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This may or may not be helpful, but it appears that there is now a 'Hoover' factor in relation to Iraqi missiles - ie. reporters and commentators are beginning to refer to 'Scud missiles' when talking about Iraqi missiles, whether or not they are actually Scuds. In message <20030325130345.12987.h006.c007.wm@mail.uncoveriraq.com.criti calpath.net>, info@uncoverIraq.com writes >If anyone has further information regarding the British press pool report >(below) concerning possible SCUDs south of Basra, would they please forward to >me ASAP (working on a newspaper correction). > >Other than this pool report, my understanding is that no prohibited SCUDs, and >no prohibited nuclear/chem/bio weapon indicants have been found in Iraq to date. > >Regards, >Drew Hamre >Golden Valley, MN USA > >=== >http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A22859-2003Mar25?language=printer > >Evidence of Iraq Weapons Remains Elusive > >By CHARLES J. HANLEY >The Associated Press >Tuesday, March 25, 2003; 5:02 AM > >In months of allegation and investigation on the way to war, no firm evidence >emerged that Iraq held weapons of mass destruction. Now it is up to the U.S. >invasion force to find such weapons - if they exist. > >Coalition commander Gen. Tommy Franks said Monday nothing conclusive has been >uncovered thus far, but the U.S. military said it was investigating a chemical >plant seized in southern Iraq's Najaf area as a "site of interest." > >"It could be difficult to find ... this stuff," Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria >Clarke said a day earlier. > >The U.S. and British accusations that Baghdad was hiding chemical, biological or >nuclear weapons programs were the reason most commonly cited by Washington for >attacking Iraq. The credibility of those claims was undercut, however, by >disclosures of forgery and misrepresentation underlying some of them, and by the >failure of U.S. intelligence reports to lead U.N. inspectors to any important >finds. > >If U.S. units now quickly report uncovering concealed arms programs, critics may >question the authenticity of the reports or suggest that intelligence had been >kept from the U.N. inspectors - and ask why. > >If few such weapons are found, the war's very premise will come under question. > >"I think that we probably have received several . . . bits of information over >the last three or four days about potential WMD (weapons of mass destruction) >locations," Franks said Monday. > >British troops have found what was described as "suspected" Scud missiles and >warheads in a chemical factory at Damaniyah, south of Basra, according to a >British press pool report. Experts have been called in to determine what is in >the warheads. > >Skepticism about U.S.-British claims could be heard in last week's resignation >of House of Commons leader Robin Cook from the British Cabinet to protest >London's support of U.S. war plans. > >"Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood >sense of the term, namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a >strategic city target," said Cook, who had access to high-level British >information. > >In the U.S. Congress, meanwhile, the disclosure that another U.S. allegation in >the nuclear area was based on a forged document led Sen. Jay Rockefeller, >D.-W.Va., to ask the FBI to investigate whether a "larger deception campaign" on >Iraq was under way. > >For months, officials of the U.S. administration have asserted Iraq maintains >stocks of such prohibited arms. In his television address two days before >launching the invasion, Bush said U.S. troops would enter Iraq "to eliminate >weapons of mass destruction." > >A day earlier, Vice President Dick Cheney claimed on a TV talk show the Iraqis >have "reconstituted nuclear weapons" - an assertion no specialist has supported. >Chief nuclear inspector Mohamed ElBaradei told the U.N. Security Council on >March 7: "We have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the >revival of a nuclear weapons program." > >Those inspections have now halted. But the on-again, off-again U.N. disarmament >effort accomplished much after Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War. > >The bulk of Baghdad's old chemical and biological weapons was certified by U.N. >inspectors to have been destroyed in the 1990s, and the teams that returned to >Iraq last November were pressing the Iraqis for documents and witnesses to clear >up discrepancies and certify destruction of the remainder. > >Iraq's uranium-based nuclear program of the 1980s, which never produced a >weapon, was dismantled by the U.N. nuclear agency in the early 1990s. >ElBaradei's inspectors were in Iraq to guard against any resurrection of the >nuclear work. > >Gaps and discrepancies in the record - combined with known Iraqi efforts a >decade ago to conceal weapons programs - were the basis for U.S. allegations >that, for example, the Iraqis today might retain as much as 500 tons of chemical >agents or 25,000 liters of anthrax. The Iraqis claim to have destroyed it all. > >On the nuclear side, meanwhile, a U.S. State Department report in December >alleged that Iraq had secretly tried to import uranium from the African nation >of Niger, an assertion repeated in Bush's State of the Union address. > >Earlier this month, however, ElBaradei reported that the basis for the >allegation - said to be a Niger government document - was a forgery. > >Another element in the U.S. nuclear allegations also came under questioning. >Last September, the Bush administration leaked information about Iraqi purchase >orders for aluminum tubes, which they said appeared intended for gas centrifuges >that enrich uranium for bombs. > >In his Security Council report on March 7, ElBaradei said his experts had >determined it "highly unlikely" the tubes were for nuclear weapons work. Powell >persisted, saying two days later that new information "indicated the tubes were >meant for centrifuges." But in an Associated Press interview on March 13, >ElBaradei said, "We have this information and it doesn't change our assessment." > >Across the Atlantic, meanwhile, the British government issued a dossier Feb. 3 >on Iraq's "infrastructure of concealment," a paper praised by Powell in his own >indictment of Iraq before the Security Council two days later. But the British >dossier was subsequently determined to have been lifted in large part from >published articles and a researcher's paper - not from fresh intelligence. > >Powell's UN presentation was densely detailed, speculating on the meaning of >satellite photos, audio intercepts and other, unattributed information. But his >claims drew a rebuff from Hans Blix, chief U.N. weapons inspector. Among other >things, Blix said that a satellite photo the American secretary contended showed >movement of proscribed munitions "could just as easily have been a routine >activity." > >By the time of his next report, March 7, Blix was referring to such U.S. >statements as "contentions" and "claims." > >Two months after U.S. officials said they had begun providing "significant" >intelligence to the inspectors, Blix told the council he was still awaiting >"high-quality information." He said no evidence had emerged to support U.S. >contentions Iraq was producing chemical or biological weapons underground or in >mobile laboratories. > >The inspectors, privately, disparaged the "leads" they were receiving from the >U.S. government. > >After more than 700 surprise inspections at hundreds of sites since November, >the U.N. teams had compiled a short list of proscribed items found: fewer than >20 old, empty chemical warheads for battlefield rockets, and a dozen artillery >shells filled with mustard gas - shells tagged by U.N. inspectors in the 1990s >but somehow not destroyed by them. > >Now, with the inspectors gone, it will fall to U.S. military forces to locate >any secret weapons programs and to convince the world they're the real thing. > >--- > >EDITOR'S NOTE - Charles J. Hanley covered the U.N. arms inspections in Iraq. > >_______________________________________________ >Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. >To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss >To contact the list manager, email casi-discuss-admin@lists.casi.org.uk >All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk -- Cathy Aitchison _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss To contact the list manager, email casi-discuss-admin@lists.casi.org.uk All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk