INTEGRATED HUMANITARIAN CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR IRAQ AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Scope and Purpose of the Integrated Plan
II. Lack of Funding as Key Constraint
III. Major Risk Factors
IV. Humanitarian Context
V. Scenarios and Planning Assumptions
   1. Scenarios
   2. Planning Assumptions
VI. Estimated Population in Need of Assistance and Planning Figures
   1. Displaced Population
   2. Food
   3. Health and Nutrition
   4. Water and Sanitation
   5. Shelter/Non-Food Items
VII. Admission of Refugees to Neighbouring Countries
VIII. Preparedness Measures
IX. Immediate Response Plans during Conflict Phase
   1. Evacuation and Deployment of Security Officers
   2. Establishment of Emergency Hub in Cyprus
   3. Cross Border Operations
   4. Agency Response during Conflict Phase
   5. Funding and Resource Mobilization
   6. Joint Press Briefings
X. Plans for Immediate Post-Conflict Response
   1. Overall Objectives for UN Assistance Activities Inside Iraq
   2. Agency Plans
   3. Planning for Early Recovery and Rehabilitation
   4. Planning for Repatriation
XI. Management and Coordination Arrangements
   1. Headquarters
   2. Coordination in the Region
   3. Coordination inside Iraq
   4. Coordination in Neighbouring Countries

Annex 1 List of Contingency Plans and Other Documents
Annex 2 Terms of Reference of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq [to be developed and approved]
Annex 3 Checklist of Actions to be Taken during Different Phases of the Crisis [to be developed]
Annex 4 Map of Iraq (2/3)
I. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE INTEGRATED PLAN

This integrated Plan has been prepared by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which chairs the Humanitarian Action Sub-Group of the Steering Group on Iraq. The preparedness and response planning of the wider UN system to a potential crisis in Iraq has taken place at several levels, including the UN Country Team, led by the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, and Country Teams in neighbouring countries under the leadership of the relevant Resident Coordinators. In developing their plans, Country Teams have generally cooperated closely with the ICRC, the IFRC and relevant Red Crescent Societies, as well as with NGOs active in their countries. Several UN agencies have also developed preparedness and response plans for Iraq and for the sub-region. This integrated plan is consequently based on each of these contingency plans, as well as a document provided by the Office of the Iraq Programme and the Security Contingency Plan prepared by UNSECOORD.1

This Plan tries to integrate the different levels of planning and is intended to assist in further discussions among the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, the relevant Resident Coordinators and Country Teams, the Office of the Iraq Programme and other members of the Humanitarian Action Sub-Group as they further refine contingency plans and address matters of common concern. It highlights inconsistencies and potential gaps between the different plans and identifies issues that still need to be addressed, including concerns that have been raised by UN agencies and in the contingency plans developed by the Country Teams.

As each of the individual contingency plans is a "working document", this Integrated Plan will be revised when updated versions of the underlying contingency plans are provided.

II. LACK OF FUNDING AS KEY CONSTRAINT

UN agencies and Country Teams have been engaged in a discreet planning and preparedness effort for several months. However, it should be noted at the outset that all UN agencies have been facing severe funding constraints that are preventing them from reaching even minimum levels of preparedness. As a consequence, the current response capacity of the UN system remains well below the critical requirements established through the inter-agency planning process.

The only resources that have been available to date have been internal agency funds, borrowed from other operations or operational reserves, which are extremely limited, and advances provided to UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF), amounting to a total of US$14.5 million. These advances have to be repaid as soon as donor funding is received.

On 13 December, UN agencies formally approached the members of the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group in Geneva with an initial request of US$37.4 million. UNRWA

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1 A list of plans and documents this Integrated Plan is based on is provided in Annex I.
requested an additional US$26.2 million to pre-position 3-month buffer stocks. It was made clear to donors that the requested funds only represent the initial installment to support and help accelerate measures that constitute a minimum level of preparedness. However, no funds have been made available to any agencies to date. UN agencies will not be in a position to reach their minimum levels of readiness unless these initial requirements are provided. Substantial additional resources will be required to allow agencies and Country Teams to achieve the level of preparedness proposed under their own contingency plans.

[Issues to be addressed: What measures should be taken to ensure that initial requirements are met? (See decisions taken at Humanitarian Sub-Group meeting on 3 January, including a second HLWG meeting in Geneva on 14 January.) Should additional requirements beyond the “initial installment” be defined and presented to donors?]

III. MAJOR RISK FACTORS

As described in detail in this Integrated Plan, UN agencies and Country Teams have agreed on preliminary planning figures on the basis of a "medium impact" scenario. At the same time, all participants in the contingency planning effort are acutely aware that a variety of risk factors and variables could have a dramatic impact on the humanitarian consequences of such a conflict, in particular the number of people affected and the ability of UN agencies and other relief providers to respond to their essential needs. Key factors include:

- The risk of a wider regional destabilization.
- The exact nature, duration and geographical impact of a military conflict, including the risk of military action by the Government of Iraq against parts of its population and the risk of civil war.
- The extent to which essential infrastructure would be affected by a conflict, in particular transportation, electricity and water and sanitation facilities.
- Lack of access to populations in need for extended periods of time.
- The extent of damage to, or looting of, existing food supplies and other stocks inside Iraq.
- Whether a conflict takes place during the winter months.
- Whether key neighbouring countries admit refugees into their territories.
- The post-conflict political and security situation.
- How quickly after a conflict a ration system could be re-established, especially in the South and Center of the country.

Another major risk factor that would dramatically affect all planning assumptions is the potential use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (NBCs). Any use of non-conventional weapons could result in massive displacements and would have a crippling effect on any humanitarian interventions. Planning for this contingency by UN agencies is, at best, at the very preliminary stage, particularly in terms of the impact that the use of NBCs might have on war-affected populations. Several neighbouring countries have also indicated that they require urgent assistance in this regard.
The level of threat to UN staff in the region would also increase if military action against Iraq was mandated by the Security Council. Threats could include direct targeting of UN staff, offices, operational activities and hostage taking.

IV. **Humanitarian Context**

From a humanitarian perspective, several factors differentiate the current situation from that in 1991. Of particular concern are the high levels of existing vulnerability and the dependence of most of the population on the Government of Iraq for their basic needs. While the Oil-for-Food Programme has succeeded in preventing the further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the country, the effects of over 12 years of sanctions, preceded by war, have considerably increased the vulnerability of the population. All but the most privileged have exhausted their cash assets and, in most cases, their material assets. The plan of the Country Team in Iraq provides a detailed overview of other indicators which are summarized below:

**Dependence on food rations:**
- According to WFP estimates, 80 percent of the average household income is constituted by the food ration, while 60 percent of the population (around 16 million persons) rely solely on the monthly food basket to meet all household needs and would be directly and seriously affected by a disruption of the food distribution system.

**Nutrition and Health:**
- Under-five mortality rate in the Center and South of Iraq (136 per 1,000 live births) remains at 2.5 times the level recorded in 1990. Half of the pregnant women are anaemic, and as a result, more than 30 percent of babies are born with low birth weight (compared to 5 per cent in 1990), making them much more vulnerable to death and under-development.
- The improvement in malnutrition rates since 1996 is highly fragile and depends on a continuing distribution of food and regular supply of potable water. An estimated 4.2 million children under five and one million pregnant women are highly vulnerable. In the event of a crisis, 30 percent of children under 5 would be at risk of death from malnutrition.
- There is a significant risk of measles outbreaks since current vaccination coverage is only around 80 percent.
- The basic health infrastructure is not fully restored and cannot be relied upon to provide full support to the population in the event of a crisis. Shortages of basic drugs and vaccines are still being reported in the country.

**Water and sanitation:**
- Only 76 percent of the population in Center and South has access to potable water (92 percent in urban areas and 41 percent in rural areas). Rural areas have to rely on
potable water distributions, ranging from once a day to once every ten days, with an average of 20 liters per household per day being delivered.

- Five million people are connected to a sewage system linked to the national grid. The system is reliant on sewage pumping stations, few of which have back-up generators.

It should also be emphasized that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population as a whole can only be met by national and local authorities. Any efforts by UN agencies will have to be supplemental to local efforts and limited to strategic emergency interventions. The collapse of essential services in Iraq, including the food ration system in the South and Center of the country, could lead to a humanitarian emergency of proportions well beyond the capacity of UN agencies and other aid organizations. UN agencies currently have only a limited capacity to implement relief programmes, particularly in the South and Center. There is also only a very limited presence of international NGOs in the South and Center.

V. SCENARIOS AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

The following sections describe possible scenarios and assumptions that have been agreed among agencies for planning purposes only. As indicated above, a range of factors could affect each of the assumptions made and may require major adjustments to the planning figures summarized in this Plan.

Scenarios

A military conflict in Iraq may have humanitarian repercussions of varying intensity:

Low impact: The military campaign rapidly achieves its objectives and encounters little resistance, resulting in limited destruction of infrastructure and services, as well as minor population movements.

Medium impact: The military campaign encounters significant resistance, but ends after a more protracted period of two to three months. As a result of a large scale ground offensive supported by aerial bombardments, there would be considerable destruction of critical infrastructure and sizeable internal and external population movements. Access to war-affected civilians would be severely limited for the duration of the conflict.

High impact: the military campaign continues for more than three months, possibly extends to neighbouring countries and could result in a complete breakdown of state capacities and, possibly, civil war. This would trigger large-scale internal and external population movements as well as massive humanitarian needs. Agencies’ ability to respond would be severely limited for an extended period.

Planning Assumptions
The UN inter-agency preparedness planning is based on the "medium impact" scenario and focuses, for planning purposes, on the following assumptions:

**Military Conflict**

**Duration:** Military conflict would be of limited duration (2-3 months).

**Geographic Scope:** While the northern governorates would remain relatively free of conflict, high intensity conflict would affect the central areas - the governorates of Ninewa and Tameem, and the governorates closest to Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk, with a total urban population of 9.2 million. The South of the country would also suffer extensive damage to service infrastructure after a relatively brief period of conflict.

**Civil Unrest:** Based on historical patterns, there is a major risk of civil unrest in portions of the country which are likely to result in high levels of casualties, a potential breakdown of law and order, and internal and external population movements.

**Attacks on population by Iraqi forces:** The risk of military action by the government against the Kurdish population in the three northern governorates and the Shia in the South is considered limited since external forces are expected to intervene to shield the respective populations from attacks.

**Impact on critical infrastructure and Essential Services:** Military conflict would result in significant disruptions of critical infrastructure in the South and Center of the country. The capacity of the government and other assistance providers to deliver basic services and to conduct relief operations would be severely limited.

**Damage to the Transportation System:**
- Road transportation system (roads, bridges, vehicles and depots);
- Railway system (bridges, culverts and tracks);
- The port of Umm Qasr would be unavailable due to damage or blockade.

**Disruption of Essential Services**
- Electricity network (damage to generating plants and the transmission and distribution networks); ²
- Government and Oil-for-Food stocks (damage to stocks held by the government as strategic reserve or under the oil-for-food programme);
- Water and sanitation system (damage to the electricity network would significantly reduce the capacity of water and sanitation systems, limiting the availability of potable water and increasing the risk of water borne diseases);
- General government capacity (damage to key ministries, loss of managerial and other staff).

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² Dahuk governorate in the north, which is connected to the national grid, is likely to lose its already limited power supply from Mosul. While this would have a significant impact at the household level, emergency services should have sufficient backup supply available.
It is expected that government services would not cease simultaneously for the entire population. A progressive run down and eventual cessation is expected depending on the geographical progression of the conflict. If a military intervention proceeds simultaneously from the North and the South, the peripheral governorates in the North and South would be affected immediately, as would facilities in central urban areas that are subject to aerial bombardments.

Local facilities (health facilities, CCCUs, warehouses) would likely continue to provide services for a short period of time, but would be unable to replenish existing supplies of food, medicine and spare parts. While supplies of vaccines and drugs in the country are sufficient for approximately four months at current consumption rates, UNICEF expects shortages of essential drugs, especially antibiotics, to occur within one month of the onset of a crisis since rates of diarrhoeal disease and acute respiratory infections would increase significantly (due to population displacements, contaminated water and shortages of heating fuels.)

Population Movements

While it is assumed that most of the population would remain in their dwellings and would be able to cope during the acute phase of the emergency, a conflict is nevertheless expected to result in medium to large scale population movements to rural and border areas, particularly towards Turkey and Iran as described in more detail below.

No major internal population movements are expected in the northern governorates but inflows of displaced persons (mainly Kurds, Turkomans and Assyrians) from south of the "dividing line" are anticipated, in particular from Kirkuk and Mosul. Most population movements towards border areas would originate from central and southern areas. Internal movements of about equal magnitude are expected both to and from southern governorates.

Population movements would also result in an increase in the number of civilian casualties due to the presence of landmines on the border with Iran and in some areas around the "dividing line", and to the likely accumulation of unexploded ordnances. There is currently no mine awareness education in the South and Center. While the rural population has acquired some knowledge, most of the urban population will not have the information required.

[Issue to be clarified: How can the above (and no projected casualties in the North) be reconciled with a planning figure of 136,000 to 270,000 potential refugees asylum seekers destined for Turkey? If these population movements are assumed to take place during a later phase of, or even after, an international conflict, this should be stated and taken into account for planning purposes.]

Access to populations in Need of Assistance
Assistance during Acute Phase of Conflict – Evacuation of International Staff

At the first indication of hostilities, all UN internationally-recruited staff would be evacuated from Iraq. International Staff evacuated from the country would support cross-border relief operations and coordinate humanitarian assistance in the country through pre-arranged communication channels.

National staff in the North, as well as the South and Center may be able to conduct certain humanitarian operations. However there is a significant risk that UN local staff may be confined to their houses, displaced due to the severity of the military conflict or mobilized by the government. In addition, local UN personnel may not be permitted by the authorities to undertake any UN-related support activities.

Local NGOs may be available for the distribution of relief items, especially the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and GFIW. Available local government institutions will be relied upon where possible and private companies that are operating will also be contracted. Availability of trucking and transport facilities may be limited, including shortages of fuel.

[Issue to be clarified: Has OIP/UNOHCI undertaken a survey of the capacity, organizations inside Iraq that would be available to assist in the implementation of relief activities?]

Access by Region

Access to the population inside Iraq would initially be limited due to the prevailing security situation or decisions to deny passage. However, UN agencies' ability to deliver assistance inside Iraq is expected to vary considerably between different regions of the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Expected Access to Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Governorates (Dahuk, Sulaymaniyyah, Erbil)</td>
<td>Virtually without interruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Governorates (Basrah, Muthana, Kerbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Thi Qar and Maysan)</td>
<td>Approximately 30 days after the start of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Governorates (Ninewa, Tameen, Salaludeen, Anbar, Babil, Wasit and Dryala)</td>
<td>Progressively after between one and three months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate and City of Baghdad</td>
<td>After three or more months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disruption of the Oil-for-Food Programme

Military conflict would have a highly disruptive impact on the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme, namely the delivery to Iraq of goods in the pipeline and the internal distribution of the remaining stocks.
Delivery Pipeline: Under current Security Council resolutions, goods in the Oil-for-Food pipeline, including some $2.5 billion of food supplies and $450 million of health supplies, could not be delivered and paid for after all internationally-recruited UN staff are evacuated from Iraq. The security council would have to pass a new resolution that would allow the delivery of goods in the pipeline under amended rules. Without Security Council authorization, funds available in the 2.3% account could also only be accessed to pay for activities authorized under the existing mandate of the Oil-for-Food Programme.

Internal Distribution of Remaining Stocks: The internal distribution of Oil-for-Food supplies would be disrupted in all parts of the country but with important regional variations. In the northern governorates the delivery system from Mosul and Kirkuk, which are located south of the "dividing line", would most likely be cut immediately given the probable course of the conflict. The local distribution network could remain more or less intact. In the South, a military attack from Kuwait and other areas South of Iraq would be expected to result in a more or less immediate breakdown of the distribution system. In the Center, aerial bombardments in key urban centers would instantly disrupt the distribution system in those areas, as well as in rural areas that are supplied from affected governorate warehouses and dependent on local [...] networks. Distributions may initially continue in other central areas that are not immediately affected by conflict.

Food Stocks at the Household Level: The recent decision by the government to distribute the food basket on a two-monthly cycle has resulted in a temporary increase in food availability at the household level. However, based on anecdotal information, it appears that many poor families are selling the additional food received to generate income to meet other essential needs. The current shortage in some commodities, especially pulses (the main source of protein), also limits the benefits of an increase in rations. As a result, household food reserves are expected to last no longer than six weeks and widespread hunger would follow if food distributions are not resumed quickly.

It is important to note that the contingency plans developed by UN agencies (which cover the first six months after the outbreak of conflict) and the Country Team in Iraq (whose plan only covers the first month) do assume, in most cases implicitly, that a ration system would be reinstated fairly quickly after the end of a conflict, especially in the South and Centre of the country. It is also fully recognized that UN agencies, even if sufficient funds were made available, would not have sufficient capacity to set up on their own such a system within a short period of time for a large percentage of the population. Government authorities and public infrastructures would have to play a major role in operating the system.

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3 Food supplies are distributed on 21 or 22 days of any given month, through a network of some 4,000 food and flour agents, with approximately one million people in all parts of the country entitled to receive their rations on each of the distribution days. Disruptions in distributions therefore would produce pockets of need where agents do not receive consignments or are no longer in place. These pockets would exist in each district and governorate.
VI. ESTIMATED POPULATION IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE AND PLANNING FIGURES

Projections of the potential humanitarian impact of a conflict in Iraq have been discussed and agreed upon on the basis of baseline poverty and vulnerability data, as well as taking into account the dynamics of previous crises in the region, in particular the Gulf crisis of 1990-92. UN agencies have agreed that, in the event of the medium impact scenario described above, the humanitarian consequences of a conflict in Iraq might unfold according to the following projections:

[Issue to be clarified: In several areas there is a significant gap between agencies’ planning figures and the estimated population in need of assistance. Plans should state clearly to what extent these discrepancies are due to projected lack of access, lack of UN capacity, estimates of funding that may be available, assistance expected from other actors (ICRC, NGOs, Government of Iraq, military) short-term coping mechanisms (e.g. household reserves) or other reasons.]

Displaced Population

Refugees and Asylum Seekers

UNHCR estimates that up to 1.45 million refugees and asylum-seekers may seek to flee Iraq in the event of a military conflict. This estimate is based on discussions with governments in the region, UNHCR’s experience and understanding of the situational context, as well as consultations with other UN agencies through the UN Country Team mechanisms.

[NB: The revised total UNHCR figure is above the 1.33 million figure agreed at Versoix I since it includes the 100,000 refugees inside Iraq and an additional 20,000 refugees destined for Turkey (revised from 250,000 to 270,000).]

Despite calls for an open admission policy, certain neighbouring governments may deny access to asylum seekers or aim at limiting the inflow of Iraqis and establish camps near the border or just inside Iraq. The anticipated admission policies shown below are based on information provided by UNHCR and the relevant Country Teams (and may differ from policies that have been announced publicly). Additional details are provided in section VII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of destination/Asylum</th>
<th>Number of refugees/asylum seekers</th>
<th>Anticipated admission policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>258,000 - 900,000</td>
<td>May be permitted to cross border but will be contained in camps in border areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>136,000 - 270,000</td>
<td>Not permitted to cross border; camps Planned on Iraq side of border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>34,000 - 50,000</td>
<td>Official position remains that no refugees will be admitted but government has indicated some degree of flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>20,000 - 60,000</td>
<td>Permitted to cross border</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Saudi Arabia | 18,000 – 20,000 | Not permitted to cross border
Kuwait | 34,000 - 50,000 | Government will not prevent refugees from crossing border
Iraq | 100,000 | 
TOTAL | 600,000 - 1,450,000 |

[Issue to be clarified: UNHCR has requested additional information regarding planned and expected assistance activities inside the country as the level of assistance will significantly impact the projected population movements.]

[Issues to be clarified: There are certain inconsistencies between figures used in the plan of the Country Team in Iraq (Annex 1), the UNHCR planning figures and the plans of Country Teams in neighbouring countries. Some Country Teams use the lower end of the range (e.g. Turkey) while others use the upper end and include higher "worst case" scenario figures (e.g. Kuwait, which includes a figure of 200,000 that is also being used by the Government). The Iran Country Team Plan uses a maximum number of refugees of 500,000, the same number used by the Government of Iran, and is deeply concerned about the use of the 900,000 figure. Certain of these discrepancies may be due to the exclusion of asylum seekers that may get stranded on the Iraq side of the border in plans of Country Teams in neighbouring countries. Consistent overall figures should be used since it will be highly unpredictable which side of the border asylum seeker refugees will be.]

[Issue to be clarified: The plan of the Country Team in Iraq (Annex 1) shows estimates of asylum-seekers by country that would not be permitted to cross the border; these estimates are inconsistent with the asylum policies of certain neighbouring countries (e.g. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) shown above.]

UNHCR has established its preparedness target for 600,000 persons which – subject to the availability of resources – would be achieved in early 2003. UNHCR’s response planning for Iraq is modular, and as such, has the capacity to quickly contract or expand depending on the scope and duration of the crisis.

Internally Displaced Persons

Up to 900,000 people may be internally displaced in addition to the 900,000 – 1,100,000 existing IDPs. This figure does not include asylum seekers who may be stranded on the Iraqi side of the borders with neighbouring countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 The existing refugee population inside Iraq comprises approximately 62,000 Palestinians, 14,000 Turks and 24,000 Iranians. UNHCR is concerned about the physical security and safety of this populations in the event of a major crisis. In the event of a collapse of country administration and resulting widespread insecurity, these refugees may be forced to seek refuge in safer areas in Iraq, to flee and seek asylum in neighbouring countries, or to return to their country of origin.
Issues to be clarified: The Plan of the Country Team in Iraq (Annex 1) shows a separate figure of two million IDPs for the South only but also a total of two million. The OIP document refers to internal population movements to the three northern governorates but no estimate is given.

Issues to be clarified: A clear distinction should be drawn between the planning figures for (i) asylum seekers (which should be included in an overall refugee/asylum seeker figure), (ii) new IDPs that are not expected to seek asylum and (iii) existing IDPs. This is also required to help delineate the primary coordination responsibilities of UNHCR for (i) and the HC for (ii) and (iii), as agreed at the Versoix I meeting.

Third Country Nationals

IOM plans to assist some 60,000 third country nationals leaving Iraq and/or the region, including 50,000 Egyptians and 3,000 Sudanese from Iraq, 7,000 other persons from Iraq and from the region.

Food

On the basis of socio-economic data and assumptions regarding the impact of military intervention, WFP estimates that approximately 10 million people, or 40 percent of the population in the Center and South and 34 percent in the North, would be affected as they would be highly food insecure, displaced or directly affected by military action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Food</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>1,249,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South/Centre</td>
<td>8,737,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9,986,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Issue to be clarified: Based on a breakdown by governorates provided by WFP and the projected times when different regions would become accessible (see above) it appears that about 1.2 million affected persons would be accessible more or less immediately (North), 2.6 million within 30 days (South), four million between one and three months (Center) and two million after more than three months (Baghdad). To be confirmed and discussed, also in the context of likely displacement patterns.

WFP has developed two response scenarios: (i) an initial response scenario, in which 4.9 million people would be assisted, including 300,000 refugees, 500,000 internally displaced and 45 percent or of the remaining affected population (4.1 million people); and (ii) a medium-scale scenario, in which 9.6 million people would be assisted, including 1.3 million refugees, one million internally displaced and 95 percent of the remaining affected population (7.3 million people). The two scenarios reflect a potential scaling-up of the assistance level, whose pace would be determined by the level of
access, available resources and operational capacity over time. The scaling-up could be achieved over a very short period of time.

[Issue to be clarified: The plan of the Country Team in Iraq (Annex 1) and the OIP document estimate that 23.09 million people would be in need of food assistance, of which 13.1 million (3.71 million people in the North, 7.43 million people in the South and two million IDPs) would immediately require food assistance. These figures are inconsistent with the figures used by the WFP.]

Health and Nutrition

The number of highly vulnerable in the table below refers to children under five and pregnant and lactating women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Highly Vulnerable</th>
<th>Direct and indirect casualties</th>
<th>Nutrition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1,230,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>1,860,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1,260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad area</td>
<td>1,290,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1,030,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>830,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5,210,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>3,020,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNICEF is planning to provide nutrition assistance to 910,000 severely and moderately malnourished children, as well as 700,000 pregnant and lactating women. It is also planning to provide health support to up to 4.7 million people.

Water and Sanitation

The figures below are based on the percentage of the population connected to water treatment systems and compact units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>4,070,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>6,180,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad area</td>
<td>4,280,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>3,710,000</td>
<td>3,710,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18,240,000</td>
<td>8,710,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the event of a crisis, only 39 percent of the population would be serviced on a rationed basis, for a short while and depending on the availability of fuel, by treatment plants that have a stand-by generation capacity. The access would be uneven between urban and rural areas, as 70 percent of urban facilities have access to emergency generation capacity against only 11 percent of rural facilities.

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5 This figure includes 2.02 million severely and moderately wasted children under five and one million pregnant and lactating women.
UNICEF is planning to provide emergency water and sanitation interventions for up to 6.9 million people.

**Shelter/Non-Food Items**

The Iraq Country Team Plan estimates that 970,000 IDPs would require NFIs but no shelter material (they are expected to use buildings and schools for shelter) and 460,000 asylum seekers that would remain inside would require shelter and NFIs.

[Issue to be clarified: The estimated figure of asylum seeker is based on admission policies that may not be accurate (see above).]

Using the planning figure of 600,000 refugees and asylum seekers, UNHCR’s contingency plan provides requirements of shelter materials (including 120,000 tents), winter kits and other NFIs.

**VII Admission of Refugees to Neighbouring Countries**

Country Teams in neighbouring countries have been cooperating closely with governments in their contingency planning efforts, in particular in preparing for a potential influx of refugees. Led by UNHCR, the Country Teams have been advocating for admission, under a temporary protection regime, of those fleeing generalized violence and/or persecution. In the event of a conflict, concerted efforts will be made to convince neighbouring countries to keep their borders open, including forceful diplomatic interventions as well as concrete offers of burden sharing by other states. As described in more detail below, cross border operations should not serve as a substitute for asylum and should not be used as an argument to deny it.

The following provides an overview of the positions the governments of neighbouring countries have taken towards admitting refugees. It also summarizes other relevant information and concerns identified in contingency plans provided by the Country Teams.

[Issue to be clarified: Several neighbouring countries have requested that the UN enter into MOUs. The key concerns countries want to address apparently differ substantially (e.g. Turkey and Jordan). There is a need to discuss whether it would be appropriate to enter into such MOUs and what their content should be. It should also be noted that RCs will have to be authorized by the Secretary-General to enter into binding agreements on behalf of the UN.]

**Iran**

*Country Team Contingency Planning Figure: 150,000  500,000*
The Government of Iran has indicated that it would prefer to contain prospective refugees inside Iraq and encourage cross border operations. Where not feasible and under humanitarian pressure, the Government is expected to admit refugees but keep them close to the border to facilitate screening and eventual spontaneous returns.

Based on previous experiences, six primary and four secondary points of entry for refugees have been identified. As border areas are heavily mined as a result of previous conflicts, closed borders or inadequate entry points could force fleeing populations to take extremely dangerous paths. The Government has assured UNHCR that those Iraqis who cannot obtain protection and assistance inside Iraq will be allowed entry through designated entry points.

The UN Country Team and the Government have agreed on 12 sites for refugee camps on Iranian territory, all of which are within 18 kilometres of the border. The Country Team Plan includes a detailed description of each of the sites, including geographical and other constraints. The majority of sites would require preparations for winter conditions. An additional seven sites were recently announced by the Government but have not been assessed by the UN.

[Issue to be clarified: Interventions at different levels should be discussed to assist agencies in obtaining urgently required radio licenses for the western part of the country.]

**Turkey**

Country Team Contingency Planning Figure: 136,000

The policy of the Government of Turkey, as reflected in regulations and confirmed in recent statements, is to avoid a mass influx of refugees into Turkish territory. To this end, the Government would make efforts to establish control over a zone of undetermined width inside Iraqi territory. It would be expected to move rapidly to establish assembly areas and camps and to provide assistance and essential services, both directly and in cooperation with the Turkish Red Crescent Society.

According to some reports, the Government plans to establish 18 camp sites ranging in population from 9,000 to 24,000 persons each. The total capacity of these camps reportedly would be 276,000 and two-thirds of the sites, with a capacity of 105,000 persons, would be located in Iraq. The camps sites in Iraq would be used first, with those on Turkish territory only being used if displacement levels become overwhelming or operations in Iraq become impossible for security or other reasons. Should the Government decide to admit refugees to Turkish territory, access may be limited to a single entry point (the Harbor Gate near Silopi), with other likely entry points being Isikveren, Uzumlu and Cukurea, in case the influx is larger and less controlled.

The Country Team’s Plan assumes that UN agencies would support the Government in assisting 80,000 refugees and 56,000 asylums seekers at the border, on the basis that UN agencies operating in Turkey may be best positioned to provide protection and assistance to this group. The overall planning figure of 136,000 is roughly half of that being used.
by the Government. The Government’s additional 140,000 persons are apparently covered by planning figures of IDPs that would be too far from the border and would not be considered asylum seekers.

Issues to be clarified: Will international NGOs be allowed to operate in Turkey or participate in cross border operations in northern Iraq? Under what conditions should UN agencies support the Government’s assistance efforts on Iraqi territory?

Draft Memorandum of Understanding with the Government to be provided to HQ.

Jordan
Country Team Contingency Planning Figure: 35,000

While the Government of Jordan has indicated for several months that it will not allow Iraqi refugees to cross its borders, recent developments suggest that it may show a certain degree of flexibility. The Government for example has started discussing potential camps sites on the Jordanian side of the border. However, the UN has not participated in any site inspections or planning.

Refugees fleeing towards Jordan are expected to gather close to the border crossing at Karameh. If refugees remain in the desert terrain near the border area, a major constraint would lack of water since the area is 275 kilometers from the nearest source of fresh water on the Jordanian side. The Government of Jordan has indicated that its military could build a water pipeline with the Al-Alzraq aquifer which has limited water reserves.

Draft Memorandum of Understanding with the Government to be provided to HQ.

Syria
Country Team Contingency Planning Figure: 20,000

The Government of Syria has stated that it would keep its border open to admit refugees. Several likely crossing points have been identified for refugees coming from northern, central and southern Iraq. The El Hol camp, which hosted some 8,000 Iraqi refugees who were admitted in 1991 and 1992, is planned as the main initial camp. An additional camp may be set up in the vicinity of Abu Kamal. Refugees would be transported by bus from the crossing points to the camp sites within 24 hours of arrival.

Saudi Arabia
Country Team Contingency Planning Figure: 20,000

The Government of Saudi Arabia has stated that it will not admit any refugees from Iraq.

No contingency plan from the Country Team is available yet.

Kuwait
Country Team Contingency Planning Figure: 50,000

While the Government of Kuwait has stated that it would not open its border, it has also indicated that it would not actively prevent refugees from crossing its border. It is envisioned that about 15,000 refugees will be accommodated in temporary sites within the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ while some 35,000 will remain stranded on the Iraqi side of the border.

[Issue to be clarified: If the above is in fact the position of the Government, it is unclear why the majority of asylum seekers would remain stranded in Iraq. Potential access constraints to border areas due to military operations should also be clarified further.]

Refugees are expected to arrive from two main towns in Iraq, namely Safwan and Basra. They are likely to be settled in locations between Abdaly and Unan Qasr (both UNIKOM crossing points), a barren landscape with no local construction material, fuel wood, water sources or sanitation facilities. Adequate sites at sufficient distances from the border still have to be identified. All efforts should be made to avoid settlements in the harsh and dry area between Adbaly and the border with Saudi Arabia.

[Issue to be clarified: Agencies may be able to have access to certain UNIKOM assets; to be further discussed at the Country Team level and with DPKO]

VIII. PREPAREDNESS MEASURES

The main operational agencies have undertaken a range of preparedness activities, particularly in terms of the pre-positioning of supplies and pre-deployment of staff.

UNHCR has a central emergency stockpile of relief supplies (not including tents and stoves) for 250,000 persons, as well as a roster of 72 staff members ready to be deployed on a 72-hour notice. Based on limited resources and not on actual needs, current pre-positioning of registration materials and non-food items, such as winterised tents, blankets and plastic sheeting, has been limited to 100,000 people. UNHCR has established a target of 600,000 people for pre-positioning purposes.

UNICEF has a standing surge capacity for up to 500,000 beneficiaries available on demand from its warehouse in Copenhagen. Through internal advances, it has procured and pre-positioned supplies in Iraq and four neighbouring countries, focusing on emergency health, nutrition, water/sanitation, child protection and education. Due to the limited funds available, the established readiness level could only target 550,000 (300,000 in the South and Center and 250,000 in the North) beneficiaries inside Iraq and 460,000 in neighbouring countries.

WFP has initiated the pre-positioning of food commodities and has entered into agreements with neighbouring countries to borrow from cereal stocks, in order to have sufficient quantities in place by the third week of January for up to 900,000 beneficiaries for 10 weeks. WFP has also started augmenting its logistics and programme capacity in
the region and negotiating for stand-by agreements with implementing partners. It has upgraded ICT in the region and costed inter-agency services (ICT and a Joint Logistics Center, as well as a Humanitarian Air Service).

[Section on deployments to the region by OCHA and UNDP to be added.]

The plan of the Country Team in Iraq contains a detailed list of supplies and stocks each agency has available inside Iraq.

[Framework for integrated inventory of relief items to be provided to agencies and Country Teams.]

IX. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE PLANS DURING CONFLICT PHASE

Evacuation and Deployment of Security Officers

At the first indication of hostilities, all UN internationally-recruited staff would be evacuated from Iraq. Air evacuations from Baghdad International Airport may be a feasible option that is being explored further by UNSECOORD. Discussion are ongoing between UNSECOORD and WFP to ensure that, if the air space is open, there will be sufficient aircraft available to transport UN staff and their families.

Simultaneously with the evacuation of internationally-recruited staff from Iraq, Phase 3 would be declared in Jordan, Kuwait, Israel, Yemen and Lebanon, requiring the evacuation of dependants and non-essential staff from these countries.

[Issue to be clarified: UN agencies and relevant Country Teams have requested that the automatic declaration of Phase 3 be revisited: to be discussed in the Steering Group on 10 January.]

As soon as there are indications that hostilities could be imminent, UNSECOORD will deploy a team of 11 additional Field Security Coordination Officers (FSCOs) to select duty stations in order to support Designated Officials and Security Management Teams. These FSCOs have undertaken familiarization visits to assigned duty stations and have conducted independent assessments. Agencies may deploy additional Field Safety Advisers and Officers to the region to complement the capacity of UNSECOORD.

At headquarters, UNSECOORD will activate its 24-hour operations office capability as required. An Operational Group, consisting of security professions from UNSECOORD, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, WFP, OCHA, and DPKO will be assembled in New York to monitor and guide the regional security team and to respond to policy requirements in a unified inter-agency manner.

Establishment of Emergency Hub in Cyprus
The Steering Group on Iraq has decided that Cyprus would serve as the emergency hub in case international UN staff has to be evacuated from Iraq. OCHA has been designated to coordinate the required arrangements in close cooperation with OIP, DPKO and UNSECOORD, as well as participating agencies.

In addition to the Humanitarian Coordinator, a senior team of agency representatives would be deployed to Cyprus as soon as staff is evacuated from Iraq. A Regional Field Security Coordination Officers (RFSCO) has also been identified and will be co-located with the Humanitarian Coordinator and serve as his/her security adviser and be responsible for coordinating any regional security requirements.

[Agencies were requested by OCHA on 3 January to provide the names of senior representatives they intend to deploy to Cyprus.]

Key common services will also be located in Cyprus, including the Humanitarian Information Center, the Joint Logistics Center and the Humanitarian Air Service (each described in more detail below).

**Redeployment of Staff and Cross Border Operations**

UNSECOORD is developing plans to conduct security assessments in areas that may be secure for the early redeployment of staff.

[Section on cross border operations (other than in support of asylum seeker, see below) to be developed, including coordination, logistics, security and policy considerations. Most plans of Country Teams in neighbouring countries contain little or no information on these matters.]

**Inter-Agency Assessment Missions**

[A section should be added that describes the modalities for inter-agency humanitarian assessment missions, possibly including principal participants (and coordinators) entry points and likely priority areas. Are assessment missions by national staff being planned?]

**Agency Response Plans during Conflict Phase**

**Assistance to Refugees and Asylum Seekers**

UNHCR will take the lead in the planning, delivery and coordination of protection and the provision of material assistance for refugees. In order to ensure both coherence and efficiency in the delivery of the emergency refugee program and to facilitate coordination with concerned governments and other UN agencies, the High Commissioner has appointed a Regional Refugee Coordinator.
In cooperation with other UN and humanitarian agencies, UNHCR has developed a six-month integrated emergency protection and assistance program to ensure a rapid, coherent and efficient response during the initial phase of an emergency. Four priorities have been identified so far:

a) The protection of the refugees through:
   - Registration and documentation as early as possible which consists of fixing the population and issuing temporary documentation. A verification exercise, including more permanent identification, would take place at a later stage. The early registration of refugees will ensure that important information is recorded and that their legal, material and physical safety is facilitated. The registration exercise will be conducted, to the extent possible, so that armed elements are properly identified and referred to the appropriate authorities.
   - Screening to determine refugee status, which might be necessary under certain circumstances, for instance, if in the course of the registration process special protection or potential exclusion cases are identified.
   - Special attention is to be given to groups with particular attention needs as early as possible, in particular women without male protection and unaccompanied and separated children to identify and provide appropriate interventions and solutions.

(b) The provision of a winter package (tents, blankets, mattresses, heating cooking stove, kerosene lamp, fuel and plastic sheeting).

(c) The provision of basic water and sanitation services in accordance with recognized international standards

(d) The sectoral level of assistance to the refugee program/asylum seekers at the border. Coordination functions will involve harmonizing and streamlining policies, needs assessments, resources and implementation as well as facilitating and sharing the flow of information.

Cooperation with Neighbouring Countries

UNHCR will practice full partnership with the neighbouring countries capitalizing on their prime responsibility, generosity and capabilities. As in any refugee situation, UNHCR and its partner staff will need to obtain safe and unhindered access to refugees wherever they are. Such access is essential to conduct proper protection monitoring, to undertake reporting and to effectively intervene when necessary, especially when protection problems arise.

Cross Border Operations to Assist Asylum Seekers

As emphasised above, cross border operations should not serve as a substitute for asylum and not be used as an argument to deny it. Experience shows that there is often a real danger that the presence of large concentrations of people and the establishment of camps in border areas still under the control of the national army (or any other party to a conflict) would elicit serious protection problems.
However, some relief/protection operations on the Iraqi side of the border may become unavoidable when all efforts to secure open borders fail and when international humanitarian assistance proves clearly necessary for the material survival of stranded populations.

Policy Considerations

The following policy considerations should guide decisions on involvement in cross-border operations:

- a) The timing and scope of such involvement needs to be assessed with great caution and to be closely coordinated amongst the agencies involved, so as not to jeopardize international efforts, led by UNHCR, to negotiate admission into neighbouring countries;
- b) Cross-border operations should focus on the most immediate needs and be of short duration in anticipation of either admission to asylum or safe and voluntary return to places of origin;
- c) The security situation in the affected areas should be relatively stable and be expected to remain so; in particular, areas of operation should not be located in or near zones of combat;
- d) The authorities in control of such areas must be reliable interlocutors with a willingness and capacity to live up to their undertakings;
- e) Such undertakings should include respect for the right of civilians to leave their country to seek refuge abroad or to return home; for non-discriminatory and safe access to humanitarian assistance and for the impartial character of humanitarian operations.

Practical Involvement

The exact modalities of cross-border operations will eventually depend on such factors as the number of asylum seekers in any given location, their own coping mechanisms and any local assistance capacity. Operations should focus on ensuring that the basic physical and protection needs are met. Fixed camp structures should be avoided.

Because asylum-seeking populations would be of special concern to UNHCR, and given the practical linkages between operations on either side of the border, UNHCR will retain a coordinating role on asylum seekers. In the event there is a failure to successfully negotiate with the governments concerned on admission for asylum seekers, as part of a joint and coordinated Country Team and regional strategy, humanitarian agencies and UNHCR will commence cross-border support operations in favor of populations stranded at the border. Plans are being developed discretely at the Country Team level to prepare for this eventuality should a cross-border response be required.

WFP
WFP’s operations will be supported by significantly upgraded capacity (staff and equipment) in the countries surrounding Iraq, in order to assist the refugee caseload and to monitor logistics corridors. The WFP country director for Iraq, together with key staff including a logistics team, will operate from Cyprus during the evacuation period. In cooperation with WFP offices in neighbouring countries, the team in Cyprus would be responsible for coordinating food assistance to refugees in the region, as well as for operating regional logistics corridors. WFP sub-offices would be established in locations where influxes of refugees are expected.

WFP staff formerly working as Food Observers in Iraq would be assigned as food aid monitors. Where possible, WFP anticipates that food distributions could be carried out through the food and flour agent system used under the Oil-for-Food Programme.

UNICEF

While international staff remains outside the country, UNICEF has a team of qualified national staff in the North as well as the South and Center who are trained to manage the humanitarian assistance programme in the country. The following are the key interventions that UNICEF plans to undertake in Iraq during a crisis:

- Provide non-food assistance to the internally displaced, including basic health services, portable water supply and sanitation, nutritional support and some non-food items and shelter materials. Advocate for the protection and humanitarian needs of IDPs.
- Provide basic primary health services to the North and to accessible areas in the South and Center for all under-five children and pregnant and lactating women, including the provision of essential drugs, vaccination against measles, reproductive health services and health information/promotion on proper management of diarrhoeal disease and acute respiratory infections.
- Support the nutritional rehabilitation of acutely malnourished children through supplemental and therapeutic feeding programmes in the North and accessible areas in the South and Center. Conduct regular nutritional monitoring/surveillance. Conduct IEC activities to encourage the exclusive and complementary breastfeeding feeding of children under six months and two years respectively.
- Support the resumption of water and sanitation services in north and accessible areas of the South and Center through water tinkering, the repair of water treatment plants and the installation of emergency generators where necessary. Hygiene promotion activities will also be conducted.
- Support the basic needs of institutionalized children in the country; provide protection and assistance to unaccompanied children and support family reunification through tracing.
- Conduct awareness raising activities on the dangers of landmines and UXOs.

Funding and Resource Mobilization
Immediately after a conflict breaks out, OCHA would coordinate the preparation of an inter-agency emergency appeal. The appeal would cover the estimated requirements of UN agencies for the first six months after the outbreak of conflict.

[Issue to be clarified: In estimated their requirements, some agencies appear to assume that "986 staff" will continue to be paid from the 2.2% account even when they perform functions that are outside the 986 mandate (e.g. monitor distributions of non-986 supplies). This would not be possible without a new Security Council Resolution.]

**Joint Press Briefings**

The Steering Group on Iraq has decided that joint press briefings by the UN system would initially be held in Amman and moved to other locations as required by developments. Public information staff in Amman would maintain close links with the emergency hub in Cyprus and other locations and agency staff in the region.

**X. PLANS FOR IMMEDIATE POST-CONFLICT RESPONSE**

**Overall Objectives for UN Assistance Activities Inside Iraq**

The Country Team in Iraq has identified targets groups and sectoral objectives for assistance activities inside Iraq.

**Target Groups**

Given the limitations of the Iraq Country Team Plan, which only covers in-country assistance for one month, UN agencies will focus in their emergency preparedness and response on the following groups, considered to be most vulnerable and most likely to require emergency assistance:

- War-related casualties;
- IDPs (water/sanitation, general/reproductive health, casualties care, food and nutrition);
- Malnourished children and children under five (nutrition, therapeutic feeding & PHC services);
- Pregnant and lactating women (nutrition & reproductive health);
- Current refugees in Iraq;
- Hospitalised and institutionalised population (water and sanitation, health), with additional focus on children, elderly and disabled (water and sanitation, health, food and nutrition); and
- General population of three northern governorates and other accessible areas (all sectors).

**Food (WFP)**

The overall objective is to minimise the adverse effects of an emergency situation or food
insecurity, focusing on:

- Maintaining nutrition situation of affected population and most vulnerable groups;
- Saving lives in severe conditions.

**Health (UNICEF, WHO, UNCHR, UNDP)**

**Health**

Efforts will be directed to mitigate/minimize the adverse effects of the emergency situation on the health situation of the population through the following set of objectives:

- When the situation permits, to ensure a proper assessment of the health conditions of the affected population is carried out on time, especially of women and children.
- To ensure the availability of essential vaccines.
- To ensure the availability of emergency medicine and equipment for at least one month from the onset of the crisis.
- To ensure the availability of relevant IEC materials.
- To ensure minimal electricity generation for operation of health services.

**Nutrition (UNICEF, WFP)**

Efforts will be directed to mitigate/minimize the adverse effects of the emergency situation on the health and nutritional status of child and mother through supporting the following objectives:

- When the situation permits, to ensure that a proper assessment of the nutritional status of the affected population, especially of children and women, is carried out on time.
- To ensure provision of compact/supplementary food items to vulnerable groups.
- To ensure the availability of weighing and measuring scales to monitor nutritional status.
- To ensure continual care of acute malnourished children.
- To ensure the availability of relevant IEC material concerning nutrition.

**Water and Sanitation (UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, UNCHR)**

The UN system will focus its attention on interventions that:

- When the situation permits, to ensure that a proper assessment of the water and sanitation conditions of the affected population is carried out on time.
- To ensure that the affected/displaced population have access to minimal portable water and sanitary services.
- To ensure minimal electricity generation for operation of water and sanitation services.

**Child Protection (UNICEF)**
The objective is to support interventions that:

- Ensure that children with special protection needs have access to shelter, food and clothing, especially institutionalised children and refugee and IDP children.
- Ensure special care, protection and physical and psychosocial support for children with special needs.
- Ensure special care, protection and psychosocial support of unaccompanied children, and their reunification with their families.

**Agency Plans**

**WFP**

Inside Iraq and upon re-entry after eventual evacuation, WFP is planning to provide emergency food aid through a network of four area offices and seven sub-offices, all coupled with warehouse/logistics facilities in addition to logistics facilities established at points of entry and/or transit. A regional coordination unit will be established.

WFP would implement a targeted food distribution programme throughout the country. It has considered two scenarios and related approaches, namely to reinvigorate the food distribution system through food and flour agents under the Oil-for-Food Programme or to establish a new delivery and distribution system by involving mainly others actors, such as NGOs, in areas where the system is not in operation.

[Issue to be clarified: Is more detail available as to the feasibility of these two approaches in different areas of the country?]

Along with the distribution of a general food ration, WFP would implement a supplementary feeding programme, targeting the most vulnerable population. WFP staff would monitor the distribution and targeting of the supplementary rations. WFP staff would also set up sub-offices in selected governorates.

[Other agencies to be added or plans to be presented by sector.]

**Planning for Early Recovery and Rehabilitation**

[UNDP should lead the early development of relevant plans by UNDGV members.]

**Planning for Repatriation**

[to be developed by UNHCR]

XI. MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS
Headquarters

All UN activities are strategically coordinated by the Steering Group on Iraq, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General. A Humanitarian Action Sub-Group has been established by the Steering Group which is chaired by OCHA and consists of WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, UNSECOORD, OIP and UNRWA. The Sub-Group will serve as the primary forum for the timely exchange of relevant information and action on key policy issues related to the UN response to a humanitarian crisis.

Coordination in the Region

Humanitarian Coordinator

Discussions are ongoing in the Humanitarian Action Sub-Group with regard to the terms of reference of the Humanitarian Coordinator who would coordinate the inter-agency response both inside Iraq and in neighbouring countries. The Humanitarian Coordinator would be deployed to Cyprus as soon as internationally-recruited staff are evacuated from Iraq.

[Issue to be clarified: Should lead agencies for sectoral coordination at the regional level be identified (in addition to the sectoral coordination arrangements agreed inside Iraq and by Country Teams in neighbouring countries, as described below)?]

Common Regional Services

The following common inter-agency services are being planned and will be located that the emergency humanitarian hub in Cyprus (with sub-offices in the region):

Regional Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)

The WFP-managed Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) will undertake the following general tasks:

- Inter-agency logistics coordination and planning at regional and in-country level;
- Identification of logistics bottlenecks affecting the humanitarian effort;
- Arranging technical assessment missions related to port, rail and road infrastructure to identify and address logistics bottlenecks in a coordinated fashion;
- Prioritization and tasking Agency air movements for the UNHAS operation;
- Monitoring Agency food and non-food supply movements;
- Operational-level CMCoord functions in coordination with OCHA;
- Maintenance of a web site dedicated to the Iraq UNJLC operation; and
- Assisting in prioritizing relief items for transport on any common UN air service which develops.

Within the region, there will be at least six UNJLC satellites, security permitting: Jordan (Amman), Syria (Damascus), Turkey (Mersin) and Iraq (Erbil, Kirkuk and Basra). These
satellites will be responsible for inter-agency logistics coordination activities within their areas of responsibility.

**Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC)**

The complexity of any large-scale humanitarian operation in Iraq will warrant the establishment by OCHA of a Humanitarian Information Center (HIC) to streamline the provision of compatible data, sector and location standards as well as assessments across sectors and boundaries. The HIC would help ensure effective and cost efficient response as well as providing management to the flow of inter-agency information and acting as a resource or the wider humanitarian community. A virtual HIC has been operational already and will be transferred to the field as and when required. The primary focal point of the HIC would be the operational hub in Cyprus which would oversee the activities of satellite offices to be established in Amman and other countries neighbouring Iraq.

**Regional Emergency Telecommunications Network**

Discussions are ongoing about the coordination of emergency telecommunications.

*Issue to be clarified: A lead agency should be identified to coordinate this area.*

**Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS)**

There will be a requirement for a humanitarian air service to transport personnel and urgently needed air cargo. WFP will manage this service on behalf of the humanitarian community to provide safe, efficient and cost effective air transport service to staff of UN agencies, eligible NGOs and representatives of donor countries in the region, carry out timely medical and security evacuation of staff as and when required, and provide airlift and airdrop capability for food and non-food to areas where overland access is not feasible. Within the framework of the contingency plan, WFP is currently carrying out an assessment of capacity requirements, facilities, routes and costing.

**Coordination inside Iraq**

Overall coordination of humanitarian assistance inside Iraq will fall under the responsibility of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (HC). The HC will be supported by the Head of Agencies represented in the Country Team (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and UNHCR), and by the staff of the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOHCI).

The UN Country Team will be responsible for the management and implementation of its Plan, according to the distribution of responsibilities within the following sectoral working groups:

- Food and Nutrition
- Health
• Water and Sanitation
• Supply, Logistics and Communications

All activities will be carried out in coordination with the NGOs participating in the sectoral working groups which include CARE, Enfants Du Monde and Premiere Urgence. The working groups comprise key local staff and have prepared operational plans for each sector.

The following matrix provides an overview of the operational roles and responsibilities of UN agencies in Iraq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Lead Agency</th>
<th>Participating Agency</th>
<th>Participating NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>EMDH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therapeutic Feeding &amp; Nutrition Surveys</td>
<td>UNICEF⁴</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA</td>
<td>CARE, PU</td>
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<td>UNDP, UNHCR</td>
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<td>Transport, Logistics, and Communication</td>
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<td>UNICEF, UNDP</td>
<td>EMDH, CARE, PU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UNICEF, WHO, WFP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The HC will coordinate activities related to the protection and provision of assistance to IDPs. Relevant agencies will provide assistance to IDPs in the sector(s) related to their mandate. There will be a need for at least two professionals (one international and one national) to support the HC in the coordination of humanitarian assistance provided to IDPs.

**Coordination in Neighbouring Countries**

UN Country Teams and Resident Coordinators will remain the principal inter-agency coordination mechanisms in neighboring countries and have agreed on sectoral coordination roles and responsibilities. The following sections provide an overview of coordination mechanisms that have been agreed or are being planned in neighbouring countries.

**Iran**

UNHCR chairs a contingency planning task force comprising UNHCR, WHO, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, IOM and ICRC. There are 11 sectoral sub-groups, each chaired by a UN agency. WFP has been designated to coordinate efforts to obtain the required radio communication licenses for all UN agencies that can be used in western areas of the country. After agreement was reached with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UN agencies have started opening offices in Kermanshah in western Iran.

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⁴ Refers to the provision of therapeutic feeding to malnourished children.
Turkey

The RC has established an inter-agency working group on emergency preparedness which comprises key UN agencies, IFRC and IOM. Ten sectoral working groups have been identified that should involve all relevant government agencies and NGOs. UNHCR is the focal point for contingency planning and convener of the inter-agency working group.

Jordan

UNHCR has been chairing an inter-agency contingency planning committee that has sectoral sub-committees. UNHCR has taken the lead role in planning and coordination for refugees and asylum seekers from Iraq. IOM has taken the lead relating to third country nationals and UNRWA has taken lead responsibilities for potential refugees flows from the occupied Palestinian territory. Other country level coordination mechanisms already exist and include the Government, UN agencies, as well as local and international NGOs.

Kuwait

The Country Team has agreed on a coordination structure, including sectoral coordination arrangements that will be activated as soon as emergency operations become imminent. Overall coordination will be tasked to a steering committee co-chaired by the RC and the Government of Kuwait. Coordination forums and information sharing platforms with donors and NGOs are also planned. UNHCR has facilitated the creation of an emergency management working group for refugee protection and assistance issues which is co-chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
ANNEX 1

List of Contingency Plans and Other Documents


2. Likely Humanitarian Scenarios OIP/UNOHC (10 December 2002)

3. UNSECOORD Security Contingency Plan - Iraq

4. IASC - UN Inter-agency Humanitarian Preparedness and Response Plan for Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (20 December 2002)

5. UNHCR Contingency Plan for Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (November 2002)


7. UNICEF - Sub-regional Contingency Plan of Action (October 2002)

8. Inter-Agency Contingency Plan for Jordan (22 December 2002)


10. Inter-Agency Contingency Plan for a Refugee Influx from Iraq to Turkey (7 November 2002)

11. UN Country Team in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Contingency Plan for a Possible Influx of Refugees from Iraq (6 December 2002)

12. UN Inter-Agency Plan for Humanitarian Preparedness and Response on Refugee Influx in Syria (October 2002)