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Author: Nathaniel Hurd, NGO Consultant on UN Iraq Policy Topic: US/UK/Spain Draft Security Council Resolution Date: 25 February 2003 Below find a series of potential American, British, Spanish and other official arguments in support of their Security Council Resolution (SCR) draft and their related SCR and UN Charter misinterpretations. Below this series, find a series of alternative arguments that address the anticipated official ones. The alternative arguments primarily draw from Nathaniel Hurd, "Security Council Resolution 1441 and the Potential Use of Force Against Iraq", 6 December 2002, http://www.casi.org.uk/info/hurd021206.doc and http://www.casi.org.uk/info/hurd021206.pdf INTRODUCTION The UN Charter, along with subsequent Iraq-related SCRs, including SCR 1441, frame the current US/UK/Spain draft SCR. Officials from UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's Government and US President George W. Bush's Administration continue to ignore the UN Charter and incorrectly insist that SCR 1441 permits the use of force against Iraq. They argue that SCR 1441 actually authorizes force, and/or at least fails to prevent the use of it. As background, Bush Administration officials (along with previous Presidential Administrations and US Congresses) have also incorrectly stated that the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire depended on the Government of Iraq (GoI) meeting the weapons-related obligations detailed in SCR 687 (1991). POTENTIAL OFFICIAL ARGUMENTS Politically, the recent US/UK/Spain draft SCR seems to be an attempt to reinforce their primary SCR 1441 misinterpretation, perhaps along with a longstanding US misinterpretation of SCR 687 (1991) and the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire. The logic these and their allied governments present to their respective publics may be as follows: 1. SCR 1441 gives the Government of Iraq (GoI) "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council". (OP 2) 2. SCR 1441 warns the GoI "that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations". (OP 13) 3. SCR 1441's strong language constitutes force authorization. 4. SCR 1441 does not explicitly state that the Council must pass an additional SCR in order to authorize force against Iraq. Therefore, member States are free to use force against Iraq, especially if they conclude that the GoI has failed to comply with SCR 1441. 5. The US/UK/Spain draft SCR states "Decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in resolution 1441 (2002)". (OP 1) Therefore, the Council as a body has concluded that the GoI has squandered its "final opportunity". While member States are free to reach the same conclusion and act as they see fit, it is important that the world's highest and most authoritative peace and security body has reached an identical conclusion. 6. Additionally, the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire depended on the GoI fulfilling its proscribed weapons obligations. SCR 1441 and this draft SCR repeat that the GoI has failed to comply to Council satisfaction. Therefore, the Council has decided that the ceasefire is no longer in effect. Member States are now free to use force against Iraq to secure compliance with Council Resolutions and Iraq's ceasefire obligations. ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS REGARDING SCRS For further elaboration on and sources for the below alternative conclusions, please see Nathaniel Hurd, "Security Council Resolution 1441 and the Potential Use of Force Against Iraq", 6 December 2002, http://www.casi.org.uk/info/hurd021206.doc and http://www.casi.org.uk/info/hurd021206.pdf 1. President's George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, along with officials from their respective Administrations, have repeated the same SCR 687/ceasefire misinterpretation: the ceasefire depended on the GoI complying with SCR 687 prohibited weapons obligations. Since the GoI failed to satisfactorily comply, to Security Council and/or US satisfaction, the GoI has violated the ceasefire terms and thus the US is free to use force against Iraq. Several US Congresses have written this misinterpretation into law and the sitting Presidents signed it into Public Law. In fact, Security Council authorization for the use of force against Iraq, as explicitly granted in SCR 678 (1990), ended when the GoI fulfilled its one ceasefire obligation (as stated in SCR 687): it notified that Secretary-General and Security Council that it accepted the provisions of SCR 687. Once it notified both designated parties, the ceasefire was in effect. A ceasefire is an end to hostilities, not a suspension. Non-ceasefire obligations, e.g., relating to proscribed weapons, were separate from ceasefire obligations. Post-SCR 687, the Council could subsequently authorize force to compel the GoI to comply with SCRs. But this would be a brand new force authorization, as the ceasefire made the SCR 678 force authorization null and void. 2. No SCR subsequent to the ceasefire authorizes the use of force against Iraq. SCR 1441 contains strong language, but it does not authorize the use of force. It does not "[Authorize] Member States...to use all necessary means", as SCR 678 authorized. The US/UK/Spain draft SCR also, notably, fails to "authorize all necessary means". On 2 October 2002 the US informally circulated to other permanent Security Council members a draft SCR which stated that the Security Council "Decides that false statements or omissions in the declaration submitted by Iraq to the Council and failure by Iraq at any time to comply and cooperate fully in accordance with the provisions laid in this resolution, shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations, and that such breach authorizes member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area". (OP 10, http://www.casi.org.uk/info/usukdraftscr021002.html) Inclusion of the specific phrase "all necessary means" suggests US officials knew full well what SCR language actually constitutes force authorization. At the time, Russian and French officials stated they would veto a resolution containing "all necessary means" (i.e., force authorization). Subsequent SCR drafts omitted "all necessary means". Instead, American and British officials settled for strong language, short of force authorization, language they would later incorrectly tell their domestic publics authorized force. If the American, British and Spanish governments thought they had sufficient Council member support, and/or the absence of a realistic French and/or Russian veto, for force authorization, they would have likely included it in this latest draft SCR. As the broad support seems absent, and France and Russia seem likely at this time to veto a resolution with force authorization, the three draft SCR sponsors seem to instead rely on the longstanding American and British official SCR 1441 misinterpretation. 3. Iraq has not attacked a member State. 4. A ceasefire is in effect between "Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990)". Iraq has not attacked a member State. The Security Council has not authorized the use of force against Iraq. Under these circumstances, if a member State attacks Iraq, then it will violate the UN Charter. Nathaniel Hurd NGO Consultant on United Nations' Iraq policy Tel. (Mobile): 917-407-3389 Fax: 718-504-4224 Residential/Mailing Address: 90 7th Ave. Apt. #6 Brooklyn, NY 11217 _________________________________________________________________ Add photos to your messages with MSN 8. Get 2 months FREE*. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/featuredemail _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss To contact the list manager, email firstname.lastname@example.org All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk