



# Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

*Provisional*

**4336**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Thursday, 28 June 2001, 3 p.m.

New York

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<i>President:</i>	Mr. Chowdhury . . . . .	(Bangladesh)
<i>Members:</i>	China . . . . .	Mr. Wang Donghua
	Colombia . . . . .	Mr. Franco
	France . . . . .	Mr. Florent
	Ireland . . . . .	Mr. Cooney
	Jamaica . . . . .	Mr. Ward
	Mali . . . . .	Mr. Kassé
	Mauritius . . . . .	Mr. Gokool
	Norway . . . . .	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation . . . . .	Mr. Lavrov
	Singapore . . . . .	Ms. Lee
	Tunisia . . . . .	Mr. Mejdoub
	Ukraine . . . . .	Mr. Herasymenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . . .	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America . . . . .	Mr. Cunningham

## Agenda

### The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Letter dated 15 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/597).

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*The meeting was resumed at 3.15 p.m. on Thursday, 28 June 2001.*

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Babaa** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*spoke in Arabic*): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We are confident that the Council's deliberations under your wise leadership will be crowned with success. We thank you for the opportunity to speak at this meeting. We express our appreciation to the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation for calling for the convening of this important meeting, for an open debate on the sanctions imposed on Iraq.

As a matter of principle, Libya opposes sanctions and supports the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and constructive dialogue. We believe in the need to respect the sovereignty, security, independence and territorial integrity of other States in order to achieve security and peace.

Sanctions must be the last resort for the Security Council to consider after it has explored all other peaceful means based on the Charter and on strong legal foundations. Sanctions must be imposed only when peace is threatened or breached and when there is aggression, and within a set time frame.

Therefore, we believe that sanctions must be immediately lifted without delay when the reasons for their imposition are eliminated. We believe that sanctions run counter to human rights. They are a violation of the right to life, the right to freedom from hunger and the right to education, health care and development. Sanctions also affect the most vulnerable in society, such as the aged, women and children. We fully reject the use of sanctions or the use of the Security Council's powers for promoting the interests of a State or group of States, for intervening in the internal affairs of States, for imposing a political regime, for overthrowing or changing a Government or for punishing a state.

The authority to impose sanctions and implement them, in addition to the right of veto, has led to disregard for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, which says that the Security Council acts on behalf of all Member States of the United Nations.

Therefore, the imposition of sanctions on a State must be a collective decision that enjoys the unanimous agreement of all Member States, with one set of standards for the imposition and lifting of sanctions.

We believe that other States have threatened regional and international peace and security. They have violated Security Council resolutions and international law and possess weapons of mass destruction. They have not been taken to task, however, because of the double standards used by major States.

The Tel Aviv regime, under the very eyes of the international community, continues to attempt to eradicate and disperse the Palestinian people and to gain control of its remaining territories, using new apartheid-like means based on occupation, settlement, siege and displacement. It is indeed strange that, due to such double standards, the major State providing the Tel Aviv regime with the most up-to-date weaponry, to be used against children and women, is the same very State that insists on maintaining the siege of Iraq and that prevents the Security Council from compelling the Tel Aviv regime to respect the resolutions of the United Nations and to protect the Palestinian people.

The sanctions imposed by the Security Council against Iraq have become a crime of genocide against the Iraqi people. The States that object to the lifting of those sanctions are guilty of that crime. These States have opened the territory of Iraq to weapons experts and foreign intelligence agencies for almost a decade. No corner of Iraq has been spared inspection; even Iraqi bedrooms have been inspected. The siege nevertheless continues as strong as ever in an attempt to destroy Iraq, its institutions and its infrastructure and to tear Iraqi society apart.

Despite the aggression and almost daily military attacks directed against Iraq, under the pretext of breaches of no-fly zones that were imposed without a mandate from the Security Council or the international community, the Security Council has not even initiated a debate of such aggression, which flagrantly violates international law, the United Nations Charter and its own resolutions under Chapter VII, which are binding on all States. Calling on Iraq to cooperate with the United Nations so that the sanctions may be lifted is an empty pretext to maintain those sanctions. Although Iraq has largely cooperated with the United Nations and the Security Council, the sanctions have neither been lifted, suspended nor lessened.

Iraq has the right not to trust that sanctions will be lifted when it cooperates, because it is mindful of the sanctions imposed against Libya and of the fact that the Security Council refused to lift those sanctions despite unanimous agreement among its members, with one exception, and within the international community that Libya had fully cooperated with the United Nations and satisfied all its obligations. Before demanding that Iraq cooperate further, the Security Council must regain its credibility by abiding by its own resolutions and cease exerting pressure on behalf of one State and its special interests.

As for the Security Council's consultations and the draft resolution being proposed in the guise of lessening the suffering of the Iraqi people by modifying the sanctions regime, they are merely attempts to perpetuate those sanctions eternally. Whether the sanctions imposed against Iraq are strong or weak, smart or dumb, they are in fact aimed against the present and future of an entire people. The object is the further destruction of that country, whose people has made a great contribution to human civilization.

In conclusion, we renew our call for an immediate lifting of sanctions without further delay. Their continuation in any form will ensure the ongoing suffering of the Iraqi people and have a negative impact on the situation in the region and throughout the world.

**The President:** I thank the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Japan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Satoh (Japan):** I would like to thank you, Sir, for giving me the opportunity to participate in today's discussion on this important issue.

Although it has been more than a decade since the ceasefire was achieved in the Gulf, the international community has yet to witness the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), which stipulated the conditions for a formal ceasefire, nor have the provisions of resolution 1284 (1999), which seeks to gain Iraq's cooperation with the United Nations, been implemented.

The current impasse, in which no progress can be made towards the implementation of the resolutions, is

a source of profound concern to us. We must remember what is at stake: the peace and stability of the Middle East region. A primary objective of the Council's resolutions is to ensure that Iraq no longer has the capacity to pose a threat to its neighbouring states. Also at stake is the credibility of international efforts for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As all know, Japan has been a strong advocate for the non-proliferation and eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, we share with the international community the concern for the plight of the Iraqi people. We believe that there is a need to make adjustments to the current sanctions regime in order to alleviate their suffering, while retaining the objectives of the Council's resolutions. It is in this context that we fully support the ongoing efforts of the Council to modify the current sanctions regime in line with resolution 1352 (2001), which was adopted unanimously. We will support any step to ease the suffering of the Iraqi people that does not compromise our common objective of resolving the disarmament issue in Iraq.

I would like to add here that the interested States in the region should be consulted in the process of formulating the specifics of the new sanctions regime. Their cooperation is essential in order to ensure the effective implementation of such a new regime.

Japan, which has retained its bilateral diplomatic relations with Iraq throughout the past decade, has continuously sought to persuade the Government of Iraq to implement the relevant resolutions and to cooperate with the United Nations, particularly with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Regrettably, such efforts by us and other members of the international community have so far reaped no discernible results.

We would therefore like to take this opportunity once again to call on the Government of Iraq to cooperate with the United Nations and to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions as soon as possible. In this context, we hope that the dialogue between Iraq and the United Nations will be maintained.

I would also to take this opportunity to urge all members of the Council, particularly the permanent members, to make further efforts to act **together** to resolve the situation. In dealing with an issue as

difficult as the Iraqi situation, it is crucial that the Council act in unity. Unless the Council speaks with one voice, the prospect for breaking the current impasse will not improve.

We look forward to the day when Iraq can normalize its relationship with the international community. This will be possible only when the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions are implemented. We sincerely hope that this will be achieved without further delay.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Turkey. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Pamir (Turkey):** Like previous speakers, I should also like to congratulate you, Mr. President, for having taken the helm of the Security Council during this busy month of June.

The Council is again deliberating on a matter that has preoccupied the international community for more than 10 years now. We believe that a comprehensive approach is required to overcome the present standstill in connection with the sanctions on Iraq. Like all those nations that are voicing their concerns and hopes here today, Turkey is deeply distressed by the ongoing suffering of the Iraqi people under the prevailing conditions. We are also one of the foremost countries to have been heavily affected by the sanctions against Iraq.

Let me place on record the fact that Turkey's principal wish is to see these sanctions lifted altogether in the nearest possible future. For this to happen, a new spirit of cooperation between the Security Council and Iraq will have to take hold. We want to see the current negotiations among the membership of the Council lead to precisely that. This exercise should stay its course and effectively eliminate the existing stumbling-blocks that stand in the way of the Iraqi people's access to all civilian goods.

Similarly, the distance between the Security Council and Iraq should be bridged in a manner that would bring them within the range of cooperation on monitoring and verification issues relating to paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 687 (1991).

I cannot overemphasize my country's longstanding concern over the deployment and development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in our region.

We were heartened when a fresh dialogue started between Iraq and the Secretary-General last February. We believe that this momentum should be maintained. We think that it is even more important now for this dialogue to continue in the light of the ongoing drafting process in the Security Council, as it seems that the resulting text will give more discretion to the Secretary-General in the execution of the humanitarian programme.

Our view of the future is clear. We are now faced with the critical need to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Iraq and to relieve the bordering countries of the disproportionate economic and social burden they have been shouldering all these years.

The idea should therefore not be to make the present scope of trade with Iraq more restrictive and render the procedures more cumbersome, introducing new uncalled-for obligations into the system. It should, rather, pave the way for a more liberalized trade system that will both guard the economic and commercial interests of these countries and draw Iraq's cooperation, which is essential, thus making arrangements workable.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of India. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Pal (India):** Mr. President, we thank you for calling this meeting. Let me also put on record our appreciation for your contribution to the Council's work and for the cooperation you and your indefatigable team have extended to all delegations.

India has always opposed sanctions that have a humanitarian impact, and, as External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh has said in Parliament,

“the sanctions imposed on Iraq are unjust, unwise and detrimental to large numbers of innocent Iraqi men, women and children”.

We have repeatedly called for these sanctions to be lifted in tandem with Iraq's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. We believe that the no-fly zones are not sanctioned by any aspect of the Council's resolutions. We have always disapproved of unilateral armed action against Iraq, and we believe attempts to undermine Iraq's territorial integrity — attempts which we reject — could have unforeseen and destructive geopolitical implications for the region.

The sanctions on Iraq have also caused acute economic and financial hardship to other countries, India among them. Unfortunately, our request for relief under Article 50 is still pending with the Sanctions Committee. To ease the serious strain imposed on our economy by these sanctions, we have also informed the Council about a counter-trade arrangement with Iraq which will let it import food from India against the export of crude oil and oil products.

India has a vital interest in the peace and prosperity of the Gulf, which is part of our neighbourhood. We have therefore supported every initiative to defuse the crisis over Iraq and believe it would help promote the security and stability of the region if Iraq were brought back into the mainstream of regional and international affairs. We hope diplomatic efforts will be resumed under the auspices of the United Nations. We see the need to develop fresh ideas and new mechanisms to serve the purpose of the United Nations. We hope the Council will act urgently to end the long nightmare of the people of Iraq.

**The President:** I thank the representative of India for the kind words he addressed to me and to my colleagues.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Australia. I invite her to take a seat at the Council table and to make her statement.

**Ms. Wensley (Australia):** I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this open meeting of the Council.

Australia remains committed to the full implementation of all Security Council resolutions on Iraq. We support the two principles now guiding the Security Council's approach to Iraq, as set out in resolution 1352 (2001), namely to improve the flow of goods and commodities to Iraq while ensuring that military-related items are not exported to it.

Australia welcomes the constructive proposals put forward in the United Kingdom draft resolution, which is based on these two principles. We believe that these proposals, if implemented, would make a significant difference to the flow of civilian goods to Iraq. If the draft resolution were adopted, we would go from a situation in which all imports to Iraq are prohibited unless specifically allowed, to one where all imports are automatically allowed, unless they are on the goods

review list. And even items on this list could be approved, depending on their end use.

Australia is of the firm view that for any region, including our own, to achieve a positive security environment, it is imperative for the States of that region to meet their international obligations. This is particularly true in respect of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction obligations under Security Council resolutions. Like others, we have been concerned that, for over two years now, it has not been possible to carry out the weapons verification and monitoring work in Iraq as mandated by the United Nations.

This has had a destabilizing effect on the region as a whole. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) has not been able to commence its inspection activities in Iraq, in line with its United Nations mandate. This is most discouraging. Likewise, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is still unable to resume its verification and monitoring activities in Iraq, as mandated by the Security Council. We call upon Iraq to cooperate fully with UNMOVIC and the IAEA to demonstrate its good faith and its willingness to work with the international community. Full implementation of these activities is essential to provide the assurances required by the Security Council. It is our sincere hope that the Iraqi leadership will now take the necessary steps to fulfil its international obligations. These obligations are clear. Iraq must comply fully with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

The Australian Government is concerned at the humanitarian situation in Iraq and is deeply sympathetic to the plight of the Iraqi people. However, United Nations sanctions are not aimed at the ordinary Iraqi person. Every effort has been made by the United Nations and the international community, including Australia, to limit their impact on the Iraqi people. The United Kingdom draft resolution would take us still further in this direction.

Australia welcomes the improvements which have been made in the implementation of the oil-for-food programme since its inception, through the passage of resolutions 1284 (1999), 1302 (2000) and 1330 (2000). These improvements include the lifting of the ceiling which previously applied to Iraqi oil exports; expedited approval procedures for many food, agriculture, educational, housing and health items; and increases in

the money available to Iraq for expenditure on its oil sector.

We welcome evidence that the oil-for-food programme has arrested the decline in Iraqi living standards, but equally we recognize the imperative of further alleviating the predicament of the Iraqi civilian population. We therefore urge the international community to support the additional improvements to the programme currently under consideration. We see this latest effort as an important step forward which will make a difference to the lives of ordinary Iraqi citizens.

**The President:** I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of the Netherlands in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, so decided.

I invite the representative of the Netherlands to take the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of New Zealand. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and make his statement.

**Mr. MacKay** (New Zealand): New Zealand fully supports the current efforts of the Council to revise the sanctions regime in respect of Iraq in order to permit the restoration of normal trade as far as possible, while maintaining effective controls on goods which may assist Iraq to rearm with weapons of mass destruction.

Sanctions are an indispensable tool for the Council, but they are also a blunt instrument. My delegation considers that sanctions must be targeted for maximum effectiveness and focused so as to minimize any harmful impact on the humanitarian needs of the civilian population concerned.

The urgent need to alleviate the serious humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi civilian population is well recognized. It was out of concern for the civilian population of Iraq that the oil-for-food programme was first put in place. It was not, however, designed as a long-term mechanism to meet all the humanitarian

needs of the Iraqi population. That said, the oil-for-food programme should be able to fulfil their basic needs. New Zealand has welcomed the efforts of the Council, particularly since the adoption of resolution 1284 (1999), to improve the situation of ordinary Iraqis by making the programme more effective.

The lifting of the ceiling on Iraq's oil exports and the streamlining of the approval process for importing civilian goods have been demonstrable improvements in the way in which sanctions have been applied to Iraq. They have given the Government of Iraq the clear means of meeting the needs of its civilian population. That the Government of Iraq has chosen not to do so, and continues to undermine the effectiveness of the programme through its current refusal to export oil, remains a matter of grave concern to my Government.

The key to removing the need for any sanctions regime is clearly in the hands of the Iraqi Government. It must comply with the resolutions of the Council, including by admitting United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspectors into Iraq in order to verify that it has met its disarmament obligations. My delegation fully endorses the Council's efforts to secure Iraqi compliance with its obligations to disarm.

We recognize that the cooperation of the countries of the region in particular is essential to make the proposed new arrangements workable and effective, and we welcome clear recognition of this fact by the Council. The current sanctions regime against Iraq has been characterized by compliance problems. The successful implementation of the changes proposed to the sanctions regime will require the full cooperation of all Member States.

The commitment of the Council in resolution 1352 (2001) to bring about significant improvements in the flow of commodities and products to Iraq will be of benefit to the region as a whole. The restoration of normal trade is an important step in Iraq's return to the modern world and will also be of great benefit to the Iraqi Government itself, should it choose to cooperate.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Bahrain. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and make his statement.

**Mr. Buallay** (Bahrain) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation is delighted to see you, Sir, presiding over the Security Council, perhaps for the second time on

the same subject. This provides a certain continuity that is a source of confidence and pleasure for us.

In taking up the consequences of Iraqi aggression against the State of Kuwait, the Security Council enacted resolution 687 (1991), which included principal elements, such as eradicating weapons of mass destruction, boycotting the regime, freeing Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti prisoners, the return of Kuwaiti property, as well as measures to ease the effect of sanctions on the Iraqi people.

Eight years after the adoption of that resolution, years characterized by varying levels of disagreement and controversy on implementation between the United Nations and Iraq, focusing essentially on the issue of weapons of mass destruction and the humanitarian aspects of the boycott, there has been a total neglect of prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property. Following those eight years, the Security Council enacted resolution 1284 (1999) which sought on the one hand to ease implementation and on the other to again shed light on the issues of prisoners and properties.

In resolution 1284 (1999) the Security Council showed that it was prepared for further cooperation with Iraq, in that it showed much flexibility on the four main dossiers relating to weapons of mass destruction, while it clearly showed an easing on the humanitarian effects of the sanctions regime.

The Security Council had hoped that in meeting Iraq halfway, the effects of its aggression on the State of Kuwait would finally be overcome. Despite the fact that there has been documented recognition of the State of Kuwait from time to time, there are strange references that cast doubt on the existence of such recognition. The Security Council tried to create a positive environment in dealing with Iraq by adopting its second major resolution, resolution 1284 (1999), a resolution inspired by the experience resulting from the implementation of the first major resolution, resolution 687 (1999). So the resolution did not come out of a vacuum. Its objective was to improve dealings between the two parties in order to move forward with the issue and finally resolve it.

What was the result? Regrettably, it was not encouraging. The situation on the ground has not shown any movement whatsoever. Iraq states that most, if not all, the dossiers on weapons of mass destruction are closed or nearly closed. If that is true, why can it not be officially certified by the United Nations

following verification by the Commission created in resolution 1284 (1999)? That commission, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), whose Chairman and other members are said to be neutral and above all the suspicions that were directed against the Chairman and some of the members of the Commission's predecessor, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Iraq states that it has no Kuwaiti prisoners. However, it states in turn that there are Iraqi missing persons. It is difficult for us to understand this statement that there are no Kuwaiti prisoners. The case file on each of those persons is fully documented and shows that they have disappeared, and that they are in Iraq. In order to resolve this issue, Iraq merely has to cooperate with the coordinator of the Secretary-General, who was appointed for that purpose, and has to participate in the activities of the international committee created for that purpose.

Finally, we have no need to take up the humanitarian aspect of the sanctions. Many improvements have been made to the regime in order to satisfy the needs of the Iraqi people. So where is the problem in trying to eliminate the remaining effects of Iraq's occupation of the State Kuwait, although more than nine years have passed since the end of the occupation and the liberation of Kuwait? We, the States of the region, believe that it is not natural for us to live in a situation of see-sawing between peace and war. We have major responsibilities towards our peoples, responsibilities and obligations in the domains of political, economic and social development. We also have the responsibility of creating conditions ensuring the success of these plans for development. We cannot say with any degree of certainty that such conditions currently exist.

Ultimately, we must call for constructive and genuine cooperation between the Security Council and Iraq. We must work to find a solid foundation for such cooperation. That necessarily requires Iraq's implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. In return, the Security Council must be prepared to lift the embargo against Iraq when the main dossiers on weapons of mass destruction are closed and when the issue of Kuwaiti prisoners of war, prisoners of other nationalities and Kuwaiti properties are resolved.

**The President:** The next speaker is the representative of Germany. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Kastrup** (Germany): The Swedish Ambassador has spoken on behalf of the European Union. My country fully supports that statement, but we would like to offer some additional remarks.

It is regrettable that the Security Council still has to discuss the sanctions regime on Iraq more than 10 years after the end of the Gulf War. My country is concerned about the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and we are, like many other Member States, determined to improve that situation. We want to emphasize, however — and I say this in the presence of the representative of the Iraqi Government — that it remains the responsibility of the Government of Iraq alone to improve the situation of its population. For Germany, it goes without saying that the best solution would be the lifting of sanctions, but, of course, only after full compliance by the Government of Iraq with all relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular the obligations contained in resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999). Unfortunately, we are still far away from this best solution. In this context, we have taken note of the new Russian draft resolution. We have strong doubts that it will contribute to the urgently needed consensus.

The call for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999) remains valid. These resolutions define the obligations of Iraq in the areas of weapons of mass destruction and describe, at the same time, the way to the suspension and lifting of the sanctions. The failure of the Government of Iraq to fulfil its obligations, most significantly visible through the continued denial of cooperation with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, prevents until this day, unfortunately, the lifting of sanctions.

The difficult humanitarian situation in Iraq has been giving the international community reasons for concern practically throughout the existing sanctions regime against Iraq. The Security Council has repeatedly reacted to this situation, particularly through the inception of the oil-for-food programme and its subsequent changes and additions. It should be recalled that this programme was never intended to meet all the needs of the Iraqi population, but it is supposed to provide sufficient basic requirements. We would like to recall the repeated concern raised by the Secretary-General that Iraq is not using the already existing mechanisms to their full potential. As this

responsibility lies solely with the Iraqi Government, the international community has only limited influence.

Nobody in Germany wants to see the Iraqi population suffer unnecessarily, but as long as the Government of Iraq does not comply with its international obligations, the question will not be whether to lift sanctions or not. The question will be how to improve the sanctions regime by making sanctions more targeted towards achievement of the objectives, by making them more efficient and by limiting their negative effects on the population of Iraq. We therefore welcome the ongoing discussions. We believe that a more transparent, practicable and targeted system could be created by improving the flow of commodities and products to Iraq, and at the same time, by creating more effective controls to prevent circumvention. This would lead to an environment that is conducive to the improvement of the humanitarian situation of the people.

Such a new approach should allow for potentially growing civilian trade, including projects for infrastructure. In this context, the so-called Goods Review List is of paramount importance. Those goods and items have to be defined that will prevent the rebuilding of the military capabilities and capacities of Iraq and prevent the import of dual-use goods. In shaping this list, work should be undertaken in a target-oriented approach, making the list transparent, concise and, thus, implementable. Furthermore, we expect that these new arrangements will, by clearly defining the goods and items on the Goods Review List, alleviate the problems that have led to the large number of applications being put on hold by the sanctions committee.

The Security Council has a responsibility to develop a new strategy in a coherent and transparent manner. We welcome the fact that, after long-standing debate on civilian passage and cargo flights, the opportunity for a solution exists. These flights should be made possible through an easily implementable system that would allow for practical solutions, including the necessary inspections.

We encourage the Security Council to work towards a concrete solution that will benefit the Iraqi people, while ensuring the compliance and cooperation of the Iraqi Government. This solution should also take into account the admittedly extremely difficult situation of neighbouring States. We recall, in that context,

Security Council resolution 1352 (2001), which confirmed the agreement among the members of the Security Council to work on new arrangements for Iraq, allowing 30 days to conclude these measures. We all know that the 30 days are about to expire in just a couple of days, but it seems much work still has to be done. In the interest of the Iraqi people and in the interest of the international community, the Security Council should meet this target.

**The President:** I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

**Mr. van den Berg** (Netherlands): The Netherlands welcomes this open debate, which offers all United Nations members the opportunity to present their views on the question concerning Iraq. We also express our full support for the statement made by the presidency of the European Union.

The Netherlands wishes to see the full rehabilitation of Iraq as a normal member of the international community as soon as possible. But let us not forget that it was Iraq itself that, by its actions, moved into the position of outcast. At the root of the present situation lies the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. This aggression was reversed back by the international community, which subsequently determined that this should not happen again. Hence, resolution 687 (1991). The Netherlands continues to support that resolution's clear objective of preventing renewed Iraqi aggression.

At the same time, the road to the full rehabilitation of Iraq is equally clear. The Government of Iraq must comply with and implement the relevant Security Council resolutions. Once Iraq has complied, sanctions will be lifted. If at a prior stage it cooperates in all respects with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), sanctions will be suspended. Sadly, so far Iraq has not made it possible for the Council to take those decisions. It even refuses to cooperate on the issues of the missing persons and Kuwaiti property.

Despite the attitude of the Government of Iraq, the Council itself must continue to do what it can to ease the plight of the people of Iraq. Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) contributed significantly to reaching the objective of more targeted sanctions. The efforts currently under way in the Council to further

improve the sanctions regime proceed from the logic of that resolution, and we warmly welcome them. We commend the United Kingdom for having taken the lead in these discussions.

The Netherlands is pleased to see the introduction of the principle that all goods and products will be allowed into Iraq unless they are on the Goods Review List and there is a specific decision to block them. We understand that setting up a new regime is a very complicated task. The new system will inevitably imply a trade-off between the length of the list and the manageability of the regime; just as it will be a trade-off between preventing the unwanted access of Iraq to military equipment and the fate of the Iraqi people.

In dealing with these trade-offs, the guiding principle should be whether the new regime can work in practice. During its membership on the Council, the Netherlands spoke up repeatedly about the unacceptably high number of contracts on hold. We hope and believe that the new system will make an excessive number of such holds a thing of the past.

A number of delegations have spoken before me and their interventions cause me to underline one aspect of the Iraqi question which is not without significance. The Netherlands believes that the Council should also look into ideas concerning the maintenance and improvement of Iraqi oil production capacity. It will enable Iraq to make full use of the expanded opportunities within the framework of an improved sanctions regime for the benefit of its people. Proper repairs and development of the industry, including providing the means for good oil-field husbandry, are needed to ensure sustainable and ecologically sound oil production over the years to come.

The Netherlands urges the Council to successfully conclude efforts to introduce the necessary improvements in the sanctions regime with regard to Iraq. If it is not possible for the Council to discuss all aspects simultaneously, we fully understand that the Council will concentrate first on the important aspect of the Goods Review List.

**The President:** The next speaker is the representative of Italy. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Vento** (Italy): I wish to begin, Mr. President, by thanking you for convening this open forum, which gives United Nations Member States that are not on the

Security Council the opportunity to express their views on one of the most sensitive issues of the day: the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. As I take the floor in this Chamber for the first time this month, I would like also to express the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you, Sir, at the helm of the Council.

The representative of Sweden has already made a statement on behalf of the European Union. Italy fully endorses it, and would like only to add a few remarks. It is Italy's strong hope that in the not-too-distant future the United Nations will be able to certify that the conditions are right for a full resumption of relations between Iraq and the international community. To that end, we must promote the establishment of a climate of trust through the adoption of measures inspired, first of all, by respect for all the pertinent United Nations resolutions and by equitable and constructive initiatives. We also consider that the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of every State in the region deserve the respect of all members of the international community.

In order for normal relations between Iraq and the international community to be re-established and for sanctions to be lifted, it is essential that the Iraqi Government show a spirit of full cooperation, first of all by welcoming the inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and allowing them to do their job.

Of the many aspects of the complex issue we are dealing with today, the humanitarian question is undoubtedly the largest and the most pressing. It is of the utmost urgency that there be a return to an appropriate dialogue on the fate of prisoners of war and of those missing in action, as well as on property that had been removed. In that connection, the foundations for the promising development of such a dialogue would be laid with immediate conciliatory gestures by the Iraqi Government.

At the same time, one cannot but feel the greatest compassion for the innocent civilian population of Iraq, where health conditions, especially those of women and children, remain critical and cry out for a prompt and appropriate response by the international community. Emergency measures are needed to stem the tide of epidemic, reverse the exponential increase in infant mortality and halt the outbreak of serious illnesses such as leukaemia and cancer related to the environmental degradation that has accompanied the now-10-year-old

sanctions regime. It is therefore a matter of top priority that Iraq's medical and hospital structures be rehabilitated and that basic health and hygiene conditions be improved.

To achieve a lasting amelioration of social conditions, the basic economic infrastructure must be revitalized. Measures must be devised to stimulate the supply of commodities and services and to facilitate economic cooperation, including investment in civilian sectors, starting with the water supply, sewage, energy, fuel and transportation. At the same time there should be a gradual resumption of commercial flights to Iraq, with appropriate guarantees and controls.

Of course, to make an improved sanctions regime function more effectively, all Member States must be determined to give the United Nations their fullest cooperation. Concurrently, the adoption of more transparent and effective authorization procedures would prevent rearmament without prejudicing trade, would liberalize the flow of civilian goods and services to Iraq, and would help redress the current imbalances.

In that context, the interests of neighbouring countries have to be taken fully into account; their agreement is needed for any future arrangement. That is requested both as a matter of fairness and for the sake of regional stability.

Ten years is a long time in both human and foreign relations. It is in everyone's best interest to reach a satisfactory and final settlement of the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. A few months ago, we had a glimpse of hope when talks were resumed between the Secretary-General and the Government of Iraq. We still trust that the Secretary-General can provide an ideal channel of dialogue to improve the present sorry state of affairs and to help Iraq abide by the relevant United Nations resolutions, finally taking its full place once again in the community of nations.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Italy for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Yemen. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Al-Ashtal (Yemen) (spoke in Arabic):** I wish at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you most sincerely on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month, a month that has seen continuous Council activity under your wise leadership.

Behind the item before the Council today — the situation between Iraq and Kuwait — lies the genuine tragedy that affected Kuwait for a certain time. But Iraq continues to suffer from its impact. To this day, the people of Iraq — women, children and old people — continue to suffer hardship and pain. They continue to suffer the repercussions of a painful calamity and to pay an exorbitant price for it.

It is true that the Gulf crisis that has blighted our region inflicted a deep wound on the Arab body politic; it will not heal until we overcome the crisis in all its dimensions. This must include an appropriate solution of the question of Kuwaiti prisoners and property.

But it is also true that continuing the blockade against Iraq will pose a threat to peace and stability in the region for many years to come. How could it be otherwise when an entire generation of Iraqis live a life of misery, which breeds indignation and hatred and sows the seeds of future crisis?

Today, Kuwait has been liberated. It has regained its sovereignty and has secured its borders. Today, the Gulf crisis is history, but Iraq continues to this day to live that tragedy. The comprehensive embargo imposed on Iraq 10 years ago continues ceaselessly to crush the Iraqi people. For Iraq and the Iraqis, time has stood still. Building has ceased; development has halted. Indeed, life has come to an end for hundreds of thousands of children felled by disease and epidemic in the wake of a comprehensive blockade imposed by military force. A whole generation of Iraqis have become victims of the embargo, whose effects exceed those of the war in their scope, harmfulness, damage and seriousness. All sectors of the State and of society have been affected; the infrastructure has withered; health care and education have deteriorated, leaving behind permanent disabilities.

The embargo's effects on Iraq are not confined to the Iraqi people; the impact has been directly felt by neighbouring countries and indirectly by other countries, such as my own country, Yemen, which has experienced great economic, trade and financial problems. Suffice it to say that eight huge Iraqi ships have been moored in Aden harbour for more than 10 years, constituting a real environmental hazard there.

We call for an end to the embargo, an end to the suffering of the Iraqi people so that they will have the opportunity to rebuild anew, to repair the damage, tragedy and pain caused by the embargo. The embargo

imposed on Iraq, whether smart or stupid, today has no political or ethical justification. This is my country's position. Arab public opinion feels that the Iraqis are the victims of collective punishment that was meted out to that people, who has suffered enough.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Yemen for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, whom I invite to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Wehbe** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, allow me, Sir, to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you preside over the Security Council for the month of June. On this occasion, I should like to assure you of our readiness to cooperate fully with you and with your brotherly country in any way possible to crown your efforts with success, efforts to promote the role of the United Nations and, particularly, this Security Council, in the maintenance of international peace and security. We would also like to express our appreciation to you for this meeting. Allow us also to express our sincere thanks to Ambassador Sergei Lavrov for his proposal to convene this open meeting of the Security Council in order to undertake a general debate on this important and timely issue.

The Syrian Arab Republic is carefully following the Security Council's continuing deliberations on the sanctions imposed on Iraq. We are hopeful that the current consultations will lead to a definitive end to the suffering of millions of women, children, young people and the elderly in Iraq, all of whom are suffering from the harshness of the embargo and its destructive consequences at various levels. We are glad to note an increasing international understanding, as I heard in delegations' statements yesterday and today. This concern shows the importance of freeing the Iraqi people from its suffering after more than 10 years of the embargo, the sole consequence of which has been more suffering and frustration for our Iraqi brothers.

At this stage, I would like to state that continuation of the sanctions will lead to serious repercussions for the unity of Iraq, for the security and stability of the region and for unforeseeable environmental and social deterioration, not to mention a grinding halt to development in all its forms.

My delegation wishes to state that we are strongly attached to the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. Syria opposes any measures taken against Iraq outside of the purview of United Nations resolutions. We must ensure the necessary credibility of the Security Council in its implementation of United Nations resolutions.

Faced with the stormy developments of 1990, the position of the Syrian Arab Republic was crystal clear. We recall the constructive role played by Syria in the liberation of brotherly Kuwait, assisting our brothers in that nation by all means available to us. We continue our endeavours to help Kuwait overcome the pain afflicted upon it. The Syrian Arab Republic continues to believe that it is necessary to eliminate all the negative effects that have befallen the people of Kuwait as a result of that war. We express our attachment to the independence, sovereignty and security of Kuwait, as well as to the return of Kuwaiti prisoners of war, missing persons and others to their families and homes. Let me stress the need for the return of Kuwaiti properties to Kuwait in a practical framework agreed upon fundamentally between the two parties, Iraq and Kuwait, so that deliberations on these issues may have a political and humanitarian framework, thus leading to a solution.

The Syrian Arab Republic supports and abides by the full implementation of the resolutions of international legitimacy. We spoke out on the need to maintain international legitimacy and the relevant resolutions in all fields, without any double standards in the implementation of such resolutions.

Within the debate on the varying aspects of sanctions, Syria is not satisfied. We have repeatedly said that we are not satisfied with sanctions in principle. We have always called for the lifting of sanctions imposed on the Iraqi people. Syria's position proceeds from the following basic factors.

First, the principle of economic sanctions has proved worthless and has shown that they are harmful to international relations and therefore must be set aside. They must not be resorted to.

Secondly, seeing that these sanctions have had such harmful effects on the Iraqi people and have increased its suffering, they, the sanctions, have also been harmful to Iraq's neighbouring States and peoples.

Thirdly, there is a general Arab consensus against continuing sanctions with respect to Iraq. This was

made very clear during the deliberations among the leaders of Arab States at the latest Arab summit in Amman. Syria looks to this Council to take into consideration, when debating and taking up the differing viewpoints on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the major economic difficulties that have confronted the neighbouring States as a consequence of the sanctions imposed on Iraq. The Council must take into consideration the utmost importance that neighbouring States and peoples attach to the lifting of the sanctions. These States must be able to resume a normal cycle of economic life. We hope that new resolutions in this regard will not jeopardize the sovereignty of neighbouring States with respect to land or the air.

Furthermore, any talk of a draft resolution tabled in the Security Council on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the region would be acceptable if it came within a comprehensive purview aiming to transform the Middle East into an area free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. Therefore, this would include the need to compel Israel to place all its nuclear installations under international control. Security Council resolution 687 (1991) states in paragraph 14 that the Council noted that measures to be taken by Iraq stipulated in earlier paragraphs represented steps towards the objective of creating a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

We are confident that the Security Council, which bears the responsibility to maintain international peace and security and to protect the life and future of humanity, will take into consideration, in debating the draft resolution on Iraq, the tragic humanitarian situation of the people of Iraq and the peoples of neighbouring countries.

There is a strong wish in international public opinion, and particularly among Arab peoples, to lift the sanctions imposed on the Iraqi people in order to heal the wounds and put an end to suffering, so as to allow the people of Iraq to open a new page on the long road to comprehensive development — development that we all seek within these United Nations.

**The President:** I thank the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic for his kind words addressed to me and also his words of cooperation to me and my country.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Spain. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make a statement.

**Mr. Arias** (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): I am pleased, Mr. President, to see you presiding over the Council on this very special occasion. My delegation associated itself with the statement delivered by Sweden on behalf of the European Union. Allow me to add a view brief comments in a national capacity.

First of all, the question of Iraq raises the need to reach a political, diplomatic and comprehensive solution based on respect for international legality expressed in all of the resolutions of the United Nations from 1991 until the present time, including resolution 1284, with which Iraq must comply and which is the only way to secure the lifting of sanctions and of normalizing its role in the international community. It is also necessary to guarantee the territorial integrity and the political independence of all of the countries in the region, including Iraq.

Secondly, consensus within the Security Council is crucial in order to achieve these objectives.

Thirdly, we support an active role for the Secretary-General, with the impartiality for which he is known, to continue the process of dialogue with Iraq begun in February of this year, for which it is important to create the appropriate conditions.

Fourthly, it is also necessary to effectively tackle the humanitarian catastrophe that is being experienced by the Iraqi people. To do so, we must normalize the civilian economy of Iraq as much as possible.

In this context, the unanimous adoption of resolution 1352 (2001) by the Security Council deserves our whole-hearted support, as do the efforts that are being made at the present time in order to implement, with the same unanimity, the principles behind resolution 1352 (2001) in order to enable us to practically reactivate the Iraqi civilian economy in all of its aspects, with minimal number of necessary restrictions, to guarantee compliance with the main objectives of controlling military exports.

Fifthly, we should not lose sight of the regional situation as a whole and, in particular, the unique and difficult circumstances of the countries that border on Iraq.

Lastly, the Goods Review List, in our opinion, should be as short, concise and clear as possible in order to prevent the current situation of "holds", which makes it difficult to use the benefits of these changes for the Iraqi people, who have suffered unjustly for a decade.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make a statement.

**Mr. Heinbecker** (Canada) (*spoke in French*): I welcome the opportunity provided me to express the point of view of Canada on the draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom.

For years now, critics have stressed that the sanctions regime against Iraq was indifferent to the sufferings of the Iraqi people. We admit that the sanctions regime has had weak points, but this draft resolution, if adopted, could eliminate most of these weaknesses once and for all.

(*spoke in English*)

This draft resolution, if adopted, would enable the Government of Iraq to respond more comprehensively than heretofore to the needs of its citizens. Unfortunately, however, there has been no sign whatsoever that the suffering of the people of Iraq has troubled the leadership of that country. Saddam Hussein has not availed himself of the many possibilities already available to him if he wished to help his people, nor has there been a scintilla of evidence that he is now reconciled to living at peace with his neighbours.

For this reason, we believe that constraints on Iraq's freedom remain necessary. So long as Iraq refuses to accept the obligations and responsibilities laid out in successive Security Council resolutions, restrictions on its military capabilities serve all our interests.

On the humanitarian front, the approach embodied by the United Kingdom's draft resolution moves us closer to the objectives of targeted sanctions, which we believe should be the norm for all future Security Council sanctions efforts. In fact, we are disappointed that the strong recommendations developed by the Security Council group on sanctions have still not seen the light of day and we would urge the Council to adopt them as soon as possible. In any case, all those who agree with the need for the Council to be more precise in the employment of sanctions

should embrace the approach embodied in this draft resolution, particularly since it so clearly and directly addresses the humanitarian plight of the Iraqi people.

It is a sad paradox that, if the opponents to this approach succeed in sidetracking it, the result will be a status quo ante that they themselves have long claimed to be unacceptable. We understand the concerns expressed by Iraq's neighbours regarding this draft resolution, particularly in light of the Iraqi threat to retaliate against any State that cooperates with the implementation of this approach — that is to say, cooperates with an approach taken by the Security Council. We welcome efforts by Council members to develop mechanisms to address these concerns.

The divisions in the Security Council, evident in the vote on resolution 1284 (1999) and since, have encouraged Iraq's intransigence over the past 18 months. They have fostered the mistaken belief that sanctions would go away. This has not served the interests of the international community; it has not served the interests of the region; and it has most manifestly not served the interests of the Iraqi people. A united and resolute stand by the Council and the countries of the region now would send a clear message to Iraq that compliance remains the only solution. Full compliance will lead to an end to the sanctions, but both compliance and control have to remain our objective.

It is for these reasons that we were particularly discouraged by the interventions we heard on Tuesday from certain Council members. I need hardly remind members of the Council that Article 24 of the Charter specifies that Security Council members are to act on behalf of the entire United Nations membership. Thus, the threat to veto this draft resolution on the basis of acknowledged national, economic or political considerations not only damages the Council's credibility, but also demonstrates once again the need to curtail this instrument. It is not being employed responsibly this time.

We appeal to all Council members to act corporately in the common interest. That is their duty under the Charter; this is our expectation of them as our representatives. We urge all members of the Council to support the United Kingdom's draft resolution.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Thailand. I invite him to

take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Singhara Na Ayudhaya** (Thailand): I should like to express my appreciation to you, Sir, for convening this important open meeting on the agenda item "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait". I should also like to thank the Russian Federation for taking the initiative of requesting such a meeting.

Like many other countries, Thailand is primarily concerned over the well-being and welfare of the people of Iraq. The sanctions imposed on Iraq by relevant resolutions of the Security Council have brought about hardship for ordinary Iraqi citizens. The suffering, particularly that of women, children and the elderly, has gone on for so long.

We note that the existing humanitarian programme in Iraq, under the auspices of the oil-for-food programme, has, over the past four years, contributed to improving the living conditions of the average Iraqi, according to the Secretary-General's report pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1330 (2000). According to the same report, however, more can be done to alleviate the plight of the Iraqi people and it is incumbent on all parties concerned

"to refrain from any actions that could exacerbate the already fragile living conditions of the average Iraqi". (*S/2001/505, para. 136*)

In order to facilitate the eventual lifting of the United Nations sanctions, Thailand hopes that Iraq will abide by the appropriate United Nations resolutions and thus help all parties concerned to join hands in finding a long-term and comprehensive solution.

**The President:** I now invite Mr. Hussein Hassouna, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Hassouna** (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month.

We are meeting here today to discuss an extremely important matter, the implications of which require a great deal of objectivity and transparency in our dealings with it. That is precisely what the international community in general, and the Arab world in particular, are expecting.

The situation in Iraq has reached a stage at which we are required to address it urgently and effectively. This situation cannot persist and we must confront it in order to prevent its further deterioration and to end the suffering of the Iraqi people, which has been under the yoke of this regime for almost a decade. The time is ripe for reaching an urgent solution, in accordance with the declaration issued by the Arab leaders at their recent summit in Amman, Jordan, on 27 and 28 March 2001, in which they called for the sanctions imposed against Iraq to be lifted.

They also called for action on the humanitarian issues in connection with prisoners of war and missing persons — be they Kuwaiti, Iraqi or from third countries — proceeding from the principles of our national, religious and human heritage, in accordance with Security Council document S/2001/342.

The principles and fundamental provisions of the Charter of the League of Arab States require compliance with the following principles: respect for the independence and sovereignty of all its member States; non-intervention in their internal affairs; the non-threat and non-use of force; and the settlement of conflicts by peaceful means through dialogue, negotiation and conflict-resolution mechanisms.

Thus respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and the sovereignty of Kuwait is an extremely important matter in arriving at a comprehensive settlement of the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.

The League of Arab States calls for the lifting of the sanctions against Iraq and for an end to the blockade. It would like also to underscore the importance of Iraq's respecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait within its internationally recognized borders. We are therefore not only calling for the lifting of sanctions against Iraq, but also stressing the need to guarantee Kuwait's security and stability.

We believe that any solution to this question should be based on the principles of international legitimacy and respect for all relevant Security Council resolutions. However, this does not mean that the sanctions imposed on Iraq will continue forever or even for a long period of time, or that they will not be reviewed. We therefore call for the use of dialogue as a means of dealing with the current crisis. This is a means we utilized in the past with respect to the Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and the

United Nations, and it is the same means we are using today in our discussion. Perhaps the time is ripe now for the Secretary-General to pursue his dialogue with the Iraqi Government, as begun last February.

Respect for the principles of international law require us also to put an end to all actions and measures that violate Iraq's sovereignty or threaten its security, especially those that are taking place outside the purview of relevant Security Council resolutions.

The League of Arab States calls for an end to pending issues relating to weapons of mass destruction and means of monitoring and controlling them through dialogue and negotiation between Iraq and the Security Council, in conformity with relevant Council resolutions.

We would like also to see the implementation of paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which highlighted the need to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. That would represent a step forward, within the framework of a comprehensive plan in this regard, towards the goal of making the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, this also includes all weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, owned by Israel, in order to avoid any double standards and to enshrine the principle of dealing with States on an equal footing.

Finally, we are hopeful that the Council will take steps to ensure the settlement of all pending matters under the agenda item "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait", on the basis of the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in accordance with internationally binding resolutions. The Council's success in achieving this goal will be a tangible contribution that will build confidence and quiet between Iraq and its neighbours and will enable us to ensure a bright future for the countries of the region on the basis of robust and stable relations.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the Under-Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. On behalf of the Council, I welcome him. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Al-Qaysi (Iraq):** I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for granting my request to be the last speaker.

First of all, I should like to extend my congratulations to you on the manner in which you have presided over the work of the Council for this month.

*(spoke in Arabic)*

The Security Council is meeting this week to discuss my country's situation in relation to the Security Council. I wish at the outset to reaffirm that the obligations imposed on Iraq under relevant Security Council resolutions are extremely harsh and go beyond customary legal measures to restore international peace and security.

In spite of this, Iraq has implemented all the obligations enshrined in the relevant Security Council resolutions. The provisions of the principal resolution — resolution 687 (1991) — have been fully implemented, as required. Iraq has recognized Kuwait's sovereignty and territorial integrity, its independence, and its borders as delineated by the United Nations.

Iraq has cooperated with the United Nations and fully implemented its commitments concerning the deployment of United Nations observer units. It has also implemented all the requirements of paragraphs 7 to 13 concerning disarmament, in addition to other relevant resolutions, especially resolutions relating to ongoing monitoring and to the import-export mechanism. This was recognized by a number of reports of the Special Commission (UNSCOM) and some of its principal elements after the unmasking of the subversive role played by this Commission, especially during the chairmanship of Richard Butler.

Iraq has returned all the Kuwaiti properties that it could find, and has pledged to return any other material that may be found in the future. A reparations regime has been imposed on Iraq, from which compensation sums are deducted. Iraq has returned all prisoners of war and has fulfilled and continues to fulfil the duty of cooperating in investigating the fate of missing persons. Finally, Iraq has implemented the special demand to condemn all forms of international terrorism.

In addition to the harsh nature of the obligations imposed on Iraq, which has been manifested in many situations by flagrant violations of international law and of precedents in relation between States, another important fact appears in the context of the implementation of the above-mentioned obligations.

Iraq has faced all forms of unusual measures, including very perverse changes in the rules and the scope of work; indeed, changes in the very obligations imposed on Iraq as they appear in resolution 687 (1991).

For example, the Security Council has involved itself in an unprecedented manner in the question of the borders between Iraq and Kuwait, not only through the formula for the delimitation of boundaries, but also through the imposition of the principles and manner of the demarcation of borders. This did not suffice. The Secretariat has been used as an instrument of pressure on the Chairman of the Demarcation Commission so as to attain the result sought by the United States and the United Kingdom: the injection of the borders question into resolution 687 (1991).

The evidence, in the form of the records of the Demarcation Commission, is within the Secretariat and is mentioned in the paper submitted to the Secretary-General in the February session. This document has been circulated to the Council.

With regard to the question of reparations, the Security Council has, in paragraph 16 of resolution 687 (1991), admitted that international law is the sole criterion for paying compensation. However, the Council has established for this purpose an unprecedented and astoundingly punitive mechanism based on administrative principles and rules that lack equality or respect for the correct application of law. The Security Council as a political body, according to this mechanism approved by resolution 687 (1991), has decided to replace the judicial function with an administrative, political process controlled by the Council, in addition to its legislative function, which is to legislate the mechanism of reparations. Thereby, the Council has totally disregarded the well-entrenched criterion of defining State liability in international law.

I said that international law has been approved as the sole criterion for the question of reparations in resolution 687 (1991). This has occurred in spite of the fact that the Council does not possess this power pursuant to the United Nations Charter. The Security Council does not have the power to intervene in the implementation of the liability principle according to the Charter. Those who wish to go back and study this matter can look at the work and deliberations of the International Law Commission. This is a United Nations commission, and thus a reparations regime has been established upon political bases, not on the basis

of legal considerations and the necessary way of dealing with matters in keeping with natural justice. The United States has and continues to be — and this has been declared by its responsible spokesman — the driving force behind this legally illegitimate regime.

Among the flagrant examples of this is the comprehensive package agreed upon by the five permanent members, which was approved by the Council on 27 September 2000. This package granted the Kuwait Oil Company a compensation of approximately \$16 billion. I assume that this transaction and its results are well known to you, because you are all members of the Bureau of the sanctions Committee. This is not the sole example of the injustice inflicted on Iraq by the reparations regime.

Allow me to add two more examples, noting that we had submitted a larger number of examples in our dialogue with the Secretary-General last February. The Bureau, in the case of Government claim number 41, which was submitted by the Kuwaiti Prisoners of War and Missing Persons Committee, has approved compensation in the amount of \$153.5 million, whereas the Kuwait Committee, that is, the claimant, has claimed compensation of about \$58.5 million. This means that the sum of the compensation decided by the Compensation Commission is equal to \$37 million above and beyond double the amount claimed by the claimant. Is this natural? A claimant calls for a certain sum, whereas that body gives him double the amount and an additional \$37 million.

Another example among many concerns the failure of the secretariat of the Compensation Commission to verify these claims. Certain United Nations Member States, such as Sri Lanka, India, Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have noticed that in 575 cases the Commission has compensated claimants twice for the very same claim.

These are some examples of the political nature of the reparations regime imposed on Iraq, which, we believe, is a vindictive punitive measure whose whole purpose is financial gain and not the administration of justice.

In addition to the foregoing, I wish to mention — based on official information available to us, thanks to our contacts — that the sum total that was deducted from our oil revenues for the reparations fund, from the start of the oil-for-food programme in 1996 to 30 May 2000, has reached 12.6 billion dollars, whereas the

amount received by Iraq from the resources for humanitarian goods, which we have actually received, is 12.8 billion dollars. Is this reasonable? In the light of the criteria for deduction, which were spelled out in paragraph 19 of resolution 687 (1991) as being the needs of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity, taking into account foreign debt service and the needs of the Iraqi economy. Is this deduction just?

In light of the fact that it takes place within the framework of a humanitarian programme, which was adopted as mentioned by resolution 986 (1995) and subsequent resolutions on this matter, this has been adopted as a temporary measure out of concern for the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi people and the danger of its further deterioration. Is such deduction in this programme, whose nature is spelled out in Security Council resolutions — just? Why did these deductions reach that magnitude? Because certain influential members of the Security Council have imposed the highest possible level of deductions for this purpose.

In the field of disarmament, whose various subjects have gained special importance, Iraq had to grapple with problems that are not related to the requirements of implementing the obligations spelled out in resolution 687 (1991). As events unfolded over eight years, it became clear that the two bodies charged with this task — that is, UNSCOM and the IAEA — have served as an instrument to realize United States and United Kingdom policies. In the former UNSCOM there was a large number of persons which for years went about their work on instructions from the United States and not according to the requirements of Security Council resolutions. The register is long, detailed and complicated.

Suffice it to say on this occasion that the Special Commission has, in a very clear and unequivocal fashion, adopted a conduct that is translated into placing obstacles, fomenting crises, distorting the concepts of work and emphasizing matters that have nothing to do with weapons dossiers or with those questions that were either secondary or complete, in addition to politicizing technical matters and continuously changing the tasks, thereby prolonging the process by creating all sorts of different considerations.

I wish to state that detailed explanations of these indications can be found in the document that we have

submitted. There is no doubt that the United States-United Kingdom objective was clear. Perhaps today it is even more clear, after the admission of certain elements of UNSCOM, which began to come out in the autumn of 1998. The purpose is to perpetuate the blockade imposed on Iraq, in spite of Iraq's tremendous efforts, through which Iraq has essentially and qualitatively implemented its obligations. This has been recognized by elements of UNSCOM who were the basic driving force behind the impediments and the crises. This has been published since the autumn of 1998.

It is regrettable that the Security Council has totally neglected the application of paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991). The Council did not take any measure of any sort to implement this paragraph.

Disarmament cannot take place in a vacuum. Unless the Council in due seriousness takes all necessary measures to deal with weapons of mass destruction possessed by Israel and with programmes for possessing such weapons by Iran, the Council will remain guilty of using double standards and selectivity that run counter to the United Nations Charter. There are many detailed examples.

The point which I want to emphasize from the beginning is that Iraq did not spare any effort to implement the obligations imposed on it, in the hope that this would lead to the Security Council taking a position that would be in keeping with its clear obligations vis-à-vis Iraq, just as has been spelled out in the Council's own resolutions. I have emphasized that Iraq has implemented all the obligations imposed on it by Council resolutions. However — and whatever may be the position of certain members of the Council concerning Iraq's implementation of its obligations — this is a question on which we do not have identical views in the Council. The fact remains that what Iraq has implemented, and with whatever reasonable percentage, is large enough to prompt the Council to have adopted, many years ago, a clear-cut resolution that would at least reduce the embargo on the basis of paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991), or implement at least paragraph 22 of the same resolution.

In view of paragraph 21, which refers to the two concepts of imposing or lifting the embargo, it is not imaginable that those who authored this resolution did not aim at a certain specific meaning of the term "reducing" the embargo. Therefore, the mention of this term is futile. Through this position, the Security

Council could have demonstrated to Iraq and the international community respect for its own resolutions and not for a position vis-à-vis the Iraqi Government. However, this still has not occurred.

The Security Council continues to adopt a static and extreme position, and from time to time it imposes new obligations on Iraq as a result of the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom, which stem from political objectives of their own and have no relation to the objectives and common interests of the international community. The United Nations Charter assumes that the Council would cherish this collective interest because the Council works on behalf of Member States, in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

I wish to say to the Ambassador of Canada that when he referred to the concept behind Article 24 — that the Security Council acts on behalf of the Members of the United Nations — he omitted to say that that particular commitment on the part of the Council has to be performed in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. In other words, the Security Council is not an absolute authority. It is an authority bound by the purposes and principles of the Charter. This condition is the underlying foundation of the concept of entrusting the Security Council with the task of the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf of the collective membership.

What is the final result? Continuing the embargo against Iraq at a time when the causes for imposing this embargo have been absent for years. Thus, a temporary measure has been transformed into a permanent measure, despite the absence of causes, in a manner unprecedented in the annals of this Organization. There is no doubt that this state of affairs could not have lasted this long without American hegemony over this world Organization, particularly the Security Council, as has been attested by various circles within and outside the United Nations — official and unofficial, political or otherwise — including United States and United Kingdom circles. I will come back to this point later on.

In addition to the above, there are aspects of the relationship between Iraq and the Security Council that have arisen outside the purview of Security Council resolutions. However, these aspects have been completely neglected by the Council, despite the fact

that it is the duty of the Council, according to the Charter, to take steps in this regard.

The no-fly zone in northern Iraq was imposed in 1991 and in southern Iraq in 1992. The latter zone was expanded in 1996. In addition, since the official declaration of the ceasefire under resolution 687 (1991), the United States of America has perpetrated three acts of aggression against Iraq: in January 1993, in June 1993 and in September 1996. The United States and the United Kingdom have carried out two attacks: one in December 1998 and one in February 2001. Indeed, since December 1998, Anglo-American aggressive operations have continued without cease, including supporting, financing and training terrorist groups in a bid to destabilize Iraq and threaten its territorial integrity.

In this regard, there is a basic contradiction. The Security Council continues calling on Iraq to comply with its resolutions. Despite that, the Security Council has shown no reaction to the coercive no-fly zones imposed by the United Kingdom and the United States on Iraq without any Security Council resolution authorizing these two countries to carry out these aggressive operations. These aggressive acts of the United States and the United Kingdom contradict the official ceasefire stipulated by resolution 687 (1991). The Security Council also remains silent concerning the aggression that is committed against Iraq. This is attributed also to the policies of two permanent members of the Security Council — the United States and the United Kingdom. This constitutes a flagrant violation of the official ceasefire under resolution 687 (1991).

In the final analysis, this can be considered the destruction of the basis for the resolution and all that ensues from it. Did the Council rectify this serious situation? This is a gross violation of the fundamental concepts of the Charter. Is it not a strange contradiction that Iraq would be asked to abide by Security Council resolutions at a time when two permanent members of the Council do not abide by resolutions adopted by the Council vis-à-vis Iraq, despite the fact that those two countries were the two main promoters of the above-mentioned resolutions?

The main conclusion, in this context, is that the Council has not fulfilled its obligations towards Iraq. It does not respect its powers and functions as spelled out in the Charter, which have been entrusted to it by the

Member States on their behalf, in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter. This has all resulted from the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom aimed at my country — policies that run counter to the principles and provisions of Security Council resolutions. Therefore, action is required by the Security Council, not by Iraq.

It should be recalled that the Security Council has not disregarded the negative impact of the continuing embargo against Iraq. They refer to the adoption of the humanitarian programme adopted by the Council, according to Security Council resolution 986 (1995). This is the position of United States and the United Kingdom officials who constantly ask, “Why does Iraq complain? It has the humanitarian programme.” Much has been said about that, including during the first part of this meeting, on Tuesday, 26 June; I shall return to this point later. It was repeated by a number of representatives following Tuesday’s statement by the representative of the United States.

Let me address this question by retracing its background, for it appears that we live in an age when people forget things — or pretend to forget them if it suits their interests at any given moment. Resolution 986 (1995) was adopted on 14 April 1995, on the basis of a United States effort cloaked in the guise of a draft resolution submitted by Argentina. My Government considered its conditions and provisions to be completely unbalanced, which led us to reject it. As a result of contacts begun by the previous Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on 6 February 1996, lengthy negotiations ensued between Iraq and the Secretariat with a view to reaching an agreement on implementation of the provisions of the programme set out in that resolution in a balanced manner that would preserve Iraq’s sovereignty, security and dignity.

The required memorandum of understanding was signed on 20 May 1996, in spite of United States objections and obstacles to negotiations. I know what I am talking about here: the United States has submitted 32 amendments to the final text of the memorandum of understanding since my Government came to an agreement with the Secretariat. The arrangements set out in the memorandum of understanding have passed through nine phases as of the end of June 2001. The Iraqi Government has complied with its provisions as a provisional measure, as stipulated in resolution 986 (1995), to ease the suffering of the Iraqi people, which is caused by the blockade. But it must not be forgotten

that the Iraqi Government has continued to call for the total lifting of the blockade.

In that context, the Iraqi Government has cooperated with United Nations agencies in discussing and identifying the needs of the sectors covered in the distribution plans, in the hope that those urgent needs of the Iraqi people would be met, at the proper time within each phase.

But many things have prevented the attainment of the humanitarian objectives of the oil-for-food programme. The representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom, along with some other representatives who spoke after them, accused the Iraqi Government of being the principal reason for the failure to achieve the programme's desired goal. They claim that we are the cause. I shall later revert to this point as well.

As I said, many things have prevented the attainment of the humanitarian objectives of the oil-for-food programme. These include the complexity of the measures adopted by the Security Council for the implementation of the memorandum of understanding, and interference by the United Kingdom and the United States in its implementation. We have seen unfairness in the distribution of revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil. We have seen the United States and the United Kingdom persist in their policy of putting contracts on hold on imaginary pretexts. We have seen contracts dealt with in a selective manner, objectionable bureaucracy in the way that contracts are submitted, delays in preparing letters of credit, late arrival of goods, and an accumulation of moneys allocated for operational and administrative costs of United Nations operations and for covering the expenses of the former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) — even though there are currently no operation costs to be covered. Vast sums are removed for the reparations fund. The principle of good performance in international commercial transactions has been disallowed. We have seen inadequate financial management, as revealed in the report of the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on just part of the Programme (A/55/436). We have also seen the failure of the demining programme and of the electricity sector programme in the three northern governorates. The Programme's officers and other United Nations officials have also violated their obligations under the memorandum of understanding.

Those examples, with full details, were submitted during the first round of the dialogue with the Secretary-General last February. The relevant documents have been distributed to members of the Council.

In addition to all that I have mentioned, I want also to refer to some grossly inadequate conditions surrounding the implementation of the so-called humanitarian programme of which not all members may be aware.

Is it reasonable that disbursement under a programme whose revenues total billions of dollars, billions of euros, should be subject to no external audit by neutral certified auditors from outside the United Nations system? Is it conceivable that the agencies responsible for implementing the Programme should be permitted to charge a commission in return for that implementation, and then use that commission to cover all their activities, both those related to the Programme and those totally unrelated to it? Is it acceptable to members of the Council that that greed knows no limits: buying vehicles, paying administrative costs, purchasing equipment? Is it acceptable to members of the Council that Iraq should be forbidden to make use of administrative material and equipment used by the Programme — purchased with Iraqi money — including vehicles and computers, even after the Programme no longer uses them, and even though the computers are destroyed on orders from New York when they have been replaced with new systems? Iraq's request to use the old computers has been rejected.

Could you accept the fact that the resources of the programme are utilized to rent personal housing for some of the directors of the agencies in Iraq? Can any Government in the world accept the non-informing of the Iraqi Central Bank or provide it with any information concerning the banking operations relating to Iraq's resources — to the tune of billions of dollars? The Iraqi Central Bank has no inkling of what happens in United Nations banking operations concerning Iraqi resources, even though the Memorandum of Understanding stipulates the appointment of a liaison official from the Central Bank to be apprised of this information and coordination. We did this. That person goes to the Bank, where they tell him he is not allowed to enter. They say he has to come back with United Nations approval. So then he goes to the United Nations, which tells him that it is not permitted because it is a question within the purview of the Secretary-

General. That same person remained in New York without work for six months.

Is it fair that purchases are imported and that purchasing offices are established abroad at a time when those materials can be provided at lower cost in Iraq? And you are speaking about the cash component? Is it acceptable that the procurements handled by some of the agencies responsible for northern Iraq are less efficient and more costly than their counterparts in the Iraqi Government working on acquisitions for the southern and central provinces? Is it acceptable that the policies of personnel interest are subject to no monetary control which is what occurred over the Easter holidays this year when the financial officers of the Programme and the agencies in Iraq were dispatched to Geneva. For what purpose? Merely to explain a financial sheet form, an accountancy application form. This was the purpose of sending all of the financial officers of the agencies who work in Iraq.

As Governments or as members of the United Nations, can you accept the fact that a secretary from Paris was dispatched to Baghdad to replace a secretary who was granted a one-month holiday abroad? This happens in the so-called humanitarian programme. Have you not noticed that the reports of the Programme's office in Iraq have not mentioned, since 1999, any detailed schedules concerning the various financial transactions in different phases and how these sums are disbursed? Why have they not been mentioned? Could the reason be perhaps that we and others concerned have begun to refer to their contents and to the many shortcomings of the Programme? Why do these reports not refer to the field reports? Why are they not mentioned in the reports of the Secretary-General? These detailed examples upon which we stumbled, either by analysing documents or by hearing the flapping of a loose tongue, deserve denunciation, at the very least. Undoubtedly, many such examples are institutionally covered up in order to keep us in the dark about our financial revenues.

Our purpose in raising these few examples is not, frankly, to cause controversy. Rather, the objective is to reveal the facts that we have discovered in our experience with the humanitarian programme, a programme that we expected at least to put an end to the deterioration in the living conditions of our peoples under the unjust embargo. It is worth stressing that we certainly did not fail to refer to many of these aspects in dozens — indeed, hundreds — of letters to the

Secretaries-General and in many contacts with the office of the coordinator of the Programme in Iraq and the oil-for-food programme in New York; so far, we have not seen any serious move to bridge these discrepancies.

We formally call on the Security Council today to undertake an appropriate investigation into these matters. We call for the results to be published, so that they may be available to the members of this Organization and international public opinion. We formally call on the Security Council to undertake, as expeditiously as possible, an external audit of the accounts of the Iraq Programme, as well as the agencies, offices and committees linked to the oil-for-food programme since its inception. Such an audit should be undertaken by an external financial auditing organization known to be qualified and neutral, chosen in consultation with my Government. In a letter dated 3 April 2001 from my Government's Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General (S/2001/324), my Government called for such an audit. To date, we have received no reply. Therefore, we are calling formally on the Security Council to do so.

Such a programme, with the shortcomings to which I have referred, cannot possibly create an effective regime that would satisfy the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. I would like to remind, in detail, all those who have blamed my Government as the cause for the failures to achieve the humanitarian objectives to recall the opinion expressed by the second of those groups created by the Security Council under Ambassador Celso Amorim to take up the humanitarian situation in Iraq in 1999. He said:

“the humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy, which in turn cannot be achieved solely through remedial humanitarian efforts.”

You may find the exact text in Security Council document S/1999/356, annex II, paragraph 58. That was the very last paragraph of the Amorim report. This clearly means that the cure is the lifting of the embargo.

Let us take up how the Security Council has acted since then. I must again go back to the background of the issue. It seems that some choose to forget and others to ignore the background. It may be recalled that when the Security Council was taking up the reports of the

Secretary-General and the former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 16 December 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom surprised the Council and the entire world by waging aggression against Iraq. Thus ended the Security Council's deliberations on the comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance, aimed at certifying that Iraq had been effectively disarmed in order to then lift the sanctions, which was the very proposal submitted by the Secretary-General on 6 August 1998. The Council remained for a while unable to act in any way whatsoever, and the United Kingdom and the United States were exonerated of any responsibility. At the same time, Iraq's rights were being totally ignored. And efforts quickly resumed to cover up the illegitimacy of the Anglo-American acts and to address the situation.

Let me recall the Canadian proposal to create bodies. The Amorim groups were created to undertake an initial review of the two dossiers — disarmament and the humanitarian situation. Then a third group was added by a Kuwaiti effort, supported by the United Kingdom and the United States, on the issue of missing persons and the return of property. Following the end of the activities of the Amorim groups and the debate on their reports, the United Kingdom, clearly supported by the United States, made strong efforts to submit a new draft resolution, and that took several months. As a result, resolution 1284 (1999) was adopted on 17 December of that year. On 19 December 1999 Iraq declared that it would not deal with that resolution because it did not respond to Iraq's legitimate call for the lifting of the embargo, and it made no mention whatsoever of the aggression against Iraq and the daily breach of its sovereignty by the imposition of no-fly zones by the United Kingdom and the United States.

Iraq stated that the true objective of the United States and the United Kingdom in the resolution was not to lift the embargo. Indeed, it was an attempt to mislead international public opinion, because the concept of suspension in the resolution was new — a concept that required a long and complicated series of new and unclear conditions, which could have been interpreted in many ways. So the resolution had no guarantee that suspension would in fact take place.

Furthermore, the timelines in the resolution were very long, artificially long. These timelines, the Council may recall, were laid down to follow the

progress and development of elections in the United States of America. The timelines show the intention of the United Kingdom and the United States to perpetuate the illegal no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, acts of military aggression, the illegitimate American intervention in internal affairs and the overt attempts to change the national political system in Iraq.

We also made it clear that in substance and in form that resolution is a mere illegal rewriting of resolution 687 (1991). We also made it clear at the time that the stringent, vague conditions surrounding the concept of suspension — a new and rather illusory concept, as I have stated — were new conditions not stipulated in previous resolutions. They were placed there to ensure that any suspension, if it ever took place, would have no substance and no benefit for Iraq, as well as being an arbitrary restriction of Iraq's sovereignty over its economy and resources. Again, the situation remained unchanged.

However, the international campaign to lift the sanctions on Iraq and to end the crime of genocide being perpetrated against the people of Iraq continued and escalated. With the coming to power of the new United States Administration at the beginning of this year, American officials began to state that the sanctions regime against my country was faltering, that it was full of holes, like Swiss cheese. They also stated that one of the major concerns of the new Administration was to revitalize the sanctions against Iraq. This concept of revitalization began to take form shortly thereafter, when talk began on so-called smart sanctions, which were claimed to be a lessening of sanctions on people and a strengthening of sanctions on the Iraqi Government. Kindly do not forget that the new United States Administration opened its file in dealing with Iraq with an act of aggression on the night of 16 February 2001. In May, during the United States presidency of the Security Council, as usual, the United Kingdom expressed the United States position in the form of a draft resolution in the guise of the humanitarian oil-for-food programme, whose ninth cycle was to end on 3 June.

Since then, draft resolutions and proposed amendments have come and gone in the Security Council and the permanent five have been working essentially to find an acceptable formula. When the ninth cycle of the oil-for-food programme was almost complete and it had become clear that agreement on an

acceptable draft resolution, as proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States, was impossible, the Security Council adopted resolution 1352 (2001) on 1 June 2001, extending the oil-for-food programme for one month. A paragraph was inserted that was to be a foothold for new arrangements, based on the concept of the Anglo-American draft, to be implemented for 190 days following the end of the first period.

Iraq has refused to deal with that resolution for two fundamental reasons. The first is that it uses the oil-for-food programme as a cover to push through the Anglo-American formula on smart sanctions. The second is that extending the programme for one month is hardly sufficient to implement its two wings: the export of oil and the import of civilian goods.

Iraq's stance is not new; in the past, it rejected resolutions 1275 (1999) and 1280 (1999). Resolution 1275 (1999) extended the programme for two weeks, while resolution 1280 (1999) extended it for one week in order to give the Security Council the opportunity to achieve consensus on resolution 1284 (1999). As a result of our position vis-à-vis resolution 1352 (2001), we ceased exporting oil under new contracts as of 4 June. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom and the United States did not abandon their attempts to ensure the implementation of the new smart sanctions regime. On many previous occasions, Iraq has declared that it will not deal with such measures in any form whatever.

The United Kingdom and United States circles that advocate this new regime claim that the objective is to free trade with Iraq from all restrictions, and even to expand it, and to prohibit only illegal trade in dual-use materials. However, the details show the misleading nature of that claim. I shall address that point later.

The fundamental content of these drafts entails a de facto new regime for blockading Iraq. There is no easing of sanctions. The so-called free trade with Iraq claimed for civilian goods has been subject to many restrictions and conditions, as well as oversight by a number of bodies — including UNMOVIC, the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990), the Office of the Iraq Programme and the Security Council as a whole — in a way that rewrites the conditions and mechanisms of the Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and the Secretary-General, which has been implemented for nine full cycles.

The new regime pushed by the United States and the United Kingdom rewrites Security Council

resolutions, in particular paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1990), resolution 700 (1991) and resolution 1051 (1996). Furthermore, this new regime takes control of all Iraq's financial resources, places them under United Nations control and disburses them without any role for the Iraqi Government. Moreover, this does not affect Iraq alone. The regime attempts to control all the dealings of Iraq's neighbours and subjects them to many restrictions in order to close the vise around Iraq.

The new regime is overtly misleading because it contains measures relating to civilian flights and to the payment of Iraqi contributions to international organizations. The first issue was imposed on Iraq on the basis of the principle of force — the simple might of force. The other is related to a legitimate right of Iraq as a member of international organizations, the denial of which right by the United States and its allies seeks to isolate Iraq politically from the work of those organizations. Resolution 661 (1990) does not cover the payment of those contributions.

*(spoke in English)*

Such payments are a financial transaction that was not prohibited under resolution 661 (1990) so as to enable Iraq to pay it in the first place. It is an obligation that accrues as a result of Iraq's membership of the United Nations. If anyone should be concerned about this, it is first and foremost the Secretary-General and his Legal Counsel. Now, it is being given to us as if it were a donation or a gift. "You see, you have a benefit."

*(spoke in Arabic)*

Finally, confusing the new punitive regime of smart sanctions with the oil-for-food programme means that the Security Council's commitment to Iraq to lift the embargo imposed under resolution 687 (1991) has been replaced by an ongoing programme that is claimed to be humanitarian and of help to the Iraqi people. We totally reject any such formula. There must be no illusion whatsoever concerning the firmness of our position on smart sanctions. We do not believe that any State or any sane person can expect another State to participate in a project, the ultimate objective of which is to end its existence as a sovereign entity. The Anglo-American plan, the French ideas and proposals and any attendant concepts will entail a full expropriation of the fate of the Iraqi State and people in all fields — politics, economics, development, trade, industry, finance and society.

Therefore, our rejection of such plans and their ultimate objectives rises, in our view, to the level of struggle for national independence, whatever the sacrifices involved. The so-called smart sanctions are but a new facet of neo-colonialism. We utterly refuse to be transformed into a mere consumer society — a society that eats but does not think, enjoys but does not produce — and for whom? For foreigners.

This position of ours, I can assure the Council, is not just rhetorical. It is a genuine position. The Security Council has from the very beginning dealt with the Iraqi people in an unfair manner with respect to food, medicine and some civilian humanitarian requirements.

*(spoke in English)*

Resolution 661 (1990) seemingly talks about exceptions to sanctions. What were these exceptions? Let me remind the Council: medicine and food, in special humanitarian circumstances — food, in special humanitarian circumstances. When the Legal Counsel was requested to provide a legal opinion on the meaning of the term “special humanitarian circumstances”, so that the Security Council and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) would know what that entails, the Legal Counsel at the time, Mr. Fleischhauer, produced a mind-boggling three-page legal opinion. If anyone reads it, and I invite members to do so, would they be so kind as to tell me whether they understood any of it? It is just a whirlwind.

So when I say that right from the very beginning, sanctions were imposed in a way that is not sincere and honest, I mean what I say. Education was under sanctions. Information was under sanctions. Has such a thing ever been heard of in the annals of the United Nations? This was not done even in the case of Rhodesia or South Africa. Why was it done in the case of Iraq?

Nothing for the brain — only medicine and food, in special humanitarian circumstances. Even under the humanitarian programme, no allowance is made for the brain, for culture, for information, for the fabric of society, for industrial, agricultural and scientific advancement — for what is needed to run a State.

Of course, the reason behind all of this is not difficult to comprehend.

*(spoke in Arabic)*

From the very beginning, the goal of imposing and perpetuating such a harsh and unjust embargo against Iraq was political — simply put, the goal was to change the national political regime in Iraq. Every single person in this Chamber is aware of this.

That goal is not the collective objective of the members of the international community, as represented in the United Nations.

*(spoke in English)*

Those who speak on behalf of the international community are simply uttering a falsehood here. They do not represent the international community in this policy. Toppling the Government of Iraq is not the collective interest of the membership of the United Nations. It is not in the resolutions of the Security Council.

No sooner was resolution 687 (1991) adopted than Sir David Hannay made a statement to the press saying that this would help topple Sadaam’s regime. Similar statements were made by President Bush senior.

If one reads Ian Johnston’s study, which was published by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), on this very question — on how resolution 687 (1991) was brought about — one can find it there, in black and white. But perhaps the Council does not have time to follow these things. It is so busy in that small room, consulting separately from those who should be working with it as its main partners.

*(spoke in Arabic)*

The United States, its Zionist ally and those who follow them and are influenced by the old colonial mindset are promoting all of these games. Those who shift the blame onto the national Government of Iraq must remember that this regime is the very same one that brought to the country the highest level of development ever, as acknowledged by the international organizations concerned.

They must also recognize that what they refer to as the faltering of the sanctions regime represents in reality a concrete reflection of the lack of conviction of the majority of the international community. This does not represent their collective goal.

We are confident that the old imperialist, Zionist and colonial schemes to contain the situation are bound to fail. It is no secret that the issue as a whole has

nothing to do with the implementation of Security Council resolutions. It is not that Iraq continues to be a threat to its neighbours, or that the problem stems from the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq.

The powers and functions under the Charter are clear and are fully explained in jurisprudential and judicial references. International legality, as represented by Security Council resolutions on many issues, has become the subject of ludicrous comments in many reference books. Those reference books talk about  
(*spoke in English*)

the appropriation of international legitimacy by the United States and the privatization of the Security Council by the United States. Those who are using such terminology are eminent American international lawyers from the very respectable University of Michigan.

This is the arrogance of power.

(*spoke in Arabic*)

What is required now, therefore, is to rectify the dangerous situation affecting Iraq, so that Iraq can indeed feel that the Security Council is dealing with it in a just, balanced and evenhanded fashion instead of fighting with it and issuing orders to it, so that those who have a hidden agenda against Iraq can take a particular course of action. The siege imposed against Iraq must be lifted, and indeed it will. The sovereignty of Iraq must be respected and all interference in the domestic affairs of Iraq must come to an end. The grievances of Iraq must be addressed fairly. These elements will ensure security, peace and stability in the region.

The Council must pay attention to the hypocritical policy of double standards pursued by the United States and the United Kingdom by comparing its role in supporting the Zionist entity against the Palestinian people, starting with the settlements on the Palestinian territory then continuing with the suppression of the glorious Palestinian uprising. The uprising and Iraq's steadfastness against the hegemony of the United States have become the motto of all Arab peoples. I am not talking about Arab Governments, but they, too, have started to feel that this is the only means that would advance their nations in order to join the mainstream of human civilization.

Yesterday we heard much from the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and a long list of speakers followed. We heard what any fair-minded person would not let pass without reply.

(*spoke in English*)

From these two representatives collectively — I realize that I am taking too much of the Council's precious time, but allow me with your indulgence, Mr. President — we heard — according to the United States — that a better name for the "oil for food" is "oil for development", because such a term more accurately reflects that even today the Iraqi regime could redevelop the country using the oil-for-food programme. Similar notions were also propagated by the representative of the United Kingdom. We heard that it is the Government of Iraq that is responsible for not getting that programme to its ultimate objective, and I have been addressed, personally or as representative of my Government, by speakers blaming my Government and calling on it to cooperate. Some even went to the extent of quoting from reports of the Secretary-General to that effect, and they mentioned the question of the visas, the question of opening letters of credit, the question of delays in concluding contracts and whatnot. Do they really know the facts? When someone speaks in this Council on behalf of a Government, they have to be relatively sure of what they say, not be ill-informed and just speak in alliance to produce a statement for God knows what ulterior motives or reasons of personal interest. I am sure that everyone here understands what I mean by reasons of personal interest.

We are being told that these new arrangements have to be finalized by 3 July because they represent the bridge between the humanitarian programme and resolution 1284 (1999); and that resolution 1284 (1999) had a humanitarian component but it was not enough, so we have to improve it. We have heard so many Ambassadors here today and talking about the improvements introduced by the Council in resolutions 1302 (2000), 1330 (2000), etc. Thank you very much for the improvement. On what? Let us see what improvement was made in those resolutions and in resolution 1284 (1999).

Iraq has to comply with resolution 1284 (1999) on weapons and has to cooperate on the oil-for-food programme. Once that is done sanctions will be

suspended, then lifted. So easy. Why has the suspension on Libya not yet become a lifting? We have to wonder why; or are we even prevented from wondering?

When we consider resolution 1284 (1999), our position in that respect and with respect to smart sanctions, the one that I am outlining today, is not an emotional position that is coming out of an irrational mind, an accusation those with ill will against Iraq try to vilify us with. It was a well-considered position based on objective analysis as to what it has entailed and what it will entail. I will give just one example in order not to take too much of the Council's time. That resolution requires inspectors to return. To do what? To carry out enhanced and ongoing monitoring and verification regimes to be implemented by Iraq and to settle remaining disarmament issues; and ultimately if the new Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report that Iraq has cooperated in all respects and made progress on all the outstanding issues then we get suspension.

I say "Welcome". Let us see on the basis of the record how this works out, on the basis of your own entities' records.

The Council will recall that when Butler and his team and the IAEA were readmitted to Iraq to do certain inspections in order to report to the Security Council on whether Iraq was cooperating so that the Council could get under way with the comprehensive review, the two combined teams carried out 300 inspections of a total of 427 sites. When the report was submitted to the Security Council, Butler reported that Iraq did not cooperate fully, whereas the IAEA reported that Iraq provided the highest possible level of cooperation. Why did Butler report that Iraq did not cooperate fully? Because of five incidents out of 427. By any calculation, the five incidents out of 427 represent 1.17 per cent; that is to say, cooperation was provided to Butler 98.83 per cent of the time. By any standard that should have at least been considered to be quite sufficient to say "Thank you, Iraq", and for the comprehensive review to get under way. What we got in return was five days of intensive bombing by the United States and the United Kingdom to derail the whole process. So what guarantee is there, when you have resolution 1284 (1999) formally like this —cooperation in all respects in order to achieve progress. What progress is that when the resolution contains the provision that if even a minor official in the field says

that there is no progress, then the suspension is suspended.

Renewing the suspension needs discussion and approval in the Security Council; yet one report of even a petty official automatically cuts it off. So how do we deal with that? Is it not a fact that some members around this table consider that there are many ambiguities in that resolution that need to be clarified? Some of them are permanent members.

Is this going to bridge the gap, really?

An allegation has been made, that found in the statements by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and those who followed suit, that it is the Iraqi Government who prefers to have the status quo continue at the expense of the suffering of its own people. What if that is so?

Why have we been working with the United Nations since 1991? Regardless of judgements as to how hard we have been working, what we have achieved, et cetera? Why have we not stopped working throughout those years I am referring to?

On the question of granting visas, people have been talking a lot in favour of that but, let us not forget: the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom tells us that his approach is really being presented in good faith. 'In good faith' in the sense that these proposals are being presented within the framework of resolution 1284 (1999), and that this approach is in response to calls made by the international community to alleviate the plight of the Iraqi people. And they say it is only the Government of Iraq that is responsible for achieving that particular goal, the alleviation of the plight of its people.

Before he said that, he talked about the cash component in the oil sector and how the intention really was to help Iraq take it up, but Iraq did not. Iraq did not take the cash component in other sectors. As you know, the cash component in the oil sector was approved by the Security Council. Paragraph 50 of Security Council resolution 1330 (2000) allowed funds of up to 600 million euros to be used to cover the costs of the local expenses of the Iraqi oil sector. A team visited Iraq during the period March 18 to April 2. Our experts worked with the team, and they conducted extensive site visits. The team presented its report to the Secretary-General at the end of last May. The Secretary-General presented that report to you, and it is

now in the document S/2001/566 of June 6. In that particular report, there is a recommendation that 600 million euros should be transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil via the Rafidayn Bank in Jordan from funds accumulated during the ninth phase of the Memorandum of Understanding, and that a further 600 million euros should be transferred in a similar manner in the following phase, making the total allocation equivalent to 1200 million euros.

First, the British ambassador tells us they are ready to agree to this proposal, but notes with regret that Iraq continues to block the implementation of the cash component elsewhere in the Iraqi economy. Now, what is the connection between the oil industry and the rest of the Iraqi economy?

Why did you not clear it for the oil industry? Why is it not cleared yet by the United Kingdom? Have you? I may be wrong, my information says you have not.

Second, in the draft that is being discussed and proposed, and in the ideas going around this table, there is no reference whatsoever to this particular question. What does that mean? What we see in the draft, drafted to improve Iraq's trade with the outside world, provided no money goes to the Iraqi Government, is that it is the lot of the Iraqi people, which is the concern of the Security Council, the British, and the Americans. They are so paternal. All of a sudden they turned in favour of the Iraqi people. We are grateful. So they brought forth the idea that they will select the companies, according to certain criteria, which will be able to deal in Iraqi oil. No other companies are allowed. In the present system under the memorandum of understanding, there are oil companies that register with the United Nations and those companies are the ones that buy. Paragraph seven of the United Kingdom's draft is very vague, but at least it is clear that companies will be selected according to certain criteria, and they are the only ones who are allowed to deal in Iraq's oil. Do we have any guarantee that those companies are not going to be fat cats of Western origin and be the only ones allowed to buy Iraqi oil? Do we have any guarantee that those companies, Mr. Ambassador, are not going to be the ones who will employ that particular facility you give them under the resolution to play havoc with oil prices at the international level, and even to the extent of possibly intimidating the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with regard to their pricing policies. You do not have such guarantees. You

are not providing any flexibility to Iraq to choose its customers. And you know, with oil, it is a specific and specialized industry, it is not any customer that counts.

How do we sell oil now under the Memorandum of Understanding? Specifically with regard to the price? Around the end of each month, Mr. President, the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) communicates with the United Nations oil overseers by fax and telephone. The oil market is discussed in general, and the prices of Iraqi crude oil are evaluated in the light of the values of the other crude oils. Iraqi crude oil prices are set in relation to price of crude oil in other markets, such as Brent, West Texas Intermediate, Oman, and Dubai. Then, after taking into consideration transportation costs, quality differentials, and other relevant factors, the price is set.

What the British proposal would lead to is an intervention in the pricing of Iraqi crude oil, which would entail the complete destruction of the relationship between supplier and buyer. The end result, which is not mentioned in the resolution, is to use Iraqi oil as leverage, because it will be under tight control, and to transform the oil market and maintain it at all times as a buyer's market rather than a seller's market. This is the alleviation of the suffering of the Iraqi people.

Regarding the talk about the cash components in other sectors, such an arrangement would place Iraqis into two categories: a category in the north and a category in the south. Any local production, when bought, and any cash component being spent in that particular field, would be used to remunerate and to punish, by taxing all Government policies, whatever objective they may have. We are not the only ones who are saying that that particular provision is ill-advised. My information is that even some United Nations officials find that provision ill-advised.

We are being told that the list that is going to be attached to the resolution is really not a denial list; that it is just a review list. So the Security Council really has to accept it. What guarantee do we have that at the end of the day the policy of putting contracts on hold is not going to continue?

I have a paper here — not an Iraqi paper — a United Nations paper. It is a weekly update from the Office of the Iraq Programme, covering the period 16-22 June 2001. I quote from that paper:

“Despite the 661 Committee’s further release from hold of four additional humanitarian supplies contracts on the condition of close end-use monitoring by United Nations observers in Iraq, which contain ‘1051’ list items, the total value of contracts placed on hold by the Committee rose slightly last week. It now stands at \$3.2 billion, still representing 14.7 per cent of the value of all contracts circulated to the Committee. The release contracts were for sewage pipes, foot-and-mouth disease vaccine and intelligent pigging.

“All together during the week, the Committee released from hold 24 contracts worth \$45.5 million, while placing holds on 37 new contracts valued at \$98.6 million.”

So the Council releases \$45 million. The Council holds \$90 million. What guarantee do we have that this is not going to happen? How will Iraqi trade be free in the interest of alleviating the suffering of the Iraqi people, as the proponents of the smart sanctions draft say they are so keen to achieve?

There is really one good thing about this whole proposal submitted by the United Kingdom and pushed by the United States. Not a word about the no-fly zone? Why the no-fly zone? I know what they will say: It is to protect your neighbours from your threats. It is to contain you because you have a tendency to renew weapons of mass destruction. It is no good for them now; even their own officers, whom they used to employ in the United Nations Special Commission, said that Iraq is qualitatively disarmed, it is no good now. Now there is another direction.

The British Ambassador said in his statement that they have worrying evidence that the Iraqis are re-arming. Show it, Mr. Ambassador. Where is that worrying evidence from? Put it on the table. Let the Council discuss it with Iraq. Do you want us to forget how, in 1998, when we were discussing the proposal for a comprehensive review with the Secretary-General and we cooperated fully, and when the Secretary-General sent a paper to the Council on how the arrangements for that comprehensive review were going to be conducted, the British Ambassador jumped into the arena and used the Council and pushed it to write a letter to the Secretary-General, putting terms and conditions on the comprehensive review — for one reason only. Because Kofi Annan’s paper put the

burden of proof on any side that alleges that Iraq still has weapons of mass destruction. The British letter that was sent and approved by the Council switched the burden of proof.

Even that was not enough. They had to strike at Iraq in December 1998 to kill it completely. So now we hear about worrying evidence. What worrying evidence is there? An article pops up in the press talking about Iraq rearming in this field and that field, only to be discredited about three or four weeks later. If we are going to go into a cycle of allegations followed by the disproof of allegations, will there be any end in sight to this whole exercise? If Mr. Butler goes to the extent of saying that even antiperspirants contain certain ingredients that can be extracted and mixed with a certain chemical that exists in hairspray and you can produce biological weapons in your bathtub, to that extent of audacity I say no.

Oh yes. Some are concerned about visas. The Secretary-General’s report is concerned with visas and obstructing visas. Well, I am not going to belabour that point because we have fully addressed that question in a letter sent by us to the Secretary-General, and it was circulated as a document of the Security Council in document S/2001/324. In that letter we gave the Council in detail the numbers of visas that we have granted and the numbers of visas that the Office of the Iraq Programme sometimes requests from Iraq, including those requested for irrational purposes, as if giving and requesting visas were the only consideration, and that were the only way to achieve the objectives of the humanitarian programme.

One hundred forty visas are requested for so-called international experts to work in the electricity programme in the North, and 103 visas are requested for so-called international experts to work in the demining programme in the North. If members read the letter, they will see that the demining programme would make taking out any mine the most expensive venture in the world, because the paraphernalia that surrounds the location and demining process causes it to be so. We are not against demining in the North, but the world standard relating to the cost of demining, as estimated by disarmament bodies, is around \$2,000 per mine, while the cost of demining through the United Nations project is around \$21,000 per mine. The figures speak for themselves.

The quantity of food imported for 28 dogs utilized in the demining programme in the North for the period July 1999 to June 2000 was 11 tons. The price was around \$33,000. As the number of dogs was 28, the value of each dog's share was \$1,143. By extrapolating that share on an annual basis, it comes to \$1,248 per dog per year. Every three dogs have the services of a pickup truck, a trainer and two guides, and every five dogs have a veterinarian. Lately, we heard, the dogs have been suffering from some sort of inertia, so they brought bitches to them so that they could allay their sexual desires. But the puppies are being sold on the market in the North.

What is an individual Iraqi's share of the humanitarian programme, calculated on the basis of the value of goods received? The value of that share includes not only food, but also health services and everything else. That share is \$125. So a dog's food is 10 times the share of a human Iraqi, on the basis of goods received.

There has been talk with reference to the Secretary-General's report that Iraq has not speedily concluded the contracts for phase IX, and that that has prevented the Programme from getting so many billions of dollars. According to paragraph 15 of the report of the Secretary-General, document S/2001/505, not a single application under the health, water and sanitation, and oil sectors has been received.

Before I came to this meeting, I lunched with the Minister of Health of Iraq, who was here for the special session of the General Assembly on HIV/AIDS. He confirmed to me that before the end of phase IX, perhaps before the preparation of the report — and the Secretariat did not rectify this — he had signed contracts in the health sector not merely for the amount allocated to it in the memorandum of understanding or the distribution plan, but had even gone over and above that amount. I am sure that, if I checked with other Iraqi authorities, they would tell me what I know for a fact: that they have done the same thing. So that criticism is not in order.

But if members are interested in the health of the Iraqis — and we have heard so many noble representatives speak here about the health of the Iraqis, and we thank them — let us look at some facts. The Minister of Health provided me with a table, which I shall circulate to members of the Council as soon as possible. The list is entitled "Status of arrived articles

for the eight phases, until 19 June 2001". It is done in terms of percentages or ratios. The total amounts of items received are as follows: phase I, 85.73 per cent; phase II, 89.21 per cent; phase III, 81.79 per cent; phase IV, 80.88 per cent; phase V, 79.67 per cent; phase VI, 58.24 per cent; phase VII, 41.02 per cent; and phase VIII, 1.09 per cent. That is the value of items for the health sector, the status of the goods received.

I also have other charts copies of which I shall provide members, concerning deaths due to the embargo, whether of children or of mothers. I shall further circulate charts on the effect of the embargo on the nutritional status of children, on infectious diseases and on communicable diseases.

What is the reason for this situation? It is the policy of putting contracts on hold, and the tendentious — or I should say the dirty — interventions on certain occasions causing goods not to reach Iraq. I shall provide just one example. There was a contract for the supply to Iraq of a blood-gas analyser. The seller is the French branch of Bayer. That contract was put on hold for a year and a half. We needed the analyser badly for heart operations and for children who were suffering from diarrhoea.

Consequently, contacts were initiated with the Secretary-General. The Office of the Iraq Programme was approached. The Coordinator was approached. That collective approach got the contract released from the hold that had been put on it. Did we get it? No. Why not? After the release of the contract, the Committee sent a letter to the Ministry of Health and said that the contract was thereby cancelled.

This is the worrying health situation in Iraq: a blood gas analyser to be used for the services I have outlined. If pressure is employed to release contracts, some are released, while others are put on hold. If one is released, outside pressures are applied to cancel contracts. And so on and so forth. You get a dentist's chair, but you do not get the other equipment needed to use it. When you leave it in storage while waiting for the rest, because the other contracts are not yet released — ah! — Iraq is not carrying out the distribution. Along comes the suggestion of an integrated approach — batches of contracts put together — and then other problems appear. And so forth and so on.

Now I will discuss a recent event, one that should be really fresh in the minds of Security Council

members. Correct me, please, if I am wrong. There was a meeting of informal consultations which was held a few days ago in which Mr. Zarif and Ms. Davis of UNMOVIC were requested to present a report to the Council on whether some of the items that I mentioned in the lists being discussed by the Council were the subject matter of contracts that had been allowed in the past by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990). They did not present that report. Why? The Council has clout with States; it does not have clout with international civil servants?

I do not want to go any further with this. But, if I am forced to, I will name names. All members of the Council have in their Missions the Blue Book published by the United Nations on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. That book has a 150-page introduction. Go to paragraph 100 of that particular document. You will see an argument very fitting to the American and British case, regarding the false claim that the no-fly zones are legal under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The way this was done was, instead of putting in paragraph 1 of resolution 687 (1991) in full, it was chopped in half. The half that serves Iraq is not mentioned. Such is the impartiality of international civil servants. I have nothing against international civil servants, by the way. But it is also true that any international organization is a reflection of the state of international relations at any particular moment. When there is a balance of power in the world, it is reflected in the work of organizations. When the world loses the balance of power, it is reflected in international organizations. But if we are not prepared to recognize at least that power politics and arrogance of power are not reflective of the Charter as our forefathers envisaged it, and if we go on just simply repeating like parrots, “international legitimacy, international legitimacy, international community, international community”, we will not be doing a disservice to the United Nations as an Organization — we will mainly be doing a disservice to our own respective nations, States, Governments, backgrounds, futures and hopes.

Having said this, I cannot consider that international civil servants are immune at all times from pressures, from personal interest, from wanting to live better or from just wanting to survive and keep their jobs. So in United Nations resolutions, when so many matters are put in the hands of international civil servants, and when you do not have control over them, and the main party is not even allowed to get into the

business of clarifying the situation to the Council formally on the record, Council members will end up committing grave acts of injustice in the name of international legitimacy at a time when you will be far off the mark.

I know for a fact — and I will name names if need be — that a report was written by the Coordinator and all of the directors of the specialized agencies, offices and programmes in Iraq, signed collectively, outlining an assessment of an in-the-field view of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and was sent via the Secretariat to Ambassador Celso Amorim. We recently learned that he did not receive that report. Yes, Mr. Sevan. Just raise your head in disagreement. You have no other option but to do so. I am willing to cross swords with you in public. Incidentally, you are not the one who embargoed that report. So do not be rash in disagreeing.

Why do I speak with this intensity, for which I apologize? Because it is my job to deal with this on a daily basis. These are the facts as I see them. I am talking about the transfer of Iraqi funds from one account to another by the banks entrusted by the United Nations with these tasks — and the Iraqi Central Bank does not know a thing about these transfers? About when the transfers were made, to whom, to which branch, on what value date so as to calculate whether the money has gone and where?

A supplier concludes a contract, and the contract is approved and he ships his goods, and the goods arrive, and he is supposed to be paid. These are the rules of the Memorandum of Understanding. Why is payment not made promptly? Why are there delays in payments by the banks that go on, in certain cases, up to thirty days? Take thirty days of funds withdrawn and put in another account? Calculate the interest. Where does that go? We have around us so many Garfields, it seems, and they are getting even fatter.

So it is facile to blame Iraq. The Ambassador of Canada even blamed my President for the non-achievement of the humanitarian objectives of oil for food — the oil for food which has come to be the fat pot for so many parasites.

I hear from my United Nations colleagues that a mission to Iraq is one of the most cherished and sought-after assignments by United Nations Secretariat staff. Why? Is Iraq the French Riviera? Or is it the

beautiful seashores of Jamaica? It is hot now. Is that why?

It is the money, gentlemen. Could commissions be taken by United Nations officers? Are they not being used to renovate buildings? Why are there requests for visas for carpenters and mechanics? Do we not have them locally?

Well, the story is long. I have taken more than two hours. I thank you very much, Mr. President, for your patience, and I thank the members for their patience. But I reserve my right to respond to any right of reply that might be exercised, because I am well equipped to go ahead even with further details, revealing even more names, regardless of what the impact will be.

**The President:** There are no further speakers left on my list.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

*The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.*