RE: [casi] Iraq and the New Great Game

[hasseini@DELETETHISmaktoob.com (Hassan Zeini)]

Dear All,

Although I agree with Colin that the list is for discussing sanctions on Iraq,
I have to disagree with his conclusions that "discussions of the role of Zionism
or Israel in recent world history seem to me to fall outside it".
The issue of sanctions on Iraq can not be taken out of its political and
regional environment, nor is it realistic to treat it separately from other issues
in the area. Israel and Zionism have played and continue to play major roles in
the affairs of the Middle East. The sanctions on Iraq, as we all know, were not
imposed because Iraq invaded Kuwait. That is the naïve and simplistic way of
seeing things. Sanctions, whose purpose was to force Iraq out of Kuwait, have now
turned into a weapon whose aim is to prevent Iraq from upsetting the strategic
Israeli/Arab balance, which has always been in Israel's favor.  For those reasons,
I believe that discussing those issues is extremely important and very relevant to
the issue of sanctions.

John Smith states "This misconception about what guides US foreign policy is
widespread in the Middle East. It reflects the desire of Arab bourgeoisies and the
middle class for a more equal relationship with imperialism."
I don't think there are any misconceptions in the Middle East regarding this
issue, nor do I think that Marxist analysis is the only way to see things. US
foreign policy on the Middle East has always been in Israel's favor, no matter who
ruled what country in the Arab world. Even strong (and subservient)allies of the
US could not shake that alliance.
I may not believe in the "Jewish conspiracy" theories, but I would not want to
dismiss them as "myths". But neither do I believe in the myth of "Anti-Semitism".
As I said, those who suffered from Zionist policies know better than those who
know them from afar.

Instead of arguing those issues, I think it best to post extracts from an
excellent analysis "ANCIENT HISTORY: U.S. CONDUCT IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE WORLD
WAR II AND THE FOLLY OF INTERVENTION" by Sheldon L. Richman, published in Policy
Analysis No.159 on August 16, 1991.  The article can be found in full at:
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-159.html.

I may not fully agree with all of what Richman says, but it gives good grounds
for deeper thinking of the issues.

HZ
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Eisenhower's opposition to the conduct of Israel, Great Britain, and
France--an anomaly in light of later U.S. policy--is explained by his opposition
to old-style colonialism. The administration wanted to win the friendship of the
newly independent countries of Africa and Asia and to keep them out of the Soviet
orbit. That could not be accomplished if the United States were perceived to be on
the side of Great Britain and France in so flagrant an act of imperialism as an
attack on Egypt. Also important to the administration's calculus was its wish that
London not challenge Washington's more subtle dominance in the Middle East.
British and French irritation with American anti-colonialism was a source of
problems among the leaders of the three nations."

"The [ American ] people have …. gotten a bad deal on oil. The true cost of
oil includes not only the per barrel or per gallon price but also the cost of the
overgrown military establishment and foreign aid budget. That cost is hidden,
because it is not overtly added to the price at the pump, but it is real all the
same. That fact was recognized in a 1953 statement by the Texas Independent
Producers and Royalty Owners Association, which said:
Although Middle East oil is so abundant that it can be developed at a fraction
of the cost of our own, it is far from "cheap." On the contrary, Middle East oil
may already be the most expensive in the world market today when consideration is
given to the fact that vast amounts of public funds are spent on the defense
mechanism which is intended largely to protect American interests in the Middle
Eastern oil fields.
The statement goes on to note that the real price would multiply immeasurably if
the policy began costing American lives--a point that is even more relevant
today."

"By any standard, the relationship between the United States and Israel has
been extraordinary. Criticism of any other American ally does not cost a person an
elective or appointed position in government. Criticism of any other American ally
does not bring accusations of being a hater of the dominant religious group in the
allied nation. Both of those things happen, almost routinely, to anyone who
criticizes Israel. Elected U.S. officials who have cast a single vote against an
Israeli position have seen major opposition mounted by Israel's American
supporters. The rare journalist who points out unattractive facts about Israeli
conduct is likely to be smeared as an anti-Semite. The chilling effect that has
had on public debate is too obvious to need elaboration."

" The United States not only accepted the UN plan [for the Partition of
Palestine], it aggressively promoted it among the other members of the United
Nations. Truman had been personally moved by the tragedy of the Jews and by the
condition of the refugees. That response and his earlier studies of the Bible made
him open to the argument that emigration to Palestine was the proper remedy for
the surviving Jews of Europe. Yet he acknowledged later, in his memoirs, that he
was "fully aware
of the Arabs' hostility to Jewish settlement in Palestine." He, like his
predecessor, had promised he would take no action without fully consulting the
Arabs, and he reneged."

"Truman's decision to support establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was
made against the advice of most of the State Department and other foreign policy
experts, who were concerned about U.S. relations with the Arabs and possible
Soviet penetration of the region. Secretary James Forrestal of the Defense
Department and Loy Henderson, at that time the State Department's chief of Near
Eastern affairs, pressed those points most vigorously. Henderson warned that
partition would not only create anti-Americanism but would also require U.S.
troops to enforce it, and he stated his belief that partition violated both U.S.
and UN principles of self-determination.

But Truman was concerned about the domestic political implications as well as
the foreign policy implications of the partition issue. As he himself put it
during a meeting with U.S. ambassadors to the Middle East, according to William A.
Eddy, the ambassador to Saudi Arabia, "I'm sorry gentlemen, but I have to answer
to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism: I do not have
hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents." Later, in a 1953 article in
the American Zionist, Emmanuel Neumann, president of the Zionist Organization of
America,conceded that Truman would not have worked so hard for the creation of
Israel but for "the prospect of wholesale defections from the Democratic Party."
Truman's decision to support the Zionist cause was also influenced by Samuel I.
Rosenman, David K. Niles, and Clark Clifford, all members of his staff, and Eddie
Jacobson, his close friend and former business partner. Truman later wrote:
The White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever
had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this
instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders--actuated by
political motives and engaging in political threats--disturbed and annoyed me.

Pressure on Truman also came from non-Jewish fundamentalists and politicians.

In some cases, support for Jewish admission to and statehood in Palestine may
have had another domestic political angle. That support sidestepped the sensitive
issue of U.S. immigration quotas, which had kept European Jews out of the United
States since the 1920s and had left them at the mercy of the Nazis. In other
words, support for Zionism may have been a convenient way for people who did not
want Jews to come to the United States to avoid appearing anti-Semitic. American
classical liberals and others, including the American Council for Judaism, opposed
the quotas, and it is probable that many of the refugees, given the option, would
have preferred to come to the United States.

By mid-November 1947 the Truman administration was firmly in the Zionist camp.
When the State Department and the U.S. mission to the United Nations agreed that
the partition resolution should be changed to shift the Negev from the Jewish to
the Palestinian state, Truman sided with the Jewish Agency, the main Zionist
organization, against them. The United States also voted against a UN resolution
calling on member states to accept Jewish refugees who could not be repatriated.

As the partition plan headed toward a vote in the UN General Assembly, U.S.
officials applied pressure to—and even threatened to withhold promised aid
from—countries inclined to vote against the resolution. As former undersecretary
of state Sumner Welles put it:  By direct order of the White House every form of
pressure, direct and indirect, was brought to bear by American officials upon
those countries outside of the Moslem world that were known to be either uncertain
or opposed to partition. Representatives or intermediaries were employed by the
White House to make sure that the necessary majority would at length be secured.

Eddie Jacobson recorded in his diary that Truman told him that "he [Truman]
and he alone, was responsible for swinging the vote of several delegations."


" The idea of a strategic relationship between the United States and Israel
emerged after the Suez crisis, when the Eisenhower administration realized that
both countries had an interest in containing Nasser's influence. Because the
Eisenhower administration feared that the Soviets were gaining clout in some Arab
countries, such a relationship was seen as useful in containing the Soviet Union
as well. When John F. Kennedy became president, he abandoned an initial preference
for a balance of power between Israel and the Arabs in favor of a strategic
relation ship. He was the first to provide Israel with sophisticated weapons and
to commit the United States to a policy of maintaining Israel's regional military
superiority. In 1962 Kennedy privately told Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir
that their countries were de facto allies, and shortly before his assassination,
Kennedy reportedly guaranteed Israel's territorial integrity in a letter to Prime
Minister Eshkol."

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