutional experts, I concluded that the Constitution requires the President to seek additional authorization before he can embark on a major new military undertaking in Iraq. I also concluded that this may well be one of our last opportunities to preserve the constitutionally mandated role of Congress in making decisions about war and peace.

The April hearing focused on important constitutional questions. These two additional days of hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee will provide us with an equally important opportunity to consider the complicated policy issues that are at stake in any decision on Iraq. Through these hearings, it will be important to assess the level of the threat that exists, along with the relative costs and dangers that would be posed by a massive assault on Iraq. We must give careful attention to the risks to American soldiers, and to our relations with some of our strongest allies in our current anti-terror campaign.

Regardless of which policy path we choose, our goal is presumably to make America more secure in the long-term. That means that it will be crucially important to think through the aftermath of any proposed military strike. That means thinking about whether or not there will be a context of order in which controls can be imposed and maintained on weapons of mass destruction and the means to fashion them, and that means thinking about the conditions and the will of the long-suffering Iraqi people. We have to be honest with ourselves and with the American people - these are big issues, and addressing them may require very serious commitments.

I don't think we need access to classified information to begin today to weigh the risks and opportunities that confront us. But I also look forward, in both secure and open settings, to hearing the administration make its case for a given policy response. Certainly the perspective of the Administration is one that we must hear before coming to any ultimate conclusions. Today, however, I think we have an opportunity to explore the general nature of the threats, dangers and policy options that exist. As a starting point, these considerations are crucial.

Following these hearings, and subsequent consultations with the Administration, Congress may ultimately conclude that America's interests require a direct military response to threats emanating from Iraq. If we do come to that grave conclusion, I would urge my colleagues to honor the Constitution by providing congressional approval for military action. And I would counsel the President that by following in his father's footsteps and seeking congressional authorization, the President would ensure that any military response against Iraq would be taken from a constitutionally unified, and inherently stronger, position.

I look forward to these initial discussions.

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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony

July 31, 2002 Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 2742 words

COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

HEADLINE: MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ

TESTIMONY-BY: CHARLES DUELFER, RESIDENT VISITING SCHOLAR

AFFILIATION: CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

BODY:

Statement of Charles Duelfer Resident Visiting Scholar Center for Strategic and International Studies Former Deputy Executive Chairman United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM)

Committee on Senate Foreign Relations

July 31, 2002

Thank you for the opportunity to testify at such a critical moment with respect to relations and actions toward Iraq. My remarks will reflect my years investigating Iraq's weapons programs as the Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. This gave me the opportunity to know Iraqi institutions and individual Iraqis high and low. I dealt with diplomats, technocrats, military, intelligence and regime officials as well as many Iraqis who have departed Iraq. While I was a UN official, my Iraqi interlocutors were always aware that I was an American familiar with Washington and its policies on Iraq.

As other witnesses have made clear, a key feature of the present regime is its dedication to all types of weapons of mass destruction. I can only underline the view that, all other things being equal, the current leadership in Baghdad will eventually achieve a nuclear weapon in addition to their current inventories of other weapons of mass destruction. For more than a decade the regime allocated billions of dollars and the efforts of thousands of individuals toward this end. That they were near success in 1991 is a tribute to the vast talent of the Iraqi people, the great resources of the country, and their misdirection by reckless, oppressive leadership. To me this highlights the enormous difference between what Iraq could be under different leadership and what it will be if the present regime continues.

Looking forward, the risk posed by the present regime will entail leverage of growing oil production (perhaps to 4-5 million barrels a day in a few years), the diminished effectiveness of sanctions as a restraining force, and the ultimate risk of a belligerent state in the region with nuclear weapons. The leadership in Baghdad knows that it was a serious blunder to invade Kuwait before they had a nuclear weapon. Regional states know this as well and recognize they will have to accommodate Saddam once a nuclear weapon is achieved. Even now they are very cautious not to antagonize the regime. So far, Saddam has proven to be a survivor and quite willing to exercise whatever leverage available to him.

In opposition to the accumulating dangers of the present regime, it is worth considering the opportunity cost to the world, and especially to the Iraqi people of the persistence of this regime.

In my experience, most Iraqis would like nothing more than to be reconnected to the rest of the world and indeed, the United States. Through the accident of birth, individuals with talent in the sciences, engineering and even military serve in a country under a miserable leadership. Exercising the option of not serving at the direction of the regime is to put themselves and families at great risk.

During my years at UNSCOM, working toward the elimination of Iraqi WMD capabilities, I often commented to colleagues in Washington that if I had 100 green cards to pass out, we could have the Iraqi program dissected and eliminated. This was meant to illustrate that the programs depend critically on a relatively limited number of people-people, who, given a choice, would rather be someplace else. Of course no one provided them such a choice. Nevertheless many Iraqis leave if they can. The constant drain of Iraqis illustrates the hopelessness in Iraq. A country with all the ingredients to be a growing regional economic power is, instead, a waste of great talent and squandered resources.

The long-term threat posed by this regime cannot, in my opinion, be addressed with weapons inspections. The experience of UNSCOM from 1991 to 1998 bears this out. While UNSCOM accomplished significant disarmament, it was not complete and it certainly wasn't permanent. At best the inspections provided a temporary improvement to regional stability. However, the goal in UN resolutions is not temporary WMD disarmament but permanent coercive disarmament. This means the inspectors were ultimately supposed to monitor extensively and intrusively forever. Iraq was supposed to comply fully and verifiably. If they did so, sanctions were to be lifted.

Iraq offered tactical cooperation and worked to divide the Security Council and erode sanctions. The international community could not sustain its commitment to its own resolutions- especially when confronted with the impact on Iraqi civilians that were ultimately held hostage by the leadership in Baghdad. From the regime's perspective, inspections were a temporary setback. They were correct. It is highly probable that if Baghdad becomes convinced that significant action to depose the regime is likely, they will offer the concession of accepting inspectors once again with the aim of buying time and dividing the international community.

A critical point we learned in the mid-nineties was just how important weapons of mass destruction were held by the regime. Senior Iraqi officials stated convincingly that the use of chemical weapons saved them in the war against Iran. It was their counter to Iranian human wave attacks. The use of long range missiles was also seen as vital to attack cities deep in Iran behind the forward battle lines.

Moreover, the regime believes that the possession of chemical and biological weapons contributed strongly to deterring the United States from going to Baghdad in 1991. They first described their pre-war actions to disperse weapons and pre-delegate authority to use them if the United States went to Baghdad in a long meeting with Iraqi in September 1995. This discussion took place only after a surprising event during the history of UNSCOM's work in Iraq.

Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan in August 1995. He had been the lead member in the ruling family directing much of the WMD effort. Following his defection, UNSCOM learned the WMD program was more extensive than had been declared and efforts were still underway--even as UNSCOM was operating its monitoring system. Moreover, we learned that a system for the concealment of these activities was run out of the Presidency. UNSCOM came close to having an inspection and monitoring system in Iraq where we would report Iraqi cooperation, but they would not be complying.

Prior to the defection, many members of the Security Council had been pressing UNSCOM to report favorably on its disarmament and monitoring work. They had tired of the long dispute that consumed long debates in the Security Council. Moreover, Iraq had been threatening to end its work with the UN unless UNSCOM reported favorably and the Security Council acted to end sanctions. Saddam Hussein himself declared such a threat in his National Day speech of July 17, 1995. The Iraqi Foreign Minister, in Cairo a few days later, set a deadline of August 31, 1995.

Finding Iraq intractable, many began, implicitly, to question UNSCOM. Maybe UNSCOM was simply too fastidious or worse, too much under the influence of the United States. Maybe Iraq would never be able to satisfy the technocrats in UNSCOM and then the Security Council would be stuck. These arguments and this predicament are not new.

The last time the international community attempted this sort of political solution to a military threat was following World War I when Germany was subject to strict disarmament limits set in the Versailles Treaty. An international body analogous to UNSCOM was created (called the Inter-Allied Control Commission) with virtually identical tasks as given UNSCOM and similar limitations. The dynamic was the same. An international body was directed by a victorious coalition to verify the coercive disarmament of a country that had not been occupied.

These earlier inspectors encountered all the same problems and deceptions as UNSCOM. I have looked up their reports in the British archives. Change some of the nouns and you would think you were reading UNSCOM reports. They were harassed, given wrong and misleading declarations, blocked from sites, accused of being spies, and pressured to give false positive reports, etc. Germany (particularly the Reichswehr under the direct guidance of General Hans Von Seeckt) worked to sustain capabilities and development work with the same strategies and techniques that UNSCOM found in Iraq. Development work was concealed in a variety of ways, including in civilian areas (e.g. hidden Krupp arms development, secret naval design efforts, like the pocket battleship, and civil aviation masking military training). Programs were located overseas (e.g. expertise in submarine work was offered overseas, tank and aircraft training took place in Russia as well as the sale of a chemical weapons production plant). Only when France reoccupied the Ruhr did Germany become, albeit temporarily, forthcoming with proper weapons declarations.

At the same time, Germany under Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann worked diplomatically to escape the constraints. The Allied coalition of 1918 eventually melted down in its purpose. Ultimately after six years of inspections, the Inter-Allied Control Commission was removed from Germany-it's work incomplete, but political momentum swept over its reports. The international community in 1926-27 halted the inspections with the artifice that Germany would join the League of Nations and be subject to the global disarmament actions under that body.

Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz was well aware of this disconnect between the inspectors categorical goals and the murky commitment of force behind them. He said on more than one occasion that we were not General MacArthur. We did not occupy Iraq. Therefore there were limits to what we could do.

Tariq Aziz was absolutely correct, although we did our best to escape this reality. UNSCOM tried very intrusive and imaginative methods to penetrate the security of Iraqi weapons programs (including techniques not usually associated with an international body accustomed to the virtues of transparency and diversity of membership). However, against the full resources of a nation-state, with thousands of people and many intelligence and security organs, it was a hopeless endeavor. To illustrate, consider that while UNSCOM had hundreds of so-called "no-notice" inspections (where no information was intentionally provided to Iraq in advance), there were very few occasions when Iraqis were actually surprised when inspectors arrived at the intended site.

However, even if one could imagine the most extensive and intrusive system of inspections, accompanied by significant military forces, could the international community sustain this forever? It has been suggestell that in the face of imminent invasion, the Saddam may finally five up WMD. But how long can the United States and the international community sustain the threat of imminent invasion? Will the sanctions also be sustained and at what price to the Iraqi people? Is the problem really the weapons or the leadership? Not being clear on this matter has left the weapons inspectors in the miserable position of being tasked with a goal that cannot be achieved while greater powers avoid facing the tough issues embodied by the Baghdad leadership. The Security Council's inability to force permanent compliance by Iraq with the very intrusive and stringent disarmament and monitoring measures leads to the case for regime removal.

A rationale can be made that the unique risks presented by this regime constitute a rare occasion when the international community is justified in intervening in internal matters of another state. This is a circumstance where sovereignty does not reign supreme. The regime is a growing threat and has taken its own population hostage. Simply to say the Iraqi people should change their own leadership is disingenuous. Many have tried and died. The regime's track record of using WMD, its ongoing defiance of cease-fire resolutions and WMD development provide grounds for a case justifying outside intervention. Such intervention would aim to create conditions whereby the Iraqi people can change their own government.

However, any proposed strategy to change the leadership in Baghdad must recognize two basic points. First, such an action is fundamentally a political action, not a military action. The second point follows from the first. The most important people in this endeavor are Iraqis in Iraq. They are the people who will make vital decisions about whether to assist in defending the regime or not. They, and the institutions they are part of, will make the decisions about how quickly the Saddam regime ends and at what cost. They are the people who will constitute the government that follows. In most ways the people of Iraq are the greatest threat to Saddam.

With this in mind, it is essential to present a clear coherent message about what the United States and the international community expect to see in any new government in Baghdad. It must be clear that new management in Baghdad will significantly improve the lot of the Iraqi people. The case must be made that forcing Saddam from power is not anti-Arab, but actually one of the most positive steps imaginable for the Arab world.

Decisions about such matters as sanctions, security relationships, and debt relief should be linked to on how the new government progresses toward agreed objectives such as pluralism, democratic elections, getting rid of WMD, cleaning up the financial system, etc. Indeed, for most institutions in Iraq, new management should be an enormous advantage.

Given a choice, Iraqis would not opt to live under the government of the Saddam regime. They will never achieve their vast potential under the current regime and implicitly senior Iraqis recognize this. They will only begin to reach their potential if they rejoin the world as part of a country with leadership that follows internationally accepted norms.

These messages of what is expected of a new government in Baghdad must be accompanied by a firm commitment by the United States and the international community to stay the course. Hence, agreement on objectives must be reached with due consideration of the views of Iraqis in and out of Iraq, regional states, colleagues in the Security Council, and our European partners. These are achievable political goals if the United States provides strong consistent leadership. For the United States to exercise such leadership, it should be founded on support within the United States itself.

Finally, the United States can and must be willing to act alone if it judges its vital interests are directly affected. However, it would be far better, and ultimately less costly, if international consensus can be achieved. It is easy to view the United States going to the United Nations Security Council akin to Gulliver going to Lilliput. Yet ultimately the Lilliputians may be willing and helpful participants. Indeed, consensus is not out of the question.

UN Secretary General Koft Annan addressed circumstances when sovereignty does not reign supreme in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 20, 1999. He was reflecting recent experiences in Rwanda and Kosovo, but took recognition of the fact that the world had changed and continued to change. His speech touched upon a very sensitive issue for an assembly of sovereign states. If nothing else, he highlighted the possibility that under certain circumstances external intervention may be justified.

Such a case could be made with respect to Iraq under the current regime. It is a growing risk to all concerned, not least of which are the Iraqi people themselves.

One certainty is that the situation is not static. Iraq is going to evolve one way or the other. Limited actions by the international community will have limited effects. The threat will continue to grow and in the meantime the opportunity for a positive Iraq continue to slide into the future. This is clearly an issue where the United States must lead one way or another. Mr. Chairman, you and your committee are raising an important subject that needs to be examined from many aspects. I hope my comments have helped illuminate some facets of this difficult issue.

I attach copies of two recent and relevant op-ed articles for the record.

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