The following is an archived copy of a message sent to a Discussion List run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
Views expressed in this archived message are those of the author, not of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
[Main archive index/search] [List information] [Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]
Dear Mark, Originally, I had simply forgotten to post here on casi an earlier announcement by the Fund for Freedom report dated Nov 26., which you'll find as item 2 below. But later I got also reluctant: What psychological impact would it have on this list to always report achievements of other orgs to casi ? Additionally: Info and URL of the report. Best Andreas -------------------------- 1) Fund for Peace: Info & Exec Summary 2) Report Finds US Invasion of Iraq Precipitated a Failed State ---------------------------- 1) http://www.fundforpeace.org/publications/reports/iraq-rep01.php Iraq as a Failed State: Report #1 Download Executive Summary with Recommendations (PDF, 54k) http://www.fundforpeace.org/publications/reports/iraq-report01-xsum.pdf Complete Report (PDF, 317k) http://www.fundforpeace.org/publications/reports/iraq-report01.pdf The Fund for Peace (FfP) is pleased to release its report Iraq as a Failed State: Report #1. This is the first in a series of six month reports by the FfP that will measure the effectiveness of US policies in the country in building sustainable security. The report concludes that the US invasion had an effect that went far beyond its original goal of regime change. It precipitated the final collapse of a state that had been deteriorating for years. This complete collapse, which surprised the administration, constitutes the gravest strategic miscalculation of the war. Measuring progress since the invasion using twelve top conflict indicators, the FfP found that four have worsened since the war, three remained at about the same acutely high levels of tension, one improved substantially - though it could backslide - and four improved marginally. The fundamental pre-war planning flaw was in not understanding how states fail, how far Iraq had deteriorated in this regard, and what would likely follow a military invasion. The security meltdown over the first six months of the occupation is a continuation of the persistent breakdown. Now it is responsibility of the US to rebuild that state. The current strategy - to fast-track the political transition - will not work because it measures success solely on the speed with which the ancien regime is replaced. It does not take into account the need to build the institutions through which elected leaders must govern. It will take a minimum of two years, perhaps more, to get through the basics of reconstituting state institutions. But it can be done if a strategic redirection is made. Three immediate policy recommended are made concerning the economic package passed by Congress, the need for creating a wider Iraqi leadership pool, and the necessity to neutralize security threats from private militias. The Mission of The Fund for Peace is to prevent war & alleviate the conditions that cause war. Exec Summary: IRAQ AS A FAILED STATE: A SIX MONTH PROGRESS REPORT Executive Summary and Recommendations Report #1 Pre-war through September 2003 PAULINE H. BAKER THE FUND FOR PEACE 1701 K Street, NW Eleventh Floor Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 223-7940 (phone) (202) 223-7947 (fax) www.fundforpeace.org Executive Summary and Recommendations In a brilliant demonstration of the law of unintended consequences, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq went far beyond its original goal of regime change. It precipitated the final collapse of a state that had been deteriorating for years. Shattered states proliferate, not eliminate, threats, however, and that is exactly what happened in Iraq. The security meltdown over the first six months of the occupation is a continuation of that persistent breakdown. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, looting, sniping, and sabotage accompanied the disorderly flight of soldiers, bureaucrats, and other state workers. This escalated into organized attacks on the coalition forces, civilians, and international agencies, with a frequency and sophistication that has led UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to conclude, after two attacks on UN headquarters in Baghdad, that "it is difficult to imagine that Iraq will grow safer in the next few months." There have been many surprises in the Iraqi war, but Secretary of State Colin Powell described the complete civil and military collapse as the biggest surprise of all. Indeed, it constitutes the gravest strategic miscalculation of the war for it has crippled recovery, frustrated international cooperation, and is costing the United States far more than anticipated both in blood and treasure. To be sure, there have been hopeful benchmarks of progress, such as opening the schools, getting oil back on stream (though less than expected), electing municipal councils, and capturing all but 13 of the 55 wanted top leaders of the Baath regime. However, this study found that, cumulatively, the indicators of internal conflict are roughly as high now as they were before the invasion. Iraq was held together under Saddam Hussein by the sheer force of his reign of terror; it is held together today by the overwhelming power of the occupation forces. Of twelve top indictors of state collapse, four have worsened since the war -- demographic pressures, the provision of public services, factionalized elites, and intervention by external political actors. Three indicators remain at about the same acutely high levels - the depth of group grievances, uneven development, and refugees and internally displaced persons. One indicator improved substantially -- human rights -- but newly acquired freedoms are still at risk from the security situation and are potentially reversible because they are not protected in law. Four other indicators improved marginally -- the brain drain, sharp economic decline, a security apparatus operating as a "state within a state" and delegitimatization of the state. Cumulative and individual trends, with their ratings and brief summaries of events, on a month-by-month basis, are depicted graphically in charts enclosed in this report. In addition, the study assessed five core state institutions - the police, military, civil service, the system of justice and political leadership - that had collapsed with the invasion and are only beginning to function, as recruitment and training proceed slowly. Iraqi political leadership is narrowly focused on the 24-member Iraqi Governing Council appointed by the U.S. While representing a wide swath of the population, the members of the Council are internally competitive and are not sufficiently consulted on key issues. The Fund for Peace, Copyright 2003 2 They were criticized by U.S. officials for dragging their heels on writing a new constitution and for taking independent positions without getting clearance from the top U.S. official Paul Bremer, who alone holds the authority to make final political decisions. Recognizing the weakness and lack of legitimacy of the Governing Council, the Bush Administration recently decided to speed up the transition by shifting control to a Provisional Government by June 2004. The Provisional Government will be elected by a transitional national assembly, whose participants will be selected by caucuses in each province by May 2004. The existing Governing Council welcomed the accelerated transfer of sovereignty and is supposed to do much of the preparation for the transfer. Elections for drafters of a permanent constitution are to take place by March 15, 2005 and a permanent Iraqi government is supposed to be in place by December 31, 2005. This decision to introduce a radical new plan at the top refocuses public debate on Iraq. Previously, debate focused primarily around poor or manipulated intelligence that may have led to a number of strategic misjudgments in the war - from failure to assess the nature of the threat from Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction correctly to the condition of the country's physical infrastructure. However, a much more fundamental flaw was made in not understanding how states fail, how Iraq itself had deteriorated in this sense, and what might follow a military invasion. The new plan announced by the Bush Administration, while correcting some flaws in the transition strategy, still fails to take into account the preconditions that are necessary to make an elected government function effectively in a collapsed state. It is an attempt to define and install democracy based on elections only, without due regard to the other factors necessary to achieve sustainable security. The basic misperception of the pre-war period was equating strongman rule with a strong state, a mistake commonly made by observers viewing autocratic regimes from a distance, and one that often leads to false conclusions. The administration assumed that once the regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown, the people of Iraq would welcome the U.S. as liberators, the military would surrender or defect, and people working in state institutions would stay on the job. These predictions were based on the premise that Iraq was a strong state whose institutions would survive the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Precisely the opposite occurred. The Iraqi state collapsed like a house of cards with the invasion, the final push in a process of state deterioration that had been going on for years. It is now the responsibility of the U.S. and its coalition partners to put the state back together again. This task is made all the more difficult because Iraq is drifting into a protracted guerrilla war, which Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of U.S. ground forces in Iraq, said is becoming more lethal, complex, sophisticated and tenacious. By the end of September, an average of three to six soldiers were dying and 40 were being wounded each week, with attacks averaging 30 a day. They are becoming bolder and more frequent with the infiltration of terrorists from other countries that the occupation forces have been unable to stop. The new transition plan announced by the administration will likely increase military activities, as Saddam Hussein loyalists, foreign infiltrators, and other spoilers try to derail the process. The Fund for Peace, Copyright 2003 3 Should a protracted low-intensity insurgency continue, it will eventually make the country ungovernable and the U.S. military presence untenable, even if an elected Iraqi government comes to power. Moreover, when President Bush declared Iraq a central front in the war on terrorism, he increased the chances of a wider and longer war by conflating the security problems of a collapsed state with the global war on terrorism, in effect inviting a showdown with international terrorists that would be seen globally as a battle between Islam and the U.S. This could undermine the new transition plan and would play into the hands of our enemies, as the fight would take place on terrain that is hospitable to them, not us, attacks would largely be at times of their choosing, not ours, and the nature of combat -- hit-and-run and suicide tactics -- would favor their military skills over our conventional capabilities. Iraqi civilians caught in the cross fire would likely turn on the U.S., blaming their predicament on the occupation and, possibly, the new elected government. Few allies would join this fight, anti-Americanism would be enflamed and Iraq's experiment in democratization would end up a failure. This is the worst-case scenario for the future that current trends portend. Fearing further deterioration, the administration's plan is basically to fast-track the political transition. The aim is to contain, if not defeat, the attackers, transfer as many security functions as possible to Iraqis, rush through the transition plan, and downsize the American military presence. Although the administration stated that troops will stay in Iraq for as long as it takes, the American military presence is expected to be reduced to 50,000 troops by 2005, with substantial troop reductions completed before the next presidential election. Congress approved the administration's request of $87 billion, nearly a quarter of which is dedicated to jump-starting the economy and rebuilding infrastructure. Legal restrictions have been lifted to open the economy to foreign investment and Iraqi police and military are being crash-trained to relieve the burden on American soldiers. But the fast-track strategy will not work because success is defined solely on the speed with which the ancien regime is replaced. Success should be defined on the degree to which sustainable security is achieved, when Iraq can resolve its own problems peacefully without an outside military or administrative presence. This is not a question of how fast an election is held but on how well the institutions through which elected leaders must govern are built. It will take a minimum of two years, perhaps more, to get through the basics of reconstituting the institutional foundations of the state, but it can be done if the administration moves away from the model of regime change and openly admits that the task is to rebuild the state. Should that strategic redirection be made in addition to the political moves already announced, an exit strategy can be devised that has a better chance of achieving sustainable security. Three major course corrections are recommended at this stage. . First, substantial parts of the $20.3 billion economic package should be reallocated from showy high tech infrastructure construction to projects that will have a direct impact on relieving the frustrations of ordinary citizens and impact the conflict indicators. Instead of a $150m state-of-the-art children's The Fund for Peace, Copyright 2003 4 hospital with cutting-edge research and post-graduate development capabilities, basic health services for the poor should be upgraded, especially in urban ghettos that are hotbeds of political activism. This would build on the progress already made in opening up all 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 primary health clinics. In place of a $9m postal system with bar coding and zip codes, a national population census should be conducted, which is essential for delimiting electoral districts, delivering public services and determining fair distribution of oil revenues to correct uneven development. The $100m for seven planned upscale communities to accommodate 16,000 people should be dropped in favor of low income housing for more than 1 million internally displaced persons and 500,000 refugees from prior wars. The $400m to build two prisons should be reprogrammed for a massive jobs-creation program to relieve the 60% unemployment among youths who turn to violence in the absence of employment. Community level schools, housing, roads, and other socially beneficial projects at the grass-roots would bring hope to disadvantaged communities, earn the coalition forces good will among the population and relieve the pressure on critical indicators that are causing tension. . Second, the U.S. must draw upon a wider Iraqi leadership pool focused on building state institutions by setting up more political bodies with defined functions that would pave the way for self-rule. An Electoral Commission should be appointed to lay the ground rules for the series of elections and caucuses envisioned in the new plan. A Civil Service Commission should be constituted to reconfigure the bureaucracy on a merit system with diverse recruitment among ethnic and religious groups so that no single group dominates. Other key state institutions, such as the police, military and the system of justice, should be similarly revamped to ensure professionalism and inclusiveness. Appropriately, the first battalion of nearly 700 soldiers for the Iraqi army that graduated in October included not only Sunni Muslims, the group favored by Hussein, but Shiite Muslims, Kurds and other ethnic groups in roughly equal proportion to their representation nationally. The Iraqi military, like armed forces in other countries, could become the vanguard of social integration if it is properly managed. Iraqis will scrutinize the ethnic and geographical make-up of all state institutions and broad representation must be ensured if the new government is to have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Legitimacy will be contingent not only on elections at the top, but in personnel appointments. Authentic representatives of Iraq's plural society must be visible in all the key state institutions. Another body that should be set up is a Human Rights Commission, an initiative buried in the administration's budget request that was allocated only $1m and described as an entity whose function would be to "question the government." An independent Human Rights Commission should have a wider mandate to draw up a constitutional Bill of Rights in a Muslim context. It would be the first body of its kind in the Arab world tasked to integrate universal standards of The Fund for Peace, Copyright 2003 5 human rights in an Islamic society. Membership of the commission should include leaders from civil society and other Arab scholars, including those from the UN panel that produced the widely respected Arab Development Report. Their recommendations included proposals on comprehensive education reforms, ways to empower and educate women, and suggestions on how to protect the media from political control. The commission should conduct public hearings, take expert testimony, and operate free of political influence, carrying out their work so that their recommendations can be incorporated into the final constitution. Authoritative bodies with particular functions could provide avenues for broader political participation and give "ownership" of the process to the Iraqi people, preparing them to reconcile their differences and conduct an open debate in a process that would be by Iraqis, for Iraqis and of Iraqis. A more democratic political transition for the full scope of state building would also be attractive to the outside world and have a greater chance of success in a reconstructed state. . Third, the U.S. must neutralize emerging security threats as well as react to existing ones, particularly private militias loyal to personalities with their own political agendas, many of whom could link up with infiltrators or external actors. Potentially as dangerous as unemployed former security forces, members of private militias should be recruited to join the national police and other well-regulated security units, just as former Iraqi soldiers, except for the Republican Guard, are being recruited into the armed forces. While there is a rethinking of how to reconstitute Iraqi security forces, there is a reluctance to embrace this idea due to fears of institutionalizing militias. However, that precisely is what will happen if private militias are allowed to proliferate in a society of simmering ethnic, religious, tribal and clan rivalries during the transition. The result would be "no-go" zones controlled by militant clerics, sectarian politicians, and warlords, who could challenge legitimately constituted civil authorities in the future. U.S. authorities need to thwart private armies from having the capability to plunge the country into civil war. Members of private militias must be carefully vetted, rigorously retrained, assigned to mixed units, and deployed to regions that are not necessarily their areas of origin. If private militias refuse to be integrated into national security units, they should be outlawed and disbanded. The controlling of militias is essential for ensuring peaceful elections. Previous conflicts have demonstrated that when the rule of law does not exist, voters tend to vote for warlords, ethnic leaders, and extremists. Secretary Powell had earlier warned the UN that Iraq could end up a failed state if the process went too fast. Powell was half-right, since Iraq is already a failed state. But the administration has decided to speed up the process, despite Powell's warning, because of the deteriorating security situation and the impending U.S. presidential election. However, it is the substance, not the pace, of change that will ultimately determine success. The administration needs to rebuild the state, not merely replace the regime at the top, and it must nurture the soft infrastructure of state institutions, not merely focus on bricks and mortar construction. The newly announced transition could be an opportunity to address the full scope of the problem, so that the trajectory of chaos is changed toward a path of constitutionalism that will allow the U.S. to bring home its soldiers without leaving the country, and its own world standing, in tatters. Currently, however, it is short of the mark. 2) http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=669&ncid=669&e=2&u=/usnw/20031126/pl_usnw/report_finds_us_invasion_of_iraq_precipitated_a_failed_state107_xml Politics - U.S. Newswire Press Releases Report Finds US Invasion of Iraq Precipitated a Failed State 22 minutes ago To: National and Assignment desk Contact: Krista Hendry of The Fund for Peace, 202-223-7940 x.212 or email@example.com WASHINGTON, Nov. 26 /U.S. Newswire/ -- In a report to be released on Dec. 4, 2003, The Fund for Peace (FfP) concludes the U.S. invasion went far beyond the original goal of regime change. It unwittingly precipitated the total collapse of the state, which had been deteriorating for years. This complete disintegration, which surprised the administration, constitutes the gravest strategic miscalculation of the war. The FfP will hold a press conference announcing these and other findings in its report: Iraq (news - web sites) as a Failed State. The report, which assessed the first six months of reconstruction, finds Iraq is not yet on the road to sustainable security. The administration's recently announced effort to accelerate political transition at the top will not achieve this goal. The plan focuses only on the speed with which the old regime is replaced, rather than on the institutions through which elected leaders must govern. A successful exit strategy cannot leave behind a weak state that is likely to collapse again. The report contains policy recommendations for building sustainable security. It is the first in a series that will monitor Iraq's progress at six-month intervals. -- Iraq as a Failed State -- Thursday, Dec. 4, 2003, 10 a.m. -- 11:30 a.m. Carnegie Building, Choate Room, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW Speakers: -- Pauline H. Baker, President, The Fund for Peace -- Evelyn "Pat" Foote, Brig. Gen., U.S. Army (retired) -- Nicholas Kehoe, Lt. Gen., U.S. Air Force (retired) and President, Congressional Medal of Honor Foundation The Fund For Peace is a Washington-based non-profit organization whose mission is to prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause war. It promotes education and research for practical solutions and is a consistent advocate of promoting social justice and respect for the principles of constitutional democracy. For more information, please visit: http://www.fundforpeace.org. Pauline H. Baker, President of the FfP, is author of the report. An Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, Dr. Baker specializes in ethnic politics, failed states and US foreign policy. Gen. Pat Foote, a FfP Trustee and recipient of the Distinguished Service Medal, has over 30 years of active service as commander of the Army's first gender-integrated basic training battalion and has served in numerous capacities, including Vice Chair of the Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. Gen. Nick Kehoe, also a FfP Trustee, has over 34 years of active service and extensive experience in top international security policy positions within the Air Force and NATO (news - web sites). He is the first president of the Congressional Medal of Honor Foundation, which promotes awareness of what America's highest military award for valor in combat represents. http://www.usnewswire.com/ ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mark Parkinson" <firstname.lastname@example.org> To: <email@example.com> Sent: Sunday, December 07, 2003 11:18 AM Subject: [casi] Course twists in Iraq I don't know anything about the Fund for Peace but they do raise some questions about the CPA's priorities for reconstruction in Iraq. 05.12.2003 [17:13] WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 (UPI) -- The United States has always favored big flowery projects in emerging nations, dams or hospitals that can carry the U.S. flag and a logo that says gift of the United States of America. Such are some of the Bush administration's plans for Iraq. Among the items for the $20.3 billion economic package Congress passed a few weeks ago was a $150 million state-of-the-art children's hospital with cutting-edge research and post-graduate development capabilities. _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss To contact the list manager, email firstname.lastname@example.org All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk