The following is an archived copy of a message sent to a Discussion List run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.

Views expressed in this archived message are those of the author, not of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.

[Main archive index/search] [List information] [Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

RE: [casi] Reply from Tom Levitt MP

On 2 Jul 2002 at 23:29, Colin Rowat wrote:

> The argument presented to me by those who argue that the sanctions are
> linked to Iraq's weapons, and not to its leadership, is that the US could
> not hold out against the Security Council if the Iraqi government was found
> to be in compliance by the weapons inspectors.

This argument is false and dangerous.

1)      Firstly the US/UK have vetoes so we have a 'ratchet' effect.

2)      To make progress, dialogue and trust is needed between the GoI and the
Secretary General. The US is trying to sabotage this progress by explicitly stating that
it's after regime change. The GoI know about 1)

3)      Compliance can be made as difficult as they want eg accounting for all stocks
held before the Gulf War - impossible. The GoI did not feel that it could ever comply
hence the need for 2) and hence the need for the US to sabotage it.

4)      Timescale: this can be dragged out by the US/UK so that weapons is officially
the reason but this is academic - the reality is regime change

5)      To achieve compliance would expose Iraq to spying and threaten its security -
would it do that with the world's superpower threatening regime change?

6)      The US/UK can resist pressure in the UNSC to stop the sanctions by pointing to
the expertise within Iraq and how quickly they could reembark on WMD programmes.

Mark Parkinson

Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
To unsubscribe, visit
To contact the list manager, email
All postings are archived on CASI's website:

[Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]