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[casi] Key issues for UN uranium testing in Iraq




Dear CASI network

This is an extract from my response to UN studies proposed for Iraq on 6
April, plus some explanations for people not familiar with recent uranium
weapons investigations.  The full paper (6 pages + latest UNEP press
releases) is available on my website at
http://www.eoslifework.co.uk/pdfs/UNiraqissues.pdf
yours in friendship

Dai Williams
Eos, Surrey, UK
eosuk@btinternet.com



Key issues for UN uranium testing in Iraq
-----------------------------------------
Implications of UNEP recommendations for Depleted Uranium studies in Iraq
Dai Williams, 10 April 2003

Summary
On 6 April the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) recommended
studies into the use of Depleted Uranium weapons in Iraq. See UNEP Press
Release in Appendix 1. Their Post Conflict Assessment Unit (PCAU) started
planning this Iraq project on 21 March, see earlier Press Release in
Appendix 2.
My worst case scenario is that coalition forces may have used up to 2000
tons of uranium weapons - several times more than in 1991.  Fast, accurate
UNEP assessments of uranium contamination are essential.

But UN proposals for Uranium testing in Iraq raise a number of key issues if
they are to be more rigorous than recent UNEP studies of Depleted Uranium in
the Balkans. 5 conditions are essential if the proposed UNEP studies are to
protect the people of Iraq:

a) uranium testing must start without delay especially in urban areas
b) targets must include known and suspected uranium weapons
c) analysis must include all types of Uranium, depleted and undepleted
d) the project will require powerful international support
e) airborne radiation monitoring is required throughout the Gulf region.

In addition the World Health Organisation (WHO) needs to start an urgent
investigation into levels of uranium contamination for sick and healthy
people in Iraqi communities, including troops and civilian casualties and
victims of any new epidemics for several years. Most of the Iraqi population
is at risk so studies will need NGO support. Parallel studies by UNEP and
WHO are required in Afghanistan for the health effects of similar weapons.
Like previous UN studies these projects are vulnerable. They are liable to
be compromised by military, political and commercial interests to conceal
the proliferation, use and health effects of Uranium weapons. They will need
massive support from UN member states, from medical and other scientific
organisations and from the international media.

===

The full paper is at at http://www.eoslifework.co.uk/pdfs/UNiraqissues.pdf
The UNEP press releases it responds to are:

UNEP press release 2003 18,Monday, April 07, 2003 7:41 AM
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=309&ArticleID=3952
UNEP Recommends Studies of Depleted Uranium in Iraq
Amman/Nairobi, 6 April 2003. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
is recommending that a scientific assessment of sites targeted with weapons
containing depleted uranium (DU) be conducted in Iraq as soon as conditions
permit.<more>

UNEP Press Release 2003 15, http://postconflict.unep.ch/high2.htm
UNEP's Post-Conflict Assessment Unit Initiates Study of Environment in Iraq
Nairobi/Geneva, 21 March 2003 - The United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) today announced that its Post Conflict Assessment Unit (PCAU) has
initiated a desk study of the environment in Iraq. <more>

==

I question serious limitations of previous UNEP and WHO reports apparently
due to direct and indirect subversion by NATO or equivalent agencies.  But I
do so to highlight the need for international action to support UNEP and WHO
in the fastest and most rigorous studies they have ever conducted.

Both organisations can move fast.  But WHO has been held back from offering
vital DU assessments to Iraqi civilians for several years.  Now the Shock
and Awe campaign may have added 5-10 times more uranium contamination than
was acknowledged in 1991.  Every day of cumulative uranium exposure in
contaminated areas increases the risks of irreversible internal radiation
damage.  Those in authority who have trivialised these risks may wish to
reconsider their risk assessment principles.  Recent investigations by ECRR,
UMRC and Professor Schott, plus weapons data located by DU network contacts
are relevant.

Hundreds of thousands of lives - Iraqi citizens, and expatriate troops and
civilians - may depend on the ability of UNEP and WHO with IAEA assistance
to launch large scale assessments of low level radiation contamination to
the highest safety standards WITHOUT interference.

Few people understand the danger of radiological weapons.  I appeal to all
veterans groups, DU researchers and other humanitarian organisations to
publicise and support these UN studies, with whatever warnings and
encouragement you think appropriate.

This is not the time for blame or disagreements.  The stakes are far too
high.  A major radiation incident has occurred in Iraq - or rather a
collection of thousands of individual radiation releases from each uranium
weapon that has been used, from 120 grams to 1500 kilograms or more.

Depending on the quantity of uranium contamination released the number of
severely disabled victims and fatalities in this conflict may be several
times higher from radiation damage than from all conventional blast and
shrapnel injuries.  Our world community through the UN now faces the grim
task of quantifying this additional dimension to the humanitarian disaster
in Iraq.  The US and UK governments and military may help or hinder.  This
choice and the ultimate responsibility is theirs.

It is probably too late to help people exposed to severe uranium
contamination near to targets e.g. children playing on burned out tanks, or
people exposed to uranium explosion plumes.  Imagine them smothered in dust
clouds like 9-11 survivors, except the dust is poisonous and radioactive.

If the UN can act fast enough to identify contaminated target areas and
concentrations of airborne radioactive particles it may be possible to
minimise cumulative radiation exposures.

The lack of response from politicians, the media and the UN to these
warnings since before the Afghan war is desperately frustrating.  It may
have cost hundreds or thousands of lives in Afghanistan and more soon in
Iraq.  Be patient (DU researchers have awesome stamina) - they need the best
facts we can offer, and cheerful encouragement to use them despite
harassment or other severe risks to their work or careers.

We need more evidence about the weapons that have been used - types,
numbers, locations, target effects and pictures from recognised sources.
Reports of unusual weapons e.g. deep craters, split warheads, intense heat,
carbonised casualties, dense black smoke, fire in smoke plumes etc.  Reports
of any unusual injuries, health problems, fatalities or epidemics may also
give vital clues to the use of radiological or other weapons of
indiscriminate effect.   Dates and locations are important and may assist in
directing UNEP and WHO field testing.

The truth about uranium weapons developed over the last 15 years will be
known sooner or later.  The ones used in Iraq in the last 3 weeks present
the highest risk right now.  Let's find them as fast as we can, and track
their use back to Afghanistan too.  Community health conditions in
Afghanistan over the next 10 years will warn WHO and the people of Iraq of
the post-conflict health problems they may face 18 months later.
I hope my suspicions prove totally wrong.  But until then we can leave no
stone unturned to identify the existence and hazards of uranium weapons.

Dai Williams
Eos, Surrey, UK
eosuk@btinternet.com



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