The following is an archived copy of a message sent to a Discussion List run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.

Views expressed in this archived message are those of the author, not of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.

[Main archive index/search] [List information] [Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]


[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[casi] Transcript of Powell's remarks to the UN




http://www.capitolhillblue.com/artman/publish/article_1705.shtml

Transcript of Powell's remarks to the UN
By CHB News Service
Feb 5, 2003, 12:00

 Email this article
 Printer friendly page

  Full text of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the United
Nations on Iraq.

POWELL: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General,
distinguished colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for
the special effort that each of you made to be here today.

This is important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to
Iraq and its disarmament obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution
1441.

Last November 8, this council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote.
The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass
destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its
obligations, stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years.

Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this
council has repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq
one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious
consequences. No council member present in voting on that day had any
allusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious
consequences meant if Iraq did not comply.

And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with
returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA.

We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do
their job. This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm and
not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to
conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.

I asked for this session today for two purposes: First, to support the core
assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this
council on January 27th, quote, ``Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine
acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it,''
unquote.

And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7, quote,
``did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that
have been outstanding since 1998.'' My second purpose today is to provide
you with additional information, to share with you what the United States
knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as well as Iraq's involvement
in terrorism, which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier
resolutions.


I might add at this point that we are providing all relevant information we
can to the inspection teams for them to do their work.


The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are
U.S. sources. And some are those of other countries. Some of the sources are
technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by
satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the
world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.


I cannot tell you everything that we know. But what I can share with you,
when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply
troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing
patterns of behavior. The facts on Iraqis' behavior--Iraq's behavior
demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort--no
effort--to disarm as required by the international community. Indeed, the
facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are
concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.

Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about to hear is a
conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on November 26 of
last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in
Iraq.


The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier
general, from Iraq's elite military unit, the Republican Guard. Let me pause
and review some of the key elements of this conversation that you just heard
between these two officers.

First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohamed ElBaradei, is coming,
and they know what he's coming for, and they know he's coming the next day.
He's coming to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these
gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things.

But they're worried. ``We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one
of them sees it?''

What is their concern? Their concern is that it's something they should not
have, something that should not be seen.


The general is incredulous: ``You didn't get a modified. You don't have one
of those, do you?''

``I have one.''


``Which, from where?''


``From the workshop, from the Al Kendi (ph) Company?''


``What?''


``From Al Kendi (ph).''


``I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried. You all have something
left.''


``We evacuated everything. We don't have anything left.''


Note what he says: ``We evacuated everything.''


We didn't destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it
into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the
inspectors showed up.


``I will come to you tomorrow.''

The Al Kendi (ph) Company: This is a company that is well known to have been
involved in prohibited weapons systems activity. Let me play another tape
for you. As you will recall, the inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads
on January 16. On January 20, four days later, Iraq promised the inspectors
it would search for more. You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard
headquarters issuing an instruction to an officer in the field. Their
conversation took place just last week on January 30.

(BEGIN AUDIO TAPE)


1/8Speaking in Arabic. 3/8

(END AUDIO TAPE)

POWELL: Let me pause again and review the elements of this message.

``They're inspecting the ammunition you have, yes.''

``Yes.''

``For the possibility there are forbidden ammo.''

``For the possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo?''

``Yes.''

``And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all of the areas, the
scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there.''
Remember the first message, evacuated.This is all part of a system of hiding
things and moving things out of the way and making sure they have left
nothing behind.

If you go a little further into this message, and you see the specific
instructions from headquarters: ``After you have carried out what is
contained in this message, destroy the message because I don't want anyone
to see this message.''


``OK, OK.''


Why? Why?


This message would have verified to the inspectors that they have been
trying to turn over things. They were looking for things. But they don't
want that message seen, because they were trying to clean up the area to
leave no evidence behind of the presence of weapons of mass destruction. And
they can claim that nothing was there. And the inspectors can look all they
want, and they will find nothing.


This effort to hide things from the inspectors is not one or two isolated
events, quite the contrary. This is part and parcel of a policy of evasion
and deception that goes back 12 years, a policy set at the highest levels of
the Iraqi regime.


We know that Saddam Hussein has what is called quote, ``a higher committee
for monitoring the inspections teams,'' unquote. Think about that. Iraq has
a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor
Iraq's disarmament. Not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but to
spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs.


The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussein. It is headed by Iraq's
vice president, Taha Yassin Ramadan. Its members include Saddam Hussein's
son Qusay.


This committee also includes Lieutenant General Amir al-Saadi, an adviser to
Saddam. In case that name isn't immediately familiar to you, General Saadi
has been the Iraqi regime's primary point of contact for Dr. Blix and Dr.
ElBaradei. It was General Saadi who last fall publicly pledged that Iraq was
prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors. Quite the contrary,
Saadi's job is not to cooperate, it is to deceive; not to disarm, but to
undermine the inspectors; not to support them, but to frustrate them and to
make sure they learn nothing.


We have learned a lot about the work of this special committee. We learned
that just prior to the return of inspectors last November the regime had
decided to resume what we heard called, quote, ``the old game of cat and
mouse,'' unquote.


For example, let me focus on the now famous declaration that Iraq submitted
to this council on December 7. Iraq never had any intention of complying
with this council's mandate. Instead, Iraq planned to use the declaration,
overwhelm us and to overwhelm the inspectors with useless information about
Iraq's permitted weapons so that we would not have time to pursue Iraq's
prohibited weapons. Iraq's goal was to give us, in this room, to give those
us on this council the false impression that the inspection process was
working.


You saw the result. Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration, rich in
volume, but poor in information and practically devoid of new evidence.


Could any member of this council honestly rise in defense of this false
declaration?


Everything we have seen and heard indicates that, instead of cooperating
actively with the inspectors to ensure the success of their mission, Saddam
Hussein and his regime are busy doing all they possibly can to ensure that
inspectors succeed in finding absolutely nothing.


My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid
sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and
conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and
these are from human sources.


Orders were issued to Iraq's security organizations, as well as to Saddam
Hussein's own office, to hide all correspondence with the Organization of
Military Industrialization. This is the organization that oversees Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction activities. Make sure there are no documents
left which could connect you to the OMI.


We know that Saddam's son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited
weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. We know that Iraqi
government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party and scientists have
hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key files from military and
scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven
around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection.


Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectors recently found
dramatic confirmation of these reports. When they searched the home of an
Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000 pages of documents.
You see them here being brought out of the home and placed in U.N. hands.
Some of the material is classified and related to Iraq's nuclear program.


Tell me, answer me, are the inspectors to search the house of every
government official, every Baath Party member and every scientist in the
country to find the truth, to get the information they need, to satisfy the
demands of our council?


Our sources tell us that, in some cases, the hard drives of computers at
Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took the hard drives. Where did
they go? What's being hidden? Why? There's only one answer to the why: to
deceive, to hide, to keep from the inspectors.


Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving, not just
documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction to keep them from
being found by inspectors. While we were here in this council chamber
debating Resolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know from sources that a
missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and warheads
containing biological warfare agents to various locations, distributing them
to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads
have been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every
one to four weeks to escape detection.


We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have
recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
facilities.


Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a couple. The photos
that I am about to show you are sometimes hard for the average person to
interpret, hard for me. The painstaking work of photo analysis takes experts
with years and years of experience, pouring for hours and hours over light
tables. But as I show you these images, I will try to capture and explain
what they mean, what they indicate to our imagery specialists.


Let's look at one. This one is about a weapons munition facility, a facility
that holds ammunition at a place called Taji (ph). This is one of about 65
such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical
munitions. In fact, this is where the Iraqis recently came up with the
additional four chemical weapon shells.


Here, you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines. The four that
are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers.


How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a closer look. Look
at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of one of the four
chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that
the bunkers are storing chemical munitions. The arrow at the top that says
security points to a facility that is the signature item for this kind of
bunker. Inside that facility are special guards and special equipment to
monitor any leakage that might come out of the bunker. The truck you also
see is a signature item. It's a decontamination vehicle in case something
goes wrong.


This is characteristic of those four bunkers. The special security facility
and the decontamination vehicle will be in the area, if not at any one of
them or one of the other, it is moving around those four, and it moves as it
needed to move, as people are working in the different bunkers.


Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking at two of those
sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the tents are gone, it's
been cleaned up, and it was done on the 22nd of December, as the U.N.
inspection team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles
arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the right.


The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They found nothing.


This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraq had been
tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji (ph). As it did throughout
the 1990s, we know that Iraq today is actively using its considerable
intelligence capabilities to hide its illicit activities. From our sources,
we know that inspectors are under constant surveillance by an army of Iraqi
intelligence operatives. Iraq is relentlessly attempting to tap all of their
communications, both voice and electronics. I would call my colleagues
attention to the fine paper that United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which
describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.


In this next example, you will see the type of concealment activity Iraq has
undertaken in response to the resumption of inspections. Indeed, in November
2002, just when the inspections were about to resume this type of activity
spiked. Here are three examples.


At this ballistic missile site, on November 10, we saw a cargo truck
preparing to move ballistic missile components. At this biological weapons
related facility, on November 25, just two days before inspections resumed,
this truck caravan appeared, something we almost never see at this facility,
and we monitor it carefully and regularly.


At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days before inspections
began, five large cargo trucks appeared along with the truck-mounted crane
to move missiles. We saw this kind of house cleaning at close to 30 sites.


Days after this activity, the vehicles and the equipment that I've just
highlighted disappear and the site returns to patterns of normalcy. We don't
know precisely what Iraq was moving, but the inspectors already knew about
these sites, so Iraq knew that they would be coming.


We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature
before inspections if they were anxious to demonstrate what they had or did
not have?


Remember the first intercept in which two Iraqis talked about the need to
hide a modified vehicle from the inspectors. Where did Iraq take all of this
equipment? Why wasn't it presented to the inspectors?


Iraq also has refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that would
give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved before, during and
after inspectors.


This refusal to allow this kind of reconnaissance is in direct, specific
violation of operative paragraph seven of our Resolution 1441.


Saddam Hussein and his regime are not just trying to conceal weapons,
they're also trying to hide people. You know the basic facts. Iraq has not
complied with its obligation to allow immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and
private access to all officials and other persons as required by Resolution
1441.


The regime only allows interviews with inspectors in the presence of an
Iraqi official, a minder. The official Iraqi organization charged with
facilitating inspections announced, announced publicly and announced
ominously that, quote, ``Nobody is ready to leave Iraq to be interviewed.''


Iraqi Vice President Ramadan accused the inspectors of conducting espionage,
a veiled threat that anyone cooperating with U.N. inspectors was committing
treason.


Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a comprehensive list
of scientists associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs.
Iraq's list was out of date and contained only about 500 names, despite the
fact that UNSCOM had earlier put together a list of about 3,500 names.


Let me just tell you what a number of human sources have told us.


Saddam Hussein has directly participated in the effort to prevent
interviews. In early December, Saddam Hussein had all Iraqi scientists
warned of the serious consequences that they and their families would face
if they revealed any sensitive information to the inspectors. They were
forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging information is
punishable by death.


Saddam Hussein also said that scientists should be told not to agree to
leave Iraq; anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would be
treated as a spy. This violates 1441.


In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned, Iraqi experts were
ordered to report to the headquarters of the special security organization
to receive counterintelligence training. The training focused on evasion
methods, interrogation resistance techniques, and how to mislead inspectors.


Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions. These are facts,
corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the intelligence
services of other countries.


For example, in mid-December weapons experts at one facility were replaced
by Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectors about the work
that was being done there. On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi officials
issued a false death certificate for one scientist, and he was sent into
hiding.


In the middle of January, experts at one facility that was related to
weapons of mass destruction, those experts had been ordered to stay home
from work to avoid the inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi military
facilities not engaged in elicit weapons projects were to replace the
workers who'd been sent home. A dozen experts have been placed under house
arrest, not in their own houses, but as a group at one of Saddam Hussein's
guest houses. It goes on and on and on.


As the examples I have just presented show, the information and intelligence
we have gathered point to an active and systematic effort on the part of the
Iraqi regime to keep key materials and people from the inspectors in direct
violation of Resolution 1441. The pattern is not just one of reluctant
cooperation, nor is it merely a lack of cooperation. What we see is a
deliberate campaign to prevent any meaningful inspection work.


My colleagues, operative paragraph four of U.N. Resolution 1441, which we
lingered over so long last fall, clearly states that false statements and
omissions in the declaration and a failure by Iraq at any time to comply
with and cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall
constitute--the facts speak for themselves--shall constitute a further
material breach of its obligation. We wrote it this way to give Iraq an
early test--to give Iraq an early test. Would they give an honest
declaration and would they early on indicate a willingness to cooperate with
the inspectors? It was designed to be an early test.


They failed that test. By this standard, the standard of this operative
paragraph, I believe that Iraq is now in further material breach of its
obligations. I believe this conclusion is irrefutable and undeniable.


Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for
in U.N. Resolution 1441. And this body places itself in danger of
irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without
responding effectively and immediately.


The issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give the
inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But how much longer are we
willing to put up with Iraq's noncompliance before we, as a council, we, as
the United Nations, say: ``Enough. Enough.''


The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to
those deadly weapons programs and describe why they are real and present
dangers to the region and to the world.


First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here about biological
weapons. By way of introduction and history, I think there are just three
quick points I need to make.


First, you will recall that it took UNSCOM four long and frustrating years
to pry--to pry--an admission out of Iraq that it had biological weapons.


Second, when Iraq finally admitted having these weapons in 1995, the
quantities were vast. Less than a teaspoon of dry anthrax, a little bit
about this amount--this is just about the amount of a teaspoon--less than a
teaspoon full of dry anthrax in an envelope shutdown the United States
Senate in the fall of 2001. This forced several hundred people to undergo
emergency medical treatment and killed two postal workers just from an
amount just about this quantity that was inside of an envelope. Iraq
declared 8,500 liters of anthrax, but UNSCOM estimates that Saddam Hussein
could have produced 25,000 liters. If concentrated into this dry form, this
amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of
teaspoons. And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one
teaspoon-full of this deadly material.


And that is my third point. And it is key. The Iraqis have never accounted
for all of the biological weapons they admitted they had and we know they
had. They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make
them. And they have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with these
agents such as there are 400 bombs. This is evidence, not conjecture. This
is true. This is all well-documented.


Dr. Blix told this council that Iraq has provided little evidence to verify
anthrax production and no convincing evidence of its destruction. It should
come as no shock then, that since Saddam Hussein forced out the last
inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much intelligence indicating that Iraq
is continuing to make these weapons.


One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence
file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the existence of mobile
production facilities used to make biological agents. Let me take you inside
that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eye witness
accounts. We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on
wheels and on rails.


The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade
detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity
of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have
produced in the years prior to the Gulf War.


Although Iraq's mobile production program began in the mid-1990s, U.N.
inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such programs. Confirmation
came later, in the year 2000.


The source was an eye witness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one
of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent
production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998.
Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents.


He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting, the biological
weapons agent production always began on Thursdays at midnight because Iraq
thought UNSCOM would not inspect on the Muslim Holy Day, Thursday night
through Friday. He added that this was important because the units could not
be broken down in the middle of a production run, which had to be completed
by Friday evening before the inspectors might arrive again.


This defector is currently hiding in another country with the certain
knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him. His eye-witness
account of these mobile production facilities has been corroborated by other
sources.


A second source, an Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details
of the program, confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving
on trailers.


A third source, also in a position to know, reported in summer 2002 that
Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road trailer
units and on rail cars.


Finally, a fourth source, an Iraqi major, who defected, confirmed that Iraq
has mobile biological research laboratories, in addition to the production
facilities I mentioned earlier. We have diagrammed what our sources reported
about these mobile facilities. Here you see both truck and rail car-mounted
mobile factories. The description our sources gave us of the technical
features required by such facilities are highly detailed and extremely
accurate. As these drawings based on their description show, we know what
the fermenters look like, we know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and
other parts look like. We know how they fit together. We know how they work.
And we know a great deal about the platforms on which they are mounted.


As shown in this diagram, these factories can be concealed easily, either by
moving ordinary-looking trucks and rail cars along Iraq's thousands of miles
of highway or track, or by parking them in a garage or warehouse or
somewhere in Iraq's extensive system of underground tunnels and bunkers.


We know that Iraq has at lest seven of these mobile biological agent
factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each.
That means that the mobile production facilities are very few, perhaps 18
trucks that we know of--there may be more--but perhaps 18 that we know of.
Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of
trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day.


It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was making
biological agents. How long do you think it will take the inspectors to find
even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming forward, as they are
supposed to, with the information about these kinds of capabilities?

Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they
can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough
dry biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of
people. And dry agent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings.


By 1998, U.N. experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques
for their biological weapons programs. Now, Iraq has incorporated this
drying expertise into these mobile production facilities.


We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized not
only anthrax, but also other biological agents, including botulinum toxin,
aflatoxin and ricin.


But Iraq's research efforts did not stop there. Saddam Hussein has
investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas
gangrene, plague, typhus (ph), tetanus, cholera, camelpox and hemorrhagic
fever, and he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox.


The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disburse lethal biological
agents, widely and discriminately into the water supply, into the air. For
example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets.
This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by UNSCOM some years ago shows
an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note the spray coming from beneath the
Mirage; that is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying.


In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Sali Abdul Latif (ph), told
inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21
that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or a UAV. UAVs
outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a
terrorist attack using biological weapons. Iraq admitted to producing four
spray tanks. But to this day, it has provided no credible evidence that they
were destroyed, evidence that was required by the international community.


There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the
capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to
dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive
death and destruction. If biological weapons seem too terrible to
contemplate, chemical weapons are equally chilling.


UNMOVIC already laid out much of this, and it is documented for all of us to
read in UNSCOM's 1999 report on the subject.


Let me set the stage with three key points that all of us need to keep in
mind: First, Saddam Hussein has used these horrific weapons on another
country and on his own people. In fact, in the history of chemical warfare,
no country has had more battlefield experience with chemical weapons since
World War I than Saddam Hussein's Iraq.


Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein has never accounted for
vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery shells with mustard, 30,000
empty munitions and enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much
as 500 tons of chemical agents. If we consider just one category of missing
weaponry--6,500 bombs from the Iran-Iraq war--UNMOVIC says the amount of
chemical agent in them would be in the order of 1,000 tons. These quantities
of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for.


Dr. Blix has quipped that, quote, ``Mustard gas is not (inaudible) You are
supposed to know what you did with it.''


We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he did with it, and he has not come
clean with the international community. We have evidence these weapons
existed. What we don't have is evidence from Iraq that they have been
destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still waiting for.


Third point, Iraq's record on chemical weapons is replete with lies. It took
years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly
nerve agent, VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four
tons.


The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a
result of the defection of Hussein Kamal, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law.
UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it
into weapons for delivery. Yet, to this day, Iraq denies it had ever
weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this council that it has
information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program.


We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons
infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry. To all outward
appearances, even to experts, the infrastructure looks like an ordinary
civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go on
simultaneously; or, on a dime, this dual-use infrastructure can turn from
clandestine to commercial and then back again.


These inspections would be unlikely, any inspections of such facilities
would be unlikely to turn up anything prohibited, especially if there is any
warning that the inspections are coming. Call it ingenuous or evil genius,
but the Iraqis deliberately designed their chemical weapons programs to be
inspected. It is infrastructure with a built-in ally.


Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an effort to
reconstitute facilities that were closely associated with its past program
to develop and produce chemical weapons.


For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tariq (ph) state
establishment. Tariq (ph) includes facilities designed specifically for
Iraq's chemical weapons program and employs key figures from past programs.


That's the production end of Saddam's chemical weapons business. What about
the delivery end?


I'm going to show you a small part of a chemical complex called al-Moussaid
(ph), a site that Iraq has used for at least three years to transship
chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field.


In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this
picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point,
and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle
associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes this
picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that
movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. So it's not
just the photo, and it's not an individual seeing the photo. It's the photo
and then the knowledge of an individual being brought together to make the
case.


This photograph of the site taken two months later in July shows not only
the previous site, which is the figure in the middle at the top with the
bulldozer sign near it, it shows that this previous site, as well as all of
the other sites around the site, have been fully bulldozed and graded. The
topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis literally removed the crust of the
earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons
evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity.


To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons programs, Iraq
procures needed items from around the world using an extensive clandestine
network. What we know comes largely from intercepted communications and
human sources who are in a position to know the facts.


Iraq's procurement efforts include equipment that can filter and separate
micro-organisms and toxins involved in biological weapons, equipment that
can be used to concentrate the agent, growth media that can be used to
continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin, sterilization equipment for
laboratories, glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle
corrosive chemical weapons agents and precursors, large amounts of vinyl
chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents, and other chemicals such
as sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor.


Now, of course, Iraq will argue that these items can also be used for
legitimate purposes. But if that is true, why do we have to learn about them
by intercepting communications and risking the lives of human agents? With
Iraq's well documented history on biological and chemical weapons, why
should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt? I don't, and I don't
think you will either after you hear this next intercept.

Just a few weeks ago, we intercepted communications between two commanders
in Iraq's Second Republican Guard Corps. One commander is going to be giving
an instruction to the other. You will hear as this unfolds that what he
wants to communicate to the other guy, he wants to make sure the other guy
hears clearly, to the point of repeating it so that it gets written down and
completely understood. Listen.

(BEGIN AUDIO TAPE)

1/8Speaking in Foreign Language. 3/8

(END AUDIO TAPE)

POWELL: Let's review a few selected items of this conversation. Two officers
talking to each other on the radio want to make sure that nothing is
misunderstood:

``Remove. Remove.''

The expression, the expression, ``I got it.''

``Nerve agents. Nerve agents. Wherever it comes up.''

``Got it.''

``Wherever it comes up.''

``In the wireless instructions, in the instructions.''

``Correction. No. In the wireless instructions.''

``Wireless. I got it.''

Why does he repeat it that way? Why is he so forceful in making sure this is
understood? And why did he focus on wireless instructions? Because the
senior officer is concerned that somebody might be listening.

Well, somebody was.

``Nerve agents. Stop talking about it. They are listening to us. Don't give
any evidence that we have these horrible agents.''

Well, we know that they do. And this kind of conversation confirms it.

Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100
and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000
battlefield rockets.Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable
Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of
territory, an area nearly 5 times the size of Manhattan.

Let me remind you that, of the 122 millimeter chemical warheads, that the
U.N. inspectors found recently, this discovery could very well be, as has
been noted, the tip of the submerged iceberg. The question before us, all my
friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg?


Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons.
And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again, against his
neighbors and against his own people.


And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field
commanders to use them. He wouldn't be passing out the orders if he didn't
have the weapons or the intent to use them.


We also have sources who tell us that, since the 1980s, Saddam's regime has
been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical
weapons.


A source said that 1,600 death row prisoners were transferred in 1995 to a
special unit for such experiments. An eye witness saw prisoners tied down to
beds, experiments conducted on them, blood oozing around the victim's mouths
and autopsies performed to confirm the effects on the prisoners. Saddam
Hussein's humanity--inhumanity has no limits.


Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam
Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program.


On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains
determined to acquire nuclear weapons.


To fully appreciate the challenge that we face today, remember that, in
1991, the inspectors searched Iraq's primary nuclear weapons facilities for
the first time. And they found nothing to conclude that Iraq had a nuclear
weapons program.


But based on defector information in May of 1991, Saddam Hussein's lie was
exposed. In truth, Saddam Hussein had a massive clandestine nuclear weapons
program that covered several different techniques to enrich uranium,
including electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gas
diffusion. We estimate that this elicit program cost the Iraqis several
billion dollars. Nonetheless, Iraq continued to tell the IAEA that it had no
nuclear weapons program. If Saddam had not been stopped, Iraq could have
produced a nuclear bomb by 1993, years earlier than most worse-case
assessments that had been made before the war.


In 1995, as a result of another defector, we find out that, after his
invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had initiated a crash program to build a
crude nuclear weapon in violation of Iraq's U.N. obligations.


Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three key components needed
to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists with the
expertise, and he has a bomb design.


Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear program have been
focused on acquiring the third and last component, sufficient fissile
material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he
needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium.


Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so
determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire
high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after
inspections resumed.


These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because
they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium. By now, just about
everyone has heard of these tubes, and we all know that there are
differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for.


Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges
used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that
they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a
multiple rocket launcher.


Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. First, all the
experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be
adapted for centrifuge use. Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any
purpose. They are banned for Iraq.


I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but just as an old Army trooper, I can
tell you a couple of things: First, it strikes me as quite odd that these
tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for
comparable rockets.


Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher
standard than we do, but I don't think so. Second, we actually have examined
tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before
they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a
progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including, in the
latest batch, an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer
surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications, go to all
that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown
into shrapnel when it went off?


The high tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the story. We also have
intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire
magnets and high-speed balancing machines; both items can be used in a gas
centrifuge program to enrich uranium.


In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India,
Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq
wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That's the same
weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge program before the Gulf
War. This incident linked with the tubes is another indicator of Iraq's
attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.


Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer show that Iraq
front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas
centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed
effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq.


People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind,
these elicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much
focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons
program, the ability to produce fissile material. He also has been busy
trying to maintain the other key parts of his nuclear program, particularly
his cadre of key nuclear scientists.


It is noteworthy that, over the last 18 months, Saddam Hussein has paid
increasing personal attention to Iraqi's top nuclear scientists, a group
that the governmental-controlled press calls openly, his nuclear mujahedeen.
He regularly exhorts them and praises their progress. Progress toward what
end?


Long ago, the Security Council, this council, required Iraq to halt all
nuclear activities of any kind. Let me talk now about the systems Iraq is
developing to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular Iraq's
ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.


First, missiles. We all remember that before the Gulf War Saddam Hussein's
goal was missiles that flew not just hundreds, but thousands of kilometers.
He wanted to strike not only his neighbors, but also nations far beyond his
borders.


While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles,
numerous intelligence reports over the past decade, from sources inside
Iraq, indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few
dozen Scud variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of
650 to 900 kilometers.


We know from intelligence and Iraq's own admissions that Iraq's alleged
permitted ballistic missiles, the al-Samud II (ph) and the al-Fatah (ph),
violate the 150-kilometer limit established by this council in Resolution
687. These are prohibited systems.


UNMOVIC has also reported that Iraq has illegally important 380 SA-2 (ph)
rocket engines. These are likely for use in the al-Samud II (ph). Their
import was illegal on three counts. Resolution 687 prohibited all military
shipments into Iraq. UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of these engines in
surface-to-surface missiles. And finally, as we have just noted, they are
for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometer range limit.


Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as December--after
this council passed Resolution 1441.


What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to
produce ballistic missiles that fly of 1,000 kilometers. One program is
pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200
kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well as I can, who will be in
danger of these missiles.


As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq has built an
engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had. Notice the
dramatic difference in size between the test stand on the left, the old one,
and the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust vent. This is where the
flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust on the right test stand is five
times longer than the one on the left. The one on the left was used for
short-range missile. The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range
missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers.


This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand has
been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for
satellites to see what's going on underneath the test stand.


Saddam Hussein's intentions have never changed. He is not developing the
missiles for self-defense. These are missiles that Iraq wants in order to
project power, to threaten, and to deliver chemical, biological and, if we
let him, nuclear warheads.


Now, unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.


Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is
just illustrative of what a UAV would look like. This effort has included
attempts to modify for unmanned flight the MiG-21 (ph) and with greater
success an aircraft called the L-29 (ph). However, Iraq is now concentrating
not on these airplanes, but on developing and testing smaller UAVs, such as
this.


UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There
is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and
testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs. And of the little that
Saddam Hussein told us about UAVs, he has not told the truth. One of these
lies is graphically and indisputably demonstrated by intelligence we
collected on June 27, last year.

According to Iraq's December 7 declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80
kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that
went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the race track pattern depicted
here.


Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometers that the United
Nations permits, the test was left out of Iraq's December 7th declaration.
The UAV was flown around and around and around in a circle. And so, that its
80 kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers unrefueled and on autopilot,
violative of all of its obligations under 1441.


The linkages over the past 10 years between Iraq's UAV program and
biological and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to us. Iraq could
use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver
biological agents to its neighbors or if transported, to other countries,
including the United States.


My friends, the information I have presented to you about these terrible
weapons and about Iraq's continued flaunting of its obligations under
Security Council Resolution 1441 links to a subject I now want to spend a
little bit of time on. And that has to do with terrorism.


Our concern is not just about these elicit weapons. It's the way that these
elicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations
that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people
around the world.


Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains Palestine Liberation
Front members in small arms and explosives. Saddam uses the Arab Liberation
Front to funnel money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers in
order to prolong the Intifada. And it's no secret that Saddam's own
intelligence service was involved in dozens of attacks or attempted
assassinations in the 1990s.


But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much
more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network, a nexus
that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder.
Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab
Al-Zarqawi, an associated in collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al
Qaida lieutenants.


Zarqawi, a Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than a
decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist
training camp. One of his specialities and one of the specialties of this
camp is poisons. When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqaqi network
helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp. And this
camp is located in northeastern Iraq.

You see a picture of this camp. The network is teaching its operatives how
to produce ricin and other poisons. Let me remind you how ricin works. Less
than a pinch--image a pinch of salt--less than a pinch of ricin, eating just
this amount in your food, would cause shock followed by circulatory failure.
Death comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote, there is no cure. It
is fatal.


Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern
Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein's controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an
agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization, Ansar al-Islam,
that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000 this agent offered Al Qaida safe
haven in the region. After we swept Al Qaida from Afghanistan, some of its
members accepted this safe haven. They remain their today.


Zarqawi's activities are not confined to this small corner of north east
Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment, staying in
the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another
day.


During this stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and
established a base of operations there. These Al Qaida affiliates, based in
Baghdad, now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and
throughout Iraq for his network, and they've now been operating freely in
the capital for more than eight months.


Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with Al Qaida. These denials are
simply not credible. Last year an Al Qaida associate bragged that the
situation in Iraq was, quote, ``good,'' that Baghdad could be transited
quickly.


We know these affiliates are connected to Zarqawi because they remain even
today in regular contact with his direct subordinates, including the poison
cell plotters, and they are involved in moving more than money and
materiale.


Last year, two suspected Al Qaida operatives were arrested crossing from
Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell,
and one of them received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide. From
his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his network in the Middle
East and beyond.


We, in the United States, all of us at the State Department, and the Agency
for International Development--we all lost a dear friend with the
cold-blooded murder of Mr. Lawrence Foley in Amman, Jordan last October, a
despicable act was committed that day. The assassination of an individual
whose sole mission was to assist the people of Jordan. The captured assassin
says his cell received money and weapons from Zarqawi for that murder. After
the attack, an associate of the assassin left Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain
weapons and explosives for further operations. Iraqi officials protest that
they are not aware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or of any of his
associates. Again, these protests are not credible. We know of Zarqawi's
activities in Baghdad. I described them earlier.


And now let me add one other fact. We asked a friendly security service to
approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about
him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice,
and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The
network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi still remains at large to come and go.


As my colleagues around this table and as the citizens they represent in
Europe know, Zarqawi's terrorism is not confined to the Middle East. Zarqawi
and his network have plotted terrorist actions against countries, including
France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia.


According to detainee Abuwatia (ph), who graduated from Zarqawi's terrorist
camp in Afghanistan, tasks at least nine North African extremists from 2001
to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.


Since last year, members of this network have been apprehended in France,
Britain, Spain and Italy. By our last count, 116 operatives connected to
this global web have been arrested.


The chart you are seeing shows the network in Europe. We know about this
European network, and we know about its links to Zarqawi, because the
detainee who provided the information about the targets also provided the
names of members of the network.


Three of those he identified by name were arrested in France last December.
In the apartments of the terrorists, authorities found circuits for
explosive devices and a list of ingredients to make toxins.


The detainee who helped piece this together says the plot also targeted
Britain. Later evidence, again, proved him right. When the British unearthed
a cell there just last month, one British police officer was murdered during
the disruption of the cell.


We also know that Zarqawi's colleagues have been active in the Pankisi
Gorge, Georgia and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are
linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi's network say their goal was
to kill Russians with toxins.


We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates.
This understanding builds on decades long experience with respect to ties
between Iraq and Al Qaida. Going back to the early and mid-1990s, when bin
Laden was based in Sudan, an Al Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin
Laden reached an understanding that Al Qaida would no longer support
activities against Baghdad. Early Al Qaida ties were forged by secret,
high-level intelligence service contacts with Al Qaida, secret Iraqi
intelligence high-level contacts with Al Qaida.


We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least
eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign
security service tells us, that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi
intelligence official in Khartoum, and later met the director of the Iraqi
intelligence service.


Saddam became more interested as he saw Al Qaida's appalling attacks. A
detained Al Qaida member tells us that Saddam was more willing to assist Al
Qaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Saddam
was also impressed by Al Qaida's attacks on the USS Cole in Yemen in October
2000.


Iraqis continued to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior
defector, one of Saddam's former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam
sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training
to Al Qaida members on document forgery.


>From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi embassy in Pakistan played the
role of liaison to the Al Qaida organization.


Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much. They say
Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and Al Qaida's religious tyranny do not
mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to
bring Iraq and Al Qaida together, enough so Al Qaida could learn how to
build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough
so that Al Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on
weapons of mass destruction.


And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with other Islamist terrorist
organizations is clear. Hamas, for example, opened an office in Baghdad in
1999, and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by Palestine Islamic Jihad.
These groups are at the forefront of sponsoring suicide attacks against
Israel.


Al Qaida continues to have a deep interest in acquiring weapons of mass
destruction. As with the story of Zarqawi and his network, I can trace the
story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in
these weapons to Al Qaida.


Fortunately, this operative is now detained, and he has told his story. I
will relate it to you now as he, himself, described it.


This senior Al Qaida terrorist was responsible for one of Al Qaida's
training camps in Afghanistan. His information comes first-hand from his
personal involvement at senior levels of Al Qaida. He says bin Laden and his
top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased Al Qaida leader Muhammad Atif (ph), did
not believe that Al Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to
manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go somewhere
else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help. Where did they go?
Where did they look? They went to Iraq.


The support that (inaudible) describes included Iraq offering chemical or
biological weapons training for two Al Qaida associates beginning in
December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abu Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) had
been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring
poisons and gases. Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) characterized the relationship he
forged with Iraqi officials as successful.


As I said at the outset, none of this should come as a surprise to any of
us. Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a
supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name. And
this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of
Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal.


With this track record, Iraqi denials of supporting terrorism take the place
alongside the other Iraqi denials of weapons of mass destruction. It is all
a web of lies.


When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional domination,
hides weapons of mass destruction and provides haven and active support for
terrorists, we are not confronting the past, we are confronting the present.
And unless we act, we are confronting an even more frightening future.


My friends, this has been a long and a detailed presentation. And I thank
you for your patience. But there is one more subject that I would like to
touch on briefly. And it should be a subject of deep and continuing concern
to this council, Saddam Hussein's violations of human rights.


Underlying all that I have said, underlying all the facts and the patterns
of behavior that I have identified as Saddam Hussein's contempt for the will
of this council, his contempt for the truth and most damning of all, his
utter contempt for human life. Saddam Hussein's use of mustard and nerve gas
against the Kurds in 1988 was one of the 20th century's most horrible
atrocities; 5,000 men, women and children died. His campaign against the
Kurds from 1987 to '89 included mass summary executions, disappearances,
arbitrary jailing, ethnic cleansing and the destruction of some 2,000
villages. He has also conducted ethnic cleansing against the Shi'a Iraqis
and the Marsh Arabs whose culture has flourished for more than a millennium.
Saddam Hussein's police state ruthlessly eliminates anyone who dares to
dissent. Iraq has more forced disappearance cases than any other country,
tens of thousands of people reported missing in the past decade.


Nothing points more clearly to Saddam Hussein's dangerous intentions and the
threat he poses to all of us than his calculated cruelty to his own citizens
and to his neighbors. Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at
nothing until something stops him.


For more than 20 years, by word and by deed Saddam Hussein has pursued his
ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle East using the only means
he knows, intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might
stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world's most deadly
weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he most hold to fulfill his
ambition.


We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass
destruction; he's determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of
aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of
his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on
those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not some day use
these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a
time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?


The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people.
Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a
few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th
world.


My colleagues, over three months ago this council recognized that Iraq
continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that
Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its disarmament
obligations. Today Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in
material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity
to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and
closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continued
defiance of this council.

My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens, we have an obligation
to this body to see that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441
not in order to go to war, we wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace. We
wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance. Iraq is not so far taking that one
last chance.


We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in our
duty and our responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are
represented by this body.


Thank you, Mr. President.

 Copyright 2003 by Capitol Hill Blue

Top of Page



  News
Latest Headlines

Powell makes his case
Transcript of Powell's remarks to the UN
Russia to Iraq: Time to cooperate
Republicans, Democrats impressed by evidence against Iraq
It's the oil, stupid
Shuttle crash or no, there's still a war coming
Nuke lab rocked by fraud scandal
NASA fired experts who questioned shuttle safety
Reserves will play a major role in US-Iraq war
Public support up for war with Iraq
Pressure & tight schedule overshadowed warnings
Congressional cutbacks increased shuttle dangers
Flights became so routine the danger was forgotten
It started as such a happy morning
Waiting for the landing that never came
Toxins probably never reached the ground
The day the whole town shook
Bush's cybersecurity chief exits with a warning
Full text of Bush's remarks
Debris rains down after shuttle breakup
Profiles of the seven astronauts on board the Columbia
Relatives stunned
Final transmission from Columbia
Remembering Challenger
"Columbia's lost. There are no survivors."
Between a war and a political hard place
Blair steps back, urges Bush to "take a deep breath"
What price security? Oh, about $41.3 billion
Entering the U.S. ain't that hard
Bioterror threat still very real

----- Original Message -----
From: Glen Rangwala <gr10009@cam.ac.uk>
To: richardbyrne <richardbyrne@tiscali.co.uk>
Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2003 5:33 PM
Subject: Re: post Powell stuff


> partial transcript at:
>
> http://cnn.org/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript/index.html
>
> On Feb 5 2003, richardbyrne wrote:
>
> > glenn
> > did you hear powell?
> > when will you have something, can you send it ASAP?
> > richard
> > voices
> > sign the pledge of resistance to the "war on terrorism"
> > www.j-n-v.org
> >
> >
>
> --
> Dr Glen Rangwala
>
> Lecturer in Politics | Newnham College, Cambridge CB3 9DF, UK
> tel (+44/0)1223 335759 | shared fax (+44/0)1223 357898 | gr10009@cam.ac.uk
>

sign the pledge of resistance to the "war on terrorism"
www.j-n-v.org


_______________________________________________
Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss
To contact the list manager, email casi-discuss-admin@lists.casi.org.uk
All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk


[Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]