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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted. THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Al-Anbari (Iraq) and Mr. Abulhasan (Kuwait) took Places at the Council table.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the following documents: S/22559, which contains a report of the Secretary-General of 2 May 1991 pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991); S/22661, which contains a letter dated 30 May 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/22792, which contains a report of the Secretary-General of 15 July 1991 pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991); S/22799, which contains a letter dated 15 July 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the (The President) Security Council transmitting a report by the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Iraq; S/22761, which contains a letter dated 4 July 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/22871, which contains a report of the Secretary-General of 1 August 1991 transmitting a plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991); S/22872, which contains a note by the Secretary-General of 1 August 1991 transmitting a plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Members of the Council also have before them three draft resolutions contained in the following documents:

S/22940, containing the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of consultations;

S/22941, containing the text of a draft resolution submitted by Belgium, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. On page 3 of the English version of this document, four lines from the bottom of paragraph 1 (c), a small correction has to be made. The line starts with the words: (spoke in English)

"regions of Iraq and to all categories of the Iraqi civilian population

(spoke in Spanish)

A comma should appear after the word "population". The Secretary will the appropriate correction in future editions of this text.

page 22 EMS/8

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Kuwait for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Iraq, on whom I now call.

Mr. AL-ANBARI (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I wish at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. Your qualities are well known, and we are confident that your guidance of the Council's work will be a model of judiciousness, fairness and outstanding diplomacy.

I take this opportunity also to express our appreciation and thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Alarcon de Quesada of Cuba, who presided over the Council last month.

As usual, the representative of the Kuwaiti régime, who spoke before me, employed false and obscene words, but I shall not respond to him, first, because I refuse to stoop to his level and secondly because most of what he said in his boring statement had nothing to do with the item on the Council's agenda.

There are three draft resolutions before the Council today. I want to state the position of my Government on each of those draft resolutions, but to save time for the Council I shall be brief in stating my Government's position on two of those texts, draft resolutions S/22940 and S/22942. But I request that the complete reply of my Government be published in official documents of the Security Council.

My Government's position on draft resolution S/22940 is as follows: Iraq's foreign-currency revenue is almost totally dependent on its oil exports. On the basis of the production capacity of Iraqi oil fields, those exports over the next five years will not reach the level defined in July 1990 by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). That is because of the destruction inflicted by aerial bombardment on our oil production and exporting facilities. It is thus anticipated that for the period 1991-1995 Iraq's oil revenues will be \$64.2 billion. That projection is on the basis of 600,000 barrels exported in the remainder of 1991, owing to the grave damage inflicted on our oil facilities, and 2 million barrels a day in 1992. An optimistic estimate has it that this could rise to 2.85 million barrels a day in 1993 and 2.9 million in 1994. Those figures presuppose full lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iraq's oil exports and on its import of equipment and other necessities for the refinement, export and shipment of oil.

It is well known that our non-oil exports are extremely limited; in the five-year period 1991-1995 these are not expected to exceed \$930.5 million.

A careful examination of the gap between those revenues and our foreign-currency requirements reveals a projected deficit over those five years of \$149.2 billion, averaging \$29.28 billion a year for that period - although the 1991 deficit is expected to reach \$47.8 billion. The reason for the higher 1991 deficit compared with the average annual rate is the enormous cost of servicing the debts incurred this year and last: the installments include all payments due in 1991 and previous years, and no agreement has been reached on deferring these payments. The meagreness of the income Iraq estimates for the next five years will compel it to fall short of its financial obligations and its requirements for food and medicine - and that does not even take into account the deduction of 30 per cent of those revenues.

RG/9

That is on the basis of these above-mentioned estimates, which clearly reflect the tremendous deficit and wide gap between Iraq's financial obligations relating to its foreign debt and its basic imports, on the one hand, and its limited revenues from its exports expected in 1991, and especially during subsequent years, and on the basis of Under-Secretary-General Ahtisaari's findings in Iraq, who stated in his report that the conflict had brought near-apocalyptic consequences on the basic economic infrastructure. The report goes on to say that most means of modern life have been destroyed or have become very weak and that Iraq has been returned to the pre-industrial age and will remain so for a period of time.

Hence, Iraq, with its current and expected financial resources during 1991 and subsequently, cannot on its own restore the social and economic life that prevailed before the events of January 1991. Intensive world efforts must be bent to compensate Iraq for the unjust damages inflicted by the aerial bombing of its civilian facilities and economic structure in order to help Iraq to accelerate the restoration of normal life.

My Government has therefore requested that it be given a grace period of five years. Such a period can be arrived at as necessary, on the basis of the statements in the Secretary-General's report which depended on the economic indicators expected for 1993, although the damages that will increase between now and 1993 because of the continued economic embargo will make such estimates much worse than what we have stated.

The premises of the Secretary-General's report before the Council make it necessary to defer the deductions until 1993 at the least, since Iraq's oil revenues during the balance of 1991 and in 1992 will be approximately \$13 billion only. This means that the total Iraqi oil revenues during these two years are much less than what is required to fulfil the basic requirements estimated at \$16 billion for the same two years, although there has been no opportunity until now for Iraq to export oil or oil products. Also, the extensive economic embargo is still being applied and Iraq's assets abroad are still frozen, despite the decision of the Sanctions Committee and the letter of the Chairman of that Committee which theoretically lifted the freezing of these assets but left the States where the Iraqi assets are to be found free to freeze these assets.

In the light of the above-mentioned facts, which any objective observer can ascertain, Iraq requests a grace period in order to allow it to face the major problems stifling its economy which are threatening to weaken the Iraqi people and its future generations. Iraq also requested a decrease in the ceiling of the deduction so as not to exceed 10 per cent of its total oil revenues.

I thank you, Mr. President, for your kind attention to the statement giving my Government's position regarding the first draft resolution on the compensation fund.

Allow me now to indicate in detail my Government's position on the second draft resolution, contained in document S/22941. Although this draft resolution alleges that it is designed to meet the humanitarian requirements of the Iraqi people, it is actually one of the most serious draft resolutions put before the Council since the outbreak of the so-called Gulf crisis. Therefore, allow me first to review the developments pertaining to meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, after which I shall explain my Government's position regarding the grave political repercussions aimed at by this draft resolution. And then I shall make Iraq's technical comments on the various items in the draft resolution.

With regard to the humanitarian requirements of the Iraqi people, members will recall that the mission dispatched to Iraq by the Secretary-General during the period 10 to 17 March 1991, headed by Under-Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari, which included representatives of the appropriate United Nations agencies and programmes, in its report of 20 March 1991, contained in document S/22366, affirmed the following:

"there needs to be a major mobilization of resources to deal with aspects of this deep crisis in the fields of agriculture and food, water, sanitation and health." (para, 37)

The report concluded:

"It is unmistakable that the Iraqi people may soon face a further imminent catastrophe, which could include epidemic and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met. The long summer, with its often 45 or even 50 degree temperatures (113-122 degrees Fahrenheit), is only weeks away. Time is short." (IhO.)

In spite of all those warnings, no humanitarian action has so far been taken. It is true that the Council adopted resolution 687 (1991) on 3 April 1991, taking into consideration the recommendations of the United Nations mission when, in paragraph 20 of the resolution, it exempted foodstuffs from the sanctions and Provided for streamlining and accelerating the Committee's approval of the exception of basic civilian foodstuffs indicated in the United Nations mission's report.

Paragraph 23 of that resolution provides that the Sanctions Committee may approve exceptions from the ban on importing materials and products from Iraq in order to provide Iraq with sufficient financial resources to import those materials the importation of which into Iraq is approved by the Committee.

Yet it has been impossible for Iraq, as it has been for the Sanctions Committee, to exercise the powers provided for in paragraphs 20 and 23 of the resolution because of the arbitrary position insisted upon by a small minority of the members of the Sanctions Committee.

Paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991) also provided that the Council review the provisions of paragraph 20 of the resolution every 60 days for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 21. In spite of the passage of more than 130 days since the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), the Council has not met to reconsider the prohibition measures and to provide the opportunity to the Council members and to Iraq to indicate the extent of its implementation of the Council's resolutions. Rather, the Council confined itself to informal consultations, after which the President issued a presidential statement indicating that the members had failed to agree on any resolution.

Here, I indicate once more that the failure of the Council to meet with the aim of reviewing the sanctions and adopting the necessary resolution is also due to the position of a small minority of its members. This minority is bent on not allowing Iraq to enjoy the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 20 and 23. This minority is also bent on not allowing other member States of the Council that support the lifting of the sanctions to express their views officially and to record their positions publicly.

Paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) actually provides for the total lifting of the sanctions once the Council takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the compensation fund - which has actually taken plac and once the Council acknowledges that Iraq has completed all the actions required of it in paragraphs 8 through 13 of the same resolution. That has actually happened, and this fact was communicated t6 the Council by Iraq.

Yet, the same small minority in the Council prevented the Council from deciding that the second condition - which is necessary for the lifting of all sanctions imposed on Iraq under resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 - had been met in the face of this situation, in a letter dated 7 June 1991, the Iraqi Mission submitted an application to the Sanctions Committee requesting a lifting of the freeze on the Iraqi funds deposited in British,

American and other foreign banks - which, as of 31 March 1991, totalled \$3,735 million - with a view to purchasing foodstuffs, medicines and basic civilian materials.

However, while the Committee acknowledged the admissibility of unfreezing those deposits, it affirmed that the States in which those Iraqi funds are deposited are not obligated to unfreeze these funds. This has led actually to continued freezing and to depriving Iraq from using its funds with a view to averting the dangers highlighted by the United Nations mission's report.

The States that have kept the Iraqi assets frozen are doing so for political considerations of their own that are irrelevant to Security Council resolutions.

In addition, on 14 March 1991, Iraq requested the Sanctions Committee to allow it to export such quantities of oil as to provide \$1.2 billion on the basis of paragraph 23 of the resolution. However, the Committee did not take any action on the question. Then, on 9 July 1991, Iraq repeated its request to allow it to export oil to the tune of \$1.5 billion for the same purpose. But once again the Committee failed to achieve consensus and the request was shelved.

Iraq once more requested the Committee to approve the export of quantities of oil, with a view to purchasing foodstuffs contracted for with foreign companies, while indicating the quantities and prices of such foodstuffs. Once again, however, the Committee failed to achieve consensus on the request and it was shelved.

The freezing referred to in paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) - each of which provides for exceptions to the sanctions, or for their total lifting - was due to the positions of a small minority which, in fact, does not exceed one State plus three. This minority is also credited with paralysing the work of the Sanctions Committee.

Moreover, that minority takes credit for preventing the Committee from adopting the necessary resolutions to implement the recommendations included in the report of the inter-agency mission, headed by the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, which are included in document S/22799 of 17 July 1991 which it drew up following its visit to Iraq during the period from 29 June until 13 July last.

The report is the most recent of the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme and contains the most accurate information and statistics in its 59 pages. Allow me to quote a number of paragraphs from the aforementioned document:

"We saw with our own eyes the scenes already reported at length ... the children afflicted by malnutrition. Our report is inevitably but a photograph in time, fast obsolete, yet the urgency of relief from suffering remains. Further, the hard statistics speak for themselves. Conditions are already grave in all of the essential sectors assessed and can only worsen in the weeks ahead. We must achieve a breakthrough to avert the looming crisis" (S/22799, Para. 131). (spoke in Arabic) The report of the mission goes on to say: (spoke in English)

"This mission has addressed the current humanitarian needs in Iraq and has concluded that their magnitude requires funding that exceeds international aid and short-term palliatives and can be met only from the country's own resources.... On the basis, however, of our deliberations and meetings with the authorities in Iraq, it would appear feasible to institute arrangements whereby Iraq's requests for imports to meet the needs outlined in this report would be submitted to the United Nations and subjected to appropriate monitoring. The precise mechanisms need not be specified here. The formula agreed upon would provide for clear records of all transactions to be furnished to the Organization." (Ibid., Para, 137) (spoke in Arabic) Finally, I have to remind the Council of the contents of paragraph 138

of the report, because the draft resolution before the Council proceeds in the opposite direction from the one advocated in the report.

"It remains a cardinal humanitarian principle that innocent civilians - and above all the most vulnerable - should not be held hostage to events beyond their control. Those already afflicted by war's devastation cannot continue to pay the price of a bitter peace. It is a peace that will also prove to be tenuous if unmet needs breed growing desperation. If new displacements of Iraq's population result from hunger and disease, if relief is again sought across national frontiers, the region's stability will once more be set at risk with unforeseeable consequences. Humanitarian and political interests converge in the aversion of catastrophe. It is clearly imperative that Iraq's 'essential civilian needs' be met urgently and that rapid agreement be secured on the mechanism whereby Iraq's own resources be used to fund them to the satisfaction of the international community" (Ibid. Rara. 138). (spoke in Arabic) But regrettably, this small minority in the Sanctions Committee succeeded in paralysing the work of the Committee and its ability to adopt a resolution. Hence, the Committee failed to achieve consensus on the recommendations of the mission headed by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, which prompted the Chairman of the Committee to refer the matter back to the Security Council for it to take whatever decision it deems appropriate, which was the aim of the small minority in the Sanctions Committee. Why? The secret lies in the provisions of the draft resolution before the Council, which are aimed not at fulfilling the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people but at exploiting them and imposing on Iraq's economy new financial sanctions and restrictions which had not been mentioned before, and to breach its sovereignty contrary to the United Nations Charter and all norms of international law.

For all intents and purposes, the draft resolution is aimed at keeping the economic embargo in place indefinitely, regardless of the provisions of paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and confines itself to giving Iraq a minimum of first-aid so that the people will not starve to death, but without providing Iraq with the opportunity to reconstruct its economy, including its oil industry, its agriculture, its irrigation system, its roads, communications, bridges and health facilities.

The Sanctions Committee cannot violate Security Council resolution 687 (1991) or add new requests that were not included in the original resolution and impose them on Iraq. Hence, the Sanctions Committee referred the report of the Secretary-General's Executive Delegate to the Council and we have before us a draft resolution that actually leads to the catastrophe warned against in paragraph 138 of the report, which I quoted earlier.

The draft resolution before the Council will actually lead to keeping the Iraqi people hostage under the influence of the small minority that claims to defend human rights and democracy in the world but has had no qualms about besieging the entire Iraqi people for more than a year. It has refused to lift the siege unless Iraq agrees to pay the price: relinquish its oil revenues and place its economic requirements and monetary policy in the hands of one State, plus one which has appointed itself as trustee over the Iraqi people, as the European Powers did in the nineteenth century vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and with respect to Egypt under the Khedives. What is surprising is that, although the United States and its three allies have announced their rejection of using food as a political weapon, Iraqis, including children, the sick and the elderly continue to die every day as a result of malnutrition, the lack of medicine and the embargo on food, medicine, funds and oil. Every day thousands of people die because the same minority is determined that it, and not Iraq, through United Nations agencies, will market - if not distribute - foodstuffs and medicines and other basic requirements for civilian life in Iraq, although such foodstuffs would be paid for by Iraqi funds and the Iraqi people itself, and not out of the generosity of those States.

In August 1990 the purpose of this inhumane embargo was supposedly to ensure Iraq's withdrawal from the territory of Kuwait, which actually took place last February. The continued embargo affirms what Iraq has always said: that this alliance had the sole aim of

destroying Iraq as an effective Arab force influential in determining the fate of the region. Hence, the 30-State alliance did not stop at destroying the infrastructure and the basic civilian structures of Iraq, but persisted in attempting to destroy Iraq by continuing the economic embargo and adopting various resolutions, all of which are aimed at punishing Iraq forever under the trusteeship of the United States and its allies, on behalf of the Security Council and the committees that it established, in order to administer the affairs of Iraq, control its exports and imports and its internal affairs.

I come now to the political aspects of the draft. Contrary to the United Nations Charter, the draft gravely impinges on Iraq's national sovereignty as a free country and Founding Member of the United Nations, and imposes a foreign guardianship on the free will of the Iraqi people. The draft also deprives the legitimate Government of Iraq of its powers and responsibilities with respect to its citizens and abolishes its role in caring for them and providing for their livelihood, their daily need for foodstuffs and health and medical services.

On the other hand, the draft gives foreign Powers the right to control Iraq's natural resources and allows them to dispose of its wealth and oil revenues as they wish, without the Iraqi people and its Government having any right to invest those resources or funds or to define their own priorities in the elimination of the effects of the unjust aggression by the 30 States against them. The draft also subordinates the humanitarian objective of the report of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, to suspect political motives and creates further difficulties for Iraq, although the pretexts that were invoked to impose those sanctions have ceased to exist. The draft actually undermines the provisions of resolution 687 (1990) and converts the partial lifting of the sanctions into colonialist restrictions that would rob Iraq of its right to full sovereignty, interfere in its internal affairs, plunder its oil wealth and usurp its right to dispose of its own funds, even though resolution 687 (1990) allows Iraq to purchase civilian requirements, such as foodstuffs and medicine without any intervention or trusteeship.

The authors of the resolution have thus wanted to circumvent the report of the international humanitarian organization that undertook field trips throughout Iraq and implicitly uncovered the nature of the brutal crimes perpetrated against Iraq when its infrastructure and national economy were destroyed through a scheme that had nothing to do with the so-called Gulf crisis but was aimed at destroying the potential of Iraq and, isolating its people, overthrowing the symbols of its cultural renaissance and comprehensive progress as an expression of deep-rooted hatred, and to further the aims of world Zionism under the motto of "legitimacy" and a "new world order".

Here I should like to take up the negative aspects of the draft resolution. While the authors claim that their aim is to cope with the grave deterioration in the health and nutritional situation of the Iraqi people and the grim portrait contained in the report of the Executive Delegate, as provided for in preambular paragraphs B and C of the draft, the draft actually imposes conditions on Iraq which lead in the direction opposite to that of the alleged aim of its authors. When we consider the preambular paragraphs of the draft, we see that they shuffle the cards and blur the facts. We note the preambular paragraph that refers to the so-called Kuwaiti detainees in Iraq. That paragraph was superimposed on the draft and was formulated in such a way as to distort the truth.

Those who are impeding the return of Kuwaitis from Iraq are the Government of Kuwait itself. The Iraqi authorities, during the period from 4 March until 14 July 1991, returned 6,133 Kuwaiti captives to Kuwait under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Also, that committee recorded 3,400 Kuwaitis residing in Iraq who wished to return to their country, but the Kuwaiti side agreed to accept only 128 individuals and dragged its feet regarding the return of the others, under the pretext of wanting to ascertain their identification. With respect to those so-called missing, the Kuwaiti Government insists on providing lists of names of people whose existence in Iraq has not been borne out by the investigations undertaken by the Iraqi authorities. Perhaps

some of them have died as a result of the allied bombardment. Also, the Kuwaiti Government did not bother to inquire about those people in other parts of the world. As is well known, it is not conceivable to expect Iraq to produce someone of whom there is no news. On the other hand, what does this have to do with a draft resolution allegedly dealing with the serious health and nutritional situation of the Iraqi people? The aim behind this artificial inclusion of the so-called Kuwaiti detainees is to create an additional pretext to keep the embargo against the Iraqi people.

Paragraph E of the draft refers to the conclusions of the report of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, in particular to the proposal to sell oil to finance urgent humanitarian relief. The draft resolution should have sought to achieve this accommodation, but it could not have been further from that recommendation in letter and spirit. The provisions of the draft do not allow Iraq to sell its oil, but rather allow other States through a slow and complicated mechanism to purchase limited amounts of Iraqi oil. In addition, no stress was laid on the humanitarian relief, but priority was given to the payment of sums to the Compensation Fund and to the expenses of the Commission dealing with the destruction of weapons, the Commission dealing with the restitution of Kuwaiti property, and the Iraq-Kuwait Border Demarcation Commission. These provisions include such conditions and costs as would

undermine the recommendations of the report of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. Preambular paragraph G and operative paragraph (c) indicate the need for the United Nations to intervene in the distribution of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs of all categories of the Iraqi people through providing for United Nations administration, monitoring and supervision.

This concept of the draft resolution runs completely counter to the concept of sovereignty assigned by the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, it constitutes a grave precedent as regards the humanitarian role of the United Nations. There is in Iraq a just and comprehensive system for the distribution of foodstuffs, which includes all persons, Iraqis and foreigners, residing in Iraq, and allows everyone to obtain basic foodstuffs at subsidized prices. The process of sales is undertaken through an integrated mechanism through the State agents and commercial markets, not through random distribution of assistance. Hence, the attempt to impose a United Nations supervision system, which has no chance of succeeding anyway, is aimed solely at derogating from Iraq's sovereignty, disregarding its organizational, administrative and economic institutions, and adding to the administrative costs of the Iraqi citizen and those taken from Iraq's own resources.

In preambular paragraph H, the draft resolution recalls the importance which the Council attaches to Iraq allowing access by the humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and affirms the important role played by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations of 18 April 1991. The reference to this Memorandum in such a manner is invidious to Iraq and its rights. Iraq has been fulfilling its obligations under the Memorandum of Understanding and the United Nations humanitarian programme. Iraq is proceeding according to the agreement and there are no significant problems in this regard. On the other hand, the Memorandum of Understanding relates to a programme of voluntary assistance provided by foreign parties, whereas the draft resolution has to do with foodstuffs and medical supplies paid for and distributed exclusively with Iraqi funds.

Moreover, preambular paragraph J provides that the Council is acting in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. Invoking Chapter VII, regarding sanctions, in this draft resolution, which is alleged to be a humanitarian draft resolution, once again exposes the suspect intent of the authors. Furthermore, it reveals the inhumane and exploitive nature of the draft.

I now turn to the technical and practical aspects of the provisions of the draft resolution. Operative paragraph i subordinates the permission of States to import Iraqi oil to seven conditions, including a time condition - six months after the passage of the draft resolution. This condition does not take into consideration the procedure followed in the international oil trade, that is, annual contacting. Hence, the purpose behind the six-month period is to stymie the process of exporting Iraqi oil and to create impediments to the marketing of necessary amounts during the same period, which would definitely lead to a decrease in Iraqi oil. On the other hand, the draft resolution does not allow Iraq to export oil at its own responsibility and to sell it on the free market, as the exception was made exclusively for imports from Iraq and not for exports by the Government of Iraq. Hence, it is not possible for Iraq to sell its oil on the free market, and it allows States to buy oil in very limited quantities and at very low prices. There is a financial condition, which is that the imports from Iraq should not exceed the value of, as it is rumoured, \$1.6 billion, which falls short of Iraq's needs to finance its imports. This is all the more serious when we see that the draft resolution gives priority in using the revenues from the imports of Iraqi oil to deducting 30 per cent for the Compensation Fund in addition to the costs of the various conditions established by the Council.

The third condition deals with approval by the Security Council Committee on Sanctions of every transaction, which is a waste of time and makes it difficult to pump Iraqi oil systematically because, as members know, the Committee usually meets once a week in a bureaucratic tradition and on a consensus basis so that any member of the Security Council in the Committee can obstruct any transaction for weeks by raising various questions which, whether they are prompted by good will or ill will, have the same effect: of obstructing the marketing of Iraqi oil and of wasting time.

The fourth condition involves placing the oil revenues directly in an escrow account in a bank chosen by the United Nations, to be administered by the Secretary-General. Naturally, the costs of such an account are to be deducted from its assets.

Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution provides that the materials needed by Iraq must be defined by the Secretary-General within 20 days after the adoption of the resolution, although the report of Aga Khan defines the type and amounts of the necessary materials to avert epidemics and famine in Iraq. Moreover, the draft makes it conditional that clear markings be placed to indicate that the imports are for humanitarian and civilian requirements, as if they were voluntary contributions by charitable organizations, and not imports financed by Iraqi funds.

Paragraph 1 also subjects the distribution of materials imported by Iraq to the monitoring and supervision of United Nations agencies to ensure their distribution throughout Iraq. This condition disregards the fact that Iraq is a country of 18 million people and that the materials will be distributed by means of ration cards, and not as voluntary grants. This also requires the presence of thousands of United Nations staff, the cost of which will be borne by Iraq indefinitely, which is contrary to the sovereignty of Iraq.

Finally, unfreezing the balance of the escrow account is also to be carried out through resolutions of the Committee on Sanctions in three equal stages, which would obstruct the import of humanitarian and civilian materials by Iraq. This is contrary to the conditions of paying these sums for imports.

Moreover, paragraph I (c) stipulates that the United Nations should provide administration, monitoring and supervision with a view to providing humanitarian assistance from other sources. This provision means that governmental and non-governmental humanitarian organizations and United Nations staff that provided assistance to the Iraqi people in coordination with the Government of Iraq will cease to provide assistance and will be transformed into a machinery of administration, supervision and monitoring, whose costs would be borne by the people of Iraq from their resources, without achieving any gains. Also, under this provision, the United Nations, if it so

wishes, can provide more of these from other sources in the numbers it decides, and the people of Iraq have to bear the costs.

In operative paragraph 3 the draft also provides that a portion of the Iraqi oil sales be used to finance Iraq's contribution to the Compensation Fund because of the destruction of the weapons and the restitution of Kuwaiti property. Placing conditions on the export of oil to fill Iraqi humanitarian needs runs counter to resolution 687 (1991), particularly paragraph 19 thereof, which provides that the Iraqi people and their ability to pay must be taken into consideration. These provisions have not been included in the draft resolution. The deductions cannot begin with a partial and conditional lifting, because the limited amount of exported oil, if approved, would not be enough to finance the needs of the Iraqi people. How could it be sufficient after deducting the percentage for the Fund and other costs?

Fourthly, the draft resolution also breaches the sovereignty of Iraq when it calls upon it to submit monthly reports about its assets in foreign currency and wealth.

In brief, for its part Iraq has prepared and provided all forms of cooperation in seeking to fulfil its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and has responded fully to the Special Commission and inspection teams in implementing section C of the resolution, the greater part of whose items have been complied with. In addition Iraq has facilitated the restitution of Kuwaiti properties. At present the gold is being returned and preparations are under way to return the museum items; and the Border Demarcation Commission is continuing its work in Geneva with Iraq's active participation. The Council should match responses by Iraq by the full lifting of sanctions. But the will of some of its members runs counter to that; for obvious political reasons not relevant to the Council's resolutions, to international law or to the Charter those States had no qualms about announcing their aims when they tied lifting the sanctions to changing the political régime in Iraq. On the other hand, Iraq is ready to ensure the necessary transparency and has proposed means necessary to inform international agencies of Iraqi imports. Iraq has also undertaken to provide immediately copies of all sales contracts and purchases of foodstuffs and has declared its readiness to sell oil to States permanent members of the Security Council and buy its medical, nutritional and other basic requirements from them so that they may be directly informed of all exports and imports.

The fact that this initiative by Iraq has not been taken into consideration, coupled with the insistence of the authors on their programme, reveals a deliberate attempt to obstruct the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. It also constitutes an attempt by some permanent members to evade their responsibility, starve the Iraqi people and blame it on the Iraqi Government by aborting the report of Sadruddin Aga Khan and proposing a complicated and impractical machinery - trusteeship over Iraq. The authors actually want to hold the Iraqi people hostage and to place before it two options: either to allow colonial and neocolonial States to plunder its oil wealth and control it indefinitely, or to keep the state of starvation and life on the brink of disaster. This will not be permitted by Iraq.

I shall now touch briefly on draft resolution S/22942. It should be noted that the draft resolution is based on two points, which are: the circumstance surrounding the second inspection team during its visit from 22 June to 3 July 1991, as indicated in preambular paragraphs c, d, e and f; and the resolution of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 18 July 1991.

Iraq has already clearly and unambiguously indicated on more than one occasion the circumstances surrounding the arrival of the second inspection team. The details of those circumstances were communicated to the high-level mission headed by Mr. Ralph Ikeus when that mission visited Iraq. The Iraqi Government provided assurances at the highest level that its authorities would open up all facilities to the inspection teams. The high-level mission mentioned these assurances in its report and indicated that the coming period would begin to show Iraq's fulfilment of those assurances. Since then, more than

one team has visited Iraq and a nuclear inspection team and a biological team are still there.

Iraq has opened up all facilities to the third inspection team and provided it with immense quantities of information, as indicated by the Director of the IAEA in his press conference at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 30 July 1991. Also, the Chairman of the fourth team, Sir David Kaye, stated before the news agency in Baghdad that his team was making progress and had obtained a great deal of information and that the Iraqis were cooperating with his team. As for the other teams that visited Iraq, they have not indicated the presence of any impediments or significant problems in their work.

Can one truly say, after the passage of more than one month since the circumstances surrounding the second team and after the experience of cooperating with all the teams, that Iraq is uncooperative and not fulfilling its obligations? We had hoped that the Security Council would express its satisfaction with the cooperation enjoyed by the international teams in Iraq, not that it would adopt a new resolution condemning Iraq for an isolated incident.

Most members of the second team are now in Iraq and enjoying unprecedented cooperation. Information is being supplied promptly, and the Council can be guided by the head of the team, who is now in Baghdad. Is this not further evidence of Iraq's abiding by the Council's resolution? This must be taken into consideration by the Security Council.

In spite of the aforementioned we find that the draft resolution does not include any legitimate provisions. Most of it is covered in the agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Special Commission, the IAEA and the inspection teams, which was accepted by Iraq. From our point of view, this agreement is appropriate to the circumstances for cooperation that may be available, and they have now become available as far as Iraq is concerned. Last month proved that they have improved.

Finally, we should like to inquire of the Special Commission, the teams and the Agency whether they were denied access to certain places or were prevented from inspecting any materials. As far as we know, there is not a single place, as indicated in the reports of the inspection teams, that has not been inspected by them. But, to be more accurate, there was a place over which a clamour was raised on 21 June. The Chairman of the third nuclear inspection team agreed to move the materials found there, and two members of his team supervised the process. The team recorded all the materials, which were photographed and unloaded from trucks under the team's supervision. The international team released the non-nuclear equipment for use in the reconstruction*of Iraq. The trucks left there under the supervision and approval of the inspection te&.n. All this is recorded in inventories and lists exchanged between the third inspection team and Iraq. The equipment was stored in warehouses, thus making it easier to be inspected by the team in future. This all took place quietly, so what can be the reason for the current draft resolution including operative paragraph 3? The Council should express its satisfaction with the practical measures taken in this regard instead of trying to condemn Iraq and impose new conditions on it.

I apologize for taking so long. Because of what happened for the first time in the Council, that is, taking up three draft resolutions consecutively for consideration, I was forced to speak at length.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Iraq for the kind words he addressed to me.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolutions before it. Unless there is any objection, I shall put the draft resolutions to the vote in the following order: S/22940, S/22941 and S/22942.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on members of the Council wishing to make statements before the voting.

Mr. AL-ASHTAL (Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): At the outset, Sir, I should like to congratulate you heartily on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We know you for your great qualities, qualities which reflect the Latin American heritage of respect for the Charter of the United Nations and international laws and norms. Your presidency also reflects your diplomatic and political qualities and great abilities. I am fully confident that you will lead the work of the Council with success.

I should like also to express my great thanks to the Permanent Representative of Cuba, Ambassador Alarcon de Quesada, who skilfully guided the work of the Security Council last month and who this month has been coordinating the work of the non-aligned caucus in the Security Council.

In my brief statement I shall comment on draft resolution S/22941.

A full year after the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, and nearly six months after the end of the war that liberated Kuwait and enabled its legitimate Government to return, the Security Council is facing a humanitarian problem of tragic dimensions. Notwithstanding numerous and continuous reports depicting the suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of the ongoing of the embargo - whose dire consequences could include starvation and death for hundreds of thousands of the most vulnerable members of Iraqi society - the Security Council is still dragging its feet in dealing realistically with the tragedy of the Iraqi people, who were the first victims of the Gulf crisis, and with the resolution by which the Security Council imposed the embargo against Iraq following the war that destroyed Iraq's civilian infrastructure. On 15 July 1991, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the Secretary-General's Executive Delegate, who headed the inter-agency mission, submitted a comprehensive report on the sad human situation in Iraq. This was the second report, following the one submitted a few months ago by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari. In its section II, "Summary of main findings and recommendations", the report says,

"With respect to the possible sale of oil by the Iraqi Government to finance such imports, paragraph 23 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) empowers the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to approve exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq, with the explicit purpose of assuring 'adequate financial resources' on the part of the Iraqi Government to procure medicine and health supplies, foodstuffs and materials and supplies for 'essential civilian needs'". (S/22799, annex, para. 32)

Later in the same section, the report says that

"If the Security Council Committee were to decide that Iraq should be allowed to use funds from oil sales or facilitate the use of blocked accounts in order to meet urgent humanitarian needs, the Government indicated that it would cooperate in making available documentation relating to sales of crude oil as well as purchases of the authorized imports. ... (A) suitable device for monitoring such credit balances could be established,., (Ibid., para. 34) It is regrettable that the sanctions Committee, which heard an oral report from Prince Sadruddin and other members of his mission, was unable to take a decision on this matter, which falls within its mandate by the terms of paragraph 23 of resolution 687 (1991). A full month after the submission of Prince Sadruddin's report the Council is seized of draft resolution S/22941, which authorizes the exemption of the sale of some Iraqi oil for a limited period of six months and in the limited amount of \$1.6 billion. Although the draft resolution would ultimately enable needed medicine and food to reach Iraq, it raises many questions of principle. First, what is the justification for submitting a special draft resolution on the humanitarian aspects of the situation in Iraq when the sanctions Committee possesses a mandate under paragraph 23 of resolution 687 (1991) to

take decisions on this subject and to permit Iraq to export oil and petroleum products exclusively to meet humanitarian needs? In other words, why was the Sanctions Committee not permitted to take the necessary decision immediately after Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan's report was submitted? And why did the Committee and the Security Council not accept the well-considered and reasonable recommendations submitted by Prince Sadruddin in his report?

Second, would not these complicated conditions in the draft resolution lead to the creation of bureaucratic mechanisms and procedures which would delay the timely arrival of foodstuffs and medicines to Iraq? And why is the Secretariat involved in technical and commercial operations, something which would add to the burdens of this Organization?

Third, why is this humanitarian draft resolution based on Chapter VII of the Charter? True, the sanctions were imposed against Iraq on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter; but we are not now dealing with the lifting of the sanctions. We are now dealing with the approval of some exceptions for purely humanitarian reasons. Was it not possible for the Sanctions Committee to allow the same-exceptions that would lead to the importation of Iraqi oil for humanitarian needs without any reference to Chapter VII of the Charter? This question acquires a special significance in view of what might happen in the future and the position that the Security Council might take should Iraq reject the export of oil in accordance with the stipulated conditions. This is not a theoretical possibility, for the Prime Minister of Iraq has already rejected the draft resolution since it would not meet the humanitarian needs and would at the same time undermine Iraq's sovereignty.

Fourth, why does the draft resolution confuse the special humanitarian situation of millions of innocent Iraqis with financial matters related to the recovery of the cost of the Special Commission and the IAEA and the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission? Does the Security Council equate those Iraqi vulnerable people who could face famine and slow death should sanctions continue with the staff of the international organizations who would not be greatly hurt by the postponement of the receipt of their remunerations? Was it not possible for the Security Council to allow the sale of some shipments of Iraqi oil to meet the costs of international organizations in a specific manner, in addition to the financing of the Compensation Fund, which relates to many innocent people - Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis who lost their lives, positions or rights as a result of the war? How can we interpret this intentional confusion and in the same draft resolution accept that it represents the absence of interest and even the carelessness regarding the fate of millions of innocent Iraqis who are helpless both in war and in peace?

The people and the Government of Yemen are concerned about our brothers in Iraq, especially the vulnerable groups among them, those who would fall as a result of the miserable humanitarian situation in Iraq. United Nations experts have been issuing warnings for a long time and some of them announced that an imminent catastrophe was inevitable. For example, the report of the mission of Medicine for Peace declares, on page 17, that

"Unless the sanctions are amended, it is probable that the public health system will collapse, which would lead to the death of many children without any justification whatsoever."

Moreover, press reports have indicated that Iraqi civilians with medium incomes have begun to sell their valuable possessions, and even household items, in order to buy the foodstuffs that are sold at astronomical prices. As for those with limited incomes in Iraq, they face want, poverty and famine.

It is expected that, given the Security Council's procrastination, the complications of the draft resolution submitted to us and Iraq's rejection, the blame for the starvation of the Iraqi people will be apportioned here and there. At that time, will it be possible for the

Security Council to deny its share of responsibility? The famine that will afflict the children of the Iraqi people will not have been created by nature, and it will not be the result of the scarcity of resources; the continuation of the sanctions will be one of its main reasons.

The Security Council, which is mandated to serve peace and security the world over, should not allow the spread of famine which might lead to massive migrations across international borders, in addition to the possibility of instability and the break-down of internal security. This would ultimately lead to jeopardizing peace and security in the area. Furthermore, the Security Council is responsible for the preservation of the lives and safety of human beings. Everybody says that he is not against the Iraqi people. Why then do some insist on the continuation of its suffering? Why do these people not lift from its shoulders the embargo that is harming and weakening Iraqi society day by day?

It is known that there are political ends that are not declared in the Security Council. But would these ends justify inhuman means?

Each country has the right to impose an embargo against another country in implementation of its own policies and in defence of its interests. But the Security Council should not be used to achieve ends other than those which conform with the Charter and are based on the Charter in letter and in spirit.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Yemen for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. MUMBENGEGNI (Zimbabwe): I should like at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. Your diplomatic skills and wealth of experience have already made their mark on the work of the Council. Your wise guidance of the Council this month will ensure that it discharges its mandate honourably.

Let me also express our deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada of Cuba, for the able and effective manner in which he steered the work of the Council last month. It was indeed a fruitful month, thanks to his distinguished stewardship.

I shall confine my remarks to the draft resolution contained in document S/22941.

The critical humanitarian situation facing the people of Iraq following the end of the Gulf war has been a source of grave concern to Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe was among the non-aligned members of the Council who submitted a draft resolution last March aimed at relieving the suffering of the civilian population of Iraq. In spite of the detailed report presented to Council members by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, portraying the distressing humanitarian situation which had arisen in Iraq, the Council was not able to take action on that proposal from the non-aligned members of the Council.

The Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General on humanitarian issues in the Gulf area, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, submitted a detailed and comprehensive report last month that carried a timely warning that Iraq was on the brink of famine. He warned that any delay in the Council's taking action might result in a catastrophe in that country.

Zimbabwe had therefore expected the Council to respond swiftly through its Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), which, under paragraph 23 of resolution 687 (1991), is empowered to approve exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating from Iraq, when required, to ensure adequate financial resources for purchasing essential civilian needs. It is therefore to be regretted that the Council was not able to take advantage of this more expeditious procedure provided for in resolution 687 (1991).

In the view of my delegation, the principal merit of the draft resolution contained in document S/22941, on which we are about to vote, is that it creates an opportunity for the possibility of generating financial resources to meet the humanitarian requirements of the people of Iraq, as well as compensation for those who suffered loss and hardship as a result of the Gulf war. Zimbabwe therefore welcomes this step about to be taken by the Council to create a mechanism designed to address the needs of the victims of war, in both Iraq and Kuwait, as well as elsewhere.

While welcoming the fact that the Council is taking action to address the needs of the victims of the Gulf war, we cannot fail to register our reservations regarding those provisions of the draft resolution before us which encroach on national sovereignty.

Zimbabwe does recognize the need to ensure transparency in all the transactions to be carried out under the draft resolution before us. However, it is our view that monitoring arrangements could have been put in place that would have ensured transparency without encroaching on sovereignty.

In the final analysis, it is my delegation's view that no opportunity which offers the possibility of alleviating the suffering of innocent civilians should be allowed to slip through our fingers.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Zimbabwe for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. ALARCON de QUESADA (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. President, in one of our private talks, which seem to account increasingly for the bulk of the work of the Council, I have already had an opportunity to say how delighted my delegation and I personally were to see you assume the presidency of the Council. Now that we are meeting formally, let me reiterate that sense of satisfaction and add what I was sure would happen in the first two weeks of August, that is, the manifestation of your competence, your sense of equity, your sense of balance and clear diplomatic skill in your conduct of the work of the Council.

I shall refer to the draft resolution contained in document S/22941. This draft resolution has been identified - and I do not quite know why - as the humanitarian resolution. It evidently has to do with situations with which the members of the Council are familiar, although the Council has not itself formally and expressly considered them.

Information has come to hand over the months reflecting the grave plight of the civilian population of Iraq as a result of the continuation of an ironclad economic sanctions regime. In the opinion of my delegation, the Council should have acted a long time ago in order to put an end completely to the economic sanctions, which cease to be justified at a time when the reasons which had justified them - which are set forth in Security Council resolution 661 (1990) - have been taken care of.

However, the draft resolution which is now before us, and which claims to be humanitarian in connection with the economic sanctions regime, in fact consolidates the sanctions. Indeed, it broadens them, as in the case of medicines and other supplies.

In resolution 661 (1990), adopted a year ago, before the military clashes took place on Iraqi territory, the Council decided to exclude supplies intended exclusively for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs. We have received much information, some of it through missions sent by the United Nations itself. From this information, we learned clearly of the existence of humanitarian circumstances. The Council is now invited to add medicine and medical supplies to the sanctions regime, plus foodstuffs, supposedly through an authorization which would be given subject to certain controls for the export of Iraqi oil and the acquisition of some of these supplies, but

subject to what we regard as an unjustifiable and strict control system under the sanctions. The Council is considering this draft resolution and two others, one of which has been around for two months, namely, the one setting the ceiling for the Iraqi contribution to the Compensation Fund, and which everyone knows the Council has been unable to consider because one delegation had difficulties with the text. Apparently it has now overcome those difficulties, and again all that was done without debate.

This Council had the opportunity, indeed the mandate pursuant to its own resolutions, to address Iraq's humanitarian needs and to authorize supplies or to slacken the sanctions regime so that those needs could have been better met, thus satisfying the humanitarian concern by which the members of the Council claim to be motivated.

Security Council resolution 687 (1991), paragraph 21, provided that we were to review the provisions every 60 days for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein. Two 60-day periods have elapsed since the adoption of that resolution and the Council has not strictly determined whether it is appropriate to reduce or lift the prohibitions, nor indeed has it been kind enough to meet to carry out such a review.

we are now meeting in certain circumstances, more or less agreed upon in the private consultations to which I referred earlier, in order to adopt, with whatever explanations anyone may wish to make, three draft resolutions. However, we should not suppose that, because in the Council we do not discuss openly the reasons or the non-reasons, as it were, for the continuation of a system that is having a severe impact on the civilian population, there is no such debate. There are public reports, public documents, reports of commissions that have been to Iraq and very interesting debates and discussions.

For example, I have here some documents that show how various committees of the United States Congress considered the same ideas more than a month ago. They considered the same points that we now see in the draft resolution in document S/22941. Indeed, one of those Congressional hearings was held just before the issuance of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan's report. Obviously, that Congressional meeting took place before the Sanctions Committee's discussion of that report. In other words, the members of the United States Congress and people from the State Department who attended that meeting - the Permanent Representative of the United States, I understand, was among them - discussed with their parliamentary colleagues the ideas which one month later we, the members of the Security Council, are generously informed of and are convened this afternoon kindly to endorse.

So there has been discussion. A representative of UNICEF has drawn attention to a fact that should have prompted more diligent action from the Council a long time ago, action unlike the one that we are required to take now. He stated that he was aware that there were various political implications involved in this question, but he also pointed out that no matter what the Political implications were we should not forget that here we are confronting a human calamity whose consequences would rest on the conscience of mankind for a very long time. He emphasized that it was not a natural disaster but rather an entirely man-made disaster.

The representative Of UNICEF stated that he personally wished to point out that children were dying every day and that he had to bury too many small children in Iraq to allow him to consider that the situation was acceptable.

This means that we are faced with a situation which clearly suggests the need for the international community to show sensitivity with respect to the various and repeated reports that emphasize the gravity of the humanitarian situation in Iraq. However the draft resolution now before us, far from tackling the humanitarian issue, rather seeks to link it with other elements and to fit it into an overall context which we find unacceptable. It is quite unacceptable to try to use foodstuffs, medicines and medical

supplies, which are vital to the health of human beings, as an instrument to attain certain political objectives. We believe that the sanctions against Iraq should have been eliminated at the moment when the causes which were argued in justification of it disappeared, and we feel that the sanctions regime should never have included elements which, from a moral point of view and from the point of view of civilization, cannot be imposed by anyone on anyone else.

My delegation does not believe that Chapter VII of the Charter, or indeed any other Chapter of the Charter, authorizes this Council to take upon itself certain functions and responsibilities, or to entrust them to the Secretary-General, which are clearly a breach of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and of the principle of the sovereign equality of States. The establishment of the proposed mechanism would really mean appropriating elements of Iraqi sovereignty and would seek to apply to Iraq a type of trusteeship system, which is entirely contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter.

I feel it appropriate to refer members to Article 78 of the Charter, which states:

"The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality".

I Shall now put to the vote the draft S/22941.

In actual fact, in practice, an attempt is being made to continue the war and the confrontation with Iraq after the end of the armed conflict and after the Council adopted various resolutions that claim to have put an end to it, making an improper use of the United Nations for these purposes. For these reasons, the Cuban delegation finds the draft resolution contained in document S/22941 to be unacceptable, and we will vote accordingly.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for his kind words addressed to me.

I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/22940.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Austria, Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ecuador, France, India, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yemen, Zaire, Zimbabwe

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): There were 15 votes in The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 705 (1991).

I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/22941.

resolution contained in document

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Austria, Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, France, India, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: Cuba

Abstaining: Yemen

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): The result of the voting is as follows: 13 votes in favour, 1 against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 706 (1991).

I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/22942.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Austria, Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ecuador, France, India, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yemen, Zaire, Zimbabwe

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 707 (1991).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. ROCHEREAU DE LA SABLIERE (France) (interpretation from French): First of all, Sir, I should like to say how happy we are to see you as President of the Council. We should also like to thank Ambassador Alarcón de Quesada for the way in which he guided our work last month.

The reasons we are once again meeting in this Chamber, a little more than one year after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and five months after the liberation of Kuwait, are, first of all, to deal with a humanitarian problem; secondly, to respond to the repeated failures of the Iraqi authorities to comply with their obligations under an important section of resolution 687 (1991), calling for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; and, finally, to complete arrangements for the operation of the Compensation Fund. We have just adopted three draft resolutions on these topics.

The situation created in Iraq, owing to the conduct of the Government of Baghdad, is being followed with great attention in France. Last March, in the light of Mr. Ahtisaari's report, the Sanctions Committee and the Security Council deemed it necessary to ease the embargo so as to allow the civilian population in Iraq easier access to essential materials and supplies. My delegation actively contributed to that effort. In April France alerted the international community to the tragic fate of the civilian populations, in particular the Kurds, who were fleeing from Iraq in the hope of escaping the intolerable oppression to which they had fallen victim. This action led to the adoption of resolution 688 (1991).

Less than one month ago, the report of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan described to the Council in detail the humanitarian situation in Iraq. It made clear the need to take urgent measures to avoid a serious worsening of the living conditions of the Iraqi population, which could not be held responsible for the faults of a regime that it had not freely chosen. It was necessary to act rapidly on the basis of resolution 687 (1991), which provided that Iraq could be authorized from time to time to export oil to finance the purchase of essential goods. In fact, Iraq had presented several requests of this nature to the Sanctions Committee.

We took these elements as the basis for drafting the text that the Security Council has just adopted. It appeared indispensable to provide very specific modalities for the sale of Iraqi oil, for the use of the resources thus generated and for the distribution of essential goods that could thus be purchased, as it was necessary to have the assurance of achieving the priority goal pursued, namely, to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population

as a whole.

Indeed, we could not trust a Government that attempts to get around Security Council resolutions, practises deception, still prohibits access to certain parts of its territory to United Nations representatives, detains by force Kuwaiti nationals and nationals of other countries and persists in refusing to allow Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan and the High Commissioner for Refugees to open humanitarian centres in those places where they are needed.

The text that has been adopted does not aim at establishing definitive rules. It was conceived as a response to an emergency situation for a period of six months. Hence, there was to be no prejudging of the future.

The authorized imports of Iraqi petroleum must produce a sum as determined on the basis of the evaluation of essential needs presented by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. One provision allows the Security Council to readjust that sum if it appears, in the light of a report requested of the Secretary-General or of information that might come later on, that that sum does not seem sufficient.

We felt that it was not up to the Security Council to specify either the details or the modalities for commercial and financial transactions authorized by the text nor the modalities for monitoring the distribution of food or medicine in order to ensure their availability to the Iraqi population. We are relying for all this on the Secretary-General, who will present us with his recommendations.

Finally, it was logical to provide, in implementation of prior resolutions, that income received from these exports by Iraq would also generate money for the Compensation Fund and make it possible to finance the operating costs of United Nations bodies set up within the framework of resolution 687 (1991), in particular the Special Commission for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The particular provision of the resolution regarding the amount to be levied for the Compensation Fund on the basis of approved authorizations reflects our concern over seeing the Fund built up rapidly. Thereafter the Fund will operate according to the modalities to be decided upon by its Governing Council.

The draft resolution on nuclear matters on which we have also just taken a decision is a response to the inadmissible behaviour of the Iraqi authorities. On several occasions, our Council expressed its concern over Iraq's repeated violations of its obligations, either those imposed upon it by resolution 687 (1991) or those deriving from its commitments to the IAEA. Non-compliance with those commitments has been established by the Board of Governors of that Agency. It has also indicated its deep concern over Iraq's attempts at deception. The information made available in recent weeks by the Chairman of the Special Commission for the Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction and by the Director General of the IAEA following on-site inspections goes overwhelmingly against the Iraqi Government. It clearly appears that Iraq was involved in a clandestine research programme intended to get nuclear weapons for Iraq, in flagrant violation of its international obligations.

The resolution therefore condemns the failures of Iraq and spells out certain provisions of resolution 687 (1991) regarding the activities of the Special Commission in order to help it carry out the important mission given it by the Security Council.

I shall complete my statement with the draft resolution regarding the percentage of the value of Iraqi petroleum exports within which the Governing Council of the Compensation Fund will have to set the actual amount of Iraq's contribution. The adoption of the proposal made to us by the Secretary-General in this regard, a proposal that takes into account both the needs of the Iraqi people and the need to ensure fair compensation, will complete the work of setting up the Compensation Fund established to

compensate the victims of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Since the decision has already been taken in Geneva, the Fund will give priority consideration to small requests, essentially those which will be presented by those who lived in Iraq or Kuwait and had to leave those countries and abandon their possessions.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of France for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. PICKERING (United States of America): First of all, I want to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council and for the work in which you have already led us and to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Alarcon de Queseda, for his work last month.

Once again the Council has convened to take action on problems arising out of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

The resolution that we have just approved on compliance with part C of resolution 687 (1991) on inspection and destruction of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq draws the attention of the world to Iraq's failure to comply with resolution 687 (1991) and Iraq's repeated material breaches of its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. I will not detail that list of compliance failures and material breaches, which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Special Commission have so well documented in recent weeks, but merely note that we have heard two further reports: the Special Commission's revelation of Iraq's biological weapons violations in its letter of 5 August and evidence of additional nuclear weapons violations contained in the International Atomic Energy Agency's letter to the Secretary-General of 6 August.

The primary purpose behind this resolution is to strengthen the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Special Commission in performing their important task of eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability and of assuring that such weapons are not reacquired.

On the one hand, this resolution provides the IAEA and the Special Commission with certain new tools to bolster the effectiveness of their work. On the other hand, the resolution sends a message to Iraq. What is expected, indeed demanded, is Iraq's full compliance with all its obligations under relevant Treaties and Security Council resolutions as well as its complete cooperation with the IAEA and the Special Commission.

The humanitarian resolution that we have just approved intends primarily to get humanitarian assistance to those in Iraq who need it the most. This is not a resolution lifting sanctions. In fact, it will strengthen the sanctions by preventing the Iraqi Government from seeking political and military gains through the misery of the Iraqi people which it has itself caused. Under the exceptions provision of paragraph 23 of resolution 687 (1991), we are making an exception for a special and limited purpose for a limited period of time. With its emphasis on equitable distribution and monitoring, the resolution seeks to ensure that food and other humanitarian assistance reaches those for whom it is most intended. The importance of vigilant monitoring of distribution of humanitarian assistance arising out of this resolution cannot be overemphasized. Careful monitoring is required to deter diversion of food and other humanitarian assistance to privileged sectors of Iraqi society or the misuse of this assistance at the expense of those most in need. Our sad experience has shown that this kind of diversion is a very real possibility unless we take strong steps to prevent it.

In adopting this resolution, the Council has put the Secretary-General and the Secretariat at the centre of the process of providing humanitarian assistance to Iraq. My Government recognizes that the resolution places a heavy burden on the Secretary-General in drawing up his report on a number of highly complex and technical issues never before tackled by

the United Nations, but it also gives him the authority to propose whatever additional measures he deems necessary and appropriate to monitor, supervise and manage this operation. Subsequently we will be depending on the Secretary-General and the United Nations to ensure that the goals of the resolution are truly achieved. We stand ready, for our part, to help in any way we can. We appreciate the excellent work the Secretary-General has done throughout the Gulf crisis. We are confident that the United Nations will rise to this challenge once-again. I should also note that we have agreed to support the 30-per-cent ceiling imposed by resolution 705 (1991) on the basis that it is fully and directly linked to resolution 706 (1991) and any subsequent Iraqi oil sales.

It is important to note that for the past 10 years Iraq itself has spent 28 per cent of its income on military equipment alone.

Finally, I want to mention the pressing and urgent need for Iraq to return all prisoners of war and all captives taken from Kuwait and from other States.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. LI DaM (China) (interpretation from Chinese): At the outset, Sir, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to wish you success in your work.

I should like also to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to His Excellency Ambassador Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, Permanent Representative of Cuba, for the remarkable way in which he handled the work of the Security Council last month.

The Chinese delegation wishes to state its position on resolution 706 (1991), which the Council has just adopted. The ever-deteriorating situation faced by the Iraqi people has for some time been a question of deep concern to the international community, including China. Sound recommendations were made in the report submitted by His Excellency Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, but regrettably the Security Council has taken no action on those recommendations.

Resolution 706 (1991), just adopted, permits Iraq to export oil for a given period in order to finance the import of humanitarian goods. That will help alleviate to a certain extent the grave and deteriorating situation faced by the Iraqi people. It is with that in mind that the Chinese delegation voted in favour of resolution 706 (1991).

But we are of the view that the sovereignty of Iraq must be respected in the implementation of that resolution. Iraq is entitled to play its proper role in the purchase and distribution of the food, medicine and other materials required to meet essential civilian needs.

The designated sum from Iraq's oil income should be used principally for humanitarian relief work. The amount of oil the resolution permits Iraq to export seems insufficient to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. For that reason, the Security Council should review this question again at an appropriate time to consider increasing the permitted amount of oil sales and extending the time limit for those sales.

Finally, I would note that it is within the terms of reference of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission to decide the percentage of the value of Iraq's oil exports that should be paid into the Compensation Fund.

The Chinese delegation reserves its position on the questions to which I have alluded.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of China for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON (United Kingdom): It is a pleasure, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council and at the same time to thank Ambassador Alarcon de Quesada for his effective handling of our affairs last month. Let me add, however, on this occasion, Mr. President, that we have particularly appreciated your patient, skilful and fair handling of our consultations on these important issues over the past two weeks: thank you very much.

My Government welcomes the resolution the Security Council has just adopted setting a ceiling for the hypothecation of Iraq's oil revenues. That decision provides some assurance to the many individuals, companies and institutions which because of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait lost their property and in some cases their lives that they will receive some recompense.

I noted sadly, but without surprise, that in the lengthy statement we heard earlier from the representative of Iraq there was not a word of regret for the suffering that Iraq had inflicted on so many innocent people. We tend sometimes to forget about them, and yet they are, of course, one of the main purposes and motivations behind this resolution.

We were pleased by the results of the first session of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, held in July and August, and, in the light of what I have just said, in particular the agreement to establish an expedited procedure for small claimants. We look forward to the continuation of the work of the Compensation Commission in September and October.

I turn now to the resolution we have just adopted on oil sales. As my delegation said in informal consultations among members of the Council on 5 August, when the last review of sanctions took place, my Government does not believe that the time has yet come to lift sanctions. The Iraqi Government has failed to live up to many of its obligations. It has failed, for example, to release Kuwaitis and other foreigners, including a British national, Mr. Ian Richter. There is still a great quantity of Kuwaiti property to return. And more generally, the policies and practices of Iraq have included the oppression of its own people in the north and the south of the country.

But it has never been the aim of my Government to harm the Iraqi people who after all have no voice of their own in their own country. You cannot deal with the misdeeds of a country's Government without, regrettably, having some impact on the civilian population. But in view of the problems that have been highlighted in the reports by Mr. Ahtisaari and subsequently by Prince Sadruddin, my Government is ready to permit limited sales of Iraqi oil over a six-month period to fund the importation of food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies. A portion of the Oil revenues must go to the Compensation Fund and to Pay for the Special Commission, to the costs of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and the arrangements for returning Kuwaiti property plundered by Iraq.

In view of the past record of the Iraqi Government, we need an effective United Nations system for monitoring oil sales and for the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies. These monitoring arrangements in our view, must ensure that supplies reach the vulnerable segments of the Iraqi population in all parts of Iraq, and we believe there should be provision for random sampling by United Nations officials to that end.

But that said, we shall look forward with keenness to seeing the Secretary-General's proposals in 20 days' time, and we shall take them fully into account in determining what practical steps are needed to fulfil the terms of this resolution.

I turn finally to the resolution we have adopted on the weapons destruction, a resolution of great importance. We believe it is vital that the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency should have all the powers they need to carry out

their duties under resolution 687 (1991); that, indeed, is one of the main purposes of this resolution.

I mentioned earlier the sad failure of Iraq to carry out all its obligations, and this applies with particular force to the question of weapons of mass destruction. More and more chilling details are being unearthed. We now have confirmation that there was indeed a super-gun project. We now have confirmation that Iraq did indeed have a biological-warfare research programme with an offensive capability. We have confirmation that Iraq held much greater stocks of chemical weapons than it had previously admitted. And finally, we have confirmation that it had separated plutonium from enriched uranium and was developing an industrial-scale facility for enriching its own uranium by using both centrifugal and electro-magnetic isotopic separation processes - the latter, incidentally, in breach of the safeguards of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of which Iraq is a signatory.

Only yesterday a spokesman of the Secretary-General issued a press release with further details of Iraq's biological weapons research programme.

I fear that this is further evidence that the declarations we received earlier fall far short of what is to be desired, and the resolution we have just adopted is wholly appropriate.

In this context, and to conclude, we do also welcome the publication of the plans produced by the Special Commission and the IAEA concerning future compliance. We are studying them carefully and we are sure that all members will be giving them close attention in the weeks to come.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative-of the United Kingdom for his kind words.

Mr. HAJNOCZI (Austria): Permit me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. Given your personal and professional qualities and your experience, we are convinced, as we have already seen, that the Council cannot but benefit from your guidance in carrying out its work.

I should also like to thank the Permanent Representative of Cuba, Ambassador Alarcon de Quesada, for the excellent manner in which he presided over the Council last month.

Austria voted in favour of, inter alia, resolution 706 (1991), which contains a package of measures aimed at dealing with a number of questions, first and foremost measures to deal with the humanitarian situation in Iraq.

We are pleased to note that it has thus been finally possible to transform into a resolution the results of the consultations held by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) as reported by him to the members of the Security Council during informal consultations held on 25 July.

The action initiated today is indeed urgently needed. The latest report on the-situatioi. of the Iraqi civilian population, namely the report dated 15 July 1991 of the inter-agency mission headed by.the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme, presented an alarming picture of the serious nutritional and health situation of the civilian population and the risk of further deterioration.

We hope that the Iraqi Government will - previous statements to the contrary notwithstanding - take full advantage of the opportunity which will be provided to it to earn the necessary revenue for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and material and supplies for essential civilian needs of its population. Anything less could lead to serious consequences which should be avoided in the best interest of the Iraqi population.

In this connection the equitable distribution of imports for humanitarian purposes in all regions of Iraq and to all segments of the Iraqi civilian population is of course of paramount importance. We understand the relevant provisions in resolution 706 (1991) as inviting the Secretary-General to submit a plan for an effective United Nations role in this respect to be carried out, by and large, by the United Nations personnel currently in Iraq. Reports to the Security Council on the working of this scheme for ensuring an equitable distribution would enable us to monitor its implementation. Another important element of the report requested of the Secretary-General are the estimates of the humanitarian requirements of Iraq which will be the basis for our final decision.

While resolution 706 (1991) has at its origin our most serious concern regarding the humanitarian situation in Iraq, resolution 707 (1991), but also

parts of resolution 706 (1991), address another fundamental problem: Iraq's failure to comply with or fully carry out its obligations under resolution 687 (1991). By voting in favour of resolution 707 (1991) Austria demonstrates the crucial importance it attaches to full compliance. In this context, I want to stress our support for the activities of the Special Commission and the IAEA with regard to Section C of resolution 687 (1991). The results of their missions undertaken hitherto have shown how significant their activities are. We view resolution 707 (1991) not only as sending a message to Iraq but also as strengthening the hand of the Special Commission and the IAEA.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Austria for his kind words.

Mr. LOZINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the high post of President of the Security Council and to express our confidence that you will continue to guide the work of the Council as successfully and outstandingly as you did in the first half of this month. I also wish to thank the Ambassador of Cuba for his successful conduct of the work of the Council in July, which he handled with his customary diplomatic skill.

The Soviet delegation is gratified that the Security Council has adopted three important resolutions - two of them unanimously and the other by an overwhelming majority. Their purpose is to secure the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which defined the arrangements for eliminating the consequences of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and restoring peace and security in that region. The resolutions that have been adopted make it possible for Iraq, in accordance with the arrangements set forth in resolution 687 (1991), to export a certain amount of oil in order to obtain sufficient financial resources with which to acquire foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for basic civilian needs. In addition, the resolutions have triggered the functioning of previous decisions on the financing of the activities of the Compensation Fund, the Special Commission and the Boundary Demarcation Commission and various other relevant United Nations expenses. The Security Council has also emphasized the importance of the need to repatriate all citizens of Kuwait and other countries being held by force in Iraq and also compensation for plundered property - a point which Ambassador Abulhasan of Kuwait rightly emphasized in his important statement at the beginning of our meeting.

The ceiling established by the Council for deductions to be paid into the Compensation Fund, in our view, creates the necessary conditions for compensation for losses sustained by victims of aggression and also for the solution of the pressing humanitarian problems facing the population of Iraq, as well as enabling Iraq to make payments on its external debt. At the same time, the Security Council has condemned Iraq's grave breaches of its obligations as a party to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of various obligations under Section C of resolution 687 (1991).

In this connection, the Security Council was obliged to stipulate the adoption of various concrete and effective measures to bring to an end Iraq's breaches of its international obligations. Clearly, many of the provisions of the resolutions we have just adopted would have been quite unnecessary had it not been for Baghdad's persistent attempts to deceive the international community about its military programmes, and in particular with regard to its activities in the nuclear sphere, in addition to the delays Iraq has incurred in the fulfilment of other obligations. We firmly expect Iraq henceforth strictly to fulfil its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions.

In the final analysis, that would be in the interests of Iraq itself. Only in this way can it turn a tragic page in its history and take a worthy place in the international community. The complete implementation of Security Council decisions would also bolster the ability of the United Nations to act as a guarantor of peace and security, based on the rule of law, and would help prevent such crises, both in that region and other regions of the world.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr van DAELE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): Allow me first, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. The exemplary manner in which you have handled our work so far leaves me convinced that the Council will fulfil its mission completely in the coming weeks.

I also wish to thank Ambassador Alarcon de Quesada for the effectiveness and courtesy with which he presided over the Council's work in July.

We have just adopted a resolution enabling States to resume, for a period of six months and up to a fixed amount, oil imports from Iraq. That resolution meets the humanitarian concerns voiced on various occasions by my delegation in the Council and in the Sanctions Committee. That is why we decided to become one of the sponsors of the resolution.

The resolution enables Iraq to obtain revenues that will make it possible for it to finance its imports of foodstuffs and essential goods.

Since April my delegation has advocated this option, while making it clear - and this is an important point - that the international community had to make quite sure that the revenues in question were really being used for foodstuffs and essential imports, and that the distribution would be carried out equitably for the benefit of all segments of the population in all regions.

We are gratified that the resolution we have just adopted sets up a workable system that meets that two-fold requirement.

In this respect, the Belgian delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General for kindly agreeing to organizing this supervision and monitoring and making it possible also for the Council to assess Iraq's humanitarian needs, thanks to the excellent report of his special representative, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan.

Resolution 706 (1991) before us creates the necessary conditions to generate additional revenues, which will make it possible to sustain the compensation fund and finance the cost of the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In this way, the compensation fund will quickly be equipped with funds to provide priority compensation for the individual human cases that its Governing Council, which met recently in Geneva, has rightly identified as being worthy of special attention.

Similarly, it was in our opinion, very justifiable for the Council to reach a decision at the same meeting today on the two other resolutions we have just adopted. The

compensation fund could not become operational, particularly in order to deal with individual cases until the ceiling for amounts to be withheld from Iraq's oil revenues had been set.

Lastly, I wish to conclude with these remarks: we felt it was necessary for the procedures for inspection of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to be defined most meticulously at the same time as we were setting the modalities for the financing of the destruction of these weapons, and at the same time we were able to draw all necessary lessons from the reports of the special commission on its mission.

Those are the remarks of my delegation which were prompted by the adoption of these three draft resolutions.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Belgium for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): Today is the forty-fourth anniversary of India's independence. On this auspicious day it is my pleasure to extend to you, Sir, my greetings and to express the deep satisfaction of my delegation to see you presiding over the Council. You bring to this high office a long and rich tradition in jurisprudence and diplomacy. These last two weeks you have given more than ample evidence of your skill and wisdom.

I should also like to express my delegation's deep thanks and appreciation to the Permanent Representative of Cuba, Ambassador Alarcon de Quesada, for the manner in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council last month.

I shall confine my remarks to resolution 706 (1991). The events in the Gulf over the last year set in motion the circumstances that the Security Council has been addressing. In recent months, an issue of undoubted importance has been the international community's response to the humanitarian problems in the region. Kuwait's independence and sovereignty have been restored, and we rejoice with the people of Kuwait, but its ordeal is not yet over. Meanwhile, the civilian population in Iraq undergoes suffering and trauma. The latter is our concern here at the moment.

The question, I believe, is not just the need to deal with the humanitarian requirements of those who suffer for no fault of their own. Both the requirements and the need to address them are evident. What is at stake is the manner in which those needs can be met. Several reports, ranging from the former Under-Secretary-General, Martti Ahtisaari's, to various missions by United Nations bodies and non-governmental organizations, down to the latest report by the Secretary-General's Executive Delegate for the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, have testified to the wretched condition of the Iraqi civilian population affected by war and sanctions.

My delegation's anxiety to formulate urgent and effective action to alleviate the misery of civilians in Iraq dates back several months. India's view has always been that the Security Council has the obligation to redress the plight of the innocent, just as the international community, as a whole, has partially been doing.

In cooperation with other non-aligned members of the Security Council, my delegation had proposed a draft resolution on this issue right at the beginning, but the Council was not able to adopt it. In the event, the

President of the Council drew attention in a statement to the importance of humanitarian relief for Iraq's civilian population.

In the Sanctions Committee, as well as during informal consultations, India has consistently and repeatedly advocated a generous and effective approach to tackling the

humanitarian situation in Iraq. To our regret, our efforts did not receive the unanimous support of Council members. This concern of ours that I have just explained has motivated, and continues to motivate, our position in the Security Council's consideration of the matter.

Needless to say, the United Nations is not unaware of the need to respond. The Sanctions Committee, in particular, has paid considerable attention to the problem. Indeed, the Sanctions Committee devised procedures to expedite certain forms of relief assistance to Iraq.

As a result of the efforts of non-aligned countries, including my own, the Council recognized the need to address this issue in all seriousness and with urgency. My delegation's initial reservations at what we felt were inadequate measures to deal with a problem of considerable magnitude were none the less somewhat allayed by the purposeful manner in which the Sanctions Committee, under the able Chairmanship of Ambassador Hohenfellner of Austria, operated the simplified procedures to clear humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Security Council resolution 687 (1991) subsequently, among other things, defined the humanitarian context in the circumstances then prevailing.

The humanitarian situation in Iraq continues to be grim. The most recent proof of this was Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan's report following his inter-agency mission to Iraq last month. After describing the desperate plight of the Iraqi civilian population, the report concluded that more massive infusion of relief supplies into Iraq was needed than what voluntary international assistance could provide. And for this purpose, he advocated permitting Iraq to utilize some of its oil revenues. We all agree with him on this point.

Resolution 706 (1991), just adopted, tries to meet these concerns to some extent. My delegation supports the idea of permitting oil sales from Iraq to finance, in a certain measure, its humanitarian needs. Paragraph 23 of Council resolution 687 (1991) deserves to be recalled here. That resolution chartered post-war arrangements for Iraq, and paragraph 23 lays down the provisions that should enable a response to the humanitarian circumstances that currently exist and are so acknowledged.

My delegation would have preferred a clear and unambiguous approach to this issue. The simplest and most effective way would have been to take action under paragraph 23. That however was not to be. In the alternative, my delegation would have liked the resolution to deal with the humanitarian aspect on its own. I realize there are other important issues. In particular, the issue of the repatriation of Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains must be resolved without delay. But in view of the urgency of providing relief in Iraq, and realizing that this resolution was perhaps the only way of achieving it, my delegation decided to go along with it. I trust that the adoption of the resolution will indeed result in the quick and effective supply of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable sections of Iraqi society.

My delegation's view of the role of the United Nations in the provision of humanitarian relief to Iraq is clear. All would agree with the objective, as My delegation does, that the resources raised by Iraqi Oil sales should be deployed for the purposes specified and that foodstuffs and other supplies should be provided equitably in all parts of Iraq and to all segments of the Iraqi civilian population. My delegation firmly believes that this should be sought to be achieved through means which are both consistent with the Charter, particularly the all-important principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, and in as practical and simplified a form as possible. Of cardinal importance in any such exercise is the consent of the country concerned. Lack of consent, or the absence of a specific request that incorporates such consent, will only thwart the effort. My delegation considers it especially important that the measures adopted must not adversely affect or undermine Iraq's sovereignty. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan himself observed in his report, in the context of equitable distribution, that a functioning food rationing system was already in place in Iraq. The Iraqi Government's willingness to

accept suitable mechanisms for the monitoring of oil revenues as well as their utilization has also been indicated by the Prince. Prince Sadruddin's report in fact made useful suggestions regarding the United Nations monitoring system that could be instituted for the purpose essentially by further developing and strengthening the present monitoring arrangements in the context of the United Nations humanitarian presence in Iraq. It is, therefore, evident that the humanitarian objectives we aim at can be achieved with simple and yet effective arrangements for observation and regular reporting, combined with provisions for review, periodically and as necessary. None of this calls for extensive United Nations machinery for administration or management. Such a United Nations presence, superimposed as it were on Iraq, would be intrusive, cumbersome and expensive. In addition, problems would arise in regard to United Nations expertise and provision of personnel for such a massive operation.

MY delegation is of the view that the provisions in the resolution do not call for arrangements of a tutelary kind that might have the effect of interfering in Iraq's internal affairs. The Secretary-General, who is requested to present his considered recommendations in the matter in 20 days' time, will no doubt keep these points in mind.

it is in the light of these considerations, and mindful of our concerns as I have tried to explain them, that we voted in favour of the resolution.

The President (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to congratulate the ambassador of India, on behalf of the Security Council, on the occasion of the anniversary of Indian national independence today. I also thank him for his kind words.

Mr. FLOREA (Romania): It is a pleasure for the Romanian delegation to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of August. As you have proved during these two weeks, we are confident that your efforts will be crowned with success for the benefit of our Council.

I should-also like to congratulate Ambassador Alarcon de Quesada of Cuba for the effective manner in which he conducted the business of the Council during the month of July.

The Council has just adopted three resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, dealing with important aspects of the matter. The first resolution establishes the ceiling of the value of Iraq's petroleum exports to the Compensation Fund established under resolution 687 (1991). The second resolution concerns the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with a number of its obligations under the relevant parts of section C of resolution 687 (1991). The third resolution authorizes, under special conditions, the import during a period of six months of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq.

We see these resolutions as an important element in assisting in the normalization of the situation in the Gulf. Kuwait, which suffered so much during the six months of its occupation, and other affected countries and individuals, will start being compensated. The situation of the Iraqi civilian population in all its segments will be improved. We understand that the provisions of resolution 706 (1991), just adopted, are extraordinary ones and the Council was obliged to react in this manner in the light of the Iraqi Government's practices and policies. We should like to stress that the manner in which these resolutions will be implemented will be a test for the Iraqi authorities and will create the grounds for a more positive approach of the Council vis-a-vis the future requests of Iraq to ease the sanctions. In this spirit, the Romanian delegation voted in favour of all three resolutions. That is why we make a solemn appeal to the Iraqi Government to fulfil its international obligations and to act in good faith to implement the provisions of the resolutions just adopted.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Romania for his kind words addressed to me.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Ecuador. I subscribe to all the words of thanks expressed to Ambassador Alarcon de Quesada for the way in which he conducted the Council's work last month, and in fact, I am reiterating what I said before we met on 8 August.

Ecuador voted in favour of the three draft resolutions adopted by the Council. As regards resolution 705 (1991), we did so because it incorporates a recommendation made by the Secretary-General about the percentage of Iraqi oil sales that should be paid into the Compensation Fund. Ecuador endorses the reasons set forth by the Secretary-General in his report for arriving at that recommendation.

With regard to resolution 706 (1991), Ecuador has always upheld the principle whereby the humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq deserve the

most favourable and timely consideration. We were among the sponsors of a draft resolution to that end, and we have consistently advocated in the Council and in the Committee provided for in resolution 661 (1991) that the Council should heed the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. The measures contained in resolution 706 (1991) will no doubt contribute to the purpose of relieving suffering and meeting the essential needs of the civilian population of Iraq.

Ecuador, however, has previously expressed its doubt about the wisdom of considering the humanitarian situation in Iraq under Chapter VII of the Charter and in connection with various other subjects that have a bearing on obligations assumed by Iraq, which need to be fully discharged, but which have nothing to do with the humanitarian situation. Moreover, Ecuador considers that supervision and monitoring by the United Nations should not lead the Organization to engage in actions at variance with permanent respect for the principles of the Charter, particularly paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article II.

As to resolution 707 (1991), Ecuador considers that, in the light of recent experience, its adoption was entirely justified.

I shall now revert to my role as President of the Council.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.