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re: The Russian proposal of 26 June 2001



> It's quite, quite different from the UK and French
> proposals - Russia is effectively proposing a 
> simple, straight swap: an immediate ending of all 
> non-military sanctions and constraints in return for

> readmitting arms inspectors. It's been considerably 
> cut down from the 22 May Russian proposal. Britain 
> calls this "dangerous"; I think we can effectively 
> argue that anything except this is dangerous, both 
> in terms of Iraqi WMD development and for Iraqi 
> wellbeing.

Thanks for the Russian draft Glen, and for your
summary.  I've not read the previous Russian drafts,
so come at this without an ability to compare.

Yes, the inspections for suspension swap seems similar
to that outlined in 1284, with the following
differences:

1. there's no 120 day co-operation period.  What may
be regarded as particularly "dangerous" is that, once
suspension occurs, a single veto is not sufficient to
reimpose sanctions, but is sufficient to keep them
suspended.

2. it makes explicit that the escrow account would be,
subject to some deductions, given over to the Iraqi
government.  This was left unclear in  33 of SCR
1284.

This offer of a swap, and Russia's closeness to Iraq,
makes me wonder whether there's some reason to believe
that this would be an offer that the Iraqi government
would accept.  If so, would they only accept it hoping
to play the new inspectors along, or is this a genuine
offer?  The answer to this might depend on how the
rest of the Council responds.

Note that the Russian draft makes no provisions for
foreign investment or debt renegotiation.  A cash
component follows from the return of escrow account
funds.  It also makes no provisions to ensure that
revenue reaches Iraqi Kurdistan.

The  3 provisions for reporting on trade with Iraq
seem sensible.  Wassenaar, the technology transfer
agreement of recent fame, works on this basis as well,
with more extensive reporting the more sensitive the
goods.

 7's emphasis on Iraq's "threat to international
peace and security" is also well taken.  As Marc
Lynch's MERIP PIN noted, there is a real danger that
we are looking at a system of "permanent sanctions":
no inspections means no lifting - fine if one's
interested in just locking Iraq out of the world, but
not if one's concerned about lives there.  By
reminding us that the sanctions were imposed (indeed,
any Chapter VII action can only be taken) in response
to threats of this sort, Russia is reminding the
Council of its mandate.
 
 9, the reminder that Iraq "adhere scrupulously" to
its foreign debt requirement is a bit scrupulous.


=====
Colin Rowat
274 Vanderbilt Ave., #2
Brooklyn NY 11205
USA
(m) 917 517 5840
(f) 707 221 3672

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