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Dear list members, I am attaching some notes on the US, French and Russian draft Security Council resolutions on Iraq in the hope that they might be of interest. The US draft is dated 25 October; I do not have dates for the other two, beyond noting that the Russian draft (as carried on the CASI site at www.casi.org.uk) was faxed on 29 October. (For a complete list of Iraq SCRs in the 1990s, see http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html.) All three resolutions begin their preambular paragraphs by calling to mind relevant past resolutions. All three act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (thus allowing enforcement actions) and all three call for the Iraqi government's immediate co-operation in disarmament. Their texts are generally similar, but they differ in nuance. The US draft is heavy with threats, and provides the Iraqi government no assurances as to the consequences of its co-operation. The French and Russian drafts provide such assurances and fewer threats, the Russian draft being more generous to the Iraqi government than is the French in this respect. I present the US draft first and then focus on differences. THE US DRAFT The "relevant resolutions" recalled by the US draft focus to some extent on SCR 678 (29 Nov. 1990), which authorised the use of "all necessary means" to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and on other early SCRs that responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Subsequent paragraphs then attempt to establish 678 as authorising "member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement ... all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660" (which condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and called for its reversal). This interpretation is consistent with that announced by Bush administration officials, but does not seem to me to hold up to the terms of SCR 687 (3 Apr. 1991), whose first operative paragraph reaffirmed the previous resolutions, "except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire". Elaborating, it declared a "formal cease-fire ... between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait" upon the Iraqi government's "official notification" of its acceptance of the terms of 687. This notification was given very grudgingly on 6 April 1991 in S/22456. The preamble stresses its concern to restore "international peace and security", but avoids the explicit aims expressed in SCR 687, namely, eliminating all "weapons of mass destruction" (including nuclear weapons) and "achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments" in the Middle East. It also criticises the Iraqi government for failing to comply with its commitments with respect to terrorism (no details mentioned), internal repression, co-operation with aid agencies and the return of people and objects seized during the Gulf War. Finally, it acknowledges that the situation has prolonged "the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people". The operative paragraphs then declare that Iraq is in "material breach" of relevant resolutions, including 687, the cease-fire resolution, in particular for its failure to comply with the disarmament conditions therein. It sets out a time table for compliance, and decides that "false statements or omissions ... shall constitute a further material breach". They give Unmovic/IAEA the right to interview Iraqis outside Iraq, including by transporting their families out with them, to receive the names of all Iraqis involved with Iraq's weapons and ancillary programmes, the right to declare no-fly/drive zones and the ability to move equipment into Iraq and use it "without search of ... official or personal baggage". Further, teams shall be selected on the basis of expertise alone. Both of these last two points will likely raise the spectre of spying by inspectors again. In response to the spying that helped discredit Unscom and end inspections in 1998, the Council had emphasised "broad national representation", recognising the predominance of inspectors from countries hostile to the Iraqi government. Finally, the procedures outlined in the 8 October letter by Hans Blix and Mohamed el-Baradei are implemented as binding. THE FRENCH DRAFT The "relevant resolutions" recalled here include those in the US draft, but add those relating to past inspection plans, and the Iraqi government's obstruction of them. The subsequent preamble and draft then focuses more narrowly on weapons issues, and stresses that compliance on these are "a first step towards a comprehensive settlement ... opening the way to ending the [sanctions'] prohibitions", offering the famous light at the end of the tunnel. Further, it implicitly takes issue with the US draft's interpretation of 678's terms by "recalling that ... a formal cease-fire" required only Iraq's official notification. The preamble includes two further statements absent from the US draft. First, it reminds the Council of its objective to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Second, it reiterates "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq, Kowe´t [sic] and other neighbouring States", an commitment repeatedly emphasised in SCRs. Its operative paragraphs, although similar to those in the US draft, again feel different. Rather than locating Iraqi failure to comply with disarmament in SCR 687, they cite SCR 1284. This is ironic - France abstained from voting on 1284, which was championed by the US - but gives the sense of having made progress since 1991, and suggests that the suspension conditions developed there are still live. This is later confirmed. The rights that it grants to Unmovic/IAEA are generally similar to those granted by the US draft, but they do not authorise interviews outside Iraq, or the transport of family members outside Iraq. The connection of activities to the "discharge of their mandate" is stressed, an allusion to the spying concerns, and a clause that may give the Iraqi government ammunition in the future. The inspectors have the right to pick their members, but the US emphasis on expertise is omitted. The draft expresses its "full confidence" in the IAEA and Unmovic executive. The failure of the Iraqi government to confirm the procedures in the 8 October letter generates "the gravest concern". A final difference between the French and the US drafts are the former's excision of some of the threats in the latter. THE RUSSIAN DRAFT The relevant Russian resolutions omit the SCR 678 series in the US and French drafts, and instead focus on the disarmament resolutions in the French draft. With some exceptions, the draft then follows the French draft. The exceptions include: 1. not condemning the Iraqi government for its failure to comply. 2. the 8 October letter is "endorsed". 3. no timetable for implementation is mentioned, other than "immediate", and less detail in general is given to disarmament provisions. Best, Colin Rowat work | Room 406, Department of Economics | The University of Birmingham | Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK | web.bham.ac.uk/c.rowat | (+44/0) 121 414 3754 | (+44/0) 121 414 7377 (fax) | email@example.com personal | (+44/0) 7768 056 984 (mobile) | (+44/0) 7092 378 517 (fax) | (707) 221 3672 (US fax) | firstname.lastname@example.org _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss To contact the list manager, email email@example.com All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk