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[casi] Informal Comments on Latest SCR Draft - Core Elements Remain (Nathaniel Hurd)



Author: Nathaniel Hurd, Consultant on UN Iraq policy
Document: Informal summary of primary components in latest draft Security
Council resolution
Date: 20 May 2003

The latest draft Security Council resolution (SCR) contains some cosmetic
changes.  But the core elements from the previous drafts remain.  Below find
a brief identification of some key retained components.  The identification
is not intended to be comprehensive.

For the 15 May draft see
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0515reviseddraft.htm

For the 9 May draft see
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0509postwardraft.htm

For further reading see:

David Cortright, Linda Gerber, Alistair Millar, and George A. Lopez, "End
Game? Removing Sanctions in Iraq", 20 May 2003,
http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/0305_19_lift_sanctions4.pdf and
http://www.fourthfreedom.org/php/t-si-index.php?hinc=EndGame051903.hinc

Open Society Institute - Washington, DC, "OSI Recommends Changes to Security
Council Resolution on Iraq", 18 May 2003,
http://www.soros.org/dc/un_resolution.htm

Amnesty International, " Iraq: Responsibilities of the occupying
powers", 16 April 2003, MDE 14/089/2003,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde140892003

DRAFT SOURCE: Spain, UK, US, draft Security Council resolution, S/2003, 556,
19 May 2003,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0619draft.pdf

Key:
PP - Preambulary Paragraph
OP - Operative Paragraph

I. The Occupying Powers Would Fully Control Iraqi Petroleum Revenue,
Including How It is Spent.

A) Following the SCR adoption, all newly generated Iraqi petroleum revenue
would be deposited in a fund, (OP 20) tentatively named the "Development
Fund for Iraq" (hereafter "the Fund").  In practice, Iraqi petroleum revenue
would become Fund money.
1) The Fund money would ostensibly be used "to meet the humanitarian needs
of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's
infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of
Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people
of Iraq". (OP 14) It remains to be seen whether the Occupying Powers will
later argue "other purposes" include continued Occupation.  There is no
reference to a potential, reasonably independent and credible (e.g., a UN
intra-agency) humanitarian and economic needs assessment, upon which
expenditure decision-making might be based.  The SCR also fails to give
examples of that for which the Fund money might not be used.

B) $1 billion in currently unencumbered escrow account funds would be
transferred into the Fund. (OP 17)

C) The "Authority" (the Occupying Powers) (PP 13), would have complete power
over Iraqi petroleum revenue expenditures.  "[T]he funds in the Development
Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority". (OP 13)

II. There Would Be No Robust Mechanism for Monitoring and Constraining
Occupying Power Decisions Regarding Petroleum Revenue Expenditures, or
Ensuring Expenditure Transparency.

A) The SCR proposes an "International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the
Development Fund for Iraq" (hereafter "the Board"). (OP 12)
1) The SCR proposes Board representatives from the IMF.  IMF capital comes
from member states.  The amount of capital contributions determines the
number of IMF votes accorded to an IMF member state, like a company
shareholder system.  Because the US contributes the most capital, it has the
most IMF votes and thus great sway over IMF decision-making.
2) The SCR proposes Board representatives from the World Bank.  World Bank
capital comes from member states.  The amount of capital contributions
determines the number of World Bank votes accorded to a World Bank member
state, like a company shareholder system.  Because the US contributes the
most capital, it has the most World Bank votes and thus great sway over
World Bank decision-making.
3) The Board will approve (there is no language regarding selection)
independent public accountants to audit the Fund. (OP 12)  The accountants
will audit the sale of Iraqi petroleum. (OP 20)  But there is no language to
suggest auditing includes checking to ensure Fund money is spent for the
purposes approved for purposes included in OP 14.  There is no language to
suggest auditing includes verifying Fund money is not spent for purposes
unauthorized by (or at least weakly based on) OP 14.  There is no language
to suggest auditing includes verifying expenditure decisions are made
apolitically and based on the needs of Iraqi civilian and Iraq's economy
(including public service delivery and infrastructure rehabilitation).  OP
14 states the Security Council "underlines that the Development Fund for
Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner…"  Board responsibilities do not
explicitly include actually ensuring transparency.
4) The Board has no formal recourse if by some means it determines Fund
money is being spent for unauthorized purposes, in a non-transparent
fashion, inconsistently with credibly and independently determined Iraqi
civilian and economic needs, etc.  It has no power to constrain Occupying
Power spending decisions, either before or after a spending decision is
implemented.

III. The UN Has No Power Over Occupying Power Decisions.

A) The UN Secretary-General will have representatives on the Board.  For the
Board's powerlessness, see section II.

B) The SCR "Requests the Secretary -General to appoint a Special
Representative for Iraq". (OP 8)  This Representative would have specific
coordinating and reporting duties,  (OP 8 and OP 9) including coordinating
with the Occupying Powers.  But the Representative would have no formal
constraining leverage over the Occupying Powers.

C) In detailing the Representative's job description, the SCR lists several
areas where the UN would be involved. (OP 8 and OP 9)  There is language in
which the UN is assigned to work, by "coordinating", "promoting", "working
with", "facilitating", and "encouraging".  But at no point does the UN's
power supercede that of the Occupying Powers.  There is no on-paper,
structural recourse if a relevant UN entity, be it the Secretariat, the
Special Representative, the Security Council or a UN agency, objects to
Occupying Power decision-making regarding Iraqi petroleum revenue
expenditures, political reconstruction, or any other matter.  This SCR seems
to be an effort to significantly increase UN involvement, while keeping the
UN effectively toothless.  Ironically, the SCR "Requests the
Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the work
of the Special Representative with respect to the implementation of this
resolution" (OP 24), but fails to explicitly and directly request the
Secretary-General to report on Occupying Power actions per say.  Instead, it
"invites the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America periodically to inform the Council of their efforts
under this resolution". (OP 24)

Nathaniel Hurd
Consultant on United Nations Iraq policy
Tel. (Mobile): 917-407-3389
Fax: 718-504-4224
E-mail: nathaniel_hurd@hotmail.com
777 United Nations Plaza
Suite 7A
New York, NY  10017

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