[casi] Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare: The US vs. FRL/Islamist Duel

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http://www.csis.org/features/031204_assymetric.pdf


Dec 04, 2003

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Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare: The US vs. FRL/Islamist Duel

Changing Grand Strategy, Strategy, Tactics, Technology, and Training

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
Center for Strategic and International Studies

December 4, 2003

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 2

Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare: Attack and Counterattack

Anthony H. Cordesman

The last few months have seen a steady escalation in the asymmetric war
between the US
and its coalition allies, and a hostile mix of former regime loyalists and
largely Sunni
Islamist extremists. The resulting conflict is asymmetric in the broadest
sense of the term.
The two sides have different grand strategic objectives, strategic
objectives, and tactical
methods and goals.

The end result has been that each side has had to alter its grand strategic
objectives. At
the same time, each side has evolved a relatively stable strategy and mix of
tactical
options to implement it. These tactics continue to evolve over time, but
what some
reports call "new" tactics are often simply variations in the mix of tactics
each side uses
or variations and intensifications of past methods of attack.

This analysis attempts to summarize the state of play for each side in terms
of grand
strategy, strategy, and tactics.

Grand Strategy

Neither side can now achieve their original grand strategic objectives. This
has forced
each side to limit its objectives to the point where neither side may be
able to "win" in
grand strategic terms.

US Grand Strategy

In the case of the US, several factors are clear:
- The US has achieved one important objective. It has ended the regime of a
cruel
and aggressive dictator.
- The US has halted Iraqi proliferation but cannot achieve the objective of
removing an urgent and imminent threat because there is no evidence such a
threat existed.
- The same problems apply to any linkage between Iraq and the war on
terrorism.
Iraq at best played a peripheral role in terrorism, with limited and
unimportant
links to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups with limited operational
meaning. If
anything, the US may have triggered more Arab and Islamic anger aimed at the
US although there is little evidence that Iraq is a "magnet for terrorists."
Less than
500 of some 12,000 suspected members of the opposition that the US has
arrested
in Iraq have been foreign. Only 25 have had suspected ties to Al Qaeda and
only 5
remain major suspects.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 3

-The US may be able to give Iraq significant new opportunities, but it will
not be
able to shape Iraq into a modern democracy or free market economy. The US
will
have to leave long before the political, economic, and energy issues in Iraq
play
out, and Iraq will then face years, if not a decade, of instability.
- Iraq will not become any near term example to the region of what a state
should
be, or of the US ability to create a democracy. There may be positives in
Iraq over
time, but they will be at least partially offset by negatives, while other
Middle
Eastern states will be driven by their own internal dynamics.
- The US could not help unleashing the confessional and ethnic forces of
Arab and
Kurd and Shiite and Sunni in Iraq that Saddam had ruthlessly crushed.
However,
the half-formed US vision of "federalism" will not prevent those forces from
playing out over the years to come.
- Iraqis may tolerate the US if Iraq emerges from US and Coalition rule as a
reasonably stable and secure state, but the US will not win the hearts,
minds, or
friendship of the Iraqi people. The war will generate as much anger as
gratitude.
- It will be years before Iraq's role in regional energy supplies is clear,
and it is
uncertain whether the end result will be any more secure, or produce higher
net
exports, than the US Department of Energy projected as coming from Iraq
before
the war.
- The US will have removed a potential military threat to Israel, but the
new post-
US regime is unlikely to be any more sympathetic to Israel than any other
Arab
state.
- The situation in Iraq is far more likely to compound US problems with
Islamic
movements than reduce them, and will probably produce a significantly less
secular regime over time.
- Iraq's military threat to neighboring states will be ended for at least a
decade, but
the end result will be a power vacuum in the Gulf that is likely to inspire
continuing Iranian, Syrian, and Turkish pressure and cause concern to the
Arab
Sunni states.

Former Regime Loyalist and Hostile Iraqi Grand Strategy

It now seems almost impossible that anything like Saddam's past regime could
reemerge,
no matter what the outcome of the war may be. Even if Saddam and senior
supporters
like Al Douri do play a major role in directing the current fighting, their
past power base
is largely destroyed.

Moreover, the forces attacking the US and the Coalition are now a diverse
mix of true
regime loyalists, Ba'ath and other opportunists who see no other future,
Arab and Iraqi

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 4

nationalists, criminals, paid activists, Iraqis hostile to the US or seeking
revenge, foreign
volunteers without clear affiliation, Iraqi Sunni and other Islamists
hostile to the US,
Iraqis who fear Us domination and neoimperialism, foreign Islamic extremist
without and
without ties to groups like Al Ansar and Al Qaeda, Sunnis who fear the loss
of power and
wealth they had under Saddam and the Ba'ath, and young male Iraqis caught up
in
momentum of such attacks at a time unemployment is 50-60%.

These groups are all lumped together in US briefings as former regime
loyalists or
"FRLs." No one knows their numbers, the trends, or the relative mix of
elements under
this title, but the past history of such wars is that whatever Saddam and
the regime may
have planned and now intend, the resulting mix of activists is simply too
diverse not to
mutate into a new political and military structure beyond the regime's
control - and one
which may well continue to operate in a new form even if Saddam, Al Douri,
and other
top Ba'ath leaders are killed or captured.

The Kurds and Shi'ites have the power to secure a major share of Iraq's
political and
economic resources, and the new "fighters" emerging as former regime
loyalists are
reacting much more out of general ethnic affiliation and Arab nationalism
than any love
of Saddam and the Ba'ath. Coupled to a significant rise in the role of Sunni
Islamists, the
end result is a "new Iraq" even in the Sunni triangle.

As a result, both sides now have to adopt more modest grand strategic
objectives. The US
would like to leave with some hope that its legacy will eventually be a
democratic, stable,
and free market Iraq. The bulk of the former regime loyalists seem to want a
return to
Sunni dominance under a strong man and something like the Ba'ath, although
it is far
from clear that they necessarily want Saddam and something exactly like the
Ba'ath
dictatorship.

Why Neither Side May "Win"

It is one of the ironies of the present fighting that neither the US, nor
its present
opponents, are now likely to achieve even the grand strategic objectives
even if they
"win" the fighting. A US defeat of Iraq's former regime loyalists and
largely Sunni
Islamist extremists is not going to create a model or stable Iraq that will
somehow
catalyze the rest of the region into democratic change. It is increasingly
clear that even a
victorious US will have to give up control over Iraq long before it can
shape the form of a
new state or economy takes, or achieve Iraqi political stability.

At the same time, it is equally hard to see how former regime loyalists and
Sunni Islamist
extremists can "win" a victory that prevents Iraq's Shi'ites from acquiring
a vastly great
share of wealth and power. If nothing else, the disbanding of the Ba'ath
security forces
and Saddam's army, and the creation of large Iraqi security and police
forces - coupled to
the emergence of strong religious leaders in the Shi'ite portion of the
country is likely to
make the old concept of a secular Sunni strong man impossible. The strength
of the
Kurds will reinforce this. The so-called "Sunni" triangle is, after all, a
small slice of 15-
20% of the population in Iraq's confessional and ethnic sandwich.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 5

Picking "winners" and "losers" is pure guesswork at this point in time, but
the most likely
winners are going to be Iraq's religious Shi'ites and the Kurds, followed by
those who
oppose the US, at least in terms of military intervention. If this happens,
Iran and Syria
will to some extent becomes "winners" among Iraq's neighbors, although both
may find
the new Iraq assertive in ways that disturb the Syrian Ba'ath dictatorship
and Iran's hardliners.
Turkey and the Sunni Arab states on Iraq's borders may become "losers" in
the
sense that Iraq ceases to be a strong, secular Sunni state. Given the past,
however, this
may also make them "winners." An unstable and demilitarized Iraq may in fact
be an
easier neighbor to live with.

As for the US, it may end up as either a limited "winner" or a limited
"loser." It is
possible that the current fighting will undermine both the secular Sunni
elements in Iraq
and the US image in the Arab and Islamic world, thus stimulating Islamic
extremist
terrorism and violence. One needs to be careful, however, about such
predictions. If the
US defeats the present threat from former regime loyalists and largely Sunni
Islamist
extremists, and leave an Iraq that is clearly Iraq for and by the Iraqis, it
may be much
harder to sell the concept of a conspiratorial and hostile US.

Strategy

In terms of strategy, the war is as sharply asymmetric as it is in terms of
grand strategy.
Each side is now pursuing a strategy designed to exploit both its strengths
and its
opponent's weaknesses, and each side is having mixed success.

US Strategy
The US and its Coalition allies are now pursuing the following strategy:
- Restructure US forces to act as low intensity combat forces making primary
use
of human intelligence and Iraqi sources to aggressively seek out and attack
hostile
forces, and to locate and destroy their leaders, financing, and arms.
- Use allied forces to secure the center and southern areas of Iraq, while
seeking
additional allied force elements.
- Reduce the US role in force protection and security missions as much as
possible,
and minimize the backlash from a US presence in Iraqi towns and cities, by
replacing the US forces with Iraqi police and security forces. Use Iraqis as
a key
source of human intelligence (HUMINT).
- Support the military effort with a military civil action program including
extensive local contacts with Iraqi officials and direct aid in the form of
CERP.
- Reduce vulnerability to hostile Iraqi attacks by using aircraft,
helicopters, and
artillery to counter hostile Iraqi rocket and mortar attacks, and use them
to target

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 6

Iraqi facilities and hostile groups without warning and the delays
inevitable in
using ground forces.
- Deter outside intervention by nations like Iran, Syria, and Turkey with
diplomatic
pressure and threats; extend counterterrorism activity outside Iraq in an
effort to
limit infiltration and support from outside groups.
- Win Iraqi "hearts and minds" by creating a new Iraqi government clearly
selected
by Iraqis and controlled by them through a process that wins broad Iraqi
political
support and approval without triggering confessional and ethnic tension or
conflict.
- Maintain Shi'ite support or tolerance of the US-led occupation, knowing
the
Shi'ites are the emerging majority (60%+), while retaining Kurdish support
and
seeking to minimize the alienation of the Sunnis and their fears of the loss
of
power, influence, and wealth. At the same time, emphasize Iraq's secular
political
development. This, in turn, would help contain a threat which is largely
Sunni and
confined largely to the Sunni triangle and Sunni areas in Mosul, Baghdad,
and
Basra with well under 12% of Iraq's population.
- Win Iraq "hearts and minds" through a $22 billion grant aid program
(FY2003
and FY2004) and economic modernization reform efforts that can move Iraq
towards a viable market economy and the ability to exploit its oil wealth,
and do
so in ways that do not lead to charges of exploitation and imperialism, or
trigger
confessional and ethnic conflict.
- Internationalize the political aid and military efforts as much as
possible --
without losing the ability to win the war and move the nation-building
effort
forward -- to win international and Iraqi support and reduce the burden on
the US.
- Create an effective information campaign to inform the Iraqis and win
their
support using TV, radio, print, and direct contact.

The US is having mixed success in all of these strategic efforts, in part
because it failed
so dismally to effectively prepare for conflict termination, nation
building, security
missions, and the risk of low intensity conflict before and during the
conventional phase
of the Iraq War, and because the Bush Administration's ideological view of
Iraq and the
region was badly decoupled from reality.

The US has made real progress in restructuring its military effort to fight
low intensity
conflict and do so with the HUMINT and civil-military action programs it
needs. Britain
and other allies do play a critical role, and the effort to train and use
Iraqis in security and
human intelligence missions has had some success.

The US-led political effort, however, has an uncertain future at best. It
has uncertain
support from Shi'ite leaders, and lacks popular support. Its broad aid
effort has had some

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 7

success, but they have been too slow to win much gratitude or influence
hearts and
minds. The effort to restore oil revenues has also made progress, but is
vulnerable and
also has not helped the US win hearts and minds.

The US-led information campaign remains a near-disaster; the Iraqi media are
filled with
conspiracy theories and are often hostile. Television is dominated by
hostile Arab
satellite TV stations, and many educated Iraqis turn to hostile Western and
outside Arab
media.

Former Regime Loyalist and Hostile Iraqi Strategy

Almost inevitably, the strategy being used by the former regime loyalists
and other
opponents of the US and its Coalition allies is a twisted mirror image of US
strategy.
Like the US, it is also a strategy that is in the process of evolution.

If the US failed dismally to properly prepare and organize to win the peace
after it won
the conventional war, Saddam's efforts to create a resistance force also
often failed.
Much of the Popular or Jerusalem Army never showed up, many arms caches were
established that never seemed to have been properly exploited, the
leadership and its
supporting cadres did a poor initial job of taking cover, and their efforts
seemed to have
been badly disrupted by the sheer pace and shock of the US advance. In
retrospect, it is
hard to believe that anything like the present threat could ever have
evolved if the US
military CPA had been prepared for a realistic and properly supported nation
building
and security effort.

The regime's loyalists did, however, have months to reorganize in which they
did not
face well organized Coalition security forces or a well-planned and
effective nation
building effort. They were able to take advantage of the large-scale release
of criminals,
an initial failure to provide ex-military with any financial security, broad
Arab and
Islamic resentment or anger at the US over a host of issues, Iraqi
nationalism, Sunni fears
of losing power and wealth, outside volunteers, and young men desperate for
money.
The end result became the diverse group of different elements now called
former regime
loyalists or "FRLs." At this point, it is unclear how much central or
regional direction
they have, although the US almost certainly has gather significant
intelligence from the
roughly 12,000 men it captured or arrested as of 1 December. Only about 350
out of the
12,000 captured or held at interrogated as of 1 November were foreign
volunteers, many
of which had entered the country before the war. A maximum of 25 were
suspected at
some point of having serious ties to Al Qaeda, and only 3-5 remained suspect
as of 1
December. (The US had in excess of 5,000 Iraqis and foreign volunteers in
custody as of
27 November.)

What does seem clear is that the FRLs are organized cells of true former
regime loyalists
directing and funding the effort. There now seems to be a rough chain of
command in the
sense there is some hierarchy or pyramidal structure, with true "FRL" cells
at the top,
regional cells below, and then large numbers of part or full time attackers.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 8

In practice, this has led the opposition to adopt a strategy with the
following elements:

- Highly dispersed elements organized in a cell-like structure, often using
men to
conduct actual attacks with little or no understanding of the command and
financing structure above them. Intimidate or kill Iraqis providing human
intelligence where possible, and enhance security Shelter in areas
supporting the
FRLs, move constantly, and use false names and deception to complicate the
human intelligence task.
- Attacks focused on high profile targets likely to get extensive media
attention and
to influence and intimidate Iraqis while creating the impression of a far
more
successful level of attack than actually exists.
- Maintain a constant stream of US casualties in an effort to have political
impact in
the US. Attack or kill Iraqis and personnel in Coalition forces,
international
organizations and contractors, and allied officials. Seek to persuade Iraqis
not to
support the Coalition and international organizations, contractors, and
allied
groups to leave.
- Steadily escalate the military threat. Create elements close to
company-sized
irregular combat units to try to challenge US raids and attack convoys and
vulnerable targets.
- Reduce the exposure of "FRL" personnel by using longer-range weapons like
mortars, surface-to-air missiles, and rockets, and by using vehicle bombs
and
improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
- Attack the US and coalition aid and nation building effort and do so at
the points
most likely to have a political impact and deprive the US of the ability to
win
hearts and minds.
- Broaden the area of attack as much as possible to make the FRL attacks
seem
broader based, force the US to disperse its forces throughout Iraq, deprive
Iraqis
supporting the nation building effort of any sanctuary, and undermine allied
and
international support for the US.
- Intimidate or kill the Iraqi police and security forces supporting the
Coalition.
Isolate them as much as possible, and try to provide incidents that will
cause
backlash against them or the US.
- Support the military effort with a military civil action program including
extensive local contacts with Iraqi officials and direct aid in the form of
CERP.
- Use US and Coalition attacks - including attacks using aircraft,
helicopters, and
artillery to counter hostile Iraqi rocket and mortar attacks - to claim
excessive

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 9

force. Exploit any civilian casualties and collateral damage as a propaganda
weapon. Encourage protests and individuals to claim innocence and collateral
damage in front of the media --even when no damage exists. Circulate
conspiracy
theories and make false claims about each US attack.
- Try to provoke or exploit intervention by Syria, while trying to increase
tensions
with Iran and Turkey, and seek support from volunteers and outside terrorist
and
extremist groups, often claiming an Islamic character to "FRL" efforts that
does
not really exist.
- Deprive the coalition of "hearts and minds" by attacking and sabotaging
the
efforts to create a new Iraqi government, by killing supporters and
officials, by
exploiting confessional and ethnic tension or conflict, and discrediting the
effort
with propaganda and conspiracy theories.
- Exploit growing Sunni fear and resentment of having a minority role in
Iraq,
while claiming a nationalist and Islamic character to try to win Shi'ite
support.
Kill or intimidate Shi'ite, Kurdish, and Sunni leaders and figures that
support the
nation building effort or US-led occupation, knowing the Shi'ites are the
emerging majority (60%+), while retaining Kurdish support and seeking to
minimize the alienation of the Sunnis and their fears of the loss of power,
influence, and wealth. At the same time, emphasize Iraq's secular political
development.
- Use direct attacks on facilities, the killing of aid workers and
contractors,
sabotage, and focused criminal activity to make aid and economic
modernization
reform efforts as ineffective as possible, and prevent the US and a new
Iraqi
government from exploiting Iraq's oil wealth. Seek to blame the US and
Coalition
for the resulting hardships, and to make the outside aid program unpopular
and
too expensive to sustain. Try to use conspiracy theories about the
allocation of
aid, and problems in the effort, justify charges of exploitation and
neoimperialism,
and trigger confessional and ethnic conflict.
- Attack UN, NGO, foreign embassies, foreign contractors and other targets
to
deprive the US of international support, and force UN, NGO, and allied
efforts
out of the country. Make sure that much of the aid process does not function
and
that the US-led effort will not be replaced or supplemented by an
international
effort that could also deprive the "FRLs" of any chance at power.
- Use an information strategy that avoids tying the opposition too closely
or openly
to Saddam, while taking steps to convince Iraqis that Saddam and other key
leaders are still alive and active. Portray the "FRL" effort as Iraqi
nationalist,
Arab nationalist, and Islamic in character. Capitalize on Iraqi and Arab
tensions
with the US over the Arab-Israeli conflict and its rhetoric and actions in
the war
on terrorism. Use Arab and Islamic media to portray the attacks on the US as
pro-
Arab and pro-Islam. Advocate anti-US and Coalition conspiracy theories.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 10

The "FRLs" are having the same mixed success in these strategic efforts as
the US, in
large part because they remain a minority of the Iraqi people and cannot
shed their
linkage to Saddam and the Sunnis. It is clear, however, that the "FRLs" are
learning and
adapting in reaction to the US and Coalition strategy. Although, one must be
careful
about the degree of learning required. Virtually every aspect of the
strategy the "FRLs"
are using to try to counter the US, and exploit its weaknesses, is a
well-established
technique used somewhere else in the Middle East since 1970. The problem for
both the
US and Coalition, and for most US and Western journalists, is that they
failed to properly
assess the lessons of such attacks or never paid attention to them.

As a result, the US and Coalition have often been "surprised by the
inevitable."
Journalists and analysts with no prior experience in asymmetric warfare
report on "new"
and "sophisticated" strategies and tactics that are actually well proven
methods, and other
report new tactics that the "FRLs" have exploited in some form since the
fall of the
regime. It is important to note that not only is asymmetric warfare based on
exploiting
the weaknesses of any enemy, but success is based on constantly altering the
mix of
tactics that make up overall strategy so that vulnerability is reduced while
exploiting the
areas that the enemy leaves exposed.

Tactics, Technology, and Training

It is simply too soon to predict how this grand strategic and strategic duel
will turn out.
So far the war has accelerated, although not in any even way. The nature of
targets and
engagements has changed overtime as each side has tried to exploit the other
side's
weaknesses, and reduced its own.

To put the level of combat in perspective, coalition forces conducted nearly
12,000
patrols and more than 230 targeted raids in the week ending November 23rd.
In that very
short period,. They captured some 1,200 enemy forces and killed 40 to 50
enemy fighters,
and wounded some 25 to 30

No day is "typical in an asymmetric war, but the following figures give a
good picture of
the level of military activity throughout Iraq. On December 1, 2003, "FRL"
forces were
average around 9 engagements per day against coalition military, two attacks
on Iraqi
security forces, and two attacks on Iraqi and other neutral civilians. That
same day the
Coalition conducted 1,658 patrols, 22 raids, and captured 115 anti-coalition
suspects.
- In the Southeast, multinational division forces conducted 240 patrols, two
raids, and detained 25
personnel
.
- Four people with Iranian paperwork, one a confirmed citizen, were captured
when coalition
soldiers discovered numerous arms and weapons in a minibus that was stopped
at a checkpoint in
al-Basra yesterday. Among the weapons seized were several rocket-propelled
grenade launchers
and rifles. In the center south zone, multinational division forces
conducted 143 patrols, detaining
36 personnel. All those personnel were later deported back to Iran. At
various points near and
around Karbala City, a coalition explosives disposal team, acting on
information provided by Iraqi
citizens, found and destroyed a large weapons cache.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 11

- In the West, the 82nd Airborne Division conducted six offensive
operations, 173 patrols, including
nine joint patrols with the border police and Iraqi police, and cleared two
caches. During these
operations, 10 enemy personnel were captured.
- In Baghdad, the 1st Armored Division conducted 528 patrols, five offensive
operations against
insurgent elements operating within Baghdad, and detained 14 individuals
suspected of ties to
Saddam Fedayeen and to other anti-coalition forces. Elements conducting a
raid on targets
suspected of attacks against U.S. forces captured three Iraqis and
confiscated 1.4 million dinar,
three computers, Wahhabi booklets, Osama bin Laden material, weapons and
ammunition.
Coalition forces in Baghdad conducted a joint raid with the ICDC against
Almar Yassiri, Muqtada
Sadr's operations officer in Sadr City, also believed responsible for the
ambush of coalition
soldiers on October 9th. He was captured without incident.
- In the northeast zone, coalition forces conducted 164 patrols, two raids,
and captured 41
individuals. In a joint operation, the 173rd Airborne Brigade completed
Operation Bayonet
Lightning, along with the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and the Iraqi police,
conducting intelligencebased
raids to target former regime elements. Twenty-six individuals were
captured; all suspected
former members of the Saddam Fedayeen. Based on information provided by
Iraqi citizens, forces
conducted a cordon and search east of Balad and a raid in Bayji. Ten persons
were captured, and
soldiers located and confiscated extensive weapons and ammunition.
- In the north, coalition forces conducted 197 patrols, one cordon-
and-knock operation, and
detained 26 individuals. Training began for the first group of Mosul police
officers for the special
reaction team. The police chief has personally selected 25 highly qualified
members -- highly
qualified police officers or former military members to form this unit.
- The 101st activated another Civil Defense Corps battalion. The unit's 854
ICDC soldiers will be
responsible for securing the pipeline in critical Iraqi oil infrastructure
nodes in the western portion
of the Ninawa Province. To date, the 101st has trained four battalions of
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
soldiers, and these units are fully integrated into combat operations and
infrastructure security.
These figures illustrate the level of combat activity on a given day, and
that the "war after
the war" is a real conflict, but there is no way to know whether they will
rise or fall even
in the short term.

There are, however, developments in the area of tactics, technology, and
training that
demonstrate a far more consistent pattern and which could have a major
impact on the
outcome.

The Intelligence and Targeting Duel

It seems unlikely that anything like the current "FRL" threat would have
developed had
the US been trained, organized, and equipped to fight low intensity combat
immediately
after the fall of Baghdad, and to rapidly deploy linguists, area
specialists, and human
intelligence officers.

The US military has since made major progress, but still has only about 1/3
to 1/2 the
specialists required, is badly short of Tactical Human Intelligence Teams,
and is badly
short of translators. As a result, it has been able to develop HUMINT
structures and
reliable mixes of informers in some areas, but still faces major problems.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 12

These problems will be compounded by the fact that most of the qualified
people will
rotate out over the next few months, with their units, and be replaced by
new troops with
no in-country expertise. This, and a similar rotation of top small combat
teams, could
hinder much of the US capability. Similar rotations often proved crippling
in Vietnam,
and they could push the US to an even higher degree of dependence on Iraqi
security
forces and sympathizers for virtually all HUMINT. This will not be a problem
if the US
appears to be winning and they are not heavily penetrated by "FRL" agents.
Both are
serious risks.

The US is making steadily better use of HUMINT, UAVs, and other targeting
aids --
although most units still do not have UAVs or adequate targeting and
intelligence aids at
the battalion level, and the 4th ID is the only unit with blue force tracker
and digital
display technology. Targeting is improving, but many strikes still hit
targets that have
been vacated and abandoned and targeting quality remains uncertain.

The "FRL" intelligence system and targeting capability has steadily improved
in recent
months. It seems likely that US, Coalition, NGO, and Governing Council/Iraqi
civil
activity is heavily penetrated, and some elements of the Iraqi police and
security forces as
well. US counterintelligence only detected above 25% of the hostile agents
in Vietnam,
and this experience may well be repeated.

The Raid and Counter-raid Duel

The US has been able to steadily step up its raid activity. The figures in
September,
October, and November had all shown a major rise in each month's activity.
The US has
simultaneously been able to improve its HUMINT to have far more focus and
success.
The US has also retrained and reorganized to exploit its major advantages in
training,
experience, firepower, and tactical intelligence assets.

The US must, however, succeed by hitting a series of highly dispersed and
mobile
targets, and often must launch multiple raids to catch one serious "FRL"
activist, and it is
not clear whether the US is killing or seizing "FRL" forces faster than new
volunteers and
paid agents can be recruited.

US success is also critically dependent on Iraqi HUMINT to target the raids,
and the
"FRL" opposition is doing a better job of using propaganda and
misinformation to accuse
the US of striking at innocent targets, hitting sensitive targets, etc.

The Ambush Duel

The pattern in US casualties as of December 4th, included 98 dead by land
accident, 324
killed in action, 2 killed in the Camp Pennsylvania incident, 11 from
friendly fire, 36
killed in helicopter accidents or combat related crashes, 8 from illness,
and 43 noncombat.
These totals do not reflect high levels of FRL success and the US has been
able
to reduce the number of ambushes, and inflict serious casualties on "FRL"
attackers in

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 13

defending against recent attacks. The deployment of unarmored Humvees,
better body
armor using the small arms protective inserts (ceramic plates) in Kevlar
vests, better
escort protection and use of helicopters and UAVs, and a variety of other
techniques have
helped protect US forces in convoy missions, protection missions, and raids.
At the same time, the "FRLs" have been able to organize large attacks for
the first time.
The "FRL" fighters have sometimes worn Fedayeen-like dress, and some of the
fighters
have been dedicated and persistent in ways that demonstrate a high
motivation. The US
has major advantages in terms of mobility, protection, and firepower, but no
force can
move without making itself vulnerable, and the "FRLs" are improving in
capability.
The patterns in total casualties are also serious. The US alone had 2,150
wounded in
action as of December 4, and 354 non-hostile wounded. The total killed broke
down as
follows:

Total Since 1 May 2003
Hostile 304 189
Non-hostile 137 114
Total 441 303

As less official breakout, developed by Brian Hartman of ABC News,
summarizes the
total patterns in casualties reaching 530 killed, with the following
breakout by country:

Status Total U.S. Britain Other
Dead 522 441 52 29
Freed POW 8 8 0 0

The Artillery Duel

The Iraqis have slowly made better use of mortars and artillery, but largely
in the form of
relative inaccurate attacks using light weapons which have little more than
a symbolic
and harassment impact.

The US has responded with UAVs, counter-mortar radars, mapping of threat
areas in
field of fire, and on-call air and helicopter attacks. These have had some
effectiveness,
but FRL ability to "shoot and scoot" or use remotely triggered rockets has
limited US
effectiveness in return.

The situation could become much more serious if the FRLs learn how to use
artillery
weapons effectively at ranges over 1 kilometer, and how to aim and register
such
weapons. Large numbers of artillery weapons, MRLs, and heavy rockets/rocket
launchers
are still unaccounted for.

The IED, Car Bomb and Explosive Duel

IEDs remain a major threat. Reporting by Luis Martinez of ABC, current as of
21
November, indicated that the 3 helicopter crashes in November dramatically
boosted the

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 14

American casualty count, and 39 of the 69 fatalities in November resulted
from those
crashes. However, 22 of the remaining 30 fatalities, as of 21 November,
resulted from
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's). This IED number was twice what it was
at this
same time period in October month, which had previously been the worst month
for IED
casualties..there were 17 overall in October.

Martinez provided a breakdown of IED deaths since May.

Month IED Deaths
November 22
October 17
September 7
August 6
July 5
June 1
May 0
----------------------
TOTAL 59

As a result, the IED threat may be the biggest continuing danger facing
American
soldiers in Iraq. In comparison, hostile fire has resulted in 4 KIA's in
November.
Martinez

The US claims to detect and prevent approximately 40% of IED attacks. This
still leaves
60%, and the Hezbollah showed in Lebanon that they could develop
sophisticated
devices and attack techniques that the Israeli's could never effectively
counter.
US protection/detection efforts to deal with vehicle and suicide bombers
have improved,
but the FRLs can also hit at Iraqi civilians, contractors, Coalition, and
NGO targets.
They have shown from the start they can identify targets with high political
and media
profiles, and they certainly are aware of far more sophisticated ways to
deploy and trigger
explosives than they have used to date.

The Surface-to-Air and Anti-Aircraft Duel

The US is steadily improving counter-MANPAD tactics and countermeasures, but
helicopters become vulnerable the moment they must fly predictable paths at
low
altitudes, and fixed wing aircraft has somewhat similar problems. The risks
are limited
because of the short range of MANPADs and light AA guns, but some FRL
attacks will
succeed as long as they are mounted in significant numbers.

Moreover, even the continued existence of a minimal threat will deter
commercial airline
traffic and raise the risk premium for even the most aggressive civil cargo
carrier and
charter.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 15

The Force Protection vs. Isolation and Penetration Duel

The use of Iraqi security forces, moving out of key cities and populated
areas, and
improved US force protection measures have all helped increase security for
the US.
They have, however, not done so for the Iraqis and many others.

The US has been able to step up its civil-military activities and local
engagement
programs in many areas, but the CPA position in Baghdad remains a force
protection
nightmare, and the location in downtown Baghdad not only is a major irritant
to Iraqis,
but isolates the CPA while requiring a major force protection effort.

The Broadening the Scope of the War Duel

There are no reliable figures on "FRL" attack patterns, because the US does
not provide
data on attempts and its breakout of actual attacks by region is too broadly
categorized to
be useful. It is clear, however, that "FRL" forces can operate in Mosul and
the north and
do conduct attacks in the south and center. The attacks may be concentrated
in the
"Sunni triangle" and greater Baghdad area, but "FRL" efforts to broaden the
war in
geographic terms have had some success.

The Border Penetration and Infiltration Duel

The US has strengthened US, Coalition, and Iraqi coverage of the Syrian and
Iranian
borders; and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have improved some aspects of
their
border security. The fact is, however, that such activity can at most hope
to stop major
movements of equipment. The movement of individuals is impossible to halt;
the borders
are simply too long and too porous.

The deployment of surveillance aircraft, UAVs, unattended ground sensors,
and ground
radars can (and is) helping up to a point. So is the deployment of Iraqi
Border Guards.
There is no way, however, to tell a foreign volunteer from any other
foreigner crossing
the border, and most "FRL" activists are not known well enough to be
recognized. While
some arms and explosives are coming in from outside, there are so many
weapons caches
and depots - and the "FRL" has had so much time in which to exploit them -
that many
US officers feel a major effort to secure them all would simply be a waster
of US and
Iraqi troops.

At the same time, the "FRL" does not seem to have inspired large numbers of
postwar
volunteers and any well-trained terrorist or Islamic extremist cadres so far
seem to be
small.

The Iraqi Security Forces vs. Iraqi "FRLs," Islamists, and Foreign
Volunteers Duel
The Iraqi security forces total 147,200 as of November 27, 2003. This
compared to
123,000 US forces, and 23,900 other Coalition forces. The police had 68,800
out of a

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 16

goal of 71,000 men, the civil defense corps had 12,700 out of 40,000, the
new Iraqi army
had 900 actives (plus 600 more trainees) out of 35,000, the Border Police
Service had
12,400 out of 25,700, and the Facility Protection Service had 52,700 out of
a goal of
50,000.

These Iraqi forces seem more loyal and effective than many feared, and often
well
motivated.

They are, however, poorly trained, armed, and equipped and are often very
vulnerable in
hostile areas. Moreover, the growing reliance on such forces makes their
loyalty and
effectiveness more and more critical, and will inevitably create
paramilitary forces that
will develop their own political agendas.

This will be particularly true as the US moves forward in an effort to
trained elements of
the various militias support the leaders of the Governing Council into
battalions trained
for active counterinsurgency operations. The US has stated that
implementation of the
recruitment" for the first such battalion, and any other battalions that
follow, will be
based on the principle that any individual that is recruited must serve as
an individual,
under a unified Iraq security service and cannot be serving to represent a
political party or
a particular militia. This is much easier to say, however, than enforce.

Nevertheless, these developments help explain why the "FRLs" have shifted to
Iraqi and
non-US targets when the US is active and alert and this seems likely to
continue. The
Iraqi security forces became a major "FRL" target during November. There
were 21
killed and 62 wounded. Some 40 friendly Iraqi civilians were killed and 108
were
wounded. A total of seven Iraqi civilians were killed, with 14 additional
attempts. The
figures have risen steadily since July and August, although October was the
worst month
in terms of Iraqi civilian casualties.

The number of sleepers, active "FRL" agents, and dual agents in the Iraqi
security forces
is impossible to determine.

So far, the Iraqi "FRLs" seem to have been able to recruit Iraqi low-level
personnel and
create new leadership cells as quickly as the US can locate and destroy
them. It has not
lost more "deck of cards" personnel in recent months, and it has a pool of
thousands of
senior Ba'ath, military, and security force personnel to draw upon. There
are no
meaningful numerical counts of "FRL" forces, either as totals, as numbers of
cells and
cadres, or in terms of senior leadership, but US expert are not claiming
that they have
been able to confirm any decline in "FRL" numbers.

The Information Warfare Duel

Iraqi and Arab media support for the FRLs is often limited, but there is
little serious
support for the US, and problems relating to Israel and the war on terrorism
are having a
major impact. The US information campaign seems to remain faltering and
ineffective,
and reporters on the scene have an almost uniformly negative impression.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 17

Most of the polling to date has been limited and impressionistic, and the
lack of adequate
polling is, in itself, an important indictment of the problems in the US and
coalition
warfare effort. Oxford Research International poll did release a poll on
December 1,
however, based on 3,244 interviews started in mid-October ("around Oct. 15")
and
completed the first week in November.

The results are a warning, Public confidence was lowest in the "US and UK
occupation
forces," with just 21 percent confident, out of Out of 11 groups or
institutions tested.
"Political parties" were about the same, 22 percent; and the CPA had 27
percent.
Confidence in "Iraq's religious leaders" was highest, by far at 70 percent,
followed by
54% for local community leaders, 50% for the police, and 48-49% for the
Governing
Council, Iraqi Media Network, and Ministries in Baghdad, the figure for the
UN was only
35%.

The figures also reflected the lack of any clear support for a new political
system. When
Iraqis were asked what Iraq "needs at this time," the top choices were "an
Iraqi
democracy" (cited by 90 percent) and "a (single) strong Iraqi leader" (cited
by 71
percent). Next was" a government made up mainly of experts and/or managers."
A
government of exports had 70%, the Governing Council had 62%, religious
leaders had
60%, a group of strong Iraqi leaders had 46%, as did a UN transition
government. The
CPA was second to last on the list, cited by 36 percent. The last was "a
government made
up mainly of Iraqi military leaders," 26 percent.

When Iraqis were asked to think in the longer term -- "in 12 months time"
and in five
years, the answers were virtually the same. "An Iraqi democracy" and then "a
(single)
strong Iraqi leader," were at the top of the list, and then "a government
made up mainly
of religious leaders." The CPA and Iraqi military were at the bottom.

Other insights were that 42 percent said the demise of the Saddam regime was
"the best
thing which happened to you" in the last 12 months - by a large margin the
top choice.
Some 35 percent said the "war, bombings and defeat" were "the worst thing,"
again a top
choice by a large margin. Some 67% said that "regaining public security in
the country"
was a top priority.

The good news for the US is that these data shows considerable support for
the kind of
government the US advocates - although for a strong man as well - and
indicate a wellmanaged
information campaign could have been far more effective. The bad news is
that
US so far has been incapable of developing and effectively communicating the
messages
necessary to win hearts and minds. Instead of "information dominance," it
has achieved
information incompetence.

The Nation Building and Aid vs. the Attack, Crime, and Sabotage Duel

The US-led aid effort has made real progress in many areas. Secretary
Rumsfeld cited the
following key milestones in a press conference on November 26:

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 18

- To date, the coalition has helped in the reopening of all 240 Iraqi
hospitals and 95 percent of the
country's 1,200 medical clinics;
- By October 6, electric power production reached 4,518 megawatts,
surpassing prewar levels;
- Iraq is producing 2.1 million barrels of oil a day for its own use and for
world markets;
- Some 400 Iraqi courts are back in operation;
- By October 16, the new Iraqi dinar currency began circulation;
- Some 170 newspapers are being published across the country;
- 5.1 million Iraqi students are back in schools, and 51 million new
textbooks have been issued; and
- 97,000 Iraqis applied to attend college for the 2003 fall semester.

However, the reality is that unemployment is still in the 50-60% level among
young men
and progress is so slow and faltering that much of the impact on hearts and
minds has
been one of increasing Iraqi frustration. Electric generation, for example,
dropped during
October from 3,948 MW to 3,582 MW vs. an October 1st goal of 4,400 MW. Oil
production is averaging 2.0 MBPD, and exports 1.5 MBPD, but the system is
very
fragile. The Iraqi consumer also sees a very different picture. Diesel
supply is at 53% of
the CPA goal, kerosene at 56%, Propane is at 34%, and gasoline/Benzine is at
only 52%
of goal - with winter approaching.

Education and healthcare numbers are improving strikingly, but quality and
consumer
satisfaction remain major issues. Water output is improving but only 50% of
Iraqis have
access to potable water. Landline telecommunications are at 77% of prewar
level and
wireless phone service is still not active. Internet access is very limited
but nearly 9%
above the prewar level. Railway service is improving but 12 of the 20 trains
per day are
military and two carry fuel.

The US military operated CERP program, however, has funded many short-term
projects,
with money going directly to Iraqis for urgent projects in the field. It has
often been
highly effective. CERP is, indeed, a model of how to win hearts and minds in
near real
time, but focusing on the most critical tasks with the most political and
military impact,
providing money only to Iraqis, and then monitoring progress and success on
a real-time
basis in the field.

As for the US civilian administered aid program, it is far too soon to judge
an aid
program that had to be improvised nearly from scratch will no serious prior
planning, and
then be implement by US officials and contractors with limited or no
experience in Iraq
and in dealing with violence or the problems of a command kleptocracy. The
eventual
flow of billions of dollars worth of aid should have a cumulative impact.
The fact the US
is not attempting to dominate the future of Iraq's oil industry should also
build
credibility.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 19

The CPA, however, is badly over-centralized, the CPA staff in Baghdad is too
isolated,
and the US contracting procedure is a time consuming nightmare. Contractor
and USAID
personnel spend too little time in the field and focus too much on project
deadlines and
too little on Iraqi short-term needs and perceptions.

The US ability to carry out armed nation building in the face of Iraqi FRL
theft, attacks,
and sabotage also is uncertain. The critical oil and gas industry are
particularly
vulnerable, and the problem is compounded by what may be serious reservoir
damage
and overproduction problems stemming from Saddam's regime.
This duel is still too close to call.

The New Governance vs. Anti-Political Change Duel

The "FRL" and the Islamic factions that support them do not seem to have
broad support,
but neither does the Governing Council or CPA. The recent changes in the US
approach
have not eased distrust or won popular support, in part because of the
feuding in the
Governing Council, lack of support from key Shi'ite leaders, and continuing
distrust of
US motives and its willingness to leave.

Neither side has particularly attractive tactics, or a particularly
attractive position at this
point. The US may have the edge over time, however, because its position is
to transfer
sovereignty and depart. The more convincing this position is the more
support the US
will gain.

The FRLs have no political or governance positions that can win nation-wide,
particularly Shi'ite and Kurd support, and have nowhere to go.

The Coalition and Ally vs. Anti-NGO, UN, and Ally Duel

The FRLs have so far been the winners. They have largely driven out the UN
and most
NGOs, and have found that even token attacks can seriously undermine allied
popular
support for the US.

The lack of broad international and popular support for the US before and
after the war
has made the US highly vulnerable to this tactic, and it is extremely
difficult - if not
impossible - to avoid having each target be vulnerable in some way. The
world simply is
not equipped for armed nation building.

It is not clear how the US can reverse this situation. Some 32 countries
have been willing
to actively support the coalition, including Britain and Australia, the two
countries that
actively fought the war as allies of the US. The US also continues to seek
aid and or
troops from some 14 additional countries, but it is unclear that it can hope
to do more
than maintain the present level of some 24,000 allied forces, and many prior
aid
commitments are proving uncertain,

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 20

This situation might, however, reverse itself if (a) the Coalition and Iraq
security forces
could establish a much higher degree of security, (b) Iraq succeeded in
developing a more
convincing leadership and transition to an Iraqi government that could do a
better job of
attracting outside support, and (c) the Iraqi economy gathered momentum and
reform
became advance and stable enough to attract foreign investment.

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 21

TABLE 1:

Daily Trends in Casualties
Date Dead Captured Missing Freed
Unknown Date 4 0 0 0
12/4/2003 0 0 0 0
12/3/2003 0 0 0 0
12/2/2003 1 0 0 0
12/1/2003 1 0 0 0
11/30/2003 0 0 0 0
11/29/2003 9 0 0 0
11/28/2003 1 0 0 0
11/27/2003 1 0 0 0
11/26/2003 1 0 0 0
11/25/2003 0 0 0 0
11/24/2003 0 0 0 0
11/23/2003 5 0 0 0
11/22/2003 2 0 0 0
11/21/2003 1 0 0 0
11/20/2003 2 0 0 0
11/19/2003 0 0 0 0
11/18/2003 0 0 0 0
11/17/2003 4 0 0 0
11/16/2003 0 0 0 0
11/15/2003 18 0 0 0
11/14/2003 2 0 0 0
11/13/2003 2 0 0 0
11/12/2003 19 0 0 0
11/11/2003 2 0 0 0
11/10/2003 0 0 0 0
11/9/2003 1 0 0 0
11/8/2003 3 0 0 0
11/7/2003 7 0 0 0
11/6/2003 4 0 0 0
11/5/2003 1 0 0 0
11/4/2003 2 0 0 0
11/3/2003 1 0 0 0
11/2/2003 16 0 0 0
11/1/2003 3 0 0 0
10/31/2003 2 0 0 0
10/30/2003 0 0 0 0
10/29/2003 0 0 0 0
10/28/2003 3 0 0 0
10/27/2003 2 0 0 0
10/26/2003 5 0 0 0
10/25/2003 0 0 0 0
10/24/2003 3 0 0 0
10/23/2003 1 0 0 0
10/22/2003 2 0 0 0
10/21/2003 1 0 0 0
10/20/2003 1 0 0 0
10/19/2003 0 0 0 0
10/18/2003 2 0 0 0
10/17/2003 1 0 0 0
10/16/2003 3 0 0 0
10/15/2003 0 0 0 0
10/14/2003 0 0 0 0
10/13/2003 5 0 0 0
10/12/2003 1 0 0 0
10/11/2003 0 0 0 0
10/10/2003 0 0 0 0
10/9/2003 4 0 0 0
10/8/2003 0 0 0 0
10/7/2003 0 0 0 0
10/6/2003 3 0 0 0
10/5/2003 0 0 0 0

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 22

10/4/2003 1 0 0 0
10/3/2003 1 0 0 0
10/2/2003 0 0 0 0
10/1/2003 3 0 0 0
9/30/2003 2 0 0 0
9/29/2003 4 0 0 0
9/28/2003 0 0 0 0
9/27/2003 0 0 0 0
9/26/2003 0 0 0 0
9/25/2003 3 0 0 0
9/24/2003 1 0 0 0
9/23/2003 1 0 0 0
9/22/2003 1 0 0 0
9/21/2003 0 0 0 0
9/20/2003 3 0 0 0
9/19/2003 0 0 0 0
9/18/2003 4 0 0 0
9/17/2003 0 0 0 0
9/16/2003 0 0 0 0
9/15/2003 2 0 0 0
9/14/2003 1 0 0 0
9/13/2003 0 0 0 0
9/12/2003 2 0 0 0
9/11/2003 1 0 0 0
9/10/2003 1 0 0 0
9/9/2003 1 0 0 0
9/8/2003 0 0 0 0
9/7/2003 0 0 0 0
9/6/2003 0 0 0 0
9/5/2003 0 0 0 0
9/4/2003 1 0 0 0
9/3/2003 0 0 0 0
9/2/2003 1 0 0 0
9/1/2003 3 0 0 0
8/31/2003 0 0 0 0
8/30/2003 2 0 0 0
8/29/2003 1 0 0 0
8/28/2003 0 0 0 0
8/27/2003 0 4 0 0
8/26/2003 1 0 0 0
8/25/2003 2 0 0 0
8/24/2003 0 0 0 0
8/23/2003 5 0 0 0
8/22/2003 0 0 0 0
8/21/2003 2 0 0 0
8/20/2003 2 0 0 0
8/19/2003 0 0 0 0
8/18/2003 2 0 0 0
8/17/2003 0 0 0 0
8/16/2003 1 0 0 0
8/15/2003 0 0 0 0
8/14/2003 1 0 0 0
8/13/2003 2 0 0 0
8/12/2003 5 0 0 0
8/11/2003 0 0 0 0
8/10/2003 1 0 0 0
8/9/2003 2 0 0 0
8/8/2003 3 0 0 0
8/7/2003 1 0 0 0
8/6/2003 3 0 0 0
8/5/2003 2 0 0 0
8/4/2003 1 0 0 0
8/3/2003 0 0 0 0
8/2/2003 0 0 0 0
8/1/2003 1 0 0 0
7/31/2003 2 0 0 0
7/30/2003 1 0 0 0
7/29/2003 0 0 0 0
7/28/2003 2 0 0 0
7/27/2003 1 0 0 0

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 23

7/26/2003 4 0 0 0
7/25/2003 0 0 0 0
7/24/2003 4 0 0 0
7/23/2003 2 0 0 0
7/22/2003 1 0 0 0
7/21/2003 1 0 0 0
7/20/2003 3 0 0 0
7/19/2003 1 0 0 0
7/18/2003 2 0 0 0
7/17/2003 2 0 0 0
7/16/2003 1 0 0 0
7/15/2003 1 0 0 0
7/14/2003 1 0 0 0
7/13/2003 2 0 0 0
7/12/2003 0 0 0 0
7/11/2003 1 0 0 0
7/10/2003 0 0 0 0
7/9/2003 4 0 0 0
7/8/2003 1 0 0 0
7/7/2003 2 0 0 0
7/6/2003 2 0 0 0
7/5/2003 0 0 0 0
7/4/2003 0 0 0 0
7/3/2003 2 0 0 0
7/2/2003 1 0 0 0
7/1/2003 1 0 0 0
6/30/2003 0 0 0 0
6/29/2003 0 0 0 0
6/28/2003 0 0 0 0
6/27/2003 1 0 0 0
6/26/2003 3 0 0 0
6/25/2003 5 0 0 0
6/24/2003 7 0 0 0
6/23/2003 0 0 0 0
6/22/2003 1 0 0 0
6/21/2003 0 0 0 0
6/20/2003 0 0 0 0
6/19/2003 1 0 0 0
6/18/2003 1 0 0 0
6/17/2003 2 0 0 0
6/16/2003 2 0 0 0
6/15/2003 1 0 0 0
6/14/2003 0 0 0 0
6/13/2003 1 0 0 0
6/12/2003 1 0 0 0
6/11/2003 0 0 0 0
6/10/2003 1 0 0 0
6/9/2003 0 0 0 0
6/8/2003 1 0 0 0
6/7/2003 1 0 0 0
6/6/2003 2 0 0 0
6/5/2003 1 0 0 0
6/4/2003 0 0 0 0
6/3/2003 1 0 0 0
6/2/2003 0 0 0 0
6/1/2003 0 0 0 0
5/31/2003 0 0 0 0
5/30/2003 3 0 0 0
5/29/2003 0 0 0 0
5/28/2003 2 0 0 0
5/27/2003 2 0 0 0
5/26/2003 6 0 0 0
5/25/2003 1 0 0 0
5/24/2003 0 0 0 0
5/23/2003 0 0 0 0
5/22/2003 0 0 0 0
5/21/2003 1 0 0 0
5/20/2003 0 0 0 0
5/19/2003 8 0 0 0
5/18/2003 2 0 0 0

Cordesman: Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare 12/5/03 Page 24

5/17/2003 0 0 0 0
5/16/2003 1 0 0 0
5/15/2003 0 0 0 0
5/14/2003 1 0 0 0
5/13/2003 2 0 0 0
5/12/2003 2 0 0 0
5/11/2003 0 0 0 0
5/10/2003 1 0 0 0
5/9/2003 4 0 0 0
5/8/2003 1 0 0 0
5/7/2003 0 0 0 0
5/6/2003 1 0 0 0
5/5/2003 0 0 0 0
5/4/2003 1 0 0 0
5/3/2003 1 0 0 0
5/2/2003 0 0 0 0
5/1/2003 1 0 0 0
4/30/2003 1 0 0 0
4/29/2003 0 0 0 0
4/28/2003 1 0 0 0
4/27/2003 0 0 0 0
4/26/2003 0 0 0 0
4/25/2003 2 0 0 0
4/24/2003 0 0 0 0
4/23/2003 0 0 0 0
4/22/2003 4 0 0 0
4/21/2003 0 0 0 0
4/20/2003 0 0 0 0
4/19/2003 1 0 0 0
4/18/2003 0 0 0 0
4/17/2003 1 0 0 0
4/16/2003 0 0 0 0
4/15/2003 0 0 0 0
4/14/2003 6 0 0 0
4/13/2003 1 0 0 0
4/12/2003 2 0 0 0
4/11/2003 1 0 0 0
4/10/2003 2 0 0 0
4/9/2003 0 0 0 0
4/8/2003 6 0 0 0
4/7/2003 8 0 0 0
4/6/2003 5 0 0 0
4/5/2003 2 0 0 0
4/4/2003 11 0 0 0
4/3/2003 11 0 0 0
4/2/2003 10 0 0 0
4/1/2003 4 0 0 0
3/31/2003 2 0 0 0
3/30/2003 5 0 0 0
3/29/2003 7 0 0 0
3/28/2003 3 0 0 0
3/27/2003 1 0 0 0
3/26/2003 2 0 0 0
3/25/2003 7 0 0 0
3/24/2003 6 0 0 0
3/23/2003 33 0 0 8
3/22/2003 11 0 0 0
3/21/2003 10 0 0 0
3/20/2003 4 0 0 0

These casualty patterns do not show an upward trend. The US is winning this
duel and
should continue to do so, but nothing is certain.



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