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Thanks, Nathaniel. Here's some attempt to summarise what's in the new draft, and how it differs from the earlier draft and the amendments proposed by France, Germany and Syria (OP=operative paragraph, PP=preambular paragraph. The various drafts are at www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq, or in the list archives). The French delegation is criticising the draft, but have promised not to veto it (http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,7447052%255E1702,00.html). Apologies in advance for details I've missed out. 1) SUGGESTIONS NOT IN THE LATEST DRAFT - The French proposal laid great stress on creating an International Advisory and Monitoring Board for the Development Fund for Iraq. This was in 1483, para 12, and there was a draft written by early June (http://www.casi.org.uk/info/cpa/iamb030611.pdf). Can anybody shed some light on what's going on with this? Is it connected with the French objections to the provision for transfer of assets (OP 16 in the 3 sep draft)? - France also wanted to write the CPA out of the constitutional process. Unsurprisingly, that hasn't turned up in the US draft - Syria's proposals have essentially been ignored - France's request that the UN initiate regional discussions over Iraq hasn't been included 2) TRANSFER OF POWER - Note Kofi Annan's statement (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=8436&Cr=iraq&Cr1=) that he isn't happy about the current proposals. A little surprising that he's saying so in public. - "underscores...the temporary nature" of CPA authority (OP 5) - welcomes international support for Governing Council, creation of preparatory constitutional committee and council of ministers (PP4, OP - asks governing council to provide a timetable for transfer of power, with UN and CPA help (OP 9, 11) - urges CPA to transfer power as quickly as possible (OP 8) - there's a nicely beefed-up PP 4 "underscoring that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the state of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, reiterating its resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly" 3) UN INVOLVEMENT - Still refers a great deal to 1483, despite the French proposal that the UN should expand its role beyond that. - asks the secretary general to carry out the program in his 17 July report (OP4; this has already been dealt with by resolution 1500) - UN should "strengthen its vital role in Iraq" (OP 4). This was "play a vital role". The word order in OP4 (was OP3) has been changed, which looks like a deliberate fudge. The text now is: Resolves that the [UN] should strengthen its vital role in Iraq, including by providing humanitarian relief, promoting the economic reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq, and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative government, as set out in relevant paragraphs of resolutions 1483 (2003) and 1500 (2003), and for this purpose encourages the Secretary General to pursue the course of action outlined in paragraphs 98 and 99 of the Report of the Secretary General of 17 July 2003 (S/2003/715); The US can now read this as "should strengthen its vital role...as set out in 1483" - i.e. implement what's already been agreed. France can read it as "should strenghten its vital role, including...as set out in 1483" -i.e. implement what's been agreed, and go beyond it. Or am I reading too much into this? 4) MILITARY FORCE/SECURITY - authorises a multinational security force (para 13) and urges states to contribute troops, etc (OP 14). Some rewording here, e.g. forces would now be contributed "under this United Nations mandate", but doesn't seem to have changed a great deal. - calls on neighbouring states to prevent terrorists and materials supporting them from reaching Iraq (OP3); Syria didn't this because it "implicitly accuses the neighbouring states of exporting terrorism". Emphasises need for police and security forces (broadened from 'police force' in 3 Sept draft) - condemns bombings of the UN, the Jordanese embassy, and the Najaf mosque, and sympathises with the victims (OP1 & 2, PP 2) 5) FINANCIAL SUPPORT - Requests states to contribute financially (para 17), including at a Donors Conference (para 18) and by transferring assets of the former regime to the Development Fund for Iraq (para 20). - OP 19 "Calls upon Member States and concerned organisations to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people by providing resources necessary for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq's economic infrastructure"; I can't see what this adds that hasn't been stated elsewhere 6) MONITORING PROGRESS - OP 15 baffles me: 15. Decides that the Council shall review the requirements and mission of the multinational forces referred to in paragraph 13 above when an internationally recognised, representative government is established by the people of Iraq and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority; does this mean that they won't review it until the end of the transition process? If not, why bother inserting it? - Secretary General will report on UN operations, including constitution/elections, at unspecified intervals (OP12) (as requested by French, except that they wanted a time limit) - US will report on military matters at least every 6 months ------------------- Daniel O'Huiginn Queens' College, Cambridge 07789 260207 do227@ cam.ac.uk ------------------- _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. 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