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> It's quite, quite different from the UK and French > proposals - Russia is effectively proposing a > simple, straight swap: an immediate ending of all > non-military sanctions and constraints in return for > readmitting arms inspectors. It's been considerably > cut down from the 22 May Russian proposal. Britain > calls this "dangerous"; I think we can effectively > argue that anything except this is dangerous, both > in terms of Iraqi WMD development and for Iraqi > wellbeing. Thanks for the Russian draft Glen, and for your summary. I've not read the previous Russian drafts, so come at this without an ability to compare. Yes, the inspections for suspension swap seems similar to that outlined in 1284, with the following differences: 1. there's no 120 day co-operation period. What may be regarded as particularly "dangerous" is that, once suspension occurs, a single veto is not sufficient to reimpose sanctions, but is sufficient to keep them suspended. 2. it makes explicit that the escrow account would be, subject to some deductions, given over to the Iraqi government. This was left unclear in § 33 of SCR 1284. This offer of a swap, and Russia's closeness to Iraq, makes me wonder whether there's some reason to believe that this would be an offer that the Iraqi government would accept. If so, would they only accept it hoping to play the new inspectors along, or is this a genuine offer? The answer to this might depend on how the rest of the Council responds. Note that the Russian draft makes no provisions for foreign investment or debt renegotiation. A cash component follows from the return of escrow account funds. It also makes no provisions to ensure that revenue reaches Iraqi Kurdistan. The § 3 provisions for reporting on trade with Iraq seem sensible. Wassenaar, the technology transfer agreement of recent fame, works on this basis as well, with more extensive reporting the more sensitive the goods. § 7's emphasis on Iraq's "threat to international peace and security" is also well taken. As Marc Lynch's MERIP PIN noted, there is a real danger that we are looking at a system of "permanent sanctions": no inspections means no lifting - fine if one's interested in just locking Iraq out of the world, but not if one's concerned about lives there. By reminding us that the sanctions were imposed (indeed, any Chapter VII action can only be taken) in response to threats of this sort, Russia is reminding the Council of its mandate. § 9, the reminder that Iraq "adhere scrupulously" to its foreign debt requirement is a bit scrupulous. ===== Colin Rowat 274 Vanderbilt Ave., #2 Brooklyn NY 11205 USA (m) 917 517 5840 (f) 707 221 3672 __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get personalized email addresses from Yahoo! Mail http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/ -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq For removal from list, email email@example.com Full details of CASI's various lists can be found on the CASI website: http://www.casi.org.uk