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[casi] SCR 1441 Analysis - Important Para. and Use of Force (Author - Nathaniel Hurd)

Dear list members,

Several well informed and well placed UN sources to whom I spoke suggested
that SCR 1441 operative paragraph (OP) 4, along with OPs 11 and 12, might be
the most consequentially serious.  They put it to me that if the US decided
to justify using force against Iraq, these OPs would be the most likely
basis for the justification.

Partially in response to their comments and conclusions, I composed a fully
sourced (includes numerous Administration and other quotes, all
footnoted/endnoted) analysis of SCR 1441.

You may find it at:

Nathaniel Hurd, "Security Council Resolution 1441 and the Potential Use of
Force Against Iraq", 6 December 2002, (pdf) and (MS Word)

You may also go to the CASI homepage, click on "Information Sources", then
"Research Reports & Analysis", and then scroll down until you see my name,
"Hurd, Nathaniel".

The document focuses on (among other topics):

* The UN Charter Framework, the 1991 Ceasefire and the Preemptive Use of

* SCR 1441 and the US Position on Whether SCR 1441 Constrains Potential US
Use of Force Against Iraq

* How the US Might Use SCR 1441 to Domestically and Internationally Justify
Using Force Against Iraq (focuses on OPs 4, 11 and 12).
- How US Officials might continue to ignore the 1991 ceasefire and UN
Charter, and   incorrectly interpret SCR 1441 warning language.
- US public laws that misinterpret SCR 678, SCR 687 and SCR 688
- SCR 688 context
- Select past and present US role in Iraqi human rights
- SCR 1441 and the US/UK “No-Fly Zones”
- The current US/UK line that “the operational Paragraph 4 makes it clear
that a material breach is a failure of disclosure and other failure to
comply. So there are two parts of it.”
- Potential implications of determining a “further material breach” in
advance of an actual report of noncompliance.
- UNMOVIC/IAEA not being the exclusive Council reporters on compliance
- Potential implications if a member state reports noncompliance and
UNMOVIC/IAEA disagree with the report.
- The relationship between reporting on noncompliance and the US potentially
withholding intelligence.
- The reporting mechanism and the US potentially accusing UNMOVIC/IAEA of
- How the US might undermine the inspections process as a disarmament
mechanism, even if UNMOVIC/IAEA report noncompliance.

Nathaniel Hurd
Consultant, United Nations Iraq policy, Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)
United Nations Office
90 7th Ave.
Apt. #6
Brooklyn, NY  11217
Tel. (M): 917-407-3389
Tel. (H): 718-857-7639
Fax: 718-504-4224

Any views or opinions presented above are solely those of Nathaniel Hurd and
do not necessarily represent those of the Mennonite Central Committee.  The
Mennonite Central Committee has no legal or other responsibility for the
contents of this message.

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