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News, 3-10/9/03 (3) US POLICY * Put the Iraqis in Charge - Why Iraq is proving much tougher than Afghanistan * Halliburton's Deals Greater Than Thought * Latest Iraq threat: cash crunch * U.S. rushed post-Saddam planning * In north Iraq, a general with a civil touch * The sick smell of panic * U.S. President expands executive order on property confiscation * Rumsfeld, on Iraq Tour, Cites 'Remarkable Progress' * Bush Seeks $87 Billion and U.N. Aid for War Effort * Dems Demand Details of Iraq Operations US POLICY http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110003937 * PUT THE IRAQIS IN CHARGE - WHY IRAQ IS PROVING MUCH TOUGHER THAN AFGHANISTAN. by Bernard Lewis Opinion, 29th August At first sight one would have expected that Afghanistan would be difficult, Iraq easy. In the one country, we ousted a religious regime, which had the prestige of having liberated the country from the plague of warlordism; in the other, we overthrew a universally detested Fascist-type tyranny. Afghanistan is a remote, mountainous country, with poor and difficult communications; Iraq consists largely of flat river valleys with quick and easy communication. Afghanistan has a strong tradition of regional independence and limited experience of central control; Iraq has known millennia of centralized government, run by a sophisticated and ramified bureaucracy. For these and other reasons, one might have expected that running Afghanistan would be difficult, running Iraq comparatively easy. In fact, the reverse has occurred. In Afghanistan, at first, things did indeed go badly, and there are still problems, both in the country and in the government, but they are manageable. Today with minimal help from the U.S., a central government is gradually extending its political and financial control to the rest of the country and dealing more and more effectively with the problem of the maintenance of order; in Iraq, after an easy and almost unresisted conquest, the situation seems to grow worse from day to day. While the Afghans are building a new infrastructure, Iraqis--or others acting in their name--are busy destroying theirs. Why this contrast? America's enemies are the same in both places, with the same objectives. The main difference is that in Afghanistan there is an Afghan government, while in Iraq there is an American administration, and the cry of "American imperialism" is being repeated on many sides. Even the most cursory examination will reveal that this charge is ludicrously inept. America has neither the desire nor the skill nor--perhaps most important--the need to play an imperial role in Iraq. But the accusation--and its resonant echoes in the Western and even in the American media--serve a very useful purpose for those whose complaints and purposes against America are in reality quite different. These anti-American forces fall basically into two groups. The first, and in the long run the more important, come from the camp of al Qaeda and related religious movements. For them, America is now the leader of Christendom, the ultimate enemy in the millennial struggle which they hope to bring, in their own time, to a victorious conclusion. In the writings and speeches of Osama bin Laden and of his allies and disciples, hatred of America is less significant than contempt--the perception that America is a "paper tiger," that its people have become soft and pampered--"hit them and they will run." This perception was bolstered by frequent references to Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia, as well as to the feeble response to subsequent terrorist attacks in the 1990s, notably on the USS Cole and on the embassies in East Africa. It was this perception which undoubtedly underlay the events of Sept. 11, clearly intended to be the opening barrage of a new war against the Americans on their home ground. The response to this attack, and notably the operations in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, brought a rude awakening, and that is surely why there have been no subsequent attacks on U.S. soil. But the perception has not entirely disappeared, and has been revived by a number of subsequent developments and utterances. Compunction--unwillingness to inflict as well as to suffer casualties--is meaningless to those who have no hesitation in slaughtering hundreds, even thousands, of their own people, in order to kill a few enemies. Open debate is obviously meaningless to those whose only experience of government is ruthless autocracy. What they think they see is division and fear--and these encourage a return to their earlier perception of American degeneracy. Such a return could have dangerous consequences, including a renewal and extension of terrorist attacks in America. By terrorist attacks, they believe, they will encourage those whose response is to say, "Let's get out of here"--perhaps even procure the election of a new administration dedicated to this policy. The other factor of anti-Americanism has quite a different origin, though there are areas of overlap. During the last few months the fear has often been expressed in Europe and America that democracy cannot succeed in Iraq. There is another, greater, and more urgent fear in the region--that it will succeed in Iraq, and this could become a mortal threat to the tyrants who rule most of the Middle East. An open and democratic regime in Iraq, inevitably with a Shiite majority, could arouse new hopes among the oppressed peoples of the region, and offer a corresponding threat to their oppressors. One of these regimes, that of Iran, purports to be Islamic, and was indeed so in its origins, though it has become yet another corrupt tyranny. Some of these regimes are officially classified as our friends and allies, and dealing with them presents a number of problems. There are no such problems in dealing with Iran, an avowed enemy, and undoubtedly a major force behind the troubles in Iraq, in Palestine and elsewhere. Some have argued that the remedy is to "build bridges" to the present regime in Iran. Even if successful, the best that such a diplomacy could accomplish would be to establish the same kind of friendship with Iran as we have with Saudi Arabia--hardly model. More realistically, such overtures could certainly achieve two immediate results--to earn the contempt of the government and the mistrust of the people. The calculation of the present regime in Iran is well known, and dates back to the first Gulf War. If Saddam Hussein had possessed nuclear weapons, the Americans would have left him alone, and he would have kept Kuwait and probably other places too. It was then that the mullahs decided that they must have these weapons, which would enable them to enjoy the same kind of immunity as North Korea. They are working desperately to that end, and the Middle East situation will take a significant turn for the worse if they are given the time to achieve it. Opinions may differ on how to handle them, but surely the worst of all options is the line of submissiveness, which can only strengthen the perception of American weakness. What then should we do in Iraq? Clearly the imperial role is impossible, blocked equally by moral and psychological constraints, and by international and more especially domestic political calculations. An inept, indecisive imperialism is the worst of all options, with the possible exception of subjecting Iraq to the tangled but ferocious politics of the U.N. The best course surely is the one that is working in Afghanistan--to hand over, as soon as possible, to a genuine Iraqi government. In Iraq as in Afghanistan, a period of discreet support would be necessary, but the task would probably be easier in Iraq. Here again care must be taken. Premature democratization--holding elections and transferring power, in a country which has had no experience of such things for decades, can only lead to disaster, as in Algeria. Democracy is the best and therefore the most difficult of all forms of government. The Iraqis certainly have the capacity to develop democratic institutions, but they must do so in their own way, at their own pace. This can only be done by an Iraqi government. Fortunately, the nucleus of such a government is already available, in the Iraqi National Congress, headed by Ahmad Chalabi. In the northern free zone during the '90s they played a constructive role, and might at that time even have achieved the liberation of Iraq had we not failed at crucial moments to support them. Despite a continuing lack of support amounting at times to sabotage, they continue to acquit themselves well in Iraq, and there can be no reasonable doubt that of all the possible Iraqi candidates they are the best in terms alike of experience, reliability, and good will. It took years, not months, to create democracies in the former Axis countries, and this was achieved in the final analysis not by Americans but by people in those countries, with American encouragement, help and support. Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress deserve no less. Mr. Lewis, professor emeritus of Near Eastern studies at Princeton, is the author, most recently, of "What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response" (Oxford, 2002). http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56429-2003Aug27?language=printer * HALLIBURTON'S DEALS GREATER THAN THOUGHT by Michael Dobbs Washington Post, 28th August Halliburton, the company formerly headed by Vice President Cheney, has won contracts worth more than $1.7 billion under Operation Iraqi Freedom and stands to make hundreds of millions more dollars under a no-bid contract awarded by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, according to newly available documents. The size and scope of the government contracts awarded to Halliburton in connection with the war in Iraq are significantly greater than was previously disclosed and demonstrate the U.S. military's increasing reliance on for-profit corporations to run its logistical operations. Independent experts estimate that as much as one-third of the monthly $3.9 billion cost of keeping U.S. troops in Iraq is going to independent contractors. Services performed by Halliburton, through its Brown and Root subsidiary, include building and managing military bases, logistical support for the 1,200 intelligence officers hunting Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, delivering mail and producing millions of hot meals. Often dressed in Army fatigues with civilian patches on their shoulders, Halliburton employees and contract personnel have become an integral part of Army life in Iraq. Spreadsheets drawn up by the Army Joint Munitions Command show that about $1 billion had been allocated to Brown and Root Services through mid-August for contracts associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Pentagon's name for the U.S.-led war and occupation. In addition, the company has earned about $705 million for an initial round of oil field rehabilitation work for the Army Corps of Engineers, a corps spokesman said. Specific work orders assigned to the subsidiary under Operation Iraqi Freedom include $142 million for base camp operations in Kuwait, $170 million for logistical support for the Iraqi reconstruction effort and $28 million for the construction of prisoner of war camps, the Army spreadsheet shows. The company was also allocated $39 million for building and operating U.S. base camps in Jordan, the existence of which the Pentagon has not previously publicly acknowledged. Over the past decade, Halliburton, a Houston-based company that made its name servicing pipelines and oil wells, has positioned itself to take advantage of an increasing trend by the federal government to contract out many support operations overseas. It has emerged as the biggest single government contractor in Iraq, followed by such companies as Bechtel, a California-based engineering firm that has won hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. Agency for International Development reconstruction contracts, and Virginia-based DynCorp, which is training the new Iraqi police force. The government said the practice has been spurred by cutbacks in the military budget and a string of wars since the end of the Cold War that have placed enormous demand on the armed forces. But, according to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-Calif.) and other critics, the Iraq war and occupation have provided a handful of companies with good political connections, particularly Halliburton, with unprecedented money-making opportunities. "The amount of money [earned by Halliburton] is quite staggering, far more than we were originally led to believe," Waxman said. "This is clearly a trend under this administration, and it concerns me because often the privatization of government services ends up costing the taxpayers more money rather than less." Wendy Hall, a Halliburton spokeswoman, declined to discuss the details of the company's operations in Iraq, or confirm or deny estimates of the amounts the company has earned from its contracting work on behalf of the military. In an e-mail message, however, she said that suggestions of war profiteering were "an affront to all hard-working, honorable Halliburton employees." Hall added that military contracts were awarded "not by politicians but by government civil servants, under strict guidelines." Daniel Carlson, a spokesman for the Army's Joint Munitions Command, said Brown and Root had won a competitive bidding process in 2001 to provide a wide range of "contingency" services to the military in the event of the deployment of U.S. troops overseas. He said the contract, known as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, or LOGCAP, was designed to free uniformed personnel for combat duties and did not preclude deals with other contractors. Carlson said the money earmarked for Brown and Root was an estimate, and could go "up or down" depending on the work performed. The Joint Munitions Command provided The Washington Post with an updated version of a spreadsheet the Army released to Waxman earlier this month, giving detailed estimates of money obligated to Brown and Root under Operation Iraqi Freedom. Estimates of the company's revenue from Iraq have been increasing steadily since February, when the Corps of Engineers announced the company had won a $37.5 million contract for pre-positioning fire equipment in the region. In addition to its Iraq contracts, Brown and Root has also earned $183 million from Operation Enduring Freedom, the military name for the war on terrorism and combat operations in Afghanistan, according to the Army's numbers. Waxman's interest in Halliburton was ignited by a routine Corps of Engineers announcement in March reporting that the company had been awarded a no-bid contract, with a $7 billion limit, for putting out fires at Iraqi oil wells. Corps spokesmen justified the lack of competition on the grounds that the operation was part of a classified war plan and the Army did not have time to secure competitive bids for the work. The corps said the oil rehabilitation deal was an offshoot of the LOGCAP contract, a one year agreement renewable for 10 years. Individual work orders assigned under LOGCAP do not have to be competitively bid. But Waxman and other critics maintain that the oil work has nothing to do with the logistics operation. The practice of delegating a vast array of logistics operations to a single contractor dates to the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and a study commissioned by Cheney, then defense secretary, on military outsourcing. The Pentagon chose Brown and Root to carry out the study and subsequently selected the company to implement its own plan. Cheney served as chief executive of Brown and Root's parent company, Halliburton, from 1995 to 2000, when he resigned to run for the vice presidency. At the time, said P.W. Singer, a Brookings Institution scholar and author of "Corporate Warriors," it was impossible to predict how lucrative the military contracting business would become. He estimates the number of contract workers in Iraq at 20,000, or about one for every 10 soldiers. During the Gulf War, the proportion was about one in 100. Brown and Root's revenue from Operation Iraqi Freedom is already rivaling its earnings from its contracts in the Balkans, and is a major factor in increasing the value of Halliburton shares by 50 percent over the past year, according to industry analysts. The company reported a net profit of $26 million in the second quarter of this year, in contrast to a $498 million loss in the same period last year. Waxman aides said they have been told by the General Accounting Office that Brown and Root is likely to earn "several hundred million more dollars" from the no-bid Corps of Engineers contract to rehabilitate Iraqi oil fields. Waxman, the ranking minority member on the House Government Reform Committee, had asked the GAO to investigate the corps' decision not to bid out the contract. After a round of unfavorable publicity, the corps explained that the sole award to Brown and Root would be replaced by a competitively bid contract. But the deadline for announcing the results of the competition has slipped from August to October, causing rival companies to complain that little work will be left for anybody else. Bechtel, one of Halliburton's main competitors, announced this month that it would not bid for the corps contract and would instead focus on securing work from the Iraqi oil ministry. In addition to the Army contracts, Halliburton has profited from other government-related work in Iraq and the war on terrorism, and has a $300 million contract with the Navy structured along similar lines to LOGCAP. Pentagon officials said the increasing reliance on contractors is inevitable, given the multiple demands on the military, particularly since Sept. 11, 2001. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is a champion of "outsourcing," writing in The Post in May that "more than 300,000 uniformed personnel" were doing jobs that civilians could do. Independent experts said the trend toward outsourcing logistic operations has resulted in new problems, such as a lack of accountability and transparency on the part of private military firms and sometimes questionable billing practices. A major problem in Iraq, Singer said, has been the phenomenon of "no-shows" caused by the inhospitable security environment, including the killing of contract workers, including a Halliburton mail delivery employee earlier this month. "At the end of the day, neither these companies nor their employees are bound by military justice, and it is up to them whether to show up or not," Singer said. "The result is that there have been delays in setting up showers for soldiers, getting them cooked meals and so on." A related concern is the rising cost of hiring contract workers because of skyrocketing insurance premiums. Singer estimates that premiums have increased by 300 percent to 400 percent this year, costs that are passed on to the taxpayer under the cost-plus-award fee system that is the basis for most contracts. The LOGCAP contract awarded to Brown and Root in 2001 was the third, and potentially most lucrative, super-contract awarded by the Army. Brown and Root won the first five year contract in 1992, but lost the second to rival DynCorp in 1997 after the GAO criticized the Army for not adequately controlling contracting costs in Bosnia. NO URL * LATEST IRAQ THREAT: CASH CRUNCH by Ilene R. Prusher The Christian Science Monitor, 3rd September BAGHDAD -- The reconstruction of Iraq, Bush administration officials predicted before the war, will pay for itself. But hopes of using Iraq's own oil and resources to fund the rebuilding were contingent on an ideal of postwar peace and security. Instead, a serious budget crunch, combined with a vicious circle of violence, sabotage, and economic instability is slowing reconstruction plans. Many potential donor nations are shying away from getting involved. As international aid groups pull personnel out in the wake of the UN bombing, less foreign money is being pumped into the local economy. And, significantly, oil revenues aren't flowing as expected. A coalition official says that war damage and sabotage have stanched the flow to just $2.3 billion per year, down from an earlier estimate of $3.4 billion. The cash shortfall means that here in Baghdad, officials are already seeing reconstruction and development projects - including electricity, gas, and water facilities - put on hold because they do not have the funds to start work. "There are substantial needs not met by this money," says a coalition official, who asked not to be named. Paul Bremer, the top US civilian official in Iraq, has been warning officials in Washington that this year's budget will fall short "somewhere in the neighborhood of $3.5 billion" and has warned that "tens of billions" more will be needed. But the administration's congressional critics say they will demand a fuller accounting of postwar operations, and a clear picture of the administration's vision for achieving success in Iraq, before appropriating more money. Officials here say that some basic infrastructure severely damaged during or since the war - as well as utilities neglected under the old regime - is expected to remain unrepaired. These include utilities, leaving many Iraqis with worse standards of living than they had under Saddam Hussein. When college students across the country go back to school in a few weeks, many can expect to find university campuses that have not recovered from the looting and destruction that followed the Iraqi regime's downfall. The future offers no immediate fiscal relief for the coalition. Iraq's budget for 2004, according an internal document provided by an official in the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA], "has inadequate funds for security, electrical, water, sewage, irrigation, housing, education, health, [and] agriculture." For many middle and working-class Iraqis, basic services like electricity, safe highways, and a living wage have disappeared. In frustration, many Iraqis say, some of those struggling people are joining the resistance movements. Tuesday, as Shiites buried their assassinated senior cleric in Najaf, a bomb went off at the Baghdad police headquarters, in an apparent attempt to assassinate the police chief. One Iraqi police officer was killed; 15 others were wounded. The bloodshed, including bombings at the UN headquarters and the Jordanian embassy here last month, are keeping investors and even small businesses away. "If you cannot get money to fix security, electricity, and infrastructure problems, that will prevent small businesses from wanting to come here to start up, and it keeps foreign investment out," the CPA official explains. "How can I run a business if I don't have a guarantee of security?" Already, the terrorism that Washington once accused Iraq of supporting abroad is now plaguing Iraq at home - and grounding what the Bush administration thought would be a solid take-off for the postwar economy. Now, the UN, nongovernmental organizations, and other major groups like the Red Cross are scaling back their operations in Iraq after the bombing of the UN headquarters, representing a withdrawal of foreign cash and demand for services that would have been pumped into Iraq. With several tens of billions of dollars more needed, according to Bremer, the US will need its allies to help foot the bill. A donor conference, to that end, will be held near the end of October. But it is already proving difficult to get countries to foot the reconstruction bill for a war that many of them opposed outright. The US is now forced to turn to countries it dismissed six months ago as part of "Old Europe" to help pay for the new Iraq. Moreover, the experience of drumming up pledges for reconstruction aid for Afghanistan at a January 2002 conference in Tokyo teaches the Iraq team that donors are not always the most reliable bunch. Even after countries make their pledges, most have to go back to their legislatures and parliaments to fund them. Finance experts here say that means that any money pledged in Madrid, Spain, next month will not show up in Iraq's budget until 2005 or 2006."When you think about these things, it just isn't going to happen," says the CPA officer. "I need other funds in 2004." One of the Bush administration's hopes for rebuilding Iraq was that by revamping the oil ministry and using seized Baathist funds and other assets, a free Iraq would fuel its own renaissance. But oil revenues, have been disappointing, in large part due to looting attacks on oil pipelines and facilities by groups trying to derail US efforts here. Saboteurs have also targeted power grids, cutting power to homes and businesses that have become accustomed to having it for decades. Seized assets, smaller than expected, have virtually run dry. Seized assets in the US totaled about $1.7 billion, a US official here says, while only $795 million was seized in the country during the war, plus another $1 million found with Mr. Hussein's sons. The funds the US seized or won from congressional appropriations are being used to try to close the gap for the second half of 2003. But even that, many here say, is hardly covering all the bases. Beyond the most urgent needs, projects that could build confidence in US intentions to help rebuild Iraq are moving much more slowly, due to financial limitations, than many Iraqis expected. The Ministry of Higher Education, for example, only received about half of what it asked for, or approximately $33 million, to carry it through the rest of the year, says Farouk Darweesh, an adviser to the ministry sent here by a US-funded program to bring exiled experts to Iraq. When the students come back to school over the coming month, he says, "they will see improvement, but not the extent that many hoped. I would expect that they would, initially at least, be disappointed." School labs and workshops, particularly in science courses that have the most tangible equipment, "were stripped and are bareboned - there's hardly anything there." Graduate level courses in need of such equipment will not be held this year. Many Iraqis blame US forces for allowing the looting to carry on as long as it did, and still speak with frustration of Bush administration officials' acceptance of the chaos as an understandable venting of anger. "The funds allocated to the Ministry of Education, though welcomed indeed, are not sufficient to effect restoration of everything inside for the next academic year," says Mr. Darweesh http://washingtontimes.com/national/20030903-120317-9393r.htm * U.S. RUSHED POST-SADDAM PLANNING by Rowan Scarborough Washington Times, 3rd September A secret report for the Joint Chiefs of Staff lays the blame for setbacks in Iraq on a flawed and rushed war-planning process that "limited the focus" for preparing for post-Saddam Hussein operations. The report, prepared last month, said the search for weapons of mass destruction was planned so late in the game that it was impossible for U.S. Central Command to carry out the mission effectively. "Insufficient U.S. government assets existed to accomplish the mission," the classified briefing said. The report is titled "Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lessons Learned" and is stamped "secret." A copy was obtained by The Washington Times. The report also shows that President Bush approved the overall war strategy for Iraq in August last year. That was eight months before the first bomb was dropped and six months before he asked the U.N. Security Council for a war mandate that he never received. Senior U.S. officials, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, conceded in recent weeks that the Bush administration failed to predict the guerrilla war against American troops in Iraq. Saddam loyalists and foreign fighters have killed more than 60 soldiers since May 1, mostly with roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades. The Congressional Budget Office projected yesterday that the demands of troop rotations globally will leave the Pentagon without any fresh Army units for Iraq in 2004 unless tours are extended beyond one year. The Joint Chiefs report reveals deficiencies in the planning process. It says planners were not given enough time to put together the best blueprint for what is called Phase IV - the ongoing reconstruction of Iraq. The report does not name any individual. Most war planning was conducted by Gen. Tommy Franks at U.S. Central Command; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the direction of Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman; and the Pentagon policy-writing shop led by Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith. "Late formation of DoD [Phase IV] organizations limited time available for the development of detailed plans and pre-deployment coordination," the report says. "Command relationships (and communication requirements) and responsibilities were not clearly defined for DoD organizations until shortly before [Operation Iraqi Freedom] commenced." In fact, the Pentagon was forced to scrap its original plan for rebuilding as violence increased against U.S. forces and basic services were slow to resume. L. Paul Bremer, a former ambassador, was tapped in mid-May to take over as Iraq's American administrator. On the weapons search - the prime reason Mr. Bush cited for going to war - the Joint Chiefs report states: "Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) elimination and exploitation planning efforts did not occur early enough in the process to allow CentCom to effectively execute the mission. The extent of the planning required was underestimated. Insufficient U.S. government assets existed to accomplish the mission." The initial search by military teams found no weapons at sites identified by the CIA and other intelligence agencies before the war. The Pentagon then replaced those teams with an overarching "Iraq Survey Group," which received additional expert personnel and new intelligence assets. Former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay is leading the search for weapons of mass destruction. The report said the planning was poor because "WMD elimination/exploitation on a large scale was a new mission area. Division of responsibility for planning and execution was not clear. As a result planning occurred on an ad hoc basis and late in the process. Additionally, there were insufficient assets available to accomplish the mission. Existing assets were tasked to perform multiple, competing missions." A Pentagon spokesman declined yesterday to comment specifically on the findings. "We always look closely at everything we do to find ways to improve and do better," the spokesman said, "and Operation Iraqi Freedom is no exception. As to specifics of the lessons learned, it's still a draft document and classified, so it would be inappropriate to comment on that." The report, labeled "final draft," suggests that combat commanders, such as Central Command, establish permanent cadres of specialists on weapons of mass destruction. It also recommends that each operational plan contain a section for dealing with such weapons. On planning for the post-Saddam period, the interagency process, such as between the Pentagon and State Department, "was not fully integrated prior to hostilities." Before the war, "Phase IV objectives were identified but the scope of the effort required to continually refine operational plans for defeat of Iraqi military limited the focus on Phase IV." The report also provides a classified timeline of events from September 11 leading to war. It says that on Aug. 29, 2002, Mr. Bush "approves Iraq goals, objectives and strategy." Three months earlier, the Pentagon began a series of war exercises called "Prominent Hammer" to judge whether the force could win in Iraq and still maintain a deterrent in other theaters, such as South Korea. On Nov. 24, Gen. Franks, the Central Command chief, presented Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld with "six major tasks for success." Central Command held a major war game Oct. 4 and 5 to test Gen. Franks' plan. The timeline also showed that the Bush administration stayed in close contact with Israel about its plans. In mid-February, "key Israeli leaders" received a briefing on the war plan. Shortly thereafter, CentCom began sharing information in Tel Aviv via U.S. European Command, whose area of responsibility includes the Jewish state. The report states that the study looks at "the big issues - strategic perspective," as opposed to lessons-learned reports that examine many tactical issues. The report awarded three grades. The worst was "capabilities that fell short of expectations or needs, and need to be redressed through new initiatives." Getting this low grade were the postwar planning and the search for weapons of mass destruction, as well as the mix of active and reserve forces, and the troop deployment to the region. The next grade was "capabilities that demonstrated effectiveness, but need enhancement." Public affairs, special-operations forces, finding bombing targets and tracking the whereabouts of friendly troops received the grade. The highest marks came under the category of "capabilities that reached new levels of performance and need to be sustained and improved." Joint service warfare, a key war fighting requirement of Mr. Rumsfeld, got this high grade, as did global war-gaming. The report also gave high marks to bombing "time-sensitive" targets. In the 2001 Afghanistan war, the report says, Gen. Franks and Mr. Rumsfeld had to approve the target list. But in Iraq, the command improved guidance and procedures so that commanders could launch strikes when targets emerged. http://www.iht.com/articles/108853.html * IN NORTH IRAQ, A GENERAL WITH A CIVIL TOUCH by Michael R. Gordon International Herald Tribune, from New York Times, 4th September RABIYA, Iraq: Colonel Michael Linnington's brigade fought its way across Iraq. But one of its most unusual missions took place in this remote northwestern corner of the country. His orders were simple - to work out an agreement between local sheiks and Iraqi customs officials to restore trade with Syria. What was unusual was that the decision had been initiated not by the State Department or civilian administrators in Baghdad, but by Major General David Petraeus, the commander of the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division and the dominant political figure in Mosul and the surrounding areas in northern Iraq. Three months later, there is a steady stream of cross-border traffic, and the modest fees that the division set for entering Iraq - $10 per car, $20 per truck - have raised revenue for expanded customs forces and other projects in the region. A five-day trip through the 101st Division's large area of operation showed that U.S. forces, not the civilian-led occupation authority in Baghdad, are the driving force in the region's political and economic reconstruction. The ethnic makeup of the north - a diverse blend of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and tribes perhaps more interested in cooperating with the Americans than with one another - is different from the troublesome area around Baghdad known as the Sunni triangle, or the Shiite-dominated south. But that only partly explains the military's relative success here. Other elements are the early deployment of a potent American force large enough to establish control, the quick establishment of new civil institutions run by Iraqis, and a selective use of raids to capture hostile groups or individuals while minimizing the disruption to local civilians. Another factor has been an American commander who approached what has come to be known as nation-building as a central military mission and who was prepared to act while the civilian authority in Baghdad was still getting organized. Petraeus, who holds an advanced degree in international relations from Princeton, was steeped in nation-building well before he arrived in Iraq. He served as the assistant chief of staff for operations for SFOR, the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia. His division is also well suited for its mission. Unlike an armored unit, it has lot of infantry soldiers - nearly 7,000 - to conduct foot patrols and stay in touch with the local population. It also has 250 helicopters to travel across northern Iraq. "We walk, and walking has a quality of its own," the general said. "We're like cops on the beat." Under Petraeus, the 101st established an Iraqi governing council for the city of Mosul and the surrounding province of Nineveh before L. Paul Bremer 3rd, the head of the occupation authority, arrived in Baghdad. The division has also established an employment office for former Iraqi military officers, found grain silos for farmers and trained the local police. In some cases, like the creation of an internal Iraqi security force, the division developed policies that Bremer's authority has only recently embraced. "If there is a vacuum in the guidance from Baghdad or from Washington, Petraeus will study the situation and take action," said Gordon Rudd, the historian for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the civilian authority in Iraq before Bremer's appointment. Hunain al-Qaddo, a member of the Mosul City Council and chairman of its committee on humanitarian assistance, said he had never met with representatives from Bremer's occupation authority; the real authority, as far as he is concerned, is the 101st Division. "They work hard to do the right thing, though sometimes they are inclined to impose their will on us," he said. Dick Naab, the northern coordinator for Bremer's occupation authority, said in a response by e-mail that Petraeus "has been key to setting up and running the Nineveh government." But Naab noted that the occupation authority had provided millions of dollars for the division's reconstruction efforts and had helped by identifying potential projects. "The 101st is 20,000-plus larger than CPA North," Naab added, using the abbreviation for his northern office. "We are a very small force, but we do our part very well." The 101st Division's sense of mission is swiftly apparent at Petraeus's command center inside a palace in Mosul. "We are in a race to win over the people," a sign reads. "What have you and your element done today to contribute to victory?" The 101st has beefed up its team of military lawyers and focused on civil projects. In the past three months, the division has spent more than $17 million on reconstruction and other civil tasks, using money provided by Bremer's administration. "Money is ammunition," reads one of the division's briefing slides. When his units exhaust their funds, Petraeus arranges for additional cash from Bremer's authority or from the division's coffers. Each morning, Petraeus receives a status report from his commanders in an hourlong radio conference. Told recently that a nationwide project to buy police vehicles and radios for the police was held up in Baghdad, he told his soldiers to press ahead. "Buy them with my funds," he ordered. In terms of security, this region does not present as great a threat as the area around Baghdad. But northern Iraq has its own dangers and challenges. It was soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division who surrounded the house in Mosul where the sons of Saddam Hussein, Uday and Qusay, were discovered and who fired the 12 antitank missiles that killed them after commandos from Task Force 20 withdrew under fire. That same week, six of the division's soldiers were killed in guerrilla attacks, two more than died during the fight to reach Baghdad. The 101st's soldiers still come under attack by rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices. Each day, its elements are involved in three to five "hostile contacts." In general, however, the division has stressed the selective use of force. During raids, the soldiers do not just burst in. They surround the house and then go to the door and knock. Outside of Mosul, brigade commanders have been immersed in the effort to build trust. In his brigade's patrol area, Colonel Ben Hodges encountered so many Iraqis who believed that the sunglasses and night-vision goggles the soldiers wear enable them to see through women's clothes that he invited local sheiks to come to his base and try out the equipment. For Linnington and his soldiers, reopening the border with Syria was the priority. Salaries in Mosul were about to be paid using American dollars, and Petraeus thought it would bring inflation unless the supply of goods grew. The 150 Iraqi customs officials who used to run the border crossing insisted on keeping their jobs, while the local Shamir tribe also wanted control. Financed by the border crossing fees, an additional 100 positions were created to give to the tribe. The next step was to notify Syria that trade was to be resumed. The division's lawyers drafted a letter, which was handed across the border. It was signed by Petraeus. http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/4954.htm * THE SICK SMELL OF PANIC by Jonathan Foreman New York Post, 5th September THE Bush administra tion's sudden decision to go to the U.N. Secu rity Coun cil for a new Iraq resolution looks like bad news for America and for the prospects of a democratic Iraq. The resolution's specific contents and even whether or not it gets passed can't change that. (Indeed, yesterday's Franco-German dιmarche suggests that we're simply in for another pointless Security Council pummeling.) The issue isn't the further internationalization of the occupation. (Thousands of foreign troops are already patrolling vast stretches of Iraq.) It is symbolism and timing. The hasty turn to the United Nations smells of panic, unwarranted panic at that, and even worse, the foolish subordination of Iraq policy to electoral concerns. The administration may genuinely believe it isn't engaged in a humiliating climbdown, but that is inevitably going to be the perception, here and abroad. The practical point of the move, to the extent it has any, is to obtain the U.N. fig leaf that will make politically possible the deployment of troops from India, Pakistan and Turkey. But even if it were worth eating some humble pie to bring in three divisions from those countries and that's debatable, given the horrifyingly brutal counter-insurgency records of all three militaries the timing of the pie-eating could hardly be more dangerous. To go crawling back to the United Nations, tail between our legs, only a week after the Najaf bombing, tells the world and, more importantly, the people of Iraq that the bombings and attacks on U.S. troops have succeeded. It signals that America is, if not exactly on the run, severely rattled. No, the Iraqi occupation has not yet turned into a 1993 Mogadishu or 1983 Beirut where America humiliated itself by fleeing after bloody setbacks, and thereby encouraged the Khadafys, Milosevics and bin Ladens of the world to believe that it was a paper tiger. But to any Iraqi who was thinking of taking the risk of joining a U.S.-organized militia, or the new police force or turning in a Ba'athist guerilla, the message of the U.S. reversal is clear enough: The Americans are irresolute and can't be trusted to hang in for the long term. Or, as the Syrian dictator Hafez Assad said at the time of the Beirut disaster, "The Americans are short of breath." Furthermore, panic about Iraq is simply not warranted. Not only is the situation there not deteriorating at an alarming rate, most of the country is in fact remarkably stable and peaceful. Unfortunately, the parts where the occupation is working don't get visited by the media or, for that matter, by L. Paul Bremer. How many people know that the 1st Marine Division, which administered the vast South Central region (until handing it over to the Polish-led multinational division Wednesday), suffered not a single combat death since April 12? (This remarkable fact has gone entirely unreported despite the Marines' repeated attempts to get foreign journalists to make the two-hour journey from Baghdad to Babylon.) Then there's the little-known success story of the North (even outside Iraqi Kurdistan, which continues to be a beacon of stability and democratic hope). In Mosul and the area around it, the 101st Airborne has done a superb job (as reported by The New York Times' Michael Gordon, one of the few reporters willing to do more than file carping stories from the capital) of winning hearts and minds and getting the country back to work. This is not to say mistakes aren't still being made. The Coalition Provisional Authority is apparently almost as slow-moving and bureaucratic as a U.N. administration would be, and it continues, almost suicidally, to fumble the task of communicating with the Iraqi people. And new troops are still often being sent to Iraq without the kind of crowd-control, peacekeeping and policing training that was standard for GIs deployed to Kosovo and Bosnia. They're also not getting the right equipment, including suffient numbers of armored Humvees. Still, overall conditions don't warrant the handing over of either military or even civilian tasks to the United Nations. Especially as there is little reason to assume that the U.N. will do a better job of administration, constitution-framing or even humanitarian relief. After all, the last time the United Nations tried to set up a democracy in a devastated land in Cambodia the end result was the authoritarian Hun Sen regime. Iraqis neither want nor deserve such a government, but they rightly fear it could be the product of greater U.N. involvement in their country. Indeed, Kofi Annan's secretariat is actively consulting neighboring Arab states and pushing for their involvement in Iraqi political reconstruction, despite those countries' opposition to the Bush vision of a viable democratic state in Iraq, and even to the removal of Saddam Hussein. For that matter, it would be naive to expect any of the powers outside the present coalition to be on board when it comes to building a democratic Iraq. France, on whom the passage of a U.N. resolution depends, wants to see America fail out of spite. And Arab leaders are terrified of U.S. success in Iraq: The emergence of the Governing Council, more representative than any governing body in the entire region (except Israel), is worrying enough. Iraqis, Americans and their allies have already paid in blood for the hope of establishing a stable, democratic Iraq whose existence could revolutionize the Middle East. Achieving this hope is certain to be a difficult task, but to go back on it now would be a tragic waste. Worse still, the apparent admission of failure could have disastrous consequences in the Middle East and around the world. * U.S. PRESIDENT EXPANDS EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PROPERTY CONFISCATION. RFE/RL IRAQ REPORT, Vol. 6, No. 37, 5 September 2003 U.S. President George W. Bush expanded Executive Order 13303 (22 May 2003) on the confiscation of assets and property belonging to former Iraqi officials and their family members on 29 August, the U.S. State Department announced on the same day (http://www.state.gov). The executive order "broadens the scope of persons whose assets may be frozen under those orders by adding the immediate family members of former Iraqi senior officials." It also allows for the confiscation and vesting of some of the assets and "provides for the transfer of all vested assets to the Development Fund for Iraq." (Kathleen Ridolfo) http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/06/international/middleeast/06RUMS.html * RUMSFELD, ON IRAQ TOUR, CITES 'REMARKABLE PROGRESS' by Douglas Jehl New York Times, 6th September BAGHDAD, Iraq, Sept. 5 Hopping to Tikrit and Mosul and back to Baghdad today, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld urged American soldiers and their Iraqi allies to regard recent setbacks here as no more than temporary obstacles in the American-led effort to build a new, democratic Iraq. But even as he cheered on the American troops, there were new reports of violence and deaths. In northeast Baghdad early today, a gunman jumped out of a vehicle and opened fire on a crowd of worshipers leaving the dawn prayer service at a predominantly Sunni mosque in a predominantly Shiite neighborhood. Three people were wounded, one seriously. An American contractor announced today that one of its employees was fatally shot in Baghdad on Wednesday while driving in a convoy escorted by military personnel. In northern Iraq on Thursday night, a British bomb disposal expert with a mine-clearing charity was killed and an Iraqi who worked with him seriously injured when gunmen attacked their vehicle, which bore the charity's logo, near Mosul. Mr. Rumsfeld was in that vicinity today, flying low in a helicopter over the site of one notable success, the killing by American troops in July of Uday and Qusay Hussein, Saddam's sons, who had taken refuge in a house in Mosul. "You've helped to free some 23 million people," he told troops from the 101st Airborne Division there, "and that's an enormous accomplishment I don't think you'll ever forget." But he also spoke repeatedly of his concern that such triumphs were being overshadowed by attention to setbacks. including recent major bomb attacks, smaller roadside strikes aimed at American troops, and the failure of the United States to track down either Saddam Hussein or evidence of unconventional weapons that the administration cited as a main reason for going to war. In a videotaped address to the Iraqi people tonight, Mr. Rumsfeld spoke of "remarkable progress" in the four months since the United States declared an end to major combat operations, and promised that "snipers and car bombs will not dissuade us from our mission." Still, his visit was punctuated with reminders of work that remains undone and questions that remain unanswered. Maj. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of the Fourth Infantry Division, whose area of operation includes Mr. Hussein's birthplace, Tikrit, told reporters that he believed the former Iraqi leader was probably "moving constantly" within that region. "If he makes a mistake, we are going to be there, and that's what we're waiting for," he said. Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the top American military commander in Iraq, said tonight that the roadside bomb attacks were becoming "increasingly sophisticated" and appeared almost certainly to be the work of foreign fighters, possibly including members of the terrorist group Hezbollah, who brought their bomb-making expertise to Iraq from Syria, Lebanon and other countries. In posing questions to Mr. Rumsfeld at a gathering in Mosul, some soldiers from the 101st Airborne touched on issues that Mr. Rumsfeld seemed uncomfortable answering, including why the United States has not found evidence of illegal weapons program, and whether a decision had been made on what unit would relieve the division when its scheduled year in Iraq ends in February. Mr. Rumsfeld said that Army planners were still trying to resolve the troop rotation issue and that questions about illegal weapons were the purview of the Iraq Survey Group, headed by a former weapons inspector, David Kay. That group's focus has shifted from inspecting sites to interrogating former weapons scientists, Mr. Rumsfeld said, because "there isn't any way in a country this size to go out and find items that small." Ultimately, Mr. Rumsfeld said of Mr. Kay's group, "I have a feeling that they will continue to work the problem and over time produce the information that will respond to your question." Still, on Iraqi television, before the troops, and in a meeting in Mosul with the elected leaders of a local government, Mr. Rumsfeld called attention to the speed with which Iraq has moved under American leadership toward embracing representative government and private enterprise, which he called "a model to the entire region." In a meeting with reporters, L. Paul Bremer III, the top occupation official in Iraq, said that his Coalition Provisional Authority had already completed work on 6,000 different reconstruction projects. Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus of the 101st Airborne, the dominant political figure in northern Iraq, pointed to that record as having helped to nourish significant good will. "Nobody loves an occupying army," General Petraeus told troops when he appeared with Mr. Rumsfeld in Mosul. "But I think they love ours as much as any has been loved." General Petraeus's division has moved more quickly than any other American unit in training units of the new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, a force that now stands at about 2,300 but should reach 15,000 by the end of the year, Mr. Bremer said tonight, as part of an effort to speed up the deployment of the Iraqi police and other forces. Today's attack at the Qeepa mosque in the Al-Shab neighborhood was carried out by men in two vehicles, said Qusay Muhammad, one of the armed guards posted outside the mosque after the attack. A man with an AK-47 emerged from a sports utility vehicle and began spraying the crowd leaving the mosque, Mr. Muhammad said. The man then rushed back to the car while a gunman in the other car opened fire to cover his retreat. After the attack, Shiites from the neighborhood gathered at the mosque to show their support for the Sunnis, and Shiite clerics joined with Sunni clerics in calling for calm. In interviews, worshipers at the mosque and residents of the neighborhood attributed the attack to outsiders trying to instigate violence, and said that Sunnis and Shiites got along peacefully in the neighborhood. "No Shiite here would shoot at devout people at dawn prayers," said Mr. Muhammad. The employee of the American contractor, KBR, who was fatally shot on Wednesday while driving in a convoy escorted by military personnel was not identified. KBR is a subsidiary of Halliburton. A mine-clearing charity, the Mines Advisory Group, today identified the Briton killed on Thursday as Ian Rimell, 53, from Kidderminster and the wounded Iraqi as Salem Ahmed Muhammad. It said in a statement that the Iraqi employee was in critical condition. It was not known who had attacked the vehicle. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/08/international/worldspecial/08PREX.html?hp * BUSH SEEKS $87 BILLION AND U.N. AID FOR WAR EFFORT by Elisabeth Bumiller New York Times, 8th September WASHINGTON, Sept. 7 President Bush said tonight that he would ask Congress for $87 billion in emergency spending for military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that Iraq had now become "the central front" in the campaign against terrorism. In a nationally televised prime-time address, his first from the White House since he announced the bombing of Baghdad on March 19, Mr. Bush said defeating terrorists in Iraq "will take time, and require sacrifice," but he left open-ended how long United States troops would remain in Iraq and how much the conflict and occupation would ultimately cost. Advertisement "Yet we will do what is necessary, we will spend what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to promote freedom, and to make our own nation more secure," Mr. Bush said, speaking from the White House Cabinet Room in a straightforward, unemotional manner that lacked the drama of his major war speeches to the nation. The president also said he would ask the United Nations for additional international troops for Iraq. Mr. Bush spoke at a time when the White House has come under intense criticism from the Democratic presidential candidates for failing to present a clear plan of the administration's course in Iraq, and for not attracting major international help for the country's reconstruction. At the same time, polls show voters' support for Mr. Bush declining as Americans continue to die in Iraq and the country remains chaotic. Mr. Bush's request for $87 billion was on the high end of what Congress had expected. In recent days, administration officials have said they anticipated asking Congress for an additional $60 billion to $80 billion for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1. The financing, if approved by Congress, would significantly add to the federal government's deficit, which is approaching $500 billion. The president said that $66 billion of the $87 billion would be for military and intelligence operations over the next year in Iraq and Afghanistan "and elsewhere," and that the rest would be for reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, including restoring basic services like water and electricity. Mr. Bush did not say how the money would be apportioned between Iraq and Afghanistan, but the bulk of it was expected to go to Iraq. The $87 billion request for the next fiscal year would add to the amount that Congress approved in a $79 billion bill last spring to pay the war costs for the current fiscal year, which ends Sept. 30. Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said he expected his fellow Democrats to go along with the request, but not without pointing out the costs and tradeoffs that heavy military spending would present. "I personally think we have to do it, but I'm sure there's going to be an alliance of liberals and conservatives who want him to eat a little bit of crow here," he said in an interview after the speech tonight. "The conservatives are going to be very skittish, because this will bump the deficit to around $600 billion. And many of us are going to point out that we can't afford to do this war the right way and have these massive tax cuts become permanent." The president's message was that the money was justified to defeat terrorists who he said were making a desperate but calculated stand in the heart of the Middle East. "There is more at work in these attacks than blind rage," said Mr. Bush, who delivered his remarks below a painting of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. "The terrorists have a strategic goal. They want us to leave Iraq before our work is done. They want to shake the will of the civilized world." In his 18-minute speech, Mr. Bush did not mention Osama bin Laden, who has so far eluded American capture in Afghanistan. He also did not mention the failure so far to find any unconventional weapons in Iraq, the major stated reason that the United States went to war. Nor did Mr. Bush dwell on the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, which he once predicted would abate if Saddam Hussein was ousted from power in Iraq. That conflict has worsened. Tonight, Mr. Bush sought to tamp down the bad news with his most succinct outline to date of the White House goals for Iraq. "Our strategy in Iraq has three objectives: destroying the terrorists, enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq and helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own defense and their own future," Mr. Bush said. Mr. Bush's appeal for help from other countries was a recognition that the administration cannot unilaterally maintain its current level of 181,000 American troops in both Iraq and neighboring Kuwait. He said the United States would introduce a resolution in the Security Council encouraging Iraq's Governing Council to submit a plan and a timetable for drafting a new constitution, and for free elections. "From the outset, I have expressed confidence in the ability of the Iraqi people to govern themselves," Mr. Bush said. "Now they must rise to the responsibilities of a free people, and secure the blessings of their own liberty." The speech was Mr. Bush's first extended address about Iraq since he declared an end to major combat operations in a May 1 speech. He was more triumphal then, asserting that "the United States and our allies have prevailed." But 149 Americans have died in Iraq since then, compared with the 138 in the invasion itself. The United Nations headquarters in Baghdad was bombed last month, a low point in the United States' now five-month-old occupation. Tonight, Mr. Bush sought to wrest back control of the debate as the White House seeks money and support for the war from Congress and the United Nations, and as he enters the first phase of his re-election campaign. Much of Mr. Bush's speech served as an update of how he saw the events in Iraq and represented his most detailed remarks so far about the country's recent chaos. He drew a distinction between what he said was the relative calm in the north and south of the country and the violence around Baghdad. "The attacks you have heard and read about in the last few weeks have occurred predominately in the central region of Iraq, between Baghdad and Tikrit Saddam Hussein's former stronghold," Mr. Bush said. But the president was vague about who was attacking American troops. He called the assailants "a collection of killers," some of whom, he said, were former members of Mr. Hussein's regime. Others he identified only as "foreign terrorists, who have come to Iraq to pursue their war on America and other free nations." Mr. Bush added: "We cannot be certain to what extent these groups work together. We do know they have a common goal, reclaiming Iraq for tyranny." Howard Dean, the former governor of Vermont whose campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination has caught fire largely because of his opposition to the war in Iraq, called the speech "outrageous," and said Mr. Bush was "beginning to remind me of what was happening with Lyndon Johnson and Dick Nixon during the Vietnam War." Asked to explain the analogy to Vietnam, Dr. Dean said: "The government begins to feed misinformation to the American people in order to justify an enormous commitment of American troops, which turned out to be a tremendous mistake." Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat and presidential candidate, said that Mr. Bush was refusing to face more important priorities at home. "He's talking about spending $87 billion in Afghanistan and Iraq," Mr. Graham said tonight on the CNN program "Larry King Live." "That's more than the federal government will spend on education this year." Mr. Bush never once used the word occupation in his remarks, and several times emphasized that the ultimate American goal in Iraq was to turn the country back to Iraqis. "Our coalition came to Iraq as liberators and we will depart as liberators," Mr. Bush said. He also spoke of two conferences for potential donor nations, one for Iraq this month and one for Afghanistan in October, that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell is to attend. Tonight, he asked some of those nations to help with reconstruction. "Europe, Japan and states in the Middle East all will benefit from the success of freedom in these two countries, and they should contribute to that success," he said. At the same time, Mr. Bush was blunt about what he called the "duty" of other countries to assist militarily. "I recognize that not all our friends agreed with our decision to enforce the Security Council resolutions and remove Saddam Hussein from power," he said. "Yet we cannot let past differences interfere with present duties." Members of the United Nations, the president said, "now have an opportunity, and the responsibility, to assume a broader role in assuring that Iraq becomes a free and democratic nation." A theme of the address was Sept. 11, which Mr. Bush employed as a warning of what must never happen again, and a reason, he said, to stay the course in Iraq. "For America, there will be no going back to the era before September the 11th, 2001, to false comfort in a dangerous world," he said. "We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength. They are invited by the perception of weakness." The "surest way" to avoid attacks on Americans, Mr. Bush said, "is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans" so that "we do not meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities." http://abcnews.go.com/wire/Politics/ap20030909_84.html * DEMS DEMAND DETAILS OF IRAQ OPERATIONS ABC News from The Associated Press, 9th September WASHINGTON Sept. 9: Congressional Democrats' support for President Bush's $87 billion request comes with a price: They want him to spell out details of his overall Iraq strategy. For months, many Democrats and some Republicans have complained that the Bush administration has offered few details about how it will rebuild Iraq, how much international support can be expected, how much American taxpayers will have to pay over the years and how long U.S. troops will be based there. Sen. Ted Kennedy, D-Mass., said he will offer an amendment to the Iraq spending bill that would bar money for relief and reconstruction until Bush officially reports to Congress on his Iraq strategy. "The president owes our troops and their families a plan before we give the administration a blank check," Kennedy said in a written statement. A Republican senator, Sen. Jon Kyl of Arizona, said he was confident the administration would provide the details. "I don't think we have to ask for it. I think they understand they need to provide it," he said. Senators are likely to seek answers about the administration's Iraq plans Tuesday as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appear before the Armed Services Committee. In a televised address Sunday, Bush said he would ask Congress for $87 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan in addition to the $79 billion that Congress approved in April. Bush said the money is needed to stop terrorists before they can strike again in the United States. Republicans, who control the House and Senate, praised Bush's speech and offered support for the plan. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., said the proposal "warrants the support of Congress." And House Appropriations Committee Chairman Bill Young, R-Fla., whose panel will help write Congress' version, said he would "aggressively expedite the president's request." Democrats will be hard-pressed to deny Bush the money he says is needed for U.S. soldiers. "We obviously want to support our troops. That, I think, is a given," said Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, the top Democrat on the Armed Services Committee. They are already using the money request to argue that the administration didn't plan adequately for the war's aftermath, was overly optimistic about Iraqi and international cooperation and foolishly pushed through tax cuts even as the war aggravated a growing deficit. On the Senate floor, Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, said there isn't enough money to meet Bush's own education goals, "and yet we're going to ask the American taxpayers to keep coughing up money for this quagmire that we're in now in Iraq." "This may not be Vietnam, but boy, it sure smells like it," he said. "And every time I see these bills coming down for the money, it's costing like Vietnam, too." Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, is demanding that tax cuts for the wealthiest taxpayers be postponed a proposal likely to face strong Republican opposition. "Is this still a sacrificeless undertaking except those we send to Iraq?" he said in an interview. "Or is there actually something that Americans are going to be asked to do?" Some lawmakers also said the $20 billion for Iraqi reconstruction would receive particular scrutiny. Levin said that money would be wasted if the Bush administration doesn't make a serious effort to secure help from other nations. Administration officials say they want international participation, but it's not clear how much authority they are willing to cede in Iraq to secure it. "If we don't get other countries involved, if we don't make a serious effort in the U.N., which other countries say is essential for their participation, then it increases the chances that the reconstruction money will be ineffective," he said. Rep. John Spratt of South Carolina, top Democrat on the Budget Committee, said the $20 billion is well short of the estimated $50 billion to $75 billion needed for reconstruction. "It is unrealistic now to think that our motley coalition will come up with $50 billion, and even more dubious that our allies in Europe and Japan will do so," he said. _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss To contact the list manager, email firstname.lastname@example.org All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk