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Below see: 1. Complete Iraq excerpt from the Strategic Survey 2000/2001 http://www.iiss.org/pub/stratsur.asp, as it appears on the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 2. IISS Director's statement at survey launch **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** ***** http://www.iiss.org/pub/ssiraq.asp Strategic Survey 2000/2001 Iraq Sanctions: Towards a New Policy In the ten years since the end of the Gulf War, the coalition which drove Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait has followed a policy of containing him. Despite much comment to the contrary, that policy has been largely effective. The serial aggressor who until 1991 had invaded and fought with immediate neighbours for all but two of his years as leader has since been unable to attack anyone. His armed forces, once one of the largest in the world, are severely constrained by shortages of equipment and spare parts. His weapons of mass destruction programme has been exposed and reduced. Where ten years ago, Saddam was on the verge of a nuclear capability, that prospect has been indefinitely postponed. Nevertheless, criticism of containment is mounting, and containment itself leaks badly. As reaction to their airstrikes in February 2001 underlined, the US and UK can no longer count on overt support for the use of force to safeguard the No-Fly-Zones. Saddam has exploited the suffering of his own people and the breakdown in the peace process to turn regional and wider popular opinion against sanctions. Inspections are on hold. And both sanctions evasion and sanctions breaches are increasing. Last year, many companies attended the Baghdad Trade Fair, while others (including three permanent members of the UN Security Council) have permitted flights to Baghdad. Oil smuggling, principally via Jordan, Iran and Turkey, is estimated at nearly $1 billion a year. And Syria has now agreed to take large quantities of Iraqi oil through a reopened cross-border pipeline. Is Containment Finished? Those who see in these developments the collapse of containment are overstating the case. Containment remains the only viable option if Saddam can't be removed and can't be rehabilitated. Removal looks unlikely – Saddam is as strong internally as he has ever been. Rehabilitation is unacceptable if it means a Saddam free to develop his weapons of mass destruction and rebuild his armed forces. Yet, containment will be increasingly less effective unless it commands approval as well as authority. To achieve that, it is increasingly clear that the current instruments of containment need to be recalibrated. In considering changes to the existing sanctions regime, the US, UK, and France (the three Western members of the Security Council or P-3) should keep three objectives in focus: Depriving Saddam Hussein of the military capabilities he needs to launch aggression against his neighbours; impeding, if not completely eliminating, his ability to produce medium- and long- range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction; and preserving, as much as possible, regional support for these objectives. A continued, robust, sanctions regime that keeps military components, offensive technology and WMD precursors out of Iraq, and money out of the hands of regime members, is essential to the first two objectives. A sanctions regime that enables the majority of Iraqi citizens to get on with their lives, reduces their isolation, and fosters a reconstitution of the Iraqi middle class is the key to the third objective. With these objectives in mind, the US, UK and France should explore the following options: The elimination of sanctions on commercial goods… Refining the regular use of force in the no-fly zones while preserving the option to use force very heavily if circumstances warrant… Lifting restrictions on investment in Iraq's energy sector… Eliminating most civil flight restrictions… Tightening controls on a narrower range of dual use items… Blocking the assets of regime members… Making a serious effort to reduce oil smuggling… Putting controls on the ground to keep contraband out of Iraq… Sharply limiting contact with senior Iraqi regime members… Insisting on tough UNMOVIC inspection measures… **************************************************************************** **************************************************************************** ***** http://www.iiss.org/pub/tx/tx01006.asp Director's Statement at the Launch of Strategic Survey 2000-2001 16 May 2001 by Dr John Chipman Iraq Sanctions Ten years after the war to expel Iraq from Kuwait, there is a requirement to develop a fresh approach to the threat that Saddam Hussein continues to pose to the region. There remains a loose consensus among the former members of the political-military coalition brought together to defeat Saddam Hussein that he must not be allowed to threaten his neighbours or reconstitute his WMD programme. There is an emerging but not yet mature consensus that a new approach requires smarter sanctions, more selective use of force and meaningful arms control. A few in the US also want to develop a more coherent and robust approach to regime change, though some of the ideas proposed within the administration remain hugely controversial among the front-line states. A clear priority must be to develop the widest possible consensus on a new smarter sanctions regime. This year's edition of Strategic Survey proposes a series of new measures that should command wide attention. They are outlined in the book and on our web page today and include: The elimination of sanctions on commercial goods Refining the regular use of force in the no-fly zones while preserving the option to use force very heavily if circumstances warrant Lifting restrictions on investment in Iraq's energy sector Eliminating most civil flight restrictions Tightening controls on a narrower range of dual use items Blocking the assets of regime members Making a serious effort to reduce oil smuggling Putting controls on the ground to keep contraband out of Iraq Sharply limiting contact with senior Iraqi regime members Insisting on tough UNMOVIC inspection measures. These measures would take some time to negotiate and to translate into a UN Security Council resolution. They should, however, be part of the wider public strategic debate. As the US and its European allies begin to develop, with Russia, stronger agreement on a new approach to Iraq, the elements of that approach should be discussed and proclaimed at the next G8 meeting in Genoa. While any new approach would need to formalised at the UN, discussion of Iraq at the next G8 meeting would sustain multilateral momentum for a more focused strategy to contain Iraq. -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq For removal from list, email soc-casi-discuss-request@lists.cam.ac.uk Full details of CASI's various lists can be found on the CASI website: http://www.casi.org.uk