Re: [casi] RE: Iraqi Oil & US State Department future of Iraq plans- question?

[Marc Azar <marca@DELETETHISarobas.net>]

[ Converted text/html to text/plain ]

Rania Masri a écrit:

Dear CASI

In the small print of the article it reads:

"Leaks from the state department's "future of Iraq" office show
|Washington plans to privatise the Iraqi economy and particularly the state-
|owned national oil company. Experts on its energy panel want to start with
|"downstream" assets like retail petrol stations. This would be a quick way
|to gouge money from Iraqi consumers. Later they would privatise exploration
|and development."


Does anyone know where we can get a copy of the state department's "future
of Iraq" plans?

Thanks


-Rania

|



All I have is this but there are no urls to U.S. gov. offices provided in the
article. No titles of official doument either. Sorry about the funny caracters
embedded in the article.
Marc Azar
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/06/international/middleeast/06IRAQ.h= tml[1]
U.S. Is Completing Plan to Promote a Democratic Iraq
By DAVID E. SANGER and JAMES DAO
6 January 2003
ASHINGTON, Jan. 5 -- President Bush's national security team is
assembling final plans for administering and democratizing Iraq after
the expected ouster of Saddam Hussein. Those plans call for a heavy
American military presence in the country for at least 18 months,
military trials of only the most senior Iraqi leaders and quick takeover of
the country's oil fields to pay for reconstruction.
The proposals, according to administration officials who have been
developing them for several months, have been discussed informally with
Mr. Bush in considerable detail. They would amount to the most ambitious
American effort to administer a country since the occupations of Japan
and Germany at the end of World War II. With Mr. Bush's return here this
afternoon, his principal foreign policy advisers are expected to shape
the final details in White House meetings and then formally present them to
the president.
Many elements of the plans are highly classified, and some are still
being debated as Mr. Bush's team tries to allay concerns that the United
States would seek to be a colonial power in Iraq. But the broad outlines show
the enormous complexity of the task in months ahead, and point to
some of the difficulties that would follow even a swift and successful
removal of Mr. Hussein from power, including these:
=B6Though Mr. Bush came to office expressing distaste for using the
military for what he called nation building, the Pentagon is preparing
for at least a year and a half of military control of Iraq, with forces
that would keep the peace, hunt down Mr. Hussein's top leaders and
weapons of mass destruction and, in the words of one of Mr. Bush's
senior advisers, "keep the country whole."
=B6A civilian administrator -- perhaps designated by the United Nations -- =
would run the country's economy, rebuild its schools and political
institutions, and administer aid programs. Placing those powers in
nonmilitary hands, administration officials hope, will quell Arab
concerns that a military commander would wield the kind of unchallenged
authority that Gen. Douglas MacArthur exercised as supreme commander in
Japan.
=B6Only "key" senior officials of the Hussein government "wo= uld need to be
removed and called to account," according to an administration documen= t
summarizing plans for war trials. People in the Iraqi hierarchy who help bring
down the government may be offered leniency.
=B6The administration plan says, "Government elements closely identifi= ed
with Saddam's regime, such as the revolutionary courts or the special
security organization, will be eliminated, but much of the rest of the
government will be reformed and kept."
=B6While publicly saying Iraqi oil would remain what one senior official calls
"the patrimony of the Iraqi people," the administration is =
debating how to protect oil fields during the conflict and how an
occupied Iraq would be represented in the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, if at all.
=B6After long debate, especially between the Pentagon and the State
Department, the White House has rejected for now the idea of creating a
provisional government before any invasion.
Officials involved in the planning caution that no matter how detailed
their plans, many crucial decisions would have to be made on the ground
in Iraq. So for now they have focused on legal precedents -- including
an examination of the legal basis for taking control of the country at
all -- and a study of past successes and failures in nation building,
reaching back to the American administration of the Philippines after
the Spanish-American War.
The plans presented to Mr. Bush will include several contingencies that
depend heavily, officials say, on how Mr. Hussein leaves power. "So mu= ch
rides on the conflict itself, if it becomes a conflict, and on how the
conflict starts and how the conflict ends," one of Mr. Bush's top
advisers said.
Much also depends on whether the arriving American troops would be
welcomed or shot at, and the Central Intelligence Agency has been
drawing up scenarios that range from a friendly occupation to a hostile one=
Yet under all of the possibilities, the American military would remain
the central player in running the country for some time. The Pentagon
has warned that it would take at least a year to be certain that all of
Mr. Hussein's weapons stores were destroyed.
Notably, the administration's written description of its goals include
these two objectives: "preserve Iraq as a unitary state, with its
territorial integrity intact," and "prevent unhelpful outside
interference, military or nonmilitary," apparently a warning to
neighboring countries.
Administration officials insist American forces would not stay in Iraq a day
longer than is necessary to stabilize the country.
"I don't think we're talking about months," one of Mr. Bush's top=
advisers said of the planned occupation. "But I don't think we're
talking a lot of years, either."
The Command
Military Joined
With Civilian
When administration officials first began publicly discussing the idea
of an American military administration for Iraq, the reaction in the
Arab world was swift: The Arabs wanted no American Caesar in Iraq, no
symbol of a colonial governor. "The last thing we need," a senior=
official said, in an allusion to General MacArthur, "is someone walkin= g
around with a corncob pipe, telling Iraqis how to form a government."<= BR>
As a result, the steering group on Iraq policy is now discussing a
hybrid command with an American military commander in charge of security and
some kind of civilian administrator -- of theoretically equal
influence -- to get the schools running, the oil fields pumping and the
economy jump-started. It is not clear whether that administrator would
be an American or if the United Nations would take the lead in that part of
the operation.
It is widely assumed that in the first chaotic months, the military
commander will have unquestioned authority. "Remember, you will have <= BR>
decapitated the command and control for the Iraqi military forces," a =
senior official said. "Who is going to make sure that score-settling <= BR>
does not break out, that there is not fights between the various ethnic
communities? It is going to have to be the U.S. military for some period of
time, and if there is a military command, there will certainly be a
military commander."
But the handover of more and more responsibility from the military
administration to an international civilian administration -- and
several years down the road to an Iraqi-run government -- is still
murky. Officials, referring to the ruling Baath Party, say
"de-Baathification" of the nation will be at least as complex as =
de-Nazification was in Germany.
"We know one thing," said a diplomat involved in the planning. &q= uot;Things
will have to come together a lot faster than they have in Afghanistan."= ;
The Oil
Protecting It
For the Iraqis
There is no more delicate question for the administration than how to
deal with Iraq's oil reserves -- the world's second largest, behind
Saudi Arabia's -- and how to raise money from oil sales for rebuilding
without prompting charges that control of oil, not disarming Iraq, is
Mr. Bush's true aim.
Administration officials have been careful always to talk about Iraqi
oil as the property of the Iraqi people. But in the White House, the
major concern is that Mr. Hussein may plan to destroy the oil
infrastructure in the first days of any war, while trying to make it
appear as if the destruction was the work of American forces.
"What happens if he started systematically destroying the fields?"= ; a
senior official said. "It's a big source of concern, and we are trying=
to take account of it as we plan how to use our military forces."
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, speaking on Dec. 29, hinted at such
a military plan when he said, "If coalition forces go into those oil <= BR>
fields, we would want to protect those fields and make sure that they
are used to benefit the people of Iraq, and are not destroyed or damaged by a
failing regime on the way out the door."
The White House has already concluded that the United Nations'
oil-for-food program, under which Iraq is permitted to sell a limited
amount of oil to buy civilian goods, will have to be amended quickly so
oil revenues can be used more broadly in the country. But it is unclear
how the administration plans to finesse the question of Iraq's role in
OPEC and who would represent occupied Iraq at the organization's meetings.<=
BR>
The administration is already anticipating that neighboring Arab nations may
accuse occupied Iraq of pumping oil beyond OPEC quotas. One official said
Washington "fully expects" that the United States will be su= spected
of undermining the oil organization, and it is working on strategies,
which he would not describe, to allay those fears.
The Leadership
Planning Both Trials
And Incentives
Mr. Bush has been warning since October that Iraqi generals who obeyed
any orders to use chemical or biological weapons against American troops would
be punished, perhaps as war criminals.
Now, as part of the effort to undermine Mr. Hussein's government and get
evidence that has so far eluded United Nations inspectors, the White
House is putting a slightly different spin on that kind of talk.
Those who have helped build Mr. Hussein's weapons stockpile, officials
say, may win some redemption by helping inspectors -- and American forces.<=
BR>
That approach appears to be part of a strategy to encourage a coup and
persuade military leaders and scientists to give up the country's
chemical and biological stockpiles and its nuclear research efforts.
"The politics of Iraq are so opaque that it's just hard to know what i= s
or isn't rumbling under the surface," one of Mr. Bush's most senior advisers
said. As a result, the president is looking to create "maximu= m
pressure" on the top leadership.
Already the C.I.A. and others have drawn up lists of Mr. Hussein's top
command and the heads of his security forces who would probably be put
on trial.
One State Department working group is studying a kind of "truth and
reconciliation" process, modeled after the one in South Africa, which =
could publicly shame, but not necessarily punish, human rights violators.
The Transition
No to Installing
Provisional Rulers
Few issues have divided the administration more bitterly than how to
create a transitional Iraqi government that could serve as a bridge
between the American military occupation and a permanent, democratic
government. The issue reflects the administration's ideological fault
lines, and in recent months Mr. Bush's national security adviser,
Condoleezza Rice, has stepped in, as one senior aide said, "to make su= re
there was not a public food fight on this one."
White House officials say that those divisions have now been resolved,
and that while planning is going forward, the United States will not
overtly install a provisional government or designate its leaders.
The division was a familiar one. Senior civilian officials in the
Pentagon and some advisers to Vice President Dick Cheney argued for the
creation of a provisional government even before Baghdad falls. It would be
led, at least initially, by Iraqi exiles. The proponents argue that
such a government in exile would speed creation of a permanent
government if Mr. Hussein is removed, allowing United States forces to
withdraw sooner. Among the reported advocates were Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld, who wants the military's role to be brief.
"The quicker you get a transition from military victory to transitiona= l
government, the better," a senior Pentagon official said. "We wan= t to be
there as long as necessary, but as short as possible."
On the other side of the debate are advocates of giving more power to
Iraqis now living in Iraq. These advocates, mainly in the State
Department and C.I.A., say the Iraqi exiles have no legitimacy among the Iraqi
people. One proposal favored by State Department officials calls
for having an international civilian agency, advised by Iraqis and
protected by allied peacekeeping forces, run the nation while Iraqis
elect local governments, create a new constitution and eventually select a
national legislature, somewhat along the postwar model of Afghanistan.
The White House has tried to finesse those differences by saying it
favors a government formed by "free Iraqis" both inside and outsi= de Iraq.
But inside the Pentagon there are doubts. "The argument that you have = to
leave seats at the table for people inside Iraq has one problem: there
is no one inside," said a senior official who supports the Iraqi
National Congress.
An official close to Mr. Bush acknowledged that "there are not a lot o= f
free Iraqis inside Iraq." Pausing, he added, "But there will be.

===References:===
  1. 
file:///Macintosh%20HD/Dossier%20Syst%8Fme/Pr%8Ef%8Erences/Marc/4ccd6j8z.slt/archive/Irak%202003/3D%22http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/06/international/middleeast/06IRA=



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