The following is an archived copy of a message sent to a Discussion List run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.

Views expressed in this archived message are those of the author, not of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.

[Main archive index/search] [List information] [Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]


[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

RE: [casi] Campaign Against Sanctions?



Dear Colin,

>  However, if a war does start, it seems likely that it
>will be fought in cities to a greater extent than that fought in >1991.  If
>this does occur, then the civilian consequences may be worse than >they were
>in 1991, especially if non-conventional weapons are used.

This rides on the presumption that Saddam Hussein commands loyalty amoungst the Iraqi people or 
even armed forces. This is clearly not the case. If the people and army saw that the US was totally 
serious then hardly anyone would stand and fight 'to defend Saddam' - from the experience of '91 it 
would probably be quite the opposite. The only loyalty he has is the Republican Guard and to a 
lesser extent his Security Apparatus.

Regards,
Sama

--

On Sun, 15 Sep 2002 18:42:28
 Colin Rowat wrote:
>Dear Sama,
>
>Thank you for your kind words about my posting.
>
>> 1. the realities you saw were only the superficial appearance of
>> iraq - the suffering of a nation under sanctions. however, what
>> you did not and could not see, is the deep rooted everyday
>> suffering and oppression of the iraqi people, which i have lived.
>> a suffering which has no voice and cannot be openly seen. this is
>> as bad, if not worse than sanctions.
>
>I agree that what I can see, and what I have seen, in Iraq is superficial.
>I hope that I didn't suggest otherwise in my previous posting.  Some of the
>oppression is still palpable, even to a foreigner like myself: I remember
>the feeling of relief that I had reaching Jordan after the first trip, after
>a bad experience with a border guard, a minor reminder of being in a police
>state.
>
>> 2. the figures of the casualties from '91 is not a fair
>> reflection of the the current situation because those figures are
>> of the people uprising against Saddam and shows how much the
>> Iraqis want Saddam out and shows how ruthless Saddam is in
>> oppressing the people.
>
>As quoted in my last e-mail, the 1991 figures are broken down into various
>categories.  The largest category, 111,000, refers to "postwar adverse
>health effects", which may include consequences of the intifada as well as
>of the Gulf War.  Those that Osborne associates directly with the intifada
>are 35,000.  Further, insofar as the intifada was a partial consequence of
>the Gulf War itself, those deaths are also a partial consequence of the Gulf
>War.  They are, of course, also a consequence of the Iraqi regime's attempts
>to stay in power.
>
>> What is planned to be done involves removing Saddam so such a
>> bloodbath would not occur or be needed.
>
>I wish that I could be sure of this.  I would imagine that the US
>administration would be happy to get its way with fewer rather than more
>civilian casualties.  However, if a war does start, it seems likely that it
>will be fought in cities to a greater extent than that fought in 1991.  If
>this does occur, then the civilian consequences may be worse than they were
>in 1991, especially if non-conventional weapons are used.
>
>Further, I have no idea what the US plan for post-Saddam Iraq is: the
>administration has made various noises, but has preferred to focus on the
>simple question of removing Saddam.  I expressed some of my concerns about
>this in my last e-mail.  I support your desire to see democracy in Iraq, but
>think that the word "shi'a" may be too frightening to the US administration:
>Iran and Hizbullah come to mind too easily.
>
>> Opposing a war on Saddam, calls - at least in the short term -
>> for the current situation to remain: Saddam oppressiong and
>> slaughtering Iraqis, sanctions starving the people. Nothing, for
>> an Iraqi, can be worse than this.
>
>This is, I think, precisely the dilemma.  I don't believe that nothing could
>be worse.  What if an Iraqi Scud missile or jet with a chemical payload does
>reach Israel, which retaliates with nuclear weapons against Baghdad, Basra,
>and Mosul?  What if the organisations best suited to organise a post-Saddam
>Iraq are religious, and a clerical rule of the Khomeini sort takes power?
>More generally, what if a new government takes power that the US does not
>approve, and we have a new oppressive regime, sanctions, but after another
>war and civil war?  What if, whatever government arises, it loses its grip
>and Iraq slips into lawlessness and protracted civil war, like Afghanistan
>did?  What if, in this situation, Turkey moved into the old Ottoman province
>of Mosul, claiming to be protecting the rights of the Turcoman population?
>
>Some of these outcomes seem to me more unlikely: while the US abandoned
>Afghanistan as soon as the Soviets were gone, allowing the further descent
>into anarchy, the US is unlikely to walk away from Iraq's oil.  Does it, an
>administration committed to opposing nation building, need a stable and
>prosperous Iraqi society to exploit this, though?  The current Iraqi
>government didn't in the 1970s.
>
>A more basic problem, though, is that I don't know how good an ability we
>have to assign probabilities to these events.  Everyone expected Saddam to
>fall in 1991; everyone was wrong.  Did anyone expect an autonomous Iraqi
>Kurdistan then?  The Turks certainly don't seem to have.
>
>Returning to the question of how we respond to these facts - to we oppose a
>new war or support it (in the hope that it will not be needed) - I find that
>what I can most unambiguously support is honest debate.  This I have yet to
>see from the US Administration.  Nor have I seen any concern for the people
>of Iraq.  Both of these things make me very concerned about placing the
>future of Iraq in US hands.
>
>Best,
>
>Colin Rowat
>
>work | Room 406, Department of Economics | The University of Birmingham |
>Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK | web.bham.ac.uk/c.rowat | (+44/0) 121 414 3754 |
>(+44/0) 121 414 7377 (fax) | c.rowat@bham.ac.uk
>
>personal | (+44/0) 7768 056 984 (mobile) | (+44/0) 7092 378 517 (fax) |
>(707) 221 3672 (US fax) | c.rowat@espero.org.uk
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
>To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss
>To contact the list manager, email casi-discuss-admin@lists.casi.org.uk
>All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk
>


_____________________________________________________________
Play the Elvis® Scratch & Win for your chance to instantly win $10,000 Cash
- a 2003 Harley Davidson® Sportster® - 1 of 25,000 CD's - and more!
http://r.lycos.com/r/sagel_mail_scratch_tl/http://win.ipromotions.com/lycos_020801/index.asp?tc=7087

_______________________________________________
Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss
To contact the list manager, email casi-discuss-admin@lists.casi.org.uk
All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk


[Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]