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TITLE: ANALYSIS OF 5 NOVEMBER 2002 US/UK DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (SCR). Author: NATHANIEL HURD, Consultant, UN Iraq Policy, Mennonite Central Committee UN Office. Hurd is a former Iraq Sanctions Project Associate, Center for Economic and Social Rights (New York City, US). Hurd has written the following document in a strictly personal capacity. ABSTRACT: * For full US/UK Draft SCR 5 November 2002 text see: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17239-2002Nov6.html This document: * focuses on some possible “trigger mechanisms” that the US might potentially use to justify large-scale military force against Iraq, before or during resumed non-conventional weapons inspections in Iraq. * comments and background information are intended to be somewhat comprehensive “food for thought”. The document is long but intended to be thorough. It assesses the SCR paragraph by paragraph and usually inserts the relevant primary source text before the commentary. * presents some of Hurd’s analysis and some that is culled from contacts (some sourced and others not). Please also see Glen Rangwala, “Comments on the US-UK draft resolution of 5 November 2002”, 7 November 2002,http://middleeastreference.org.uk/commentson021105.html [Dr. Rangwala is a Lecturer in Politics, Newnham College, Cambridge University (UK) and co-author with Alan Simpson (MP) of “The Dishonest Case for War on Iraq”, http://www.labouragainstthewar.org.uk/link5.html), a critique of official statements regarding Iraq’s non-conventional weapons, Iraq as a non-conventional weapons threat, and the potential use of large scale force against Iraq.] Also see Colin Rowat, “US, French and Russian SCR Drafts on Iraq”, CASI Discussion List, 2 November 2002, http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2002/msg01971.html [Dr. Rowat is a Lecturer in Economics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and a former Iraq Sanctions Project Coordinator, Center for Economic and Social Rights (US).] * assumes that the draft SCR does not explicitly constrain the potential US use of force. It seems that the draft has been deliberately aimed to be ambiguous so as to neither constrain nor authorize the use of force. “‘It is a masterpiece of creative ambiguity,’” said a council diplomat.” (Maggie Farley, “Compromise Reported on Iraq Resolution at U.N.”, Los Angeles Times, 6 November 2002. (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-uniraq6nov06021420,0,601429.story?coll=la-headlines-world) This lack of constraint seems consistent with US objectives and draft interpretations. E.g., “Nothing in this resolution handcuffs the [US] President”. (White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, press briefing, 6 November 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021106-1.html) E.g., “Senior U.S. officials insisted that the new resolution formally presented to the council today preserves Bush's authority to wage war against Iraq.” (Colum Lynch, “U.S. Presses U.N. to Back Tough New Iraq Resolution”, Washington Post, 7 November 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19704-2002Nov6.html) * is formatted for plain text distribution. * For past official and unofficial SCRs, see http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/scriraq.html and http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/whatsnew.html * Preambulatory paragraphs provide background to the actions that the Council will later detail in operative paragraphs. Operative paragraphs list Council ordered, requested, etc. actions. * Unless otherwise noted, a “para.” refers to “operative paragraph”. * For US legislation, the included date refers to date on which the US President signed it into public, not when the Congress passed it. [begin] I. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, preambulatory para. 1 I A) Along with relevant SCRs, the Security Council “Recall[s]...all the relevant statements of its President”. Sometimes Iraq-related Presidential Statements contain language stronger than SCR language (e.g., “gross” or “clear” “violation”, or “material breach” of SCRs). On occasion, usually to address a specific matter, a Presidential Statement will be issued when there is no SCR. Presidential Statements may reflect opinion present in the Council, but they are non-binding. Only SCRs are binding. This paragraph section seems like an attempt to make up for language not included in SCRs or for the absence of an SCR. E.g., see Statement of the Security Council President, S/23643, 26 February 1992, in which the Security Council President declares Iraq to be in “material breach” of relevant SCRs. For a partial list of Presidential Statements see http://www.un.org/documents/pstatesc.htm II. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, preambulatory para. 4, 5, 10 and 11 [begin] Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area, [preambulatory para. 4] Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area, [preambulatory para. 5] Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein, [preambulatory para 10] Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance [preambulatory para. 11] [end] II A) These paragraphs seem to contribute or add up to a trigger mechanism. II B) SCR 678 force authorization ended with SCR 687 and the ceasefire condition therein: Iraq had to officially accept SCR 687’s provision. The ceasefire did not depend on other SCR 687 provisions, even those relating to Iraq’s non-conventional weapons. SCR 687 did not authorize Member States to use force once the ceasefire was in effect. In sum, neither SCR 678 nor SCR 687 (nor for that matter SCR 688 which is woven in preambulatory para. 9) authorized the use of force. See below details. II C) The US seems to want to make the currently discussed SCR as consistent as possible with US legislation, particularly pertaining to SCR 678. Clinton and G.W. Bush Administrations, along with the US Congress, have incorrectly used SCR 678 as a pretext to use force against Iraq, in a post-SCR 687 (Gulf War ceasefire) era. II C 1) In SCR 678 (29 November 1990) the Security Council [begin] Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so [para. 1] Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area [para. 2] Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution [para. 3] [end] II C 1 a) In SCR 660 the Council “Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait” and “Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990” (para. 1 and 2). In SCR 678 para. 1, the Council seemed to order Iraq to comply with SCR 660 and all relevant post-SCR 660 resolutions and grant Iraq until 15 January 1991 (a deadline) to fully implement relevant SCRs. II C 1 b) SCR 678’s “Foregoing resolutions” (para. 2) seemed to refer to relevant resolutions passed before 15 January 1991. In practice this was SCRs 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677 and 678, a total of 12 SCRs. The Council seemed to authorize the use of force, but only if Iraq didn’t implement relevant SCRs 660-678 by 15 January 1991. II C 1 c) SCR 678’s “subsequent relevant resolutions” seem to refer to SCR 660 and relevant resolutions beyond 15 January 1991, if Iraq did not implement relevant SCRs by 15 January 1991. Thus the Council seemed to in advance authorize the use of force to enforce SCR 686’s (2 March 1991) terms. Note that SCR 686 “Demands that Iraq implements its acceptance of all [of the SCR 686-noted] resolutions” (para. 2), and “Decides that Iraq shall notify the Secretary-General and the Security Council when it has taken [SCR 686 demanded] actions”. (para 7) But SCR 686 does not state that implementation will by definition trigger a ceasefire. SCR 686 seems to be the last SCR for which Council force authorization applied. II C 1 d) SCR 687 (8 April 1991) “Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire”. (para. 1) To clarify the SCR language, one the goals of “this resolution” (687) is “a formal ceasefire”. Also in SCR the Council “Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990)”. (para. 33) The Council noted “the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government”. (preambulatory para. 2) The Council had achieved its ostensible main goal in response to Iraq’s invasion. The subsequent ceasefire depended on Iraq accepting SCR 687’s provisions. Once Iraq officially accepted said provisions, a ceasefire would exist between Iraq and Kuwait and “the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678”. Two key points: One, the Council linked Member State cooperation with Kuwait to SCR 678, and the related exclusive Charter-based Council purview regarding the use of force. Two, Iraq’s acceptance was the ceasefire’s pre-requisite. The ceasefire effectiveness did not depend on, e.g., other Council-determined “obligations” regarding Iraq’s non-conventional weapons. The Charter states that Source: UN Charter, article 51, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm [begin] Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. [end] Thus, once Iraq committed its armed attack against Kuwait, Kuwait and/or other Member States could use armed force to defend Kuwait. However, the Charter only permitted Kuwait and Member States to act without Security Council authorization “until the Security Council [took] measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Once the Security Council officially acted on 2 August 1990 (SCR 660), then, according to the UN Charter, the Council had authority over Kuwait and supporting Member States. It was thereafter up to the Council to determine when Member States (and presumably Kuwait) could use force to force Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. In SCR 678 the Council authorized Member States to use force to “uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions to restore international peace and security in the area”, (para. 2) if Iraq had not implemented relevant SCRs by 15 January 1991. Having officially acted on 2 August 1990, Charter-wise the Council alone could (and did) authorize the use of force regarding Iraq. By SCR 687 (8 April 1991), the Council was “seized of the matter”. This meant that just as Charter-wise the Council could exclusively authorize the use of force vis à vis Iraq, so to could the Council exclusively declare a formal ceasefire. Member States cooperating with Kuwait, who earlier used force under Council authority, would thereafter have to cease using force and abide by the ceasefire. SCR 687’s ceasefire replaced SCR 678’s force permission. SCR 687 (para. 33) lays out only one prerequisite for the Council to declare that a ceasefire is in effect: Iraq had to officially notify the Secretary-General and the Council that Iraq accepted SCR 687’s provisions. The Council might have linked lifting sanctions to it determining that Iraq had fulfilled all Council-required “all actions”. (para. 22) But ceasefire-wise the Council did not condition the ceasefire upon the Council determining that Iraq partially or fully complied with SCR 687’s provisions (other than para. 33 regarding acceptance). Effectively, the Council identified Iraq’s non-conventional weapons as a peace and security issue that ostensibly concerned the Council. In SCR 687 the Council detailed related actions that the Council ordered Iraq to undertake. Those orders and to-be-undertaken actions seem to be at least one primary, ostensible reason why the Council “Decide[d] to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.” (para. 34) Iraq as a peace and security issue, and the continuing seizure and further steps are separate from the ceasefire and use of force authorization ending therein. Charter-wise, the Council would have to later authorize (not re-authorize relating to the ceasefire) the use of force against Iraq. In other words, the Council laid out a ceasefire condition: Iraq had to officially accept SCR 687’s provisions. It did, on 6 April 1991 (S/22456). The ceasefire was in effect. The Council stated that Iraq was a peace and security issue in relation to which the Council wished to remained seized. Since SCR 687 the Council has remained seized of that issue and has taken steps. The ceasefire is still in effect. If the Council authorizes the use of force against Iraq, it will be an act separate from the ceasefire. However, the authorization will not necessarily be separate from SCR 687 provisions that pertained to the period following the ceasefire declaration and/or Iraq as a peace and security issue. To read more on ceasefires and why they constitute issue-specific use of force termination, rather than suspension (to be relatedly resumed at any time), see Dr. Glen Rangwala, “Does a “Material Breach” of SCR 687 Justify an Invasion?”, CASI discussion list, 22 August 2002, http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2002/msg01239.html II C 2) On 3 January 1991, a full US Congressional “Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678” became “US public law” (Passed as H.J. Res. 77 and signed into law as US Public Law 102-1, “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution”, 14 January 1991). This resolution “pursuant” to SCR 678 was consistent with the UN Charter’s Chapter VII regarding peace and security, the Security Council, the use of force and Member States. II C 3) As suggested above, Council authorization for Member States to use force against Iraq ended with SCR 687 and Iraq’s officially accepting SCR 687. Nevertheless, the US Congress passed a joint Resolution that incorrectly states that Source: Passed as H.R. 4655 and signed into law as Public Law 105-338, “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, 31 October 1998, sec. 2 [begin] Hostilities in Operation Desert Storm ended on February 28, 1991, and Iraq subsequently accepted the ceasefire conditions specified in United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991) requiring Iraq, among other things, to disclose fully and permit the dismantlement of its weapons of mass destruction programs and submit to long-term monitoring and verification of such dismantlement. [end] Later, in mid-December 1998, President Bill Clinton incorrectly stated that SCR 678 and SCR 687 effectively authorized US to use force against Iraq during “Operation Desert Fox”: Source: “Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, 18 December 1998, http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/12/18/981218-wh1.htm [begin] At approximately 5:00 p.m. eastern standard time on December 16, 1998, at my direction, U.S. military forces conducted missile and aircraft strikes in Iraq in response to Iraqi breaches of its obligations under resolutions of the United Nations Security Council...It is consistent with and has been taken in support of numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolutions 678 and 687, which authorize U.N. Member States to use “all necessary means” to implement the Security Council resolutions and to restore peace and security in the region and establish the terms of the cease-fire mandated by the Council, including those related to the destruction of Iraq’s WMD programs. [end] II C 4) The 19 September 2002 White House, “Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq” discussion draft invoked US Public Law 102-1 (1991) and SCR 678 and 687 therein, and US Public Law 102-90 (1991) and SCR 687 and SCR 688 respectively therein, to support potential US use of force against Iraq. Source: White House, “Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq”, discussion, draft, 19 September 2002, preambulatory para. 11. [begin] Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has authorized the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve full implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678; Whereas Congress in section 1095 of Public Law 102 190 has stated that it “supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (Public Law 102-1),” that Iraq’s repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and “constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,” and that Congress “supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Resolution 688” [end] US Public Law 102-190 (1991) invoked SCR 687 and SCR 688 (5 April 1991) to authorize the potential use of force against Iraq. SCR 688 “Condemn[ed] the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region” (para. 1). SCR 688 primarily “demande[d]” that the Government of Iraq end this repression, grant access to international humanitarian organizations, requested the Secretary-General to report on the civilian repression-related humanitarian situation, “Appeal[ed] to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts”, and “Demand[ed] that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends” (para. 2-4 and 6-7). Notably, in SCR 688 the Council does not act under UN Charter’s Chapter VII, the pre-requisite for Council force authorization. Thus, it is incorrect for the US to suggest that SCR 688 legitimates the “no-fly zones” (e.g., Richard Boucher, briefer, “Daily Press Briefing”, US Department of State, 16 June 2000, http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/0006/000616db.html) (and the therein use of force) or potential US military actions against Iraq. As an aside, in contrast, when addressing Iraq, SCR 660 onward, the Council almost always acts under Chapter VII (although its force authorization has not applied since SCR 687 and the ceasefire therein). By SCR 688, the Iraqi Government continued to repress Iraqi civilians, especially Kurds, just as it did throughout the 1980s. During the 1980s the UN Commission on Human Rights (HRC) Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances reported on thousands of unaccounted disappearances in Iraq. The Commission also appointed a Special Rapporteur on “summary or arbitrary executions”, and Iraq was one of the focus countries. Additionally, Amnesty International, other organizations and the press reported on Government of Iraq repressing (including killing on mass scales) Kurd, Shias and other individuals and groups. But almost certainly because of Iran-Iraq War considerations, neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council condemned or acted in response to the Iraqi Government’s human rights violation during the 1980s. In fact, the Council did not condemn the internal repression in resolution form until SCR 688(and then it did not invoke Chapter VII), while the GA first issued a relevant resolution on 17 December 1991 (A/RES/46/134). All condemnation only followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Source: Passed as H.R. 2100 and signed into law as US Public Law 102-190, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993,” 5 December 1991, sec. 1095 [begin] the Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1). [end] Source: Passed as H.R. 2100 and signed into law as US Public Law 102-190, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993”, 5 December 1991, sec. 1096 [begin] the Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 consistent with all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1). [end] The recently processed US Public Law 107-243 includes the standard US legislative language that incorrectly suggests that SCRs 678, 687 and 688 authorize to use force against Iraq. Source: Passed as H.J.RES.114 and signed into law as Public Law 107-243, “Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002”, 16 October 2002 [begin] Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994); Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1), Congress has authorized the President ‘to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677’; Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it ‘supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),’ that Iraq’s repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and ‘constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,’ and that Congress, ‘supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688’; [end] III. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, preambulatory para. 8. [begin] Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council’s repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people, [end] III A) The SCR seems to allude to long-standing Council economic sanctions on Iraq and link those sanctions to the suffering therein. But it suggests that Iraq’s failure to “provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)” is the exclusive reason for “the suffering of the Iraqi people”. This argument ignores Council responsibility for its actions’ foreseeable consequences. Since SCR 661 (6 August 1990) the Security Council has linked Iraq’s humanitarian situation and Iraq as a peace and security issue. The Council has used measures that predictably damaged Iraq’s economy and largely contributed to Iraq’s humanitarian crisis. Consistently, the Council conditioned ending these measures upon the Government of Iraq fully complying (in Council judgment) with Council SCRs. At no point has the Council de-linked its ostensible peace and security objectives from Iraqi civilians and their humanitarian crisis. Relatedly, publicly available information and conversations with contacts close to the process suggest that through diplomatic, economic and other means, the US has long used a multi-lateral mechanism (the UN and Security Council) to maintain a unilateral policy (economic sanctions on Iraq). If the US decided to argue that economically-damaging measures on Iraq should end, it seems almost certain that no Council Members, particularly other permanent Members, would seriously contest the conclusion. Council Members, especially permanent Members China, France and Russia, have no real economic, political or other desire to maintain economic sanctions on Iraq. However, these States have decided that it is not in their short-term and/or long term “interests” to really oppose the US to the point where they publicly insist that the Council separate humanitarian issues from and Security ones and end Council measures that foreseeably will damage Iraq’s economy and lead to humanitarian consequences. Unsurprisingly, the calculus seems to be that national and/or personal economic, political and other costs, real or imaginary, override the consequences that Council actions have for Iraqi civilians. III B) Economic sanctions’ foreseeable consequences, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Security Council’s own 1999 Humanitarian Panel, UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy, the UN High Commission on Human Rights, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other UN bodies, some with a human rights and others with a humanitarian focus, all link Council economic sanctions to Iraq’s long standing and well documented humanitarian situation. Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali generally linked sanctions to economic damage and conflicting with UN development objectives. Foreseeable and/or documented consequences suggest more about “regret”, and establish responsibility for outcomes, far more than oral/written rhetoric regarding regret and/or intent. III B 1) Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Source: [Annual] Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations”, A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, para. 70, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html [begin] Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behavior is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects. Sanctions also always have unintended or unwanted effects. They can complicate the work of humanitarian agencies by denying them certain categories of supplies and by obliging them to go through arduous procedures to obtain the necessary exemptions. They can conflict with the development objectives of the Organization and do long-term damage to the productive capacity of the target country. [end] III B 2) Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “..the people of Iraq continue to suffer from the effects of sanctions.” ([Annual] Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, A/55/1, 30 August 2000, para. 143, http://www.un.org/documents/sg/report00/a551e.pdf) “[S]anctions...are causing so many hardships for the Iraqi people.” (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, address to UN General Assembly, SG/SM/8378 and GA/10045, 12 September 2002, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SGSM8378.doc.htm) III B 3) 1999 Security Council-appointed Humanitarian Panel: Source: Report of the Second Panel Established Pursuant to the Note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100), Concerning the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq”, Annex II of S/1999/356, 30 March 1999, para. 45, http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/panelrep.html [begin] Even if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war. [end] III B 4) UNICEF Director Carol Bellamy: When Bellamy introduced the UNICEF 1999 Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Surveys Source: UNICEF, “1999 Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Surveys”, 12 August 1999, http://www.unicef.org/reseval/pdfs/irqu5est.pdf [begin] Ms. Bellamy noted that if the substantial reduction in child mortality throughout Iraq during the 1980s had continued through the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of children under-five in the country as a whole during the eight year period 1991 to 1998. As a partial explanation, she pointed to a March statement of the Security Council Panel on Humanitarian Issues which states: “Even if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war.” [end] III B 5) Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Source: “Background Paper prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for the meeting of the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs”, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 5 September 2000, para. 14, http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/undocs/sanct31.pdf [begin] “OHCHR believes that the current sanctions regime is having a disproportionately negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights by the Iraqi population.” [end] Also see OHCHHR’s document for a comprehensive summary of UN bodies’ comments regarding sanctions generally and sanctions on Iraq specifically. III B 6) UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) (founded in 1985 by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (a main UN organ)) on economic sanctions generally: Source: E/C.12/1997/8, “CESCR General Comment 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 12 December 1997, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/974080d2db3ec66d802565c5003b2f57?Opendocument [begin] While the impact of sanctions varies from one case to another, the Committee is aware that they almost always have a dramatic impact on the rights recognized in the [International] Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)]. [end] III B 7) Economic sanctions damage a target economy. III B 7 a) Economic damage is why economic sanctions’ architects design and implement economic sanctions, ostensibly to force State and/or non-State actors to change their actions. III B 7 b) Economic sanctions fail to do cause economic damage only when they are completely ineffective. III B 7 c) The damage extent and type depend on the sanctions particulars (specific measures, enforcement, comprehensiveness, etc.) and the target economy (the Iraqi economy was for well chronicled reasons (e.g., reliance on revenue generated from a single export, reliance on imports for nutritional and infrastructural inputs) particularly vulnerable). III B 8) By definition, economic damage leads to suffering. III B 8 a) Civilians are most vulnerable. III B 8 b) Vulnerable civilians (women, children, the sick, the elderly and the poor) are most likely to bear the suffering brunt. III B 8 c) The extent and type of suffering depends on the economic damage and individual vulnerability. III B 9) Applied economic sanctions will lead to economic damage and subsequent civilian suffering – this is inevitable and foreseeable. III B 9 a) For some potential, predictable economic sanctions-related outcomes, see Dr. Eric Hoskins, “The Impact of Sanctions: A Study of UNICEF’s Perspectives”, February 1998, http://www.unicef.org/emerg/Sanctions.htm and particularly Table 3 http://www.unicef.org/emerg/ImpactSanctions.htm III B 9 b) Thus, if one accepts the above hypothesis, one may argue it is inaccurate to state that applied economic sanctions do not have a primary role in Iraq’s economic damage and civilian suffering. The policy has clear, inevitable, foreseeable economic and civilian consequences. Thus, those who make, and especially those who maintain, such a policy have a responsibility for its reasonably foreseeable and/or documented outcomes. IV. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, preambulatory para. 9 [begin] Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq... [end] IV A) To varying degrees, President G.W. Bush and numerous Administration officials have tried to link Iraq to al Qaeda, and thus to 11 September 2001 or a potential repeat of it. H.J.RES.114, signed into law as Public Law 107-243 also tries to establish this link. (H.J.RES.114, signed into law as Public Law 107-243, “Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002”, 16 October 2002). No credible source seems to have substantiated these claims. They certainly do not constitute a basis for the Security Council to authorize force against Iraq. See especially Sebastian Rotella, “Allies Find No Links between Iraq, Al Qaeda”, Los Angeles Times, 4 November 2002, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-fg-noqaeda4nov04.story IV B) The SCR 688 invocation also seems designed to establish more SCR continuity with US Public Law 102-90 (1991). V. General Preamble comments A) Preamble does not recall SCR 687 (1991), para. 14., which “Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons”. VI. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 1 [begin] Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991); [end] VI A) “Material breach” seems to be a primary trigger mechanism. VI A 1) On whether “material breach” alone is enough to “justify and invasion, please see Glen Rangwala, “Does a “Material Breach” of SCR 687 Justify an Invasion?”, CASI discussion list, 22 August 2002, http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2002/msg01239.html VI A 2) SCR 707 (1991) is the only SCR in which the Council states that Iraq is in “material breach”. Some Security Council Presidential statements have declared that Iraq is in “material breach” (e.g., Statement of the Security Council President, S/23643, 26 February 1992). But SCRs are ostensibly binding, while Security Council Presidential are non-binding. Source: SCR 707, 15 August 1991, para.1 [begin] Condemns Iraq's serious violation of a number of its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991) and of its undertakings to cooperate with the Special Commission and the IAEA, which constitutes a material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 which established a cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region [end] VII. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 2 [begin] Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council [end] A) “Final opportunity to comply” seems to be the key phrase. Like much SCR language, it is not tightly defined. Does the Council order perfect compliance? Is perfect compliance possible, given the mass of information and number of individuals involved in declaring and disarming? If UNSCOM reports a minor infraction and the Council determines that the individual, Ministry, etc. connected to the reported infraction has either intentionally or unintentionally erred, has the Council determined in advance (via this paragraph) that Iraq squandered its “final opportunity”? If so, is “final opportunity” the textual cover (although not authorization) for the US to use force against Iraq? VIII. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 3 [begin] Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material; [end] VIII A) “A declaration regarding weapons programme should be possible within 30 days and the same should be true for declaring remaining permitted peaceful nuclear programmes (op.3). To declare all other chemical programmes in a country with a fairly large chemical industry, as well as other biological programmes might be more problematic in a short time.” (Hans Blix, “Notes for the Briefing to The Security Council”, draft, 28 October 2002”, para. 7, http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/blix021028.pdf) VIII B) [Hans Blix] “said... it would be impossible for Iraq to meet a 30-day deadline to declare every component of its civilian chemical and biological industries.” (Colum Lynch, “U.S. Presses U.N. to Back Tough New Iraq Resolution”, Washington Post, 7 November 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19704-2002Nov6.html) VIII C) Inherent in every somewhat modern economy and national infrastructure are at least some biological, chemical and other materials with potential, non-conventional military application. Declaring within 30 days all biological and chemical programs, materials and equipment with potential non-conventional utility may be impossible, for they all qualify as having said potential. If Iraq is unable to make these programmatic et al declarations because of an unrealistic timetable, will the US then be better positioned to declare that Iraq has not complied and thereafter initiate military action against Iraq? VIII D) Suppose that a declaration contains a genuine mistake. Technically, a document with an error is not “currently accurate, full, and complete”. Will such a mistake be a pretext for military action, in the name of non-compliance? IX. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 4 [begin] Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraph 11 or 12 below; [end] IX A) Perhaps the most overt trigger mechanism. The trigger would follow inspections’ resumption. IX B) As with previous paragraphs, this paragraph does not seem to allow for unintentional mistakes or unintentional declaration delays. IX C) Does not define or distinguish between major and minor “false statements or omissions”. IX D) A contact noted that when commenting on a similar paragraph in the 25 October 2002 US/UK draft, Jeremy Greenstock, UK Permanent Ambassador to the UN, emphasized the “and”, in between “this resolution” and “failure”. Greenstock argued that Iraq would have to provide “false statements or omissions” AND fail “at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution”, in order for it to “constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations”. That seems like a flawed explanation. One might argue that the antecedent (including “false statements or omissions”) to the relevant “and” in operative para. 4 is part of “this resolution”. Therefore, what follows “and” is also what precedes it. Greenstock’s post-“and” is thus redundant and “false statements or omissions” stands as enough to constitute a “further material breach”. IX E) Determines a poorly defined “material breach” before actions take place. Past Security Council policy has been to categorize an action as a material breach after the action occurs. IX F) Is a “false statement or omission” sufficient cause to wage war on Iraq, with all the reasonable foreseeable/likely resulting consequences? IX G) “Other council members, though, might not be willing to go to war over an incomplete list.” (Maggie Farley, “Compromise Reported on Iraq Resolution at U.N.”, Los Angeles Times, 6 November 2002, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-uniraq6nov06021420,0,601429.story?coll=la-headlines-world X. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 5. [begin] Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi government [end] X A) Source: Hans Blix, “Notes for the Briefing to The Security Council”, draft, 28 October 2002”, para. 9, http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/blix021028.pdf) [begin] The [25 October 2002 US/UK] draft resolution prescribes that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA access to officials or other persons for interviews pursuant to any aspect of their mandates and that this shall occur in the mode or location chosen by the organizations. I understand this to mean that we can request Iraq to find the relevant persons and assist in bringing them to a place of our choice for the interview and that it is open to us to decide to hold the interview without any official present to avoid any risk of intimidation. We are aware, however, that, for various possible reasons, some of the persons thus asked for interviews might decline to speak with us in private or to speak at all. I understand that the provision (in op. 5) under which UNMOVIC or the IAEA might ‘facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq’ is an authorization rather than a mandate. There would be great practical difficulties in using such authority, unless there was cooperation by the Iraqi side. [end] X B) “Blix...reiterated his concern about a U.S. proposal to grant him the power to interview Iraqi scientists and their families outside the country.” (Colum Lynch, “U.S. Presses U.N. to Back Tough New Iraq Resolution”, Washington Post, 7 November 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19704-2002Nov6.html) X C) “U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix has questioned the measure's practicality – how many family members and colleagues would the U.N. need to take for each expert, and once they left, would they face even more harassment upon their return? Or would they automatically become refugees?” (Maggie Farley, “Compromise Reported on Iraq Resolution at U.N.”, Los Angeles Times, 6 November 2002, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-uniraq6nov06021420,0,601429.story?coll=la-headlines-world) X D) Giving UNMOVIC discretion to take Iraqis out of the country may be designed to trigger Iraq rejecting the SCR. If Iraq rejects the resolution, then the US might claim a pretext for using large scale military force against Iraq. X E) This sentences authorizing UNMOVIC to interview people out of Iraq may be designed to poison the inspections process once it begins. E.g., UNMOVIC may refuse to exercise the SCR-granted authority. The US might argue that such interviews are essential for effective disarmament. UNMOVIC might disagree. The US might then explore ways to disrupt inspections. Or, the US might argue that less-than-optimal inspections and disarmament are insufficient to disarm Iraq to a standard that it determines. The US would then argue that it therefore has no choice but to use force against Iraq to secure Iraq’s disarmament. X F) If potential interviewees and/or their family members refused (either voluntarily or under duress) to leave Iraq, how would the Council respond? Would the US use it as a pretext to use force against Iraq? XI. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 8 [begin] Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution [end] XI A) The Government of Iraq often makes hyperbolic statements, either through officials or official/government-affiliated media, that include the threat of force. In future would such statements be a pretext for military action against Iraq? XI B) The US often incorrectly claims that it was the authority to “support” SCR 688 by using aerial munitions in the so-called “no-fly zones”. If the Iraqi Government states that its air defenses will attack such US planes that are not authorized by the Council, will the US utilize its SCR 688 “support” claim to argue that Iraq has violated this paragraph. XI C) If an Iraqi guard with too much bravado starts waving around his gun during an inspection detail, will this be a pretext for the use of force against Iraq? XII. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 9 [begin] Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA [end] XII A) “The U.N.'s chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, cited several problems with the U.S. text of the resolution. He said that a seven-day deadline for Iraq to accept the terms of the resolution was unnecessary” (Colum Lynch, “U.S. Presses U.N. to Back Tough New Iraq Resolution”, Washington Post, 7 November 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19704-2002Nov6.html) XIII. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 10 [begin] Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA [end] XIII A) Source: Hans Blix, “Notes for the Briefing to The Security Council”, draft, 28 October 2002”, para. 13, http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/blix021028.pdf [begin] “The provision I have referred to [in the 25 October 2002 US/UK draft SCR, operative para. 10] touches upon some of the most sensitive and difficult parts of our future activities. Access to sites is vital but it must be coupled with information about what sites may be relevant. We have much information ourselves, from the past, from satellite images, from the recently delivered semi-annual monitoring declarations and from open sources. However, this information needs to be supplemented by recommendations from Member States’ intelligence. The providers of such information can legitimately require that we be organized and operate in such a fashion that there are no leakages and that no sources are endangered. They cannot, however, expect us to conform to a common two-way pattern of exchange. We are not engaged in some quid pro quo activities. Their governments have a direct interest in our going the most interesting sites and objects for inspection. This is the most important gain that what we and they can get out of our cooperation. To achieve this, we must, as we have noted earlier, be able at least to have a dialogue in which we tell our providers what particular information we are interested in. What goes beyond that is difficult to define and must, I think, be left to our judgement to decide in particular matters. It is clear that our mandate is limited to weapons of mass destruction and that we have no business to look for conventional weapons other than when they are relevant for WMDs, e.g. bombs or warheads as munitions for WMDs. [end] XIII B) Source: Hans Blix, “Notes for the Briefing to The Security Council”, draft, 28 October 2002”, para. 12, http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/blix021028.pdf) [begin] I welcome that Member States are recommended to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA, inter alia, by providing information and recommendation of sites to be inspected and persons to be interviewed. I think we might be able to determine, without guidance, the conditions of the interviews and what data to collect. I take it that, as in the past, only significant results will be reported to the Council. [end] XIV. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 11 [begin] Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution [end] XIV A) This does not distinguish between varyingly serious and type of “interference” or “failure to comply”. An earlier French draft SCR “directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any serious failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections, under this resolution” (French draft SCR, operative para. 10). The French draft SCR at least qualifies “failure by Iraq to comply” with “serious”. XIV B) Blix has long stated that “Our reports must be as accurate and objective as is at all possible. However, I will not agree with an interpretation suggesting that we have peace and war in our hands. We report. It is the Security Council and its Members who decide.” (Hans Blix, “Notes for the Briefing to The Security Council”, draft, 28 October 2002”, para. 14, http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/blix021028.pdf) What if there is a disagreement between UNMOVIC and the US over what constitutes “any interference” or “failure by Iraq to comply”? UNMOVIC might conclude that a situation is not worth reporting, while the US might conclude that it qualified as “any interference” or “failure to comply”. The US might argue that the Government of Iraq is not letting UNMOVIC do its job, even if UNMOVIC doesn’t report an incident as per the 5 November 2002 draft SCR (para. 11) provisions. XIV C) The US might cite an incident, unreported by UNMOVIC, to argue that Iraq is interfering or not complying to US satisfaction. This would incident would be the pretext for the use force against Iraq. XV. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 12 [begin] Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to restore international peace and security [end] XV A) This paragraph binds Council Member States to do no more than meet and discuss the relevant situation, following “upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above”. US Permanent Representative to the UN John Negroponte stated that “the resolution does not prejudge what might happen after that stage.” (Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Remarks following the Consultations on the Iraq Resolution, at the Security Council Stake-out, 6 November 2002, http://www.un.int/usa/02_183.htm) Paragraph 11 does not mean that Member States could only use force after explicit Council authorization in the form of a second SCR, following Council considerations and discussions. In fact, the US could have already begun its military operations against Iraq by the time the Council convenes. XV B) The French for long insisted that Council-approved force usage could only follow a second SCR. In the second SCR, the Council would have to first find Iraq to be in “material breach” over actions that UNMOVIC reported. The Council would then in the SCR have to explicitly authorize Member States to use force to secure Iraq’s SCR compliance. XV C) The US has consistently and publicly stated that Council force authorization would be optimal but that it reserved the right to act without Council approval. Conversations with contacts confirmed that during SCR negotiations, US negotiators made it clear that the US would not accept a resolution that constrained the US ability to use force against Iraq. XV D) “Security Council diplomats said they did not believe either US President George W. Bush or Jacques Chirac, his French counterpart, had scored a clean victory in the negotiations. The French were unable to force the US to commit to a two-resolution process, but Washington had failed to persuade the Security Council to back its demands for immediate authority to go to war, they said.” (Caroline Daniel, Robert Graham, Carola Hoyos, Andrew Jack and James Kynge, “Washington Confident of Wide Support for its Iraq Resolution”, Financial Times, 7 November 2002) XVI. US/UK draft SCR, 5 November 2002, operative para. 13 [begin] Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations [end] XVI A) “Warned” and “serious consequences” seem to be additional and rather straight-forward trigger mechanisms, should the US and/or the Council declare that Iraq is further non-compliant (without or without UNMOVIC reporting as such). Following such a determination, the US would probably quote such a paragraph to justify its military actions against Iraq. Suggested reading: Carola Hoyos and Alan Beattie, “Nations Ponder Expense of US Stance at UN”, Financial Times, 6 November 2002, http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1035873057605&p=1031119383196 [end] Nathaniel Hurd 90 7th Ave. Apt. #6 Brooklyn, NY 11217 Tel. (M): 917-407-3389 Tel. (H): 718-857-7639 Fax: 718-504-4224 _________________________________________________________________ MSN 8 with e-mail virus protection service: 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/virus _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss To contact the list manager, email email@example.com All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk