The following is an archived copy of a message sent to a Discussion List run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.

Views expressed in this archived message are those of the author, not of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.

[Main archive index/search] [List information] [Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]


[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[casi] Bush on Middle East "Democracy" & "Ending Occupation" in Iraq




http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/cgaa/talkingpoints/0311iraq.html


      FPIF Talking Points:
      Bush on Middle East "Democracy" & "Ending Occupation" in Iraq
      By Phyllis Bennis | November 21, 2003

      Editor: Miriam Pemberton, Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)




            Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org



      Facing the most serious escalation in U.S. casualties in Iraq, with
the New York Times proclaiming "Iraq Policy in Crisis," and with the specter
of Viet Nam-style quagmire hovering over the 2004 elections, the Bush
administration has issued two major policy pronouncements. One was the
November 6 speech on democracy in the Middle East, the other a high-profile
timetable for ostensibly turning some authority over to Iraqis.

      Both statements are critical. The first lays out the administration's
official new rationale for the Iraq war--designed to divert public attention
from the lies regarding weapons of mass destruction. The second is primarily
the Bush campaign effort to convince Americans the U.S. will not be bogged
down in Iraq by July 2004, just five months before the elections. The effect
of the shift will be to abandon even the current claim of "democratization"
in Iraq in favor embracing the Iraqization of the U.S. war.

      Bush's speech on November 6 called for a "forward strategy of
freedom," placing his claimed commitment to democratization in the Middle
East on par with Reagan's cold war call for democratization in Eastern
Europe. He acknowledged that earlier U.S. policies of accommodating
repressive regimes in the region "did nothing to make us safe," but offered
no indication of an actual new approach.

      Bush's speech on democracy in the Middle East is thoroughly
hypocritical. While acknowledging "sixty years of Western nations excusing
and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East," Bush's "forward
strategy of freedom" proposed nothing to actually change the lack of
freedom. While repeating the usual threats toward Syria, Iran, and
Palestine, Bush praised the king of Morocco and the Gulf petro-states for
their small, and in many cases largely cosmetic steps toward democracy. He
lauded close U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and Egypt for initial and potential
democratic openings, but assured them that "working democracies always need
time to develop," thus alleviating any fear of serious pressure on Riyadh or
Cairo.

      In a particularly cynical note, Bush quoted from the UN Arab
Development Report's assessment that "the global wave of democracy has--and
I quote--'barely reached the Arab states'." But he credited it only as "a
recent report by Arab scholars," refusing even to acknowledge the United
Nations contribution.

      The speech, and the announcement of a new "forward strategy for
freedom" was designed to give a popular cover to what has emerged as a
permanent war--framing Bush's preventive "war on terrorism" as a "war for
liberty." It was designed to imply that the current war in Iraq was also
waged "for liberty," to distract the American people from the sham reasons
actually given for the war: the embarrassingly missing WMDs, the
non-existent "imminent danger," and the false claims of Iraq's links with al
Qaeda.



      What does the new Iraq timetable call for?
      End of Feb 2004:
        a.. Iraqi army and security forces to be placed under Iraqi civilian
control--Maybe. In fact Pentagon officials are already angling to retain
U.S. control of the Iraqi military. (The U.S. military will remain in Iraq
under full U.S. command.)
      End of June 2004:
        a.. "Sovereign" provisional government to be established--based on
regional assemblies chosen largely by the Governing Council and vetted by
the U.S.
        b.. U.S. dissolves Coalition Provisional Authority--but does not
remove U.S. troops, end U.S. control over the $20 billion in reconstruction
funds, or potentially even end the presence and role of Bremer and his team
(only the title would change).
      End of 2005:
        a.. New constitution by committee chosen by the U.S.-vetted national
assembly.
        b.. New government elected according to that constitution.


      Why are They Changing the Policy Now?
      The new strategy announced by the Bush administration reflects the
abject failure of the U.S. occupation of Iraq and their desperation for new
approaches. U.S. casualties continue to escalate, particularly with the
increase in helicopters being shot down, with dozens of U.S. soldiers
killed. More than 400 U.S. soldiers have been killed in Iraq. Iraq remains
unstable and dangerous, with unknown thousands of Iraqi civilian casualties.

      Two new Iraqi polls, one by the State Department's intelligence
office, the other by Gallup, confirm that Iraqis do not support the U.S.
occupation. According to Gallup, only 5% of Iraqis believe the U.S. invaded
Iraq "to assist the Iraqi people," and 4% believe it was to destroy WMDs.
Only 1% believe it was to establish democracy, while 43% said the U.S.-UK
invasion was "to rob Iraq's oil." The State Dept. poll, included within the
top-secret CIA report of Nov. 10, showed that a majority of Iraqis view the
U.S. troops as occupiers, not liberators. Three-quarters believe the
decisions of the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council are "mostly
determined by the [U.S.] coalition," and they do not believe the appointed
Council is capable of governing or planning elections.

      Iraqi resistance to the original U.S. timetable was on the rise. It
called for appointing the Governing Council, then appointing a
constitutional committee, then drafting a constitution, then holding
elections. Demands for early elections increased, particularly from the
Shia'a majority and especially from the influential Shia'a leader Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani. The U.S.-appointed Governing Council, still without
legitimacy, essentially stalled, and indeed some Council members began to
challenge the U.S. timetable.

      The U.S.-imposed privatization scheme is increasingly recognized as
illegal, since it was imposed by the U.S. and not adopted by a legitimate
Iraqi government. Under international law, an occupying power is extremely
limited in how it benefits from the economy of the occupied territory. (The
analogy is to a house-sitter--who is allowed to eat the food in the
refrigerator, but not to put the house on the market and sell it for
condominiums.) International business insurance companies are refusing to
provide insurance for purchases of Iraqi infrastructure put on the market by
Bremer and the U.S. occupation forces. U.S. agencies, including the Ex-Im
Bank, appear ready to pick up the slack, but the danger remains that a
future truly independent government in Iraq might reject earlier contracts,
deeming them null and void because they were not signed by a legitimate
government. (That would mean, of course, that U.S. taxpayers would have to
foot the bill to bail out those corporations who lose their assets in any
re-nationalization scheme.) Some in the Governing Council and in the U.S.
occupation forces seem to believe that creating something called a
"government," even if interim, might stave off the taint of illegitimacy
that currently hovers over all the U.S.-imposed economic policies.

      International allies are still refusing to send troops or significant
funds to back the U.S. occupation. Even countries that had agreed to send
token troops deployments (Japan, South Korea) are reneging on those
commitments; Italy and perhaps others with troops in Iraq now will soon be
under significant domestic pressure to withdraw.

      U.S. election timetables remain a critical factor. Bush's advisers are
certainly increasingly worried about the impact of U.S. casualties, the bad
press over Iraq policy generally, and the vision of quagmire now on the
front pages.



      What Won't Change?
      According to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, U.S. troops will remain in
Iraq. This will still be a U.S. occupation, but that reality will be denied
and identified instead as "U.S. troops present at the request of the
sovereign Iraqi government."

      Military opposition and thus U.S. casualties will continue unabated
since there will be little change in the presence of U.S. occupation troops
throughout Iraq.

      The billions in reconstruction funds will remain under full U.S.
control. Control of the reconstruction and privatization contracts will
presumably remain in U.S. hands.

      The UN will remain largely marginalized; whatever participation it is
allowed will be under the domination of U.S. control.



      So What are the New Problems?
      U.S. declarations of a "sovereign government" in Iraq do not provide
legitimacy. There will still be a U.S. occupation in place, but it will not
be acknowledged. The so-called "sovereign government" will still be
illegitimate--having been chosen through a process flawed from the beginning
by its control by the U.S. and U.S.-appointed Council members. When that
illegitimate government begins the process of drafting a constitution, that
process will be flawed as well.

      The U.S. may intend to involve NATO in Iraq, according to European
Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana. This would pressure Washington's
European allies to send troops, and NATO would provide a veneer of
international credibility while remaining under Washington's domination.
Such a move would require unanimous agreement in NATO, including France and
Germany, who might insist on a larger political role for the UN in return.
Solana may be making this statement to pressure Washington to increase
NATO's role; his claim may reflect Colin Powell's view, it is unlikely to
represent the Bush administration's position as a whole.

      The U.S. will not allow the United Nations a truly independent role.
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer urged greater UN participation in
order "to give the process wider legitimacy." U.S. pressure in the Security
Council could lead to exactly that result. UN member states might also be
pressured by Washington to acquiesce to or even endorse NATO's role to
provide international approval.



      So What Do We Call for?
      The U.S. occupation remains illegal. Neither an "invitation" from a
U.S.-created "government" nor a U.S.-controlled NATO deployment will make
this occupation legal. We call for an end to the U.S. military occupation of
Iraq.

      The withdrawal of the U.S. military should be paralleled by the entry
into Iraq of an independent UN mission, backed by the Arab League, to
provide political assistance in arranging elections, humanitarian
assistance, and a peacekeeping contingent to maintain stability while Iraq
is reclaiming its sovereignty. While the election process is underway, UN
and Arab League troops should immediately work to restore the capacity of
the Iraqi security forces to provide security under the authority of the new
legitimate government as it comes into existence.

      The UN should refuse to play a role in Iraq while the U.S. occupation
continues. It should defy Washington's efforts to use the global institution
to give an international or legal fašade to the U.S. war. The UN should
reject any U.S. campaign to endorse a NATO deployment.

      The U.S. should end its control of all reconstruction funds in Iraq.
That money, whether donated by the U.S. or by other countries, should be
turned over to the United Nations for distribution to a truly sovereign
Iraqi government as it comes into existence, on the same basis as UN
projects elsewhere in the world.

      The U.S.-imposed privatization of Iraq should be declared null and
void. Only after a legitimate sovereign government has been created should
any reworking of Iraq's economy be undertaken, and then only as determined
by that new government.




_______________________________________________
Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss
To contact the list manager, email casi-discuss-admin@lists.casi.org.uk
All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk


[Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]