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To: Sir Terence Clark; CASI list Sir Terence states, concerning Halabja, <reliable evidence of Iraqi responsibility
became available ... much later.> I am very pleased that Sir Terence has made
this statement. In doing so, he has moved on from his exclusive concern with a
side-issue (the purpose and timing of David Mellor's visit to Iraq in Spring
1988), to a direct comment on the substance of the CASI discussion, which was
about the responsibility of the Saddam Hussein regime for the Halabja massacre.
I was concerned that his three little words ("at the time") were too
small in relation to the rather longer words "two conflicting versions of
events", and that the effect, if not the intention, of his intervention
was to recreate some of the confusion about who was responsible for Halabja.
His latest posting has removed this danger. I had also complained that Sir Terence had
made no comment on other parts of my statement concerning "the UK
government's nefarious alliance with the Saddam regime during the period when
he was London's representative in Baghdad". He responded <the point of my intervention ... was not
to comment on your view of British
policy towards Iraq, as the facts are widely on record> The facts which are on record represent only
a tiny proportion of the totality of facts relevant to UK and US dealings with
Saddam Hussein during the US/UK's covert alliance with Baghdad during the war
with Iran. The rest of the facts are buried in secret files in Whitehall and in
such places as Sir Terence's own memory. One outstanding fact which is on the public
record is the enormous extent of the deception and lies which ministers of the
UK government at the time of Halabja perpetrated against Parliament and the
people. This was, of course, the subject of the Scott enquiry, which was itself
not a real enquiry but a damage-limitation exercise. Andrew & Patrick Cockburn, in "Out
of the Ashes - the Resurrection of Saddam Hussein", have some interesting things to say
concerning the big issues which once again I invite Sir Terence to comment on: "Prior to the invasion of Kuwait... Saddam's
murderous regime evoked few complaints in the outside world. Even when he took
to gassing his Kurdish subjects, governments in Washington, London, and other
western capitals stayed mute, grateful that he was fighting the Islamic
Republic of Iran." (p12) Finally, Sir Terence quotes my closing
paragraph: <Sir Terence is
undoubtedly in a position to shed light on ... many ...questions of interest to
the ordinary people of Iraq and the UK [note: I should have added "and to
the people of Iran"]. It would be interesting to know, for instance, which
arms deals he did help to arrange during the period in question (from, say,
February 1988, which he describes as "well before Halabja", which
took place on March 16th, to autumn of that year).> He replied: <The short answer is none.> I look forward to researching this subject
further, and to asking some questions which might elicit the long answer. John S ****************************** Original message: Message text written by "John
Smith" >Sir Terence has set the record straight
on one issue of fact, but he has used my inaccuracy to recreate some of the
confusion about who carried out the attack on Halabja, an important issue which
had been substantially settled by Glen's observations. It is interesting what Sir Terence does and
does not say in his brief posting. He refers to the "two
conflicting version of events", as if responsibility for Halabja is an open
question.> Please read again what I wrote: " Leaving aside the enormous
difficulties of verifying at the time either of the two conflicting versions of
events, as they have been related on this List," You have overlooked the three little words
"at the time" and created your own confusion! I was referring to the
genuine difficulty all of us had in the aftermath of Halabja of verifying what
had happened. Halabja was completely out of bounds to independent observers and
while the indications pointed to Iraqi responsibility, there were also reports
circulating of Iranian use of cyanide shells. Both these versions were aired on
this List recently. I no longer recall when reliable evidence of Iraqi
responsibility became available but it was I am sure only much later. < He adroitly - or should I say maladroitly
- sidesteps other parts of my statement: both the general point about the UK
government's nefarious alliance with the Saddam regime during the period when
he was London's representative in Baghdad, and the specific one about the UK
government's role in protecting Saddam from UN censure for perpetrating the
Halabja attack.> You misunderstand the point of my
intervention which was not to comment on your
view of British policy towards Iraq, as the facts are widely on record,
but purely to correct your unfounded allegations about the purpose and timing
of David Mellor's visit to Iraq. You alleged: "the UK government sent
David Mellor to Baghdad to negotiate a major arms contract while the bodies
were still lying in the street [of Halbja]". I repeat that he did not
negotiate any arms deals whatsoever and as his visit was 3 weeks before the
attack on Halabja there were consequently no victims lying on the streets. <Sir Terence is undoubtedly in a position
to shed light on these and many other questions of interest to the ordinary
people of Iraq and the UK. It would be interesting to know, for instance, which
arms deals he did help to arrange during the period in question (from, say,
February 1988, which he describes as "well before Halabja", which
took place on March 16th, to autumn of that year).> The short answer is none. Terence Clark |