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Guardian story on US not taking yes for an answer



Hi all

You may recall the piece in the Guardian (reproduced below)
about US war plans and intended refusal to take yes for an 
answer re return of weapons inspectors. I put it to my 
senior USAF recently retired contact who served in the Gulf
and worked on war planning. I pass on his comments below

Cheers

Eric


I would take with a grain of salt anything the 
Guardian has to say about the situation, and here is why:
 
The article says :"The Pentagon and the CIA have begun 
preparations for an assault on Iraq involving up to 200,000
US troops that is likely to be launched later this year 
with the aim of removing Saddam Hussein from power, US and 
diplomatic sources told the Guardian yesterday."
 
First thing, I detest writers that rely ONLY on unnamed 
sources.  
 
As you and I know the Pentagon and CIA do not fight the 
wars, nor do the Pentagon and CIA do the actual planning.  
The theater CINC and his staff are chartered to develop war
plans and courses of action (except for Clinton and his 
unilateral use of cruise missiles in attacking Sudan 
without consulting the CINC, but Bush is no Clinton.)  
Therefore lumping the amorphous "train and equip" Pentagon 
with the CIA is nonsense, and the unnamed diplomatic 
sources in the article are either misquoted, misinformed 
terribly, or even made up.  
 
It is true that the CIA has been authorized to develop 
plans that would generate internal dissent and make 
toppling Saddam from within much more likely.  However, the
CIA has no technical expertise or skill or experience in 
making war plans.  In my last posting with the Air Force I 
participated in such planning for certain countries.  We 
used all sorts of intelligence sources to assist in the 
planning, but never included them in the actual 
step-by-step-how-are-we-gonna-do-this mission.
 
Besides, right now, internally in the United States, there 
is no real support for the introduction of troops in Iraq 
to over-throw Saddam.  However, given another terrorist 
attack and that would be irrelevant and you better not be 
there when it happens.
 
While the Guardian gets it right by noting "President 
George Bush's war cabinet, known as the "principals 
committee", agreed at a pivotal meeting in late January 
that the policy of containment has failed and that active 
steps should be taken to topple the Iraqi leader," they are
wrong in their assessment that "the plans for a parallel 
overt and covert war only landed on the president's desk in
the past few days." The "active steps" are only CIA covert 
ops to support Iraqi dissidents.  Oh, the CIA would not 
present a combined CIA/military plan to anyone, as the CIA 
has no expertise in conceptualizing or planning for massive
military operations, and 200,000 troops is pretty massive.
 
The article has it right in regard to the US administration
being of one mind and one voice; Saddam must leave.  
However, the actual method on how to achieve that goal is 
still very much in doubt and debated internally.
 
The writer of this article tips his hand and reveals he is 
not too bright when it comes to reporting on US military 
matters.  He says, "The blueprint for a campaign against 
Iraq has evolved from a contingency plan drawn up by the 
joint chiefs of staff that envisaged the use of a 
200,000-strong US force, the bulk of which would invade 
from Kuwait."
 
Look, I am not quibbling here, but it is just plain silly 
to say the joint chiefs developed a plan.  The joint chiefs
do nothing of the sort.  Again, it is the theater CINC that
develops the plans, with the joint chiefs training and 
equipping the troops.  I cannot stress enough that the 
joint chiefs/Pentagon have nothing to do with plans.  Now, 
it may be possible the theater CINC asked for concepts, 
theory only, on how best to fight a war (much like 
Schwarzkopf did for the Gulf War when he asked the USAF Air
Staff for planning guidance for a strategic air war).  
 
Here is another point that shows the Guardian writer is not
too informed and a bit "out there."  The writer says, 
"Central Command has already set up forward headquarters in
the Gulf from which each of the component services will be 
able to coordinate the war."
 
CENTCOM Forward never left Riyadh.  

They have remained in place from the end of the Gulf War to
help run/coordinate the NFZ's and support other actions in 
the AOR.
 
He is correct by reporting, "The air force headquarters 
(Afcent) is at the Prince Sultan air base in Saudi Arabia. 
The army headquarters (Arcent) is in Kuwait, while the navy
(Navcent) is in Bahrain.  Central Command's marine 
component (Marcent) is also expected to move to Bahrain in 
the next few days, weeks after the main marine force left 
Afghanistan." 
 
However, please note, just because the Marine's command 
element left Afghanistan doesn't have anything to do with 
supposed impending military action.  The Marine command 
element left Afghanistan because there was no reason for 
them to stay-all the Marines left!!  The command element 
would naturally return to their more permanent faculties, 
co-located with the Navy in Bahrain.  Make nothing of this 
move.   
 
The writer is an alarmist.  He notes "The US, Israel and 
Turkey were due to hold joint exercises codenamed Anatolian
Eagle this year, but in another sign of accelerated 
preparations there will be three such exercises in the next
few months, based at the Turkish air force base at Konya. 
Once upgraded, Konya could be used alongside Incirlik as a 
base for air strikes on northern Iraq."   Let me tell you, 
large exercises of this nature, like Bright Star with 
Egypt, are not just a week or two, are planned for years, 
and have many different phases to test and exercise the 
various complex command and control and deployment and 
actual field exercises that make up a war plan.  You take 
it in stages and put them together, with evaluations and 
adjustments all along.  Smaller exercises, no problem, 
major ones like this one and you have to spread them out.  
This is especially true when much of your regional support 
is already engaged in real-world activities.  This last 
point is most critical, and the major reason why the 
exercise is piece-meal.
 
"The Pentagon's military planners are reported to have 
agonised over the Iraq plan because of the significant risk
that Saddam - aware that unlike during the Gulf war his own
life is at stake this time - would use chemical and 
biological weapons against US troop concentrations and 
Israel.  The danger would be minimised by intensive bombing
of missile launchers, but the generals reportedly remain 
extremely concerned that the risks cannot be eliminated 
entirely."
 
The risk is certainly a concern.  But Eric, don't you find 
it ironic that the Guardian makes a point to say Saddam is 
at personal risk in any supposed upcoming action, whereas 
the Guardian admits the US/coalition did not target 
personally Saddam in the Gulf War.  This makes me chuckle. 
 
The points in the article about how the CIA would conduct 
covert operations are essentially correct.
 
The Guardian writer uses nothing but unnamed sources to 
buttress his allegation.  I do read the Guardian on a 
semi-regular basis and I am appalled at their causal and 
extensive use of unnamed sources.  I fully appreciate the 
value of such sources, but a good rule when using such 
sources is to verify as best you can, use them sparingly, 
make sure they are credible and know what they are talking 
about, and if possible use other sources (named or unnamed)
as balance.  Failure to do this, as I am sure you are 
aware, makes one susceptible to disinformation and 
manipulation.  An unnamed source can be a good source of 
information, but only when credibility has been firmly 
established.   
 
To make my point, the writer alleges "As the American 
intelligence source put it, the White House "will not take 
yes for an answer", suggesting that Washington would 
provoke a crisis. He added that he expected the war to 
begin soon after the May ultimatum."
 
Just how the heck would the source know this?  Just who the
heck is this "intelligence source," as he would have to be 
the president himself to know such a thing.  How does the 
writer know this source is truly in the know and not 
someone with an agenda?  How does the writer know the 
source (if there is one) is actually high enough in the 
food chain to know what is going on in the minds of the 
NCA?  
 
Eric, plans are made all the time, and plans are never 
assigned a timetable, like "in six months we will invade 
country XX, but first we will do "a," then "b," then we 
will respond with military action."  
 
Congressional support is critical, as Congress are the ones
to declare war and to authorize the presidents' use of 

military force (War Powers Act).  If Bush manipulated 
things to invade Iraq, then Congress would be very angry 
and withhold support.  The president is not a prime 
minister.  He can't act unilaterally, and without 
Congressional support, and the support of the American 
people, Bush would be toast.
 
The assertion that "US allies in the Middle East have been 
informed that a decision to attack Iraq has already been 
taken" is pretty bold.  IF such a decision was made, then 
telling ANYONE in the Middle East would be foolish as they 
leak worse than a rusty bucket and there would be NAMED 
sources everywhere screaming to anyone who will listen.  
This is an apparent falsehood on the part of the writer.  
He is making this up, I can bet you a non-alcoholic fruit 
beverage on this one.
 
"diplomats from the region said yesterday they were 
resigned to the inevitability of a war that may threaten 
the stability of a string of Arab regimes." 
 
I do not think they are "resigned to the inevitability" of 
any military action against Iraq.  My sources in the region
(unnamed, of course) do not support the writer's statement.
Not at all.  
 
Besides, if their stability was so plainly to be 
threatened, they would in no way go quietly in the night.  
Can you imagine Saudi meekly  accepting US action that 
would put at risk their own regime.  Not hardly.  No way.
 
Bottom line, Eric, this article is alarmist, baseless and 
without merit.
 
However, as I said from the start, it is not a good time to
travel to unstable countries in the region, as one never 
knows what may happen tomorrow.  Another terrorist attack 
and the whole situation changes.  And that, my friend, is 
why I recommend you don't go there.
 
Oh, funny thing, prior to 9-11 and Afghanistan, Bush was 
portrayed in the media (especially European media) as 
bumbling and inept, and now he is calculating enough to 
plan events that would trigger US domestic support for a 
massive US invasion of Iraq and get all those disparate 
Middle East regimes to go along with a plan that would put 
them at great risk. . .hmmmm.  

By way of additional information regarding war plans:
Plans are made and revised all the time.  Regulation and a 
matter of good sense require this.
Situations change; alliances form and fail, force 
structures go up and down and political environments flail.

As a result of ever-changing situations, the military 
regularly makes adjustments.
Contingencies are thought of, options evaluated, new plans 
formed and old ones exercised.  
Some plans are adjusted on a more regular basis (Iraq), and
others are pretty much left to the routine (Korea).  
This goes for all regions of the world.
Each theater CINC has an entire staff (J-5) that dedicates 
each day to evaluating pre-existing plans, refining them, 
"what-if-ing" other scenarios, and making adjustments. That
is what they do, as does the UK PJHQ.  It is the smart 
thing to do because when the doo-doo hits the fan, that is 
not the time to start planning.  The, "what do we do now?" 
is best asked a long time ago.
For example, when General Schwarzkopf took over CENTCOM in 
early 1990, he tasked his J-5 staff to take a good look at 
all plans and he picked off the shelf a pre-existing plan 
to exercise-the Iraq invades Saudi scenario. (You can't 
exercise all plans, just too many of them.)  As a result of
his decision to exercise that plan, in late May to early 
June 1990, I participated in a computer-based exercise 
conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  During this 
exercise Iraq invaded Kuwait and Saudi.  We fought the war,
won, but it took a lot longer than the actual Gulf War.  
The Iraq/Saudi scenario was considered the most likely 
scenario at the time, as Iran was very weak and no other 
nations in the region demonstrated external aggressions.  
Also, as the CINC of all US military action in theater, he 
selected that exercise because it was the most complicated 
and involved equally all the service components-not just 
the Navy (most plans in that region were/are Navy-centric, 
as basing rights in the region were essentially 
non-existent and very complicated).
 
Let me summarize, that the US has plans in the works for 
Iraq is not news and not irregular or in response to any 
direction from the NCA.  No sir.  Things are changing in 
that region every day, and plans must be adjusted 
accordingly.  

Keep in mind, even as I write this email there are CINC 
staffs around the world making plans for a myriad of 
contingencies that may call upon the US military to 
respond-anywhere, at anytime. 


http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,649917,00.html

US targets Saddam. Pentagon and CIA making plans for war 
against Iraq this year 

Julian Borger and Ewen MacAskill
Thursday February 14, 2002
The Guardian 

The Pentagon and the CIA have begun preparations for an 
assault on Iraq
involving up to 200,000 US troops that is likely to be 
launched later this year with
the aim of removing Saddam Hussein from power, US and 
diplomatic sources told
the Guardian yesterday. 

President George Bush's war cabinet, known as the 
"principals committee",
agreed at a pivotal meeting in late January that the policy
of containment has failed
and that active steps should be taken to topple the Iraqi 
leader. 

But, according to a US intelligence source familiar with 
CIA preparations, the plans
for a parallel overt and covert war only landed on the 
president's desk in the past
few days. 

"I will reserve whatever options I have. I'll keep them 
close to my vest. Saddam
Hussein needs to understand that I'm serious about 
defending our country," Mr
Bush said yesterday. 

Since the principals committee decision, Colin Powell, the 
secretary of state and
the dove of the administration, has pointedly added his 
voice to the calls for a
"regime change". 

"We are looking at a variety of options that would bring 
that about," he told the
Senate budget committee. 

The blueprint for a campaign against Iraq has evolved from 
a contingency plan
drawn up by the joint chiefs of staff that envisaged the 
use of a 200,000-strong US
force, the bulk of which would invade from Kuwait. 

However, it may be that the actual force used will be less 
numerous, relying more
on covert and special forces operations. 

Central Command has already set up forward headquarters in 
the Gulf from
which each of the component services will be able to 
coordinate the war. 

The air force headquarters (Afcent) is at the Prince Sultan
air base in Saudi
Arabia. The army headquarters (Arcent) is in Kuwait, while 
the navy (Navcent) is in
Bahrain. 

Central Command's marine component (Marcent) is also 
expected to move to
Bahrain in the next few days, weeks after the main marine 
force left Afghanistan. 

The US, Israel and Turkey were due to hold joint exercises 
codenamed Anatolian
Eagle this year, but in another sign of accelerated 
preparations there will be
three such exercises in the next few months, based at the 
Turkish air force
base at Konya. Once upgraded, Konya could be used alongside
Incirlik as a base
for air strikes on northern Iraq. 

The Pentagon's military planners are reported to have 
agonised over the Iraq
plan because of the significant risk that Saddam - aware 
that unlike during the
Gulf war his own life is at stake this time - would use 
chemical and biological
weapons against US troop concentrations and Israel. 

The danger would be minimised by intensive bombing of 
missile launchers,
but the generals reportedly remain extremely concerned that
the risks cannot
be eliminated entirely. 

The CIA's covert war would involve arming and training 
Kurdish fighters in northern
Iraq and Shi'ite forces in Kuwait. CIA trainers and special
forces troops have
already been dispatched to Kuwait for that purpose, and may
already have begun
work. 

Meanwhile, CIA and special forces will launch a campaign of
sabotage and
information warfare in the next few months. 

The CIA puts very little faith in the military capacity of 
the main opposition
movement, the Iraqi National Congress, but it has begun 
intensive consultations
with INC officials about the logistics of training and 
arming the movement's
supporters. 

The trigger could be the expected row over weapons 
inspections in three months'
time. America's allies are clinging to the hope that US 
military action will be
forestalled by Baghdad's acceptance of unconditional and 
unfettered weapons
inspections when the international sanctions regime comes 
up for review at
the United Nations in May. 

However, Iraq's vice-president, Taha Yassin Ramadan, said 
yesterday there
was no need for "spies" from the UN weapons inspection 
teams to return to the
country. 

A US state department official said he thought it very 
unlikely that the Iraqi
regime would be prepared to accept the stringent programme 
of inspections the
US will demand. As the American intelligence source put it,
the White
House "will not take yes for an answer", suggesting that 
Washington would
provoke a crisis. He added that he expected the war to 
begin soon after the
May ultimatum. 

US allies in the Middle East have been informed that a 
decision to attack Iraq has
already been taken, and diplomats from the region said 
yesterday they were
resigned to the inevitability of a war that may threaten 
the stability of a string of
Arab regimes. 

"It is a nightmare situation for us," said one Arab 
diplomat in Washington. "We
feel the Americans will take very drastic action and we 
have to be prepared for
such a reality. But the public opinion in the street will 
not see this as a benign
attempt to restore order, but as American imperialism." 

France, Germany and others in the European Union have been 
queuing up to
make clear to Mr Bush that they will not support him in 
military action against Iraq.

The German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, this week 
joined the French
foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, by expressing publicly 
his concern about US
policy towards Iraq. 

But Tony Blair and the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, have 
refused to join the public
outcry. A Foreign Office official said yesterday that 
military action was not
imminent, but would be "a question of months". 

A Foreign Office spokesman later said: "The prime minister 
has made it clear
from the outset that the campaign would have two phases: 
the first focusing on
Afghanistan and the second looking at different aspects of 
international terrorism.
In that context, we have to look at issues such as weapons 
of mass destruction." 

There are regular exchanges between the US state department
and the Foreign
Office on strategy for tackling Iraq. The Foreign Office 
spokesman said: "We will
proceed in consultation with our allies and the precise 
methods of action will be for
consultation in due course." 

In the months after September 11, the Foreign Office 
repeatedly ruled out military
action against Iraq, other than the regular bombing along 
its border with Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait. Its line at the time was that there was 
no evidence linking Iraq to
terrorist activity. 

Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey, all US allies neighbouring
Iraq, expect to sustain
significant economic and political damage from a new 
conflict. Jordan believes it
stands to lose $800m (£500m) from the interruption of 
deliveries of cheap Iraqi oil,
and has already begun to hint at the need for compensation.



----------------------
Dr. Eric Herring
Department of Politics
University of Bristol
10 Priory Road
Bristol BS8 1TU
England, UK
Office tel. +44-(0)117-928-8582
Mobile tel. +44-(0)7771-966608 
Fax +44-(0)117-973-2133
http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/Politics
eric.herring@bristol.ac.uk

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