The following is an archived copy of a message sent to a Discussion List run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
Views expressed in this archived message are those of the author, not of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
[Main archive index/search] [List information] [Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]
Author: Nathaniel Hurd, Consultant on UN Iraq policy Document: Informal summary of primary components in latest draft Security Council resolution Date: 20 May 2003 The latest draft Security Council resolution (SCR) contains some cosmetic changes. But the core elements from the previous drafts remain. Below find a brief identification of some key retained components. The identification is not intended to be comprehensive. For the 15 May draft see http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0515reviseddraft.htm For the 9 May draft see http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0509postwardraft.htm For further reading see: David Cortright, Linda Gerber, Alistair Millar, and George A. Lopez, "End Game? Removing Sanctions in Iraq", 20 May 2003, http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/0305_19_lift_sanctions4.pdf and http://www.fourthfreedom.org/php/t-si-index.php?hinc=EndGame051903.hinc Open Society Institute - Washington, DC, "OSI Recommends Changes to Security Council Resolution on Iraq", 18 May 2003, http://www.soros.org/dc/un_resolution.htm Amnesty International, " Iraq: Responsibilities of the occupying powers", 16 April 2003, MDE 14/089/2003, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde140892003 DRAFT SOURCE: Spain, UK, US, draft Security Council resolution, S/2003, 556, 19 May 2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0619draft.pdf Key: PP - Preambulary Paragraph OP - Operative Paragraph I. The Occupying Powers Would Fully Control Iraqi Petroleum Revenue, Including How It is Spent. A) Following the SCR adoption, all newly generated Iraqi petroleum revenue would be deposited in a fund, (OP 20) tentatively named the "Development Fund for Iraq" (hereafter "the Fund"). In practice, Iraqi petroleum revenue would become Fund money. 1) The Fund money would ostensibly be used "to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq". (OP 14) It remains to be seen whether the Occupying Powers will later argue "other purposes" include continued Occupation. There is no reference to a potential, reasonably independent and credible (e.g., a UN intra-agency) humanitarian and economic needs assessment, upon which expenditure decision-making might be based. The SCR also fails to give examples of that for which the Fund money might not be used. B) $1 billion in currently unencumbered escrow account funds would be transferred into the Fund. (OP 17) C) The "Authority" (the Occupying Powers) (PP 13), would have complete power over Iraqi petroleum revenue expenditures. "[T]he funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority". (OP 13) II. There Would Be No Robust Mechanism for Monitoring and Constraining Occupying Power Decisions Regarding Petroleum Revenue Expenditures, or Ensuring Expenditure Transparency. A) The SCR proposes an "International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq" (hereafter "the Board"). (OP 12) 1) The SCR proposes Board representatives from the IMF. IMF capital comes from member states. The amount of capital contributions determines the number of IMF votes accorded to an IMF member state, like a company shareholder system. Because the US contributes the most capital, it has the most IMF votes and thus great sway over IMF decision-making. 2) The SCR proposes Board representatives from the World Bank. World Bank capital comes from member states. The amount of capital contributions determines the number of World Bank votes accorded to a World Bank member state, like a company shareholder system. Because the US contributes the most capital, it has the most World Bank votes and thus great sway over World Bank decision-making. 3) The Board will approve (there is no language regarding selection) independent public accountants to audit the Fund. (OP 12) The accountants will audit the sale of Iraqi petroleum. (OP 20) But there is no language to suggest auditing includes checking to ensure Fund money is spent for the purposes approved for purposes included in OP 14. There is no language to suggest auditing includes verifying Fund money is not spent for purposes unauthorized by (or at least weakly based on) OP 14. There is no language to suggest auditing includes verifying expenditure decisions are made apolitically and based on the needs of Iraqi civilian and Iraq's economy (including public service delivery and infrastructure rehabilitation). OP 14 states the Security Council "underlines that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner…" Board responsibilities do not explicitly include actually ensuring transparency. 4) The Board has no formal recourse if by some means it determines Fund money is being spent for unauthorized purposes, in a non-transparent fashion, inconsistently with credibly and independently determined Iraqi civilian and economic needs, etc. It has no power to constrain Occupying Power spending decisions, either before or after a spending decision is implemented. III. The UN Has No Power Over Occupying Power Decisions. A) The UN Secretary-General will have representatives on the Board. For the Board's powerlessness, see section II. B) The SCR "Requests the Secretary -General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq". (OP 8) This Representative would have specific coordinating and reporting duties, (OP 8 and OP 9) including coordinating with the Occupying Powers. But the Representative would have no formal constraining leverage over the Occupying Powers. C) In detailing the Representative's job description, the SCR lists several areas where the UN would be involved. (OP 8 and OP 9) There is language in which the UN is assigned to work, by "coordinating", "promoting", "working with", "facilitating", and "encouraging". But at no point does the UN's power supercede that of the Occupying Powers. There is no on-paper, structural recourse if a relevant UN entity, be it the Secretariat, the Special Representative, the Security Council or a UN agency, objects to Occupying Power decision-making regarding Iraqi petroleum revenue expenditures, political reconstruction, or any other matter. This SCR seems to be an effort to significantly increase UN involvement, while keeping the UN effectively toothless. Ironically, the SCR "Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the work of the Special Representative with respect to the implementation of this resolution" (OP 24), but fails to explicitly and directly request the Secretary-General to report on Occupying Power actions per say. Instead, it "invites the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America periodically to inform the Council of their efforts under this resolution". (OP 24) Nathaniel Hurd Consultant on United Nations Iraq policy Tel. (Mobile): 917-407-3389 Fax: 718-504-4224 E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org 777 United Nations Plaza Suite 7A New York, NY 10017 _________________________________________________________________ The new MSN 8: advanced junk mail protection and 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss To contact the list manager, email email@example.com All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk