[casi] Protecting Iraq's Heritage

["ppg" <ppg@DELETETHISnyc.rr.com>]

State Department press briefing, April 5. What went so completely wrong?
Who changed the orders?
Is this an example of US State policy (Powell) being overridden by Pentagon
policy (Rumsfeld)?    pg


http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/text2003/0406cultural.htm
05 April 2003
Military Planning Includes Protecting Iraq's Cultural, Religious Heritage

Army Civil Affairs officer describes measures

The U.S. military has integrated measures to identify and protect sites of
religious, cultural, and historical importance in Iraq into every phase of
its planning and operation, according to U.S. Army civil affairs officers
who briefed reporters in Kuwait on April 5.

Protection of cultural and religious sites is part of high-level planning,
all the way down to unit cultural affairs officers who implement the
measures to protect such sites, said Major Christopher Varhola, a civil
affairs reservist who is a cultural anthropologist.

Iraq's religious and cultural heritage is priceless, Varhola said. "It's
beyond rating."

Varhola said that he is in constant contact with the archeological and
anthropological communities to gain assistance and insight. With this
information, "We refine target lists and adjust military plans to
incorporate cultural and archaeological considerations," Varhola said. As an
example, he cited the great care with which the military has operated near
Mosque of Ali in Najaf.

Damage from bombs are only one threat to religious and cultural sites,
Varhola pointed out. Military construction and the threat of looting are
also concerns that the military tries to address in its planning.

"The U.S. military is eager to coordinate with any organization dedicated to
the task of preservation, which transcends military and operational
necessity," Varhola said.

By contrast, the regime of Saddam Hussein has demonstrated an utter
disregard for protecting Iraq's heritage, according to Lieutenant Colonel
John Kuttas. "Obviously we are aware that they will use schools, and mosques
and hospitals and museums. Our biggest concern is that someone will take
advantage of our cultural sensitivity and try to use that as a weapon."

Varhola recalled how, in the 1991 Gulf War, coalition forces refrained from
attacking combat aircraft parked in the vicinity of the ancient city of Ur.

When asked about his assessment of the value of the cultural and religious
sites in Iraq, Varhola said, "It is absolutely priceless. From the smallest
excavation from a tiny, tiny village which lead to agricultural patterns
started thousands of years ago to whole social structures. And we aren't
just concerned with ancient Mesopotamia structures but also those from the
Golden Age of Islam, the 800's, 900's up until the medieval period. There
are a number of priceless structures as well. I can emphasize this all day.
It's beyond rating."

Following is the transcript of a U.S. Army civil affairs briefing on
protection of Iraq's cultural and religious heritage, held in Kuwait on
April 5:


Coalition Press Information Center
News Briefing
State of Kuwait
April 5, 2003
The Protection of Cultural and Religions Sites in Iraq
By U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officers, Lieutenant Colonel John Kuttas and
Major Christopher Varhola

Major VarholA: I am a Major in the United States Army, a civil affairs
reservist, and a cultural anthropologist. I first became acquainted with the
complex nature of this situation in Iraq concerning arts and monuments when
I was a tank platoon leader in 1991 with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Our fighting positions were in and around Nasiriyah, which is also in and
around the vicinity of the ancient city of Ur. I personally observed how
Iraqi jets were parked around the ziggurat, obviously so we would not hit
the jets. I personally observed how the Iraqi military forces moved jet
fighters from the nearby Talil airbase to the immediate proximity of the
great ziggurat, which dates to approximately 2000 BC.

This was purposely done because the Iraqi military knows that we take
extreme measures to protect cultural, religious, and archaeological sites.
This is something that I firmly believe in, and that members of the U.S.
military firmly believe in. This is also in accordance with the 4th Geneva
Convention, as well as with common decency and respect.

In the case of Ur in 1991, for instance, our assessment was that the
long-term damage to world culture was clearly not worth the short-term
military gains that would have been made by destroying the Iraqi jets. As a
result the Iraqi jets were not hit. They were later towed away, when we took
that area, and towed away by tractors and then blown up in place. Our
missiles and our jets intentionally let those jets survive because we did
not want to hit that ziggurat.

That's how I became acquainted with the need for the protection of
monuments, particularly in Iraq, which has literally tens of thousands of
known archaeological sites -- not just the big, known ones, but also many
smaller ones, some dating back more than 10,000 years.

We're here to talk about historical protection and the institutional
measures by which the U.S. Army is taking steps to protect historical sites.
Concerning archaeological preservation, there are multiple levels. At the
highest level, as you may know, Pentagon planners have worked closely with
members of the academic community to identify, not only locations of
concern, but also to identify the kinds of military activity that might
adversely affect these areas.

More than just bombing can cause damage. Digging ditches, in southern Iraq
for instance, or erecting earthworks, can damage the multiple soil layers
that show the temporal and social context of a given site, so critical to
understanding the longer-term cultural and archaeological significance of
the site.

High-level planning is only one part of the equation, obviously. All
high-level planning is useless if there is not a way to get the plans down
to the combat soldiers. Part of what we want to stress here is that there
are institutional mechanisms by which information is diffused to the combat
soldiers on the ground. One mechanism for that is integrating targeting
information, which Lieutenant Colonel Kuttas will talk to you about.

On the tactical level, Army civil affairs assets work closely with ground
commanders to advise them of archaeological and cultural sites in their
areas of operation. The institutional mechanism for this is the cultural
affairs officer. This is an actual position in civil affairs, the cultural
affairs officer, whose responsibility is to do the research, on his own and
with higher headquarters, so that he is aware or she is aware of the targets
that need to be protected. The institutional mechanism is the cultural
affairs officer present in the civil affairs units.

A key point of civil affairs is that we are predominantly Reservists. As
such, we capitalize on the civilian career fields of soldiers and on
translate these skills in support of military operations -- in the case of
protected targets, for instance.

I'm a cultural anthropologist. I am not an archaeologist; but, prior to
deployment, and via e-mail now, I am in constant contact with members of the
archaeological and anthropological communities in order to gain their
assistance and insights with refining target lists. The target lists that
Lieutenant Colonel Kuttas will talk about are really big documents, which
are constantly refined. We refine target lists and adjust military plans to
incorporate cultural and archaeological considerations.

In the cases of both Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, I work closely with
anthropologists and archaeologists from Catholic University, George
Washington University, and the University of Chicago. I worked with many of
them on our Afghanistan operations, as we put together lists that were
incorporated into our overall scope of operation there for protected
targets.

A couple of key points to mention here: how the U.S. Army respects
archaeological and cultural sites and how the Iraqi military uses these same
sites for protection. Consider the recent activities in and around the
Mosque of Ali in Najaf. I cannot speak for the ground commanders, but I can
assure you that, because of civil affairs soldiers, the ground commanders
are aware of the importance of preserving sites and of not letting
short-term military necessity override that importance.

Another concern is looting -- especially in the absence of law and order and
the economic uncertainty that is inherent to any military operation of this
magnitude. All around Iraq, there are a number of museums, in particularly
the National Museum of Baghdad, that hold priceless materials. The U.S.
Military is eager to coordinate with any organization dedicated to the task
of preservation, which transcends military and operational necessity.

As far as key organizations, we do not usually comment on which
organizations we work with, but I will say that UNESCO is an important one.
The Swedish "Cultural Heritage Without Borders" is another one that has the
same mandate. I am not saying that we are working with these people now, but
we might well deal with them.

Lt. Col. Kuttas: I am going to take the piece out of the middle, and try to
explain how we protect the cultural heritage of Iraq. We do all we can to
prevent unnecessary damage. We only target what is a military necessity. We
draw on a wide variety sources to ensure that we don't cause any unnecessary
damage. We always insist on positive identification. We do not shoot into
the dark. We make sure that we know what's out there with our powers of
observation so we know what's on the ground.

I'm not a cultural anthropologist, just a cannoneer; but we use all the
information that people like Chris give us. We put it in our manual of
operations to make sure our targeting information is extremely accurate and
constantly updated. People all the way up the chain have this information.
It's a field document that is refined continually, and it really does
reflect our general sensitivity and respect for culture.

We've seen Saddam Hussein's thugs taking advantage of our respect for their
culture and hiding in mosques. It doesn't work for him, but it's not
something you're going to see us doing. In the event that we do have a
situation, such as aircraft parked alongside a site, or snipers in a
minaret, the coalition response is going to be measured; it's going to be
proportional. If we do have to take action, it is only going to be if there
is a military necessity and with full respect and understanding of the
cultural and social implications of what we are doing.

Q:(CBS Radio) What are your particular concerns as troops move into Baghdad
as far as preserving what is there?

A: We are probably more concerned about the actions the Iraqis may take --
that Saddam Hussein and his thugs might do -- and how he might take
advantage of our respect. We're seeing constantly hospitals used for
military actions and schools being turned into barracks. That's a major
concern for us. Obviously we are aware that they will use schools, and
mosques and hospitals and museums. Our biggest concern is that someone will
take advantage of our cultural sensitivity and try to use that as a weapon.

Q:What buildings have you helped preserve in Nasiriyah?

A: I'm not going to answer that. It's operational and I really can't tell
you where we have drawn the lines for a no-fire zone because they will
become points for the regime's death squads. But I can tell you that it is a
fairly extensive list that has been vetted by not just people like me.

Q:You paint a very rosy picture. But what can you say about the extensive
damage done to Saddam Hussein's palaces?

A: I'm not going to comment on things on the ground where we have control.
We are trying to bring down this regime and if this regime chooses to
position itself in front of monuments and artifacts, it's a real problem.
But I can't comment on Najaf because I haven't been there.

Q:Have you done any counter assessment? Are you planning any remodeling?

A: We have not received a comprehensive assessment. There will be Civil
Affairs people with all units and the assessment survey will be forthcoming.
As far as reconstruction and renovation, we don't do that. We are focusing
on mitigating military damage. That's our focus. Renovation is a sensitive
issue but that will be something for the Iraqis to undertake with their
academics and experts, perhaps with the international community of
archeologists and academics. The ideal though is to end the hostilities with
as much as possible intact.

Q:Can you explain the process of how you decide what to put on the list?

Everyone has the information up the chain. Obviously when you are on the
ground you need to know this. The information systems work in our favor in
this respect. Now obviously we don't expect our soldiers to die while they
wait for an answer. The commander in the field is going to make the final
call and analysis whether he wants to put his soldiers at risk. However, he
also understands what is at stake. He's got a bigger picture than the next
two minutes. We haven't seen too much of this so far. Afghanistan was
probably a better example. And as a result of this kind of information other
options were used to bring about the outcome.

Q:You have good intentions but how can you prevent things from happening?

A: Yes. We have a process and it's worked on continually. It's not something
we just put on a shelf. It's not just me doing it but hundreds of people up
and down the chain from a cannoneer up to full colonels. This is a continual
process. It's not a one-shot deal. It's not perfect but if I knew a way to
do it better, we would be doing it.

Q:Have there been disagreements between field captains and higher-ups?

A: I can't really comment on that. In the final analysis it doesn't come up
very often.

Q:Weren't American soldiers trying to going into shrines in Najaf?

A: We don't comment what is on or not on the target list but it is a fairly
safe assumption that tombs of Hussein and tomb and mosque of Ali are very,
very near the top. And general orders prohibit soldiers from going into
mosques.

There are rare exceptions where if we have Muslim soldiers they can
coordinate with the locals for worship purposes but our soldiers do not go
into mosques. And again, without saying what is or is not on the target
list, it's a pretty safe assumption that we recognize the importance of
those shrines and you will not see American soldiers going in there despite
the reports that there have been hostile Iraqi operating out of those
mosques. It's a very tricky situation, which is why we want to address it.
But let me just stress that we hold the mosque of Hussein in very, very high
regard. And we recognize how important they are. I cannot stress that
enough.

Q:Do you have an indication of number of sensitive sites?

A: Thousands. An unprecedented amount.

Q:Where do you rate Iraq in terms of its archeological treasures?

A: Priceless. It's the cradle of civilization. The source of so much that we
owe our culture to. It is absolutely priceless. From the smallest excavation
from a tiny, tiny village which lead to agricultural patterns started
thousands of years ago to whole social structures. And we aren't just
concerned with ancient Mesopotamia structures but also those from the Golden
Age of Islam, the 800's, 900's up until the medieval period. There are a
number of priceless structures as well. I can emphasize this all day. It's
beyond rating.



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