[casi] today;s newspapers on blix offer and US Government warmongering

["richardbyrne" <richardbyrne@DELETETHIStiscali.co.uk>]

some of today's articles about Iraq's offer to hold talks with hans blix,
preceded by story from today on press association (also covered on bbc
radio) of US official saying they will go for regime change whether
inspections happen or not, could be useful to quote in letters to newspapers
richard
voices

Guardian: letters@guardian.co.uk
Independent: letters@independent.co.uk
Telegraph: dtletters@telegraph.co.uk
The Times: letters@the-times.co.uk


[Letter-writers: remember to include your address and telephone # and that
The Times require exclusivity for their letters]


 Ananova:

Despite weapons offer, US still 'wants Saddam out'

America wants Saddam Hussein ousted as President of Iraq whether he allows
weapons inspectors in or not, a senior US Government minister says.

The United Nations is set to consider an Iraqi offer on talks about the
return of inspectors early next week.

Britain is sceptical about the offer, warning Saddam has a history of
"playing games" with the international community while failing to deliver on
his promises.

But US under-secretary for arms control John Bolton suggests the readmission
of inspectors will make no difference to America's determination to bring
about "regime change" in Baghdad.

He told the BBC: "Let there be no mistake. While we also insist on the
reintroduction of the weapons inspectors, our policy at the same time
insists on regime change in Baghdad.

"That policy will not be altered whether the inspectors go in or not."

While Mr Bolton said "regime change" did not necessarily mean war, his
comments will disturb those opposed to a US military strike on Iraq who
thought the offer of talks had reduced the risk of conflict.

Iraqi foreign minister Naji Sabri wrote to United Nations Secretary General
Kofi Annan to say the Iraqi government wanted the UN's chief weapons
inspector Hans Blix and his team of experts to go to Baghdad "at the
earliest agreed-upon time".

Mr Annan gave the offer a cautious welcome. His spokesman Fred Eckhard says
it is "at variance" with the procedures laid down by the UN Security Council
for the return of inspectors.

But Mr Eckhard says the initiative will be discussed by the Security Council
on Monday.

Story filed: 08:52 Saturday 3rd August 2002





----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Serious offer or just an attempt to buy time?

Brian Whitaker
Saturday August 3, 2002
The Guardian

Saddam Hussein has "thrown a monkey wrench" into US war plans, Scott Ritter,
the former UN weapons inspector, said yesterday, designed as a "a bold
diplomatic move to derail this headlong rush towards war".
The invitation to Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, for talks in
Baghdad, is the "the exact opposite direction the Bush administration
wants", Mr Ritter said.

"If you return weapons inspectors, you engage the machinery of diplomacy
that will lead to the lifting of sanctions and thereby the freeing up of
Saddam Hussein to continue ruling in Iraq," he told BBC Radio 4's Today
programme.

Analysts agreed yesterday that Iraq's manoeuvre represents a setback for
Washington hawks but they were uncertain whether it should be seen as a
genuine offer or just an attempt to buy time.

"I really don't see Saddam Hussein letting in the inspectors on the terms
the Americans are pushing for," said Daniel Neep, of the Royal United
Services Institute in London.

He suggested that the invitation to Mr Blix - delivered by letter to the UN
secretary general on Thursday - might have been calculated to stymie any US
plans for a surprise attack on Baghdad this autumn.

"One view is that there's nothing new in this. It could just be another line
in the propaganda war," said Toby Dodge of the Royal Institute for
International Affairs.

But he pointed out that it follows recent diplomatic efforts - especially by
Arab countries - to convince the Baghdad regime that US threats are in
earnest.

"Possibly the loudness of the war drums wasn't quite carrying to Baghdad. If
that was the case, then you could read this as a dawning."

Previously, he said, Iraq had attempted to trade weapons inspections for the
lifting of sanctions, but there are signs that it may be shifting its
ground. "It could now be trying to trade weapons of mass destruction for a
commitment to the regime's survival."

Burhan Chalabi, an Iraqi-born British businessman who has contacts in
Baghdad, insisted that the Iraqi offer is "very serious".

Iraq is willing to let the inspectors back, he said. "All they are worried
about is that the Americans might move the goalposts."

But Iraq will face an uphill struggle convincing the world of its sincerity.
Since last March, the UN has tried three times to persuade Iraq to re-admit
the weapons inspectors.

Iraq has also muddied the waters with facetious ploys, such as inviting Tony
Blair to hunt for illicit weapons in Baghdad.

The latest Iraqi letter is described as more moderate in tone and lacking
the usual rhetoric. UN sources said it would be passed directly to the
security council for a decision on how to respond.

Ahmed Fawzi, director of the UN information centre in London, said Baghdad's
initiative, if serious, was a "positive development".

"Any credible diplomatic move to avert war should be explored," he said, but
added: "If it's just another delaying tactic, I don't think the
international community will accept that."

Russia, which recently sent a high-level delegation to Baghdad for talks on
"unblocking the Iraqi problem", was less cautious in its welcome.

"Moscow believes that the Iraqi proposal is an important step towards
solving this problem by political and diplomatic means in accordance with
the UN security council's resolutions," the Russian foreign ministry said.

For Iraq, the move on weapons inspections is also an opportunity to isolate
the US further by appearing more reasonable than the Americans.

Washington's case for attacking Baghdad will be weakened if the US does not
explore all avenues for resuming weapons inspections or is perceived as
blocking them with unreasonable conditions.

In this, Britain's attitude will be crucial, according to Dr Chalabi.

As reported in the Guardian last week, Mr Blair has privately told President
George Bush that Britain will support a US attack on Iraq if Saddam Hussein
refuses to accept resumed UN weapons inspections.

"Britain holds the key," said Dr Chalabi. "The US can't wage war without
Britain, otherwise it's completely isolated."


Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2002

How the inspections broke down

Linda MacDonald
Saturday August 3, 2002
The Guardian

April 3 1991 UN security council passes resolution 687, dictating terms of
Gulf war ceasefire. Requires Iraq to declare and destroy weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. Also establishes UN
special commission (Unscom) to monitor and verify elimination of weapons
May 1991 Unscom begins inspections in Iraq
February 1992 Security council condemns lack of full compliance
July 1992 Unscom personnel try to enter agriculture ministry in Baghdad
without warning for inspection. They are blocked and begin 24-hour
observation. Forced to leave country after being attacked by mobs in street
July 1993 Unscom prevented from installing monitoring cameras at two missile
test stands. Government backs down under threat of international military
action
June 1994 Unscom destroys chemical warfare agents
June 1996 Inspectors denied access to sites associated with Republican Guard
and Special Republican Guard, believed to be involved in concealment of
weapons. Iraq denies access to four of six sites, saying they are
presidential areas. Iraq condemned in August for gross violations of UN
resolutions
June 1997 Iraq again blocks Unscom from certain sites
October 1997 Iraq refuses to deal with US personnel working for Unscom
November 1997 Resolution 1137 condemns continued violation by Iraq
November 1997 Russians secure return of Unscom
January 1998 Iraq continues to block inspection teams
October 31 1998 Iraq ends all cooperation with Unscom
December 16 1998 Special commission withdraws staff from Iraq, Unscom
disbanded
December 17 1999 Resolution 1284 creates UN monitoring, verification and
inspection commission (Unmovic) to replace Unscom. Iraq rejects resolution
March 1 2000 Hans Blix assumes post of Unmovic executive chairman
November 2000 Deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz rejects new weapons
inspection proposals
March/May 2002 UN secretary general Kofi Annan unable to persuade Iraqi
representatives to allow inspectors' return
July 5-6 Talks in Vienna between Annan and Iraq's foreign minister, Naji
Sabri, fail.
July 25 2002 Sabri says any agreement must include route towards lifting
sanctions, ending threats of regime change, and end to no-flight zones
August 2002 Iraq invites chief weapons inspector to Baghdad for talks on
resuming inspections


  Putting a price on war

A new oil crisis could cost Bush dear

Leader
Saturday August 3, 2002
The Guardian

The question of whether oil could be a weapon of war is being whispered in
Washington. George Bush's administration appears ready to strike against
Iraq's Saddam Hussein, who yesterday opened a diplomatic front with an offer
to hold talks with UN arms inspectors. But worries are surfacing that
petroleum prices could sap the strength of the nascent US recovery and undo
the war effort. The first Gulf war 11 years ago cost $80bn and drained the
world of growth by sending oil prices shooting up. This induced a recession
which cost Mr Bush's father the White House. To win a war and lose a
presidency once is bad enough for the Bush dynasty. Twice would be
unforgivable political ineptitude. Yet the scenario is both plausible and
probable. Mr Bush is not unaware of the risk. America has been quietly
stockpiling oil - and aims to store 700m barrels, enough for about 100 days.
Hawkish voices have been talking up Russia as a possible counterweight to
Opec and have urged non-Arab oil suppliers like Nigeria to up capacity.
America runs on petrol. Disruption to supplies would see oil prices spike
skywards and the US, or for that matter the world, could not easily cope
with crude at $60 a barrel. But action against Iraq itself would not
unsettle the oil price. Despite its large reserves, Iraq is a relatively
small producer - hindered by UN restrictions and an oil industry starved of
investment. The loss of Iraq's output would barely be noticed by the
markets. The impotence of Iraq's mineral threat was seen in April when
Baghdad stopped selling oil in protest at Israeli army incursions in the
West Bank. The oil price was largely unperturbed. Yet when a military coup
in Venezuela threatened to remove President Hugo Chavez, oil zoomed to $30 a
barrel. The reason was not just that Venezuela is a bigger producer than
Iraq but that its future oil output was uncertain. Once future oil supply is
clouded by doubt, the prospect of too little oil has to be priced. This risk
is creeping into the market and now makes up 10% of the $25-a-barrel oil
price.

The threat posed now is profoundly different from that presented by Arab
states in 1973. The problem now is not concerted action by oil producers but
chaos in the Middle East. The key question here is what would happen to
Saudi Arabia, as no other nation can flood the market or deprive it of oil
so quickly. Would Saddam launch missiles against Kuwaiti and Saudi oil
fields? Would an attack on Baghdad foment strife in Riyadh? To different
degrees both would be a shock to oil supplies. This may occur as a result of
inaction rather than action. A big oil producer paralysed by revolution can
see production fall precipitously because its workforce is out on the
streets rather than manning the taps in the terminal. This is what happened
in Iran during the 1979 revolution. Iranian oil production fell from 6m
barrels a day to 3m and never recovered. If the same happened in Saudi
Arabia, the world would see oil prices spurt upwards.

The consequences would be rising inflation and consumers deprived of
spending power. All this at a time when America, which provides 40% of world
economic growth, has growing unemployment, a falling stock market and a
widening budget deficit caused by increased defence spending. The last Gulf
war was mostly paid for by Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This time it will
be financed by the US taxpayer, who may support toppling Saddam but object
to the cost. Mr Bush's self-appointed task is regime change in Baghdad. The
nightmare for the president is that it could result in regime change at
home.




The Independent
Iraqi offer greeted with widespread scepticism
Leadership's hint that it will let UN arms inspectors return for first time
in four years drives a wedge between the big powers
By David Usborne and Kim Sengupta
03 August 2002

The United States and Britain accused Saddam Hussein yesterday of "playing
games" after the Iraqi leadership unexpectedly invited the chief UN weapons
inspector to Baghdad for talks.

Although Washington and London did not totally dismiss the Iraqi offer,
which instantly opened up old divisions among the big powers on the security
council, officials said inspectors must have unfettered access to anywhere
they demanded.

Naji Sabri, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, made the surprise overture in a
letter delivered to the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, on Thursday,
inviting Hans Blix, head of the UN weapons inspectors, to visit Baghdad for
fresh talks on resuming inspections.

Responding cautiously yesterday, Mr Annan decided to discuss it with the
security council on Monday after realising that the Iraqis were still
insisting on terms that have so far proved unacceptable.

The letter arrived as President George Bush reaffirmed his goal of
instigating a "regime change" in Iraq. It seemed to indicate Baghdad was now
taking seriously the threat of US military action to dislodge the Iraqi
leader..

Iraq's UN ambassador, Mohammed al-Douri, hinted that his country would
defend itself if it was invaded. "This is a political and diplomatic way to
defend ourselves. They are always accusing us of not permitting those people
and now we say we are ready to lay the ground to allow the inspectors," he
said.

While both America and Britain, its main ally in taking a hard line on Iraq,
voiced scepticism over the latest Iraqi gesture, other permanent members of
the Security Council, notably Russia, moved quickly to encourage a visit to
Baghdad by Mr Blix. Russia is opposed to any military action in Iraq. Most
Middle Eastern governments have also voiced alarm.

A British Foreign Office minister said: "Saddam has a long history of
playing games."

The Russian Foreign Ministry took a different stance. "Moscow considers
Iraq's proposal to be an important step towards solving the present problems
through diplomatic and political means," a statement said.

America did not reject the letter out of hand yesterday, although Mr Bush
reiterated that he was considering an array of "tools" to depose the Iraqi
leader. "Iraq knows what it must do, and that is to submit to international
inspection and to disarm," a White House official said.

The development came hours after a visit to the White House by King Abdullah
of Jordan, who described American plans to invade Iraq as "somewhat
ludicrous".

Devoid of much of the bellicose rhetoric that usually accompanies Iraqi
statements on the issue, Mr Sabri's letter ­ on the eve of the 12th
anniversary of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait ­ hinted that allowing the
resumption of inspections was now a real possibility after a nearly
four-year hiatus.

UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in December 1998 before an
Anglo-American bombing raid was launched to punish the country for failing
to co-operate fully.

In his letter, Mr Sabri said talks with Mr Blix, chairman of the UN
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, (Unmovic), should be
arranged to "establish a solid basis for the next stage of monitoring and
inspection activities and to move forward to that stage". He suggested that
the meeting take place "at the earliest agreed-upon time".

United Nations officials said the secretary general was disquieted by the
details of the letter, which suggested Iraq wanted to negotiate the terms of
the inspectors' mission before they were readmitted. The UN says the
opposite: that inspectors must go in and decide what they need to do for
themselves.

A spokesman said that while Mr Annan "welcomes the letter, which is in line
with the agreement to maintain contact, including discussion of technical
matters, the procedures proposed are at variance with ones laid down by the
security council in its resolution of 1999". Sanctions against Iraq will
only be lifted when it is certified to be free of weapons of mass
destruction.

Other UN sources confirmed that the letter was problematic. "They are trying
to trap us here," said one source close to Mr Blix, emphasising that any
discussion about the exact mission of the inspectors could only happen after
they had been readmitted.

Whatever the doubts, however, for the UN or America to ignore the invitation
will be hard. At the least, it threatens to complicate any movement in
Washington towards approving a military assault. America will have scant
support for an invasion if other countries believe a diplomatic option
remains.

The White House is apparently still trying to pursue leads that might
connect the 11 September attacks with Iraq. The Los Angeles Times reported
that officials still believed the hijacker Mohammed Atta secretly met five
months earlier with an Iraqi agent in Prague, an indication that the Iraqi
regime was involved in the terrorist attacks. A senior Bush official said
that evidence of the long-disputed meeting in Prague "holds up".

The players - what they're saying about Saddam's illegal weapons arsenal

Saddam Hussein

The President has been preparing his top brass to withstand a US attack for
months. He says claims of his intention to make weapons of mass destruction
are "a joke". His latest offer on inspections shows his success in pitting
the big powers against each other.

Naji Sabri

Iraq's Foreign Minister has claimed arms inspectors want to return to update
intelligence for a possible invasion. Until now, Iraq has said a deal on
their return must include a route to lifting sanctions, stoppingthreats of
"regime change" and ending Anglo-American no-fly zones.

Amer Al-Saadi

The suave Iraqi general, who has been a leading member of Iraq's technical
delegation for years, argues that inspectors should resolve outstanding
disarmament issues before they set foot in Baghdad. Iraq insists all weapons
of mass destruction have been destroyed.

Kofi Annan

The UN secretary general has insisted inspectors must be let back in, and is
worried by Iraq's stated preconditions. Yesterday, he put to the Security
Council the matter of Hans Blix's invitation to hold talks in Baghdad so
soon after his own failed negotiations in Vienna.

Hans Blix

The chief UN weapons inspector wants to verify Iraqi claims over the
elimination of weapons of mass destruction, notably 8.4 tonnes of anthrax.
Iraq has admitted producing 3.9 tonnes of VX nerve gas, and the inspectors
do not know how much of it has been destroyed.

Richard Butler

The Australian diplomat, who was Mr Blix's predecessor as chief weapons
inspector, warned Washington this week that Iraq might be close to
developing a nuclear bomb. Iraqi defectors suggest President Saddam might be
reactivating a programme to build a nuclear weapon.

George Bush

The US President remains serious about overthrowing the Iraqi leader and
said this week he was looking at "all tools" to do so. But the Bush
administration remains deeply divided despite months of preparation for an
invasion of Iraq that would topple President Saddam.

Tony Blair

The Prime Minister has been the most vociferous backer of George Bush over a
possible attack on Iraq. But according to King Abdullah of Jordan, privately
he is worried about the consequences of an invasion and has grave
reservations about US policy being driven by hawks.

Jacques Chirac

The French President insists that any attack on Iraq must be approved by the
United Nations. France is pivotal in the Iraq crisis because the country has
a foot in both camps - as a friend of Iraq, but also as a Western power with
a Security Council veto.


Independent, Sat August 3


It may be a bluff, but Saddam's offer can be turned to our advantage
03 August 2002




Leading article: It may be a bluff, but Saddam's offer can be turned to our
advantage
It is entirely natural, indeed wise, to be dubious about Saddam Hussein's
offer to open talks on allowing the United Nations weapons inspectors back
into Iraq. In the four years since they were barred from that country there
have been repeated attempts by Saddam to buy time with such offers,
particularly at times when he feels threatened. There is every reason to
think that he is being true to form on this occasion and it would be naive
to take his word at face value.

All that said, however, there is a strong case from the point of view of our
own interests to be made for responding positively to this overture. The
most powerful reason is that a visibly strenuous effort on the part of the
West might actually work if Saddam is indeed so perturbed about the
bellicose stance of the United States. For if Saddam believes that President
Bush really is determined on a "regime change" - and he has been given no
shortage of public clues about that - then he might even be prepared to
allow the inspectors to go about their work unmolested, simply so that he
can live to fight another day. In other words, if a halt to any chemical,
nuclear and biological weapons programmes he may be pursuing is the price of
staying in power, then Saddam may well be pragmatic enough to pay it.

Less optimistically, we could take the view that is just a bluff, pure and
simple; that he is "playing games", in the words of the Foreign Office. If
that does prove to be the case then that is all to the good. It is vital -
for hawks as well as the doves - that Saddam be seen to defy the reasonable
requests of the United Nations. There would then be a much greater chance of
building the sort of widely based coalition against him that was the key to
success in the Gulf war 11 years ago. The United States would then be much
closer to winning a UN resolution in favour of intervention, and would be
acting from a position of vastly superior moral and diplomatic strength to
the one it finds itself in today. Militarily, too, having supportive
regional allies might make the difference between success and failure. Tony
Blair in particular should be keen to press this on the US because of the
importance he has attached to the authority of the UN in upholding
international law.

The chances, however, are that the United States will not see how Saddam's
offer can be turned to advantage. Again, it has to be admitted that
frustration at Saddam's manoeuvrings is understandable. America's quest for
security in the aftermath of 11 September is not an ignoble one. No one
would be so surprised if Mr Bush decided to act unilaterally. But the prize
for caution is priceless: an action against Saddam, led by the US but with
participation by other nations; supported by Europe, Russia, the Arab states
and Iran, backed by the UN and international law. It would not, as
unilateral action would, further inflame and complicate the conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians. And it would not risk the break-up of Iraq, if
her neighbours have signed up to a declaration in favour of regime change
but not the dismembering of the state.

It may seem absurdly optimistic to hope for such a turn of events. Perhaps
it is to hope for too much. But the point is that, between the poles of a
go-it-alone policy by America and a wholly united international community
acting in concert, we should grasp at anything that moves us closer to the
second position. Taking Saddam at his word and going the extra mile for
peace over the rest of the summer is the clever thing to do. Saddam is not
be trusted but he may just be ready to hand us a way out of the impasse that
is very much to our advantage, however it turns out. We must seize it.

The Independent
Charles Duelfer: Prospects remain dim for inspectors allowed in sites
03 August 2002


Leading article: It may be a bluff, but Saddam's offer can be turned to our
advantage
Iraq is offering to accept inspectors in some fashion as a tactic to derail
international support for an American military build-up against the regime.
But even if they do get into Iraq, their prospects are dim.

The United Nations inspectors have been and will be caught between the
conflicting goals of Baghdad, Washington and other Security Council members.
Their ability to succeed is limited by Iraq's lack of co-operation and the
council's inability to force compliance.

Baghdad views weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as vital to survival of the
regime. Chemical weapons were used in the war on Iran. Iraq believes its
arsenal in 1991 helped to stop America from marching on Baghdad.

UN inspections, at best, may delay or complicate Iraq's weapons programme.
Unscom, the former weapons-inspection team, tried for seven years to account
for all Iraqi programmes. That tortured experience yielded partial
compliance. Iraq gave up what it was forced to expose, and retained the
rest.

The continuous cat-and-mouse game, and episodic American and British
bombing, have given Baghdad excellent practice in concealing weapons.

The UN inspectors have, on paper, the right to immediate, unconditional,
unrestricted access - words that sound good in New York but are difficult to
implement in Iraq. Practicalities intrude.

For example, is it reasonable to demand that Iraq turn off its entire air
defence system so inspectors may fly into Iraq anytime, and anywhere?
Baghdad will reasonably point out that it has a legitimate air defence
system and some accommodation must be made to provide information on UN
flights.

>From this, the Iraqi government can derive warning information on
inspections. Similar accommodations will sprout in virtually all inspection
activities.

Iraq's close monitoring of all inspection activities meant "no-notice"
inspections rarely equated to surprise inspections. Unscom conducted
hundreds of no-notice inspections. Only a few, though, were truly surprise
inspections, and they developed into confrontations, delays and blockages.

If the UN-Iraqi process goes ahead, how will we know if a serious inspection
regime is planned? One test will be whether activity since Unscom left in
late 1998 will be investigated. Credible defectors report that Iraq has
since expanded its WMD programmes.

The UN database includes the 200-300 important personnel from Iraq's earlier
efforts. If the programmes have continued, many of these individuals will be
involved. Inspectors must interview them without government presence to
verify their work since 1998.

Does non-cooperation by Iraq mean they are not complying? Is war justified
simply because some stubborn inspector was blocked from a sensitive security
warehouse? If America is serious, it should not centre its argument on the
inspection issue.

Washington needs to make a broader case. It needs to show the threat is
broad and growing. To say Iraqis should change their own government is
disingenuous . Outside intervention is needed to create conditions in which
Iraqis can change their government.

The potential of Iraq will never be realised under this regime. A country
that should be the engine of development in the Middle East will remain a
contorted and dangerous mutant threatening the region and beyond. And the
people will continue to suffer.

Charles Duelfer served as deputy chairman from 1993 to 2000 of Unscom. He is
a visiting scholar at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington.




The Times
august 3rd 2002
UN rejects offer to let inspectors back into Iraq
by james bone
Saddam is trying to rewrite UN resolutions



THE United Nations Secretary-General, taking care not to fall foul of the
United States, rejected an Iraqi offer yesterday to invite the chief UN
weapons inspector to Baghdad.
Kofi Annan said that an Iraqi letter calling for a further round of
technical talks with Hans Blix, the head inspector, set conditions "at
variance" with the demands of the 15-nation Security Council.

The Iraqi invitation to Mr Blix seemed intended to split the big powers at
the UN as the drumbeat of war in Washington grew louder.

British and US officials described the Iraqi letter as an attempt by
President Saddam Hussein to rewrite UN resolutions on weapons inspections.

"What he should say is: 'Yes, I accept any time, any place unfettered
inspections'," Sean McCormack, a spokesman for the US National Security
Council, said.

Russia, however, welcomed the Iraqi initiative as an "important step towards
resolving the crisis through political and diplomatic means".

Although bitterly divided over the prospect of the United States using
military force to bring about a "regime change" in Iraq, the leading powers
do publicly agree that Iraq should allow the resumption of weapons
inspections in line with the requirements of Security Council Resolution
1284.

The 1999 resolution demanded that UN inspectors should be allowed
"immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" in Iraq and gave them 60
days to identify the "key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by
Iraq" and to establish a programme for future inspections.

UN officials said yesterday that Iraq was effectively trying to make the UN
identify the remaining disarmament tasks and draw up a programme of work
before the inspectors were allowed back in.

In the letter to Mr Annan, Naji Sabri, Iraq's Foreign Minister, said the
proposed talks would be aimed at reaching common ground on the scientific
and practical criteria that would be adopted to resolve what the UN weapons
inspectorate might see as disarmament issues. Mr Sabri also asked the UN to
revisit an earlier UN review of outstanding disarmament tasks - a request Mr
Blix had already rejected in previous rounds of talks.

Mr Annan has held three rounds of face-to-face talks with Iraq this year on
the possible return of the weapons inspectors, who were forced out of Iraq
in 1998.

However, Mr Annan is wary of Iraqi promises after Saddam reneged on a deal
brokered by Mr Annan earlier in 1998.

At the last round of talks, in Vienna, he refused to set a date for a new
face-to-face encounter because he felt Iraq was just agreeing with him in
order gain time. He did, however, agree that technical talks could continue
between UN and Iraqi officials.

Fred Eckhard, the UN spokesman, said that Mr Annan's objection was to the
substance of the Iraqi invitation, not to the proposed venue of Baghdad. "It
's what is to be discussed," he said.

Mr Annan will gather reaction to the Iraqi proposal at his monthly lunch
with Security Council members on Monday. However, diplomats and UN officials
made clear that, with both Britain and the United States expected to oppose
talks on Iraq's terms, it was virtually certain that Mr Blix would not
accept the invitation to go to Baghdad.


The Times

August 03, 2002

Whitehall dossier says Saddam plans biological weapons for Palestinians
by michael evans, defence editor



SADDAM HUSSEIN is suspected of planning to arm a Palestinian terrorist group
with biological weapons to attack either American or Israeli targets.
A Whitehall dossier containing a detailed assessment of Saddam Hussein's
weapons of mass destruction programme, which has been circulated to the
Prime Minister and other senior Cabinet ministers, is understood to focus on
Iraq's biological weapons capability.

Details of the dossier came to light as the United Nations rejected a new
offer from the Iraqi leader. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, said that
an Iraqi letter calling for a further round of technical talks with Hans
Blix, the head weapons inspector, set conditions "at variance" with the
demands of the United Nations Security Council.

Using mobile laboratories for their research, the team of scientists working
for Saddam are believed to be developing a range of biological agents that
can be "delivered" by an aerosol system.

The latest assessment in Washington and London is that Saddam's plan is to
produce a basic weapon that can be used by a terrorist group to attack the
Iraqi leader's enemies, the United States and Israel. In the same way that
Iran has funded and trained terrorist groups to carry out attacks from
Lebanon against Israel, Saddam, according to the assessment, could be
banking on recruiting a Palestinian terrorist group to act on his behalf.

Analysis of US satellite imagery over the past four years has provided
sufficient evidence to show what Saddam has been doing since the expulsion
of the United Nations weapons inspectors in December 1998. While the Iraqi
leader has pursued all elements of his weapons of mass destruction
programme, he has made greatest progress in trying to "weaponise" his
biological systems, using the mobile research laboratories to try to deceive
America's spy satellites.

The Iraqi leader knows from experience that it is far more difficult to hide
work on nuclear weapons because of the substantial infrastructure required.
Saddam's attempts to develop long-range ballistic missiles, capable of
reaching America, have also been carefully monitored from space and there is
no sign that he has succeeded beyond trying to modify old Russian Scud
missiles.

In assessing the threat posed by Saddam's weapons of mass destruction
programme, the emphasis has, therefore, been on his biological warfare
projects, which pose as great a threat as nuclear devices and can be
developed relatively easily away from the sensors of America's spy
satellites.

The Palestinian connection is now at the heart of intelligence thinking.
Despite the belief in some quarters in America that a senior officer in
Saddam's intelligence service met an al-Qaeda terrorist in Prague last year,
before September 11, this is given no credence by the CIA, the FBI or by
British Intelligence.

Saddam has funded Palestinian extremist groups for many years, and the
assessment now is that, with the Middle East in turmoil, the Iraqi leader
may see that the best way of taking revenge against the US and Israel is by
using a Palestinian organisation as his proxy terrorists.


Daily Telegraph


Saddam's 'cynical ploy'
By Toby Harnden in Washington
(Filed: 03/08/2002)


London and Washington last night dismissed as a cynical ploy Saddam
Hussein's offer of talks about the return of United Nations weapons
inspectors to Iraq.

Diplomats in both cities said the move was an attempt to stall the growing
momentum in the United States towards military action.



But initial responses from Moscow and Paris suggested that Saddam might have
partly succeeded in his aim of dividing world opinion. Tony Blair's
backbench critics could also be emboldened by the prospect of talks.

Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, gave a guarded welcome to the move,
although a spokesman cautioned that "the procedure proposed is at variance
with the one laid down by the Security Council in its resolution of 1999".

The letter from the Iraqi foreign minister, Naji Sabri, was sent to Mr Annan
on Thursday inviting Hans Blix, the UN's chief weapons inspector, for
"technical talks".

The Russian foreign ministry, which opposes the use of force against Saddam,
called the offer "an important step towards solving the present problems
through diplomatic and political means".

The French government said it supported "all efforts that might lead to Iraq
respecting its obligations".

America fears that a partial Iraqi compliance with the UN demand for the
return of inspectors could scupper its efforts to build support for a war
against Saddam.

The White House said the offer of talks would not alter the American policy
of "regime change" in Iraq.

"Saddam has a long history of playing games," a Foreign Office spokesman
said in London. "As his record shows, he does not deliver."

Weapons inspectors pulled out of Iraq in December 1998 after Baghdad failed
to co-operate with them.

President George W Bush has stepped up efforts to justify a decisive strike
against Saddam. Yesterday there were reports that it had revived the notion
of a link between Iraq and the September 11 attacks.

A White House official told the Los Angeles Times that a meeting between
Mohammed Atta, ringleader of the September 11 hijackers, and an Iraqi
official had taken place in Prague last year.

Richard Butler, the former head of the UN weapons inspectorate, was
dismissive of the motive behind Saddam's move.

"They can hear the drums of war beating," he told CNN. "It got their
attention. And what did they do? They wrote a letter saying, 'We want to
talk about the possibility of having inspectors back', not, 'Come in, let's
do it'."



Daily Telegraph

Seven years of resistance and brinkmanship
By Sandra Laville
(Filed: 03/08/2002)


At one point the prospect of disarming Saddam Hussein using a United Nations
mandate carried out by the most intrusive of weapons inspections seemed a
realistic possibility.

Buoyed by the Desert Storm victory in February 1991, the allies believed
that the task of seeking out and destroying Iraq's hidden stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction was attainable.

But after the first inspection in May 1991, the optimism was quickly
dispelled. "It became obvious that there was resistance," a former inspector
said yesterday. "That resistance has remained."

In the next seven years the inspectors were allowed in, then thrown out,
then invited back.

Brinkmanship reached new heights, the political fault lines of the UN
Security Council were painfully exposed and the credibility of the Unscom
inspection team was severely questioned.

Unscom was formed in April 1991 to carry out UN Security Council resolution
687 - demanding the demolition and removal of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction and their means of production. It provided for a system of
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance.

It was followed by further resolutions as Saddam continued to block open
inspections including resolution 949, in 1994, ordering Iraq to "co-operate
fully" with Unscom, and resolution 1060 in 1996, listing Iraq's violation of
previous UN decisions.

At each standoff, threats of military action were raised by America and
Britain, denounced by Russia and France and deflected by Kofi Annan, the UN
secretary-general, until Saddam backed down.

While Mr Annan complained privately that the Americans were choreographing
Unscom, Saddam accused Richard Butler, the Australian head of Unscom, and
Scott Ritter, the former Gulf soldier turned inspector, of being spies.

When Unscom finally pulled out in 1998, it had found and destroyed masses of
illegal weapons, including thousands of litres of anthrax and botulinum. But
it knew there was a great deal more that had been concealed.

It never accounted for a number of long-range missiles and warheads and
hundreds of chemical munitions, and had no proof that Iraq had destroyed its
biological weapons programme.

Six months later, American officials confirmed that US intelligence agents
had worked under cover as inspectors and Unscom was disbanded.

Daily Telegraph

Iraq's olive branch too little, too late
(Filed: 03/08/2002)


Alan Philps, Middle East Correspondent, analyses the thinking behind
yesterday's overture by Saddam Hussein to the UN weapons inspectors


After months of belligerence, Saddam Hussein has decided to put a brake on
the drift to war and hinted that he is ready to welcome United Nations
weapons inspectors back to Iraq.

This comes as little surprise to diplomats, who are used to Saddam doing
U-turns when the pressure becomes intolerable.

Only days ago, Iraqi officials were saying that UN weapons inspectors would
never be allowed back, as they were spies who would collect intelligence for
the long-promised American assault to remove Saddam.

The timing of his offer of an olive branch is impeccable. Just as
Washington's plans to topple him are coalescing, a diplomatic initiative
could delay the process for months.

This happened in February 1998 when America called off a bombing campaign
after Russia arranged a compromise over Saddam's refusal to allow weapons
inspectors to investigate his many palaces. The deal collapsed quickly and
the bombs fell 10 months later.

The Iraqis calculate that this time President George W Bush does not have 10
months to spare. There are rare opportunities in a president's four-year
term when he can engage in something as risky as an assault on Iraq and not
jeopardise his chances of re-election.

This winter is perfect timing for Mr Bush. The summer in Iraq is too hot for
soldiers to go into battle in chemical warfare suits; the following winter
could be too late.

Saddam's record over the past 12 years is one of failure to consolidate any
gains - unless mere survival is counted a victory. There are two reasons why
his diplomatic manoeuvring is likely to fail again this time. First, he has
offended too many of his friends and would-be mediators.

In 1998, Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, travelled to Baghdad to try
to cement a compromise on inspecting the presidential palaces. The deal was
short-lived.

Before making a second trip to Baghdad, Mr Annan would have to be persuaded
that he was not wasting his time again.

He well remembers the humiliation of his predecessor, Javier Perez de
Cuellar, who went to Baghdad in 1991 to try to persuade Saddam to pull his
troops out of Kuwait.

He was kept waiting for a day before the dictator gave him a curt no.
Saddam's other problem is that dictators tend to believe their own
propaganda and fail to grasp the way the world changes.

His cardinal error when he invaded Kuwait in 1990 was to fail to see that
the Cold War was over, that the Kremlin could not defend him and that
America could lead a worldwide coalition, including Arab states, to force
his troops out.

Saddam sees himself as a great survivor on a par with the Cuban leader,
Fidel Castro. He is convinced that one day his enemies will admit defeat and
come crawling to him for contracts to rebuild his shattered country.

The propaganda around him is intoxicating: his defeats and misjudgments
become victories and he is portrayed as a latter-day Saladin, who liberated
Jerusalem from the Crusaders.

Saddam can see that Mr Bush has little overt international support for his
campaign. The world outside Washington is yearning for a compromise that
would let the inspectors in for "unfettered access".

Saddam could be forgiven for underestimating the will of America to remove
him. Its past behaviour has never been a real threat to his survival. Half a
dozen American-backed coup attempts have been bloodily suppressed. Attacks
from the air have amounted to no more than stirring up a hornets' nest and
running away.

But the world has moved on from 1991. It is not clear if Saddam understands
that in Washington there is an administration that despises the UN way and
believes that it has the weapons and the will to go into battle alone.

Scott Ritter, a former weapons inspector, believes that he does. He also
believes that Saddam's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction is almost
destroyed or too old to use.

Mr Ritter greeted the Iraqi initiative as "a sincere effort, a bold
diplomatic move to retail this headlong rush towards war that exists in the
United States". In Washington, they prefer to see the threat of Iraq
becoming a nuclear power in three to five years.

The late President Anwar Sadat of Egypt used to say that "America holds 99
per cent of the cards" in the Middle East. By that reckoning, Saddam has
barely a single card to play against the Americans, and he has just played
it. It would be a real surprise, given past experience, if this was the card
that could stop the drift to war.


D Telegraph

 Winning the war of words
(Filed: 03/08/2002)


The world has known that Saddam Hussein poses a threat to peace for more
than a decade, but most people are still in denial about the gravity of that
threat. A coalition of the unwilling, drawing on the old establishment as
well as the Left, expresses its doubts. From retired field marshals and
foreign secretaries to the next Archbishop of Canterbury, the forces of
appeasement are gathering.

And although this coalition is mistaken, people can hardly be blamed for
their hesitations if the case for such a huge project as an attack on Iraq
is not properly and publicly made. The signals from Washington are mixed:
disputes within the Pentagon, with civilian hawks lined up against supposed
military doves, contribute to an impression of disarray. As for the country:
we talk of soaring house prices or collapsing stock markets, of cabbages and
kings. War against Iraq seems far away.

Faced with Western confusion, Saddam knows exactly what to do. Yesterday he
announced that weapons inspectors were welcome to return to Baghdad, as if
there had never been the slightest obstacle to the completion of the task
that the UN gave them 11 years ago. And there are plenty of voices who can
put the case for inaction.

When King Abdullah of Jordan told the Washington Post that Tony Blair
expressed "tremendous concerns" about war in Iraq when the two met this
week, the king must have known that it would sow discord within the
Anglo-American alliance and give comfort to the Continental Europeans, who
have made their participation in any action against Iraq "conditional on
proof that Iraq has belligerent intentions". Though proof of such intentions
is unlikely to be forthcoming, it is high time Mr Blair produced his dossier
of evidence on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.

A campaign of public diplomacy by the Bush administration is urgently
needed. There should be a full explanation of Saddam's preparation of
weapons of mass destruction. The Al Daura plant, for example - apparently
built to manufacture foot and mouth vaccine, has in fact been used for a
range of biological weapons (including experiments with camel pox, similar
to smallpox), as the British-trained virologist who headed the facility
admitted to UN inspectors in 1998.

George W. Bush's administration has not developed the case against Saddam in
sufficient detail since the "axis of evil" speech in January. The threat
from Iraq perhaps seems so obvious to him that he has not taken enough steps
to make it equally plain to a doubting world. He will need to appeal
directly to the people, if necessary over the heads of politicians. There is
enough ammunition in Saddam's genocidal past, but that evidence must be
presented with conviction. The State Department, which should be leading the
offensive, is hamstrung by internal bureaucratic politics. American missions
overseas should explain this policy to the world.

Here Mr Blair is in holiday mood. He, better than anyone in this country,
knows what is at stake in the overthrow of Saddam; but rather than confront
the coalition of the unwilling, the Prime Minister seems curiously detached.
When the present phoney peace comes to an end, as it soon must, the country
will need to understand why it is, in effect, at war. It is no use
mobilising the Armed Forces without mobilising public opinion first.







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