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NEW WORLD ORDER SUPPLEMENT, 14-21/1/01 * The questionable future of NATO [by Henry Kissinger. The veteran mass-murderer, responsible for the bombing of Cambodia and Laos, see Simon Jenkinsı piece later on, suggests that, under Bush, Europe will just have to come to terms with Americaıs greatness] * We must fight the good fight for jingoism [by Michael Gore in The Times. Another attempt to give credibility to the Bush conception of foreign affairs. Which has also all of a sudden become the Hague conception, though in Bushıs absence we didnıt hear much about it] * West claimed moral high ground with air power [by John Keegan of the Daily Telegraph, a classic article that everyone should have framed on their wall as a reminder of the depths to which we fall when we give free reign to our propensity for moral self righteousness] * U.N. Sanctions Keep Iraqis Poor, Hopeless [The title is very misleading. The article is actually about the nature of modern weaponry and ends up with a brief description of the best known items in the American arsenal] * Bombs that turn our leaders into butchers [Simon Jenkinsı powerful description of the Plain of Jars in Laos. After which let no-one think that we and our allies are in any position to accuse anyone of war crimesı] * Condoleeza Rice comments Iraq sanctions, Balkans [Nothingıs gonna change our world ...] * Deadly blast from the past [an account of the virtues and shortcomings of fuel airı weapons. Concludes that cluster bombs are a more effective way of killing people, though fuel air bombs are good for dispersing the evidence of a chemical weapons attack] * Analysis: Khalilzad and Bush's Afghanistan policy [Account of the Afghani who may guide the process of sanctions against Afghanistan. He favours pitting the Pashtun against the Talibani. Since the Talibani are themselves the present day representatives of the Pashtun, this may be difficult.] * Diverse faith groups at prayer lunch [A self indulgence on my part. But Iım intrigued by the apparent respectability of Sun Myung Moon who, as I knew, controls the Washington Times and also, as I didnıt know but was beginning to guess, the United Press International. Both these two organs seem to be very anti-Iraq] URLsONLY: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/commentary/printedition/article/0,2669,SA V 0101160080,FF.html * DISPUTE REFLECTS DEEPER CONFLICTS, RIVALRIES BETWEEN EUROPE AND U.S. by William Pfaff Chicago Tribune (probably from Los Angeles Times), 17th January http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/01/17/afghanistan.us.threats.reut/index.html * U.S. OFFICIAL SAYS AFGHANISTAN CENTER OF TERRORISM CNN, January 17, 2001 http://www.dawn.com/2001/01/14/op.htm#1 * THE QUESTIONABLE FUTURE OF NATO by Henry Kissinger Dawn (from Los Angeles Times), 14th January THE uneasy reaction of European media and political leaders to the American election, ascribed to a desire for continuity, actually involved a remarkable paradox. Why continuity when Atlantic relations have been far from harmonious? Our allies, Britain largely excepted, have been dissociating, often demonstratively, from sanctions against Cuba, Iran or Iraq, and from American policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the Taiwan Straits. They have disagreed publicly with the concept of a national missile defence, which French President Jacques Chirac attacked at a press conference at the side of Russian President Vladimir Putin, explicitly on behalf of all of Europe. The European Union is in the process of creating a military force institutionally distinct from NATO. Since the end of the cold war, common policy toward the Soviet Union has been replaced by allies seeking their own "special relationship" with Moscow - not necessarily directed against other allies but not especially solicitous of their views either. The disagreements in the economic field are even more visible. The United States has threatened retaliation against Europe over bananas and beef, and the European Union has threatened the United States over American taxation of exports. The two sides are deadlocked on how, or even whether, to launch a new multilateral trade negotiation. Another dispute over energy policy looms, especially if oil prices remain high. Equally striking is the weakening of the emotional bond. More Americans and Europeans are visiting each others' continents than ever before. But they travel in the cocoon of their preconceptions or of their professional relationships, without acquiring a knowledge of the history and politics of the other side. On the other hand, the United States, as depicted in European mass media, is defined by the death penalty, the lack of a system of free medical insurance, the vast American prison population and other comparable stereotypes. In this atmosphere, many advocates of European integration are urging unity as an exercise in differentiation from, if not opposition to, the United States. The Clinton administration has left a legacy of unanswered questions: Is the Atlantic Alliance still at the heart of transatlantic relations? If so, how does it define its purpose in the post-cold war world? If not, what can be put in its place to undergird transatlantic relations?The paradox is that, the political vacuum notwithstanding, personal relations among the leaders of the Atlantic nations during the 1990s remained remarkably close. But they were based less on shared policy views than on shared personal experiences as the first group of leaders who had grown up after World War II. The founding generation of the Alliance presumed the benevolence of American power and the importance of allied unity. Their sons and daughters, growing up during the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s, developed a profound distrust of American power; at a minimum, they wanted America to use its power only for universal causes transcending the national interest. The founding generation viewed the Alliance as the point of departure for a union of democracies. The generation governing in the 1990s viewed the Atlantic Alliance as a relic of the cold war, if not an obstacle to overcoming it. Its goal was less to strengthen the Alliance than to "erase dividing lines." Thus, in a joint press conference with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in March 1997, President Clinton described the "old NATO" as "basically a mirror image of the Warsaw Pact," equating a voluntary association of democracies with what the Soviet Union had imposed on subjugated countries. The key to the paradox is that, throughout the West, foreign relations are today more than ever a function of domestic politics. Since the European centre-left governments have disappointed the radical wings of their parties by implementing economic reform based on the market, they are reluctant to inflame these further by implementing national security policies identified with the United States. On the other hand, the domestic opposition to President Bill Clinton's foreign policy came generally from the right. Because of this difference in domestic politics, European leaders saw no contradiction between their personal admiration - and even affection - for Clinton and vocal opposition to policies they conceived as having been partly imposed on him. So it happened that the most harmonious encounters of the European leaders with President Clinton occurred at "Third Way" get-togethers of world - mostly European - social democratic leaders. These are gatherings at which leaders of the centre-left have struggled to define a new agenda after having acquiesced in the Reagan-Thatcher revolution in market economics. This is why the Socialist prime minister of Portugal was invited to these gatherings and the conservative prime minister of Spain was not; why the Socialist prime minister of France attended but the conservative president of France was excluded. In attending as a regular participant, Clinton threw the prestige of the American presidency behind one side in the domestic politics of the countries represented. The advent of a Republican administration will inevitably change America's focus of consultation with Europe's leaders. They will be less geared to personalities and more designed to bring about a meaningful trans-Atlantic dialogue based on congruent, permanent national interests regardless of party. The previous record of service of the new national security team in Washington makes it very likely that the task of revitalizing the Alliance will be given high priority. Nostalgia for cold war certitudes is no guide to a wise policy. But neither is the rote reiteration of slogans of Atlantic solidarity belied by the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy. The basic challenge is whether the Western democracies can rediscover a sense of common destiny. The cold war has ended but history and geography have not been abolished. Whether the Atlantic Alliance can remain relevant to the new necessities depends on how it deals with issues of traditional security, how successful it is in promoting stability to the east of Europe and stability along Europe's southern frontier and in the Middle East. The security issue presents itself as an insurance policy against a reimperializing Russia, as missile defence and as the new European army (Euroforce). A new trans-Atlantic dialogue on missile defence is urgently needed. European critics must ask themselves whether any American president can seriously be asked to leave his people permanently vulnerable to the threats generated by proliferating nuclear technology. American policymakers need to find a way to show the relevance of their concerns and strategy to European necessities. Both sides have an obligation to reexamine a concept of deterrence that, if it fails, would produce millions of casualties in a matter of hours. As for the European army, the key issue is not whether Europe should have an autonomous voice but whether the Euroforce represents a diversion of resources, and what Europe means by autonomy. Specifically, how can the strategic objectives of the Euroforce be reconciled with the shrinking defence budgets in almost all the European countries? Even if existing budgets are maintained, the Euroforce would avoid a net diminution of allied defence only if it generated an overall increase of allied defence spending. And what, in practice, is the meaning of an autonomy according to which, in EU language, the Euroforce operates only where "NATO as a whole is not involved"? An agreed division of labour is conceivable, though care must be taken not to suggest a degree of American dissociation that invites pressures from other countries. But what if the EU acts without the concurrence of the United States - that is, if, in effect, all members of the Alliance except America and Canada go to war? Would, in such circumstances, the Euroforce have access to NATO logistics and intelligence that are in the main American? Would the United States come to the rescue if things went wrong? Finally, would, at NATO meetings where the use of force is discussed, the Americans encounter colleagues who have already reached a collective EU decision, imposing procedures on NATO that are inconsistent with its entire history? European leaders who question missile defence because it might lead to the decoupling of American security from that of Europe should take care not to adopt institutions that drift inevitably toward political decoupling. The key test is the ability to reestablish political coherence in trans-Atlantic relations. Absent that, the Euroforce could produce the worst of all worlds: disruption of NATO procedures and impairment of allied cooperation without enhanced allied military capability or meaningful European autonomy. The trans-Atlantic relationship faces as well major geopolitical and economic challenges. To the east of NATO and the EU, the domestic arrangements that followed the demise of the Soviet Union are ending, if only because the generation that inherited power is passing from the scene. Chaos (or Russian domination) beckon unless the nations bordering the North Atlantic define it as a common problem and deal with it energetically as a common policy. It is particularly important to improve the coherence of efforts to bring Russia into the international community. Though every ally asserts that it serves the common cause, the definition of the common cause has, so far, remained elusive. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,248-68661,00.html * WE MUST FIGHT THE GOOD FIGHT FOR JINGOISM by Michael Gove The Times, 16th January Itıs time for a revival of jingoism. Ten years after the mother of all battles began, with the godfather of terror, President Saddam Hussein, still repugnantly in place, and the rising son, George W. Bush, at last restoring virtue to the White House, the moment is ripe for a restoration of this grand Victorian principle. Jingoism has become synonymous in the public mind with bellicose adventurism. But when the word first emerged, it encapsulated the essence of prudent foreign policy. In the words of the music-hall song which inspired the phrase: ³We donıt want to fight, but, by jingo if we do, weıve got the ships, weıve got the men, weıve got the money too.² And in that raucous chorus there lies more wisdom than in most contemporary pronouncements on foreign affairs. Not least those from our own Government. The foreign policy philosophy of the Blair administration exemplifies one, flawed, response to the post-Cold War world a willingness to intervene and project force beyond any prudent calculation of national interest or capability. They do want to fight, but they lack the ships, demoralise the men and flounder the whole way through. Unfortunately, the most vigorous case made against the Blairite, and as it happened, Clintonite, approach of promiscuous insertion of military muscle came from a neoisolationist alliance of Left and Right which doesnıt want to fight at all. This curious coalition which brought George Galloway and Pat Buchanan together, which unites continental Greens and Le Penistes and which has given Bruce Kent a new lease of life, has been strengthened by the Blair and Clinton Governmentsı mishandling of Kosovo and energised by their proliferation of military adventures. There is a strong case for proper suspicion towards Utopian attempts to achieve a new world order. It can, and has, led to the subversion of international law and contempt for nationsı rights to make their own choices. But the neo-isolationists have damaged the case for caution with their willingness to believe that any enemy of the ³new world order² should be a friend. The new peaceniks, with their opposition to national missile defence (NMD), willingness to be Saddamıs stooges in attacking Iraqi sanctions, and blindness to the resurgent imperial ambitions of Russia and China, leave the world open to more conflict, not less. Between these two, idealistic but misplaced, positions there is a rational, and in the best sense, jingoistic, course. It is the position being advanced by George W. Bush and eloquently backed last week by William Hague. These new jingoists appreciate the complexity of the post-Cold War world and abjure any attempts to impose an overarching order. They are, as Bush has made clear in his campaign, ³humble² enough not to want to engage in ³nation building². They donıt want to fight, but . . . The new jingoists are aware that there is an emerging hierarchy of threats, that new thinking is required in dealing with them, and that military strength must be enhanced, and then properly husbanded to deal with them. The range of threats to stability in the modern world is, potentially, endless. Senior Blair advisers, sensitive to the doctrine of the West as world policeman which their master outlined in his 1998 ³Chicago doctrine², can provide a superficially persuasive itinerary of troublespots which Her Majestyıs Forces might visit. Africa, Blairite diplomats argue, will become one of the worldıs major oil suppliers in twenty years so a presence in Sierra Leone is useful, as might a role in the petrol-rich but inflammable Caucasus. The scourge of drugs on our streets requires policing not just in Peckham but in Afghanistan and Colombia. The destabilising effect of mass movements of asylum-seekers demands involvement in the Balkans, around Kurdistan and perhaps even South Asia. Not only is the domestic rationale for this interventionism often specious (we are in Kosovo in force but the number of asylum-seekers hasnıt diminished) but it also spreads resources too thinly to deal with real threats. The Westıs ability to do good abroad, like respect for the rule of law at home, depends on politicians using their power sparingly, but forcefully. The case for robust action to deal with Saddam, and other rogue states such as North Korea and Libya, is overwhelming. As Richard Butler, the man once charged with inspecting Iraqıs arsenal, makes clear in his new book, Saddam Defiant, the order of threat posed by the Iraqi dictator and his playmates is huge. His nuclear, chemical and biological arms, whether delivered by ballistic missile or terrorist fanatic, could devastate Western cities. His agents have been at work as far afield as Bangkok and the Balkans. Other rogue states, such as North Korea, have learnt from him that power grows out of a freshly dug silo and have beggared their people in efforts to build weapons with which to blackmail the West. Faced with this danger, the new jingoists argue, correctly, that the old principle of mutually assured destruction no longer holds. Dictators willing to gas and starve their own people do not react as predictably as the old Soviet Union did. New shields, such as the national missile defence, must be fashioned. And a willingness to cross swords, with the most lethal force available, must be shown. The current temporising of the Blair Government on NMD, and indeed its pusillanimity when defending the use of depleted uranium, sends out precisely the wrong signal to Saddam and his ilk. It is a mercy we have a proper jingoist in the White House. Heıs got the ships and heıs got the men. But he needs a proper ally or two. http://www.telegraph.co.uk:80/et?ac=000579381554028&rtmo=lvwlHnot&atmo=99999 999&pg=/et/01/1/16/wirq116.html * WEST CLAIMED MORAL HIGH GROUND WITH AIR POWER by John Keegan, Defence Editor Daily Telegraph, 16th January TEN years ago, at just before midnight on Jan 16, 1991, the air phase of the Gulf war began. It was a beginning in more than one sense - the beginning of an unusual punishment operation, for breach of international law, but also the beginning of an experiment in the use of air power. The air commanders did not declare an intention to bring the Iraqis to heel by bombing. Wisely so, for "air control" of Iraq had failed in the Twenties. There is no doubt that the airmen were confident of severely depressing both the Iraqi means and will to resist before the ground offensive was launched. Their confidence was to be justified. There were failures in the air campaign. The targeting of Iraq's Scud missiles, for which much was claimed, achieved not a single hit. Mounted on mobile launchers and constantly moved between hiding places - underpasses were a favourite - the Scuds survived. The RAF's attacks on runways with its JP-233 penetrator bomb were too costly to sustain. Much old-style, non-smart ordnance was wasted, as it always had been in strategic bombing effort. However, even non-smart weapons worked when used against the targets Saddam laid out for the B-52s. Saddam, who gave currency to the phrase "the mother of all battles", seems badly read in military history. Had he even bothered to follow the newspapers during the l967 Arab Israeli war, he ought to have grasped that to park an army, unprotected by air power when the enemy has plenty, in the open desert is to invite its destruction. The Egyptian army was devastated in Sinai by the Israeli air force in three days. In the Kuwaiti desert in 1991, the unfortunate low-grade divisions of the Iraqi army lay out for five weeks, deluged each night by hundreds of tons of explosive. By the end, the main thought of most reservists who had survived was how soon they could surrender. Smart weapons, less than 10 per cent of the ordnance expended, were destroying the Iraqi infrastructure - bridges, power stations, telephone exchanges, other communications, and the headquarters of Saddam's political and military apparatus. "Supersmart" missile interceptors drew the sting of his last threat, the Scuds launched against American targets in Saudi Arabia. By the time the coalition's armoured divisions crossed the start line, Saddam had already lost his "mother of all battles" - the air war. His air force had fled to the territory of his old enemy, Iran. His air defence weapons had not worked. His soldiers had given up the ghost. That is not to minimise the achievement of the ground forces, whose penetration and encirclement of the Iraq positions set a model of how a modern military operation should be conducted. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that the Gulf war was a new sort of war, because for the first time the 20th-century vision of a justified war, won almost without casualties, had been realised. Had the Gulf war been an isolated phenomenon, its tenth anniversary might not seem to demand commemoration. However, those who fought and won it - the Americans foremost, with the British as their most active allies - won another air war, even more strictly defined, in Kosovo. The Serb army, bent on expelling a million long-settled Albanians from their homes, in conditions of great suffering, was forced to desist and to withdraw. A pattern seems to be emerging. The Western world has, since the beginning of the 19th century, sought to define itself by two measures that distinguish it from less evolved parts: its superior technology and its higher public morality. For much of that period, it has sought to put the first at the service of the second. The story of the Second World War, as recounted in American and British schools, tells how Anglo American industrial might, allied to democracy, overcame Nazism, fascism and the imperialism of Japan. The Gulf and, even more so, Kosovo suggest a sequel: that technology and international morality now march in step. If so, and if the rhythm can be maintained, there is hope that Saddams and Milosevics may be deterred from their crimes before bad intention becomes action. One hard-line Serb nationalist has given herself up for trial to the International Court of Justice. It is not impossible that Milosevic, despite his fear of punishment, may open a plea bargain with the court. Saddam is a harder case. Yet even he is being given reason to fear the long arm of the law. Air power plus war crimes legislation is a new and novel brew. Few have the means to survive forever beyond its reach. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/01/16/MN138517.DTL * U.N. SANCTIONS KEEP IRAQIS POOR, HOPELESS by Keay Davidson, San Francisco Chronicle, January 16, 2001 In the 10 years since high-tech weapons dazzled the world in the Persian Gulf War, military technology has advanced in new directions. But the world has changed, too. Old enemies have vanished or have been vanquished, to be replaced by new ones with different munitions and motivations. And, experts fear, the "smart" weapons of Gulf War glory may not be ideal for fighting the likely foes of tomorrow -- small, shadowy bands of terrorists who fight for their ideals not with bombers and troops but with computer keyboards and bottle-sprayed microbes. The super-weapons of the Gulf War were products of Cold War science, a titanic enterprise that cost U.S. taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars and that generated lethal gizmos worthy of James Bond: "smart" bombs that allegedly zipped down chimneys, unpiloted "drone" aircraft that transmitted TV images of enemy movements, infrared scanners on space satellites that detected heat from the engines of enemy trucks rumbling through the desert night. The Gulf War "was really the first (time) anyone talked about all these 'smart' weapons as a way to fight a war, rather than with the nuclear weapons of the Cold War," says Jim Tegnelia, vice president of Defense Department programs at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque. Today, the cutting edge of military technology aims at empowering individual solders in the field. One device could do for biowarfare what cell phones did for communication: The handheld gadget detects deadly biological agents. Its inventors at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory have dubbed it HANAA, for Hand-Held Advanced Nucleic Acid Analyzer. They claim it can distinguish an Ebola virus from a cold germ within 15 minutes. Killer microbes are exactly the threat dreaded by many military analysts, now that the traditional U.S. foe -- the former Soviet Union, with its bulging arsenal of nuclear weapons -- has become our debtor and almost our pal. Biological and chemical agents are called "the poor man's nuclear weapons:" When used against civilian populations, their shock value would more than compensate for their tactical inefficiency on the battlefield. If an enemy force sprayed killer germs on U.S. troops, soldiers could use HANAA to quickly identify the microbes and take an antidote. For example, if troops inhaled a toxic cloud containing pulmonary anthrax, they could die within days. Before HANAA, experts might have needed weeks to identify the killer and protect soldiers. With the device, the microbes could be identified within "about 15 minutes, although we have done it as fast as seven," says Ron Koopman, a physicist who is special projects manager for the "Chem/Bio" National Security Program at Livermore. Decades ago, Americans feared death from the sky -- a murderous rain of inter-continental ballistic missiles fitted with Soviet nuclear warheads. But nowadays, "the biggest thing we have to worry about are Ryder rental trucks," says Sunnyvale's Chuck Hansen, creator of the acclaimed CD-ROM "Swords of Armageddon," a rich mine of documents on Cold War nuclear weapons. He was alluding to the truck carrying explosive agents that right-wing terrorists used to destroy a federal office building in Oklahoma City in 1995. "Look at that whacked-out cult in Japan that spread (nerve gas) in the subway system," Hansen adds. Politicians talk about guarding against terrorists armed with biowarfare agents, but Hansen is pessimistic: "The border's just too porous, both the Mexican and Canadian borders. We'd probably have to become a police state to stop it." In his view, the era after the Gulf War is one in which America's enemies are defined by comparatively small, fierce nations like Iraq and affiliated terrorist groups, not by geopolitical octopi like the old Soviet Union. Less than a year after the Gulf War, the bankrupt Soviet Union -- which was humiliated by its inability to intervene on behalf of its Iraqi ally -- vanished into history. "The nature of the threat has certainly changed," says Hansen, who is preparing a new edition of his CD-ROM. "Great big nuclear-bombing tank battles on the plains of Germany probably aren't going to happen now. Instead, the kinds of threats we face will be the kind we faced in the last 10 to 15 years - - small conflicts in faraway places." "Take the Cole incident," he says, referring to the October bomb attack on a U.S. destroyer in Yemen. "Trying to protect against that, the military is faced with almost the same kind of threat they faced with the (suicide dive- bombing) kamikazes at the end of World War II. "If somebody really wants to get through to you and is willing to sacrifice their lives to do it, they can probably get through to you." In interviews, military experts cited other post-Gulf War trends in weaponry: -- Improved radar for use in bad weather and difficult terrain. The high- tech weapons of the Gulf War functioned unusually well at least partly because they were used in a region with relatively simple weather and terrain -- in other words, sunny skies and largely flat desert terrain. The limits of "smart" weaponry became clear when the United States and its allies intervened in the Bosnian war and in Kosovo, Tegnelia says. The tree- covered Balkan terrain and sometimes difficult weather made it harder to spot enemy troop movements. Hence the recent trend toward "smarter" radar able to see through fog, rain and trees. Scientists at Sandia Labs are developing very small, portable radar systems that can see objects otherwise veiled by weather or terrain features. -- Improved cruise missiles. During the Gulf War, cruise missiles were confused by the relatively flat terrain of the desert, which lacked features easily recognizable by the missile's on-board radar and computers. So now, cruise missiles navigate using the same system trusted by many hikers and campers: the GPS (Global Positioning System) satellite network. "GPS is much more accurate," says Hansen. "In the case of the Gulf War, some of these missiles had to cross very large, featureless terrain where there were no landmarks for the radar to latch onto." -- Robots. "Drone" aircraft are just the beginning of the roboticization of warfare, which may eventually replace many troops with machines, according to some military visionaries. Eventually, some say, robots could all but eliminate human casualties in warfare. Although Tegnelia works for one of the nation's preeminent military labs, and welcomes roboticization as a way to lessen U.S. casualties, he isn't sure that the ultimate dream -- "risk-free" wars -- would be a total blessing. Is the United States, he asks, prepared to risk the global revulsion that might result, should this nation be capable of exerting its military might anywhere with impunity -- and whether or not the use of force is justified? "If you can go to war without risk, is that a morally good position to be in?" he asks. "The concept of risk-free warfare is kind of a frightening thing. " WEAPONS OF WAR Some weapons that played a key role during the Gulf War. Patriot Land-based anti-aircraft weapon used against surface-to-surface guided missiles, especially Scuds. Scud NATO's name for Soviet-made SS-1, surface-to-surface ballistic missile able to carry warheads with varying accuracy to targets up to 560 miles away. Tomahawk $1 million cruise missile launched from ships, submarines or B-52 bombers. They can be guided to targets 800 miles away by onboard computer. Apache U.S. Army's super-advanced AH-64 attack helicopter, designed to fight at close range night or day. Abrams M1A1 Tank Main U.S. battle tank that gained reputation as the world's best heavy tank. . Stealth F-117 Nighthawk, the world's first operational "stealth" attack plane, skimmed undetected through Iraq's radar and air defenses.. Black Hawk Successor to Vietnam-era UH-1 Huey as the Army's main workhorse helicopter. Warthog U.S. Air Force's A-10 is nicknamed for its ungainly appearance. Designed for close support of ground troops, it carries guns, missiles and smart bombs. B-52 Stratofortress History's most durable bomber, this eight-engined B-52, with its 40-foot shark- fin tail and drooping wings, was upgraded to use missiles. Bradley Speedy, tracked troop carrier with powerful 25-mm "Bushmaster" chain gun. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,248-69202,00.html * BOMBS THAT TURN OUR LEADERS INTO BUTCHERS by Simon Jenkins The Times, 17th January Still the war continues, killing and maiming hundreds. Every other day, someone treads on a bomb, plays with it or hits it with a hoe or a fishing line. Instantly the years roll back and blood and guts are everywhere. There are far too many bombs ever to be cleared. When they are discovered and made safe, their relics are built into fences, roofs and table legs, or act as baths, water troughs and even keyrings. The rest form a landscape of fear from which the enemy will never be driven, a killing field that will never see peace. With the tenth anniversary of the Gulf War bombing campaign, and the second anniversary of the Yugoslav one looming, I last week visited the greatest bomb-site in history. It is the forgotten Plain of Jars, surely the worldıs most unobtrusive battlefield. For nine years, from 1964 to 1973, the tiny nation of Laos was bombed more ferociously than anywhere before or since. The bombing failed. Laos was not ³bombed back to the Stone Age², as promised by US generals. It was merely bombed into communism. Communist it remains to this day. The beautiful plain, in reality a long valley flanked by high karst mountains, is still a morass of craters, each containing unknown horrors. Its settlements were more blasted than the Somme, more flattened than Dresden. The 500-year-old provincial capital of Xiang Khouang saw its temples reduced to dustclouds by B52s, described afterwards as ³looking like Hiroshima². Nobody knows how many people died. The only memorial I saw was to the 320 villagers of Tham Piu, forced from their homes into a cave, where a direct hit from a T28 rocket incinerated them. When the regimes of South-East Asia are told to hand over their ³war criminals², they ask in sincere naivety: ³Will Americans be there too?² I am not much given to battlefield tourism. I have never been a soldier, and find the silent detritus of war impossible to relate to historyıs grand logic. We are told that central Laos has always been contested land, and that Hmong tribesmen used as mercenaries by the Americans were always foes of the Vietnamese. If half their menfolk died and two thirds became refugees to keep Laos ³safe from communism², such are the cruelties of history. Laos was proof only that the weak get hurt when the strong go to war. The Laos war was kept secret for six years, as the CIA and its special air force units supported local troops against the communist Pathet Lao and Vietcong. Though devoid of legal or moral justification, it was an efficient war. Commanders freed of bureaucracy and political scrutiny fought well. Strike aircraft were effective in close support of the Hmong ground troops. Laos was probably the last war in which airmen took greater risks than ground troops, notably the forward fire control Cessna pilots. Christopher Robbinsıs account of their war, The Ravens, is one of the best battlefield books I know. Robbinsıs book is a textbook on what air superiority can achieve, and what it cannot. Its villain is the US Air Force, whose incompetence in South-East Asia was of Crimean dimensions. By the time Nixon and Kissinger sent the Air Forceıs ³strategic² B52s to the Plain of Jars in 1970 against the pleading of local commanders the Vietnam War was lost. But punitive bombing exacted a terrible revenge on Laos, as on Cambodia to the south. Laos suffered a monsoon of destruction, with a peak of 500 sorties a day. The B52s used napalm, defoliants and weapons which, on any definition, were ³chemical². They bombed the plainıs neolithic jars, like bombing Stonehenge. At night they hosed anything that moved with cannon. Yet the enemy calmly went on building roads and moving troops and supplies. The bombs were ineffective. America is still ³in denial² over Laos, where its chief concern is to search for the bodies of missing American pilots. It cares less for the Laotian bodies still to come. There are estimated to be some nine million unexploded bombs and bomblets (or ³bombies² the size of tennis balls) littering the country. They constitute a gigantic, unmapped minefield. The BLU and CBU canister weapons contained hundreds of delayed action bomblets, each with timers and 250 ball bearings. They were and are wholly unreliable, a quarter to a third not exploding as intended. Todayıs mutilated victims fill the hospitals and beg in the streets. A quarter of the casualties are small boys. No remotely civilised state should use such weapons. Britain uses them. The RAF dropped them on Iraq in 1991 and on Yugoslavia in 1999. I have no doubt they are being dropped on Iraq this very day. They are no more accurate or sophisticated than those used in Laos 30 years ago, more than a quarter reportedly failing to explode in Yugoslavia. Indeed rules requiring pilots to fly above missile range make them even more dangerous. No modern air force would dare risk a Cessna for precision fire control, as in Laos. Missed targets are not ³accidents². They are the calculable risk of using specific weapons from specific heights on specific targets. A Cessna Raven would have prevented the disastrous bombing of the Kosovan refugee column or the Serbian commuter train. Cluster bombs are disproportionately horrific weapons. Dud cluster bombs are random landmines. The British Government supposedly signed the 1997 Landmine Convention and its Mines Advisory Group is even active in the Plain of Jars. The International Development Secretary, Clare Short, likes to be photographed in ³Diana-style² mine-clearing garb. Yet Ms Short sat in the Cabinet that approved the cluster bombing of Yugoslavia, including the daylight massacre in Nis marketplace. I recall her on Any Questions? as a vociferous champion of the bombing. The estimated 14,000 unexploded bombs with which her Government ³seeded² the (mostly Kosovan) landscape are far more dangerous than landmines. Minefields are usually mapped and may blow off a leg. A bombie may lurk anywhere and its makers promise death over 1,000 square metres. How Ms Short finds bombies acceptable and mines not is a mystery. Laos is a land of grim lessons for the bombing lobby. It showed the worth of close air support in the heat of battle. But this required pilots brave enough to engage the enemy with precision at close quarters. The politics of virtual war make this no longer an option. Pilots must fly high and safe. Smart missiles may nowadays compensate for the ³lack of eyeball², but they require static targets, and the RAF is too poor to afford many Tomahawks. Three quarters of its Yugoslavia bombs were ³dumb² and their accuracy is now accepted as poor to dreadful. The military case for Natoıs bombing strategy has been reduced in most debates to: ³Well, we won in the end². The contribution of bombing to the conflicts in Iraq and Yugoslavia has been heralded as a new era of risk-free, airborne coercion. So said The Economist last week. The historian John Keegan claimed in yesterdayıs Daily Telegraph that ³air power, technology and international morality now march in step², making the global triumph of democracy unstoppable. This is surely mad. Strategic bombing did not oust the Iraqis from Kuwait or the Serbs from Kosovo. This needed an actual or threatened ground assault. So-called strategic bombing of non-military targets in Serbia and Iraq did nothing to topple their respective regimes. Slobodan Milosevic went only when voted from power and deserted by his army. Saddam Hussein is still there. Close air support has a role in any war. But the photogenic nature of strategic bombing makes it no more effective today than it was in Europe in 1945 or South-East Asia in 1970. The bombing of Laos ranks among the most obscene acts of war. It was wanton destruction, power without restraint divorced from the purpose of battle, which is to take and hold territory. Laos, thank God, is recovering. But each week the echoes of that power still explode across its landscape, as they do across the plains of Iraq and Yugoslavia. Like medieval armies salting fields and poisoning wells, modern air forces leave behind them weapons which they know will sprout death for decades to come. I am told that not a single Cabinet minister protested against their use. http://www.vny.com/cf/News/upidetail.cfm?QID=152943 * CONDOLEEZA RICE COMMENTS IRAQ SANCTIONS, BALKANS by Pamela Hess WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 (UPI) -- Condoleezza Rice, Bush's pick to be national security adviser, says one of the new administration's top priorities will be to "re-energize" the unraveling sanctions regime against Iraq. "The sanctions regime needs to be reinforced and strengthened....I think it's very clear we have a big job to do in trying to re-energize (sanctions). We need to rededicate our efforts in making sure he doesn't turn himself into a terrorist...or threaten his neighbors," said Rice at a foreign policy forum Wednesday. "We're going to have to take it on because no one wants to see Saddam Hussein escape his box." Sanctions have been in place against Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War but Iraq's neighbors and oil-hungry potential customers are increasingly violating them; Iraq and Syria have struck a trade agreement and have reopened an oil pipeline between them. The problem in Iraq is just one of many Rice and Bush will be inheriting and one of the few Rice made definitive policy statements on at a conference sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace. On the Balkans, Rice denied Bush ever contemplated a withdrawal from peacekeeping commitments there and said he would do nothing to withdraw the troops without consulting the allies. "He believes it is important to review American deployments in various parts of the world...but any review of any deployments would take place in the context of alliance consultations," Rice said, adding he would not renege on America's commitment to the process. "That has not changed. That continues to be the policy today," Rice said. Bush made a withdrawal of troops from the Balkans an issue in his campaign, suggesting that U.S. troops are overstressed by frequent deployments and that he would review worldwide deployments with an eye toward bringing at least some of them home. "I'm concerned that we're overdeployed around the world. You see, I think the mission has somewhat become fuzzy. Should I be fortunate enough to earn your confidence, the mission of the United States military will be to be prepared and ready to fight and win war, and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place. There may be some moments when we use our troops as peacekeepers, but not often," Bush said in the Oct. 17, 2000 presidential debate. Rice added to the picture by telling the New York Times in October that extended peacekeeping degrades America's ability to carry out more important military tasks. "The United States is the only power that can handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind of force that is needed to protect Saudi Arabia and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Straits. And extended peacekeeping detracts from our readiness and these kinds of global missions," Rice told the newspaper. Rice Wednesday sidestepped a question on whether the Bush administration would pick up where President Clinton leaves off in the Middle East, or whether it would offer its own peace proposal. "There's one president of the United States until Jan. 20. I think President-elect Bush believes until he is president of the Untied States he is not going to make foreign policy," she said. With regard to Russia, Rice said Bush "has made it clear he expects to have a fruitful, professional relationship with Russia," Rice said. "I don't think 'hard line' approach would accurately characterize that." In April 2000, Bush's campaign Web site suggested Bush would toughen the U.S. approach to Russia. It said he opposed further International Monetary Fund loans Russia and would "redirect American assistance, investment and loans to the Russian people, not to the bank accounts of corrupt officials." Bush also said he would "withhold international financial assistance from Russia because of the Russian government's attacks against civilians in Chechnya." Rice said under her leadership the National Security Council would recast itself as a broker between the various government agencies that dabble in foreign affairs in an attempt to develop a coherent U.S. foreign policy adhered to by all agencies. It would be a change from the current construct in which the NSC prepares the government for "total war" -- a construct she said ignores the changing world structure in which a variety of foreign policy tools present themselves to the president. "The challenge in 2001 is to unit the concerns of all agencies working across our borders," Rice said. "These many agencies have to perform in concern, they have to have a clearly written sheet of music so everyone knows what tune to play." "We at the NSC are going to try to work the seams," she said. One of the main changes will be creating a new office -- a deputy to the assistant to the president for international economic affairs -- that will also report directly to Rice. "We will have a single seamless staff that will be responsible for the whole range of issues. It could be one of the most important innovations that we try to make." http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/science/story/0,3605,423528,00.html * DEADLY BLAST FROM THE PAST by David Hambling Guardian, January 18, 2001 The MoD ran into a storm of criticism when it announced that it was developing a thermobaric weapon for urban warfare. News coverage compared the device to a tactical nuclear weapon and doubts were raised over its legality. True, thermobaric weapons are different from normal explosives, but are they necessarily worse? Every year, hundreds of lives are lost in blasts which do not involve explosive substances. Flour is normally pretty harmless, but if a cloud of flour reaches a critical concentration in the air it forms an explosive mixture. In fact, any flammable powder or gas can explode if mixed with air in a certain ratio. All it takes is a spark for ignition, and flame accelerates through the cloud to supersonic speeds, creating a lethal shockwave. Many flour mills have been destroyed this way, and there have been explosions associated with powdered soy beans, wheat bran and even walnut shells. Explosions in mines were always blamed on gas, until it was shown that coal dust alone can create a blast. A demonstration beloved of physics teachers shows that even custard powder is explosive under the right conditions. The effect is referred to as a fuel-air or thermobaric ("heat pressure") explosion, and the shockwave from it is unusual in two ways. The extremely high-speed burning means that the force of the blast, known as the overpressure, is greater than that produced by high explosives. Because it comes from a wide area instead of a single point, the shockwave lasts longer. And although it is measured in milliseconds, the longer duration makes it much more damaging to buildings. It is the difference between a brief shove which a wooden fence can spring back from, and a sustained push which will break through it. The only other explosions which produce a prolonged shockwave are nuclear. Since a thermobaric explosion can use almost anything flammable as fuel, it does not need to be based on a standard explosive. Many substances release more energy than high explosives when they burn. A thermobaric bomb could be five to 10 times as powerful as a standard one of the same weight, even before the added effects of a fuel-air blast are taken into account. Developing a fuel-air weapon involves major technical challenges. Ideally, a warhead would release a perfectly uniform cloud of gas which would mix perfectly with the air before being ignited. But the unpredictable effects of the wind, terrain and climate meant that the early fuel-air bombs were more useful for engineering tasks than as weapons. The most famous was the fearsome BLU-82 "Big Blue 82". At more than seven tonnes, it is too large for a bomber or attack aircraft, and has to be rolled out of the back of a modified Hercules transport. In Vietnam it was used to create instant helicopter landing pads out of the thickest jungle. Another use was mine clearance. The pressure wave from a BLU-82 can detonate mines over a wide area. One was tested against the minefields in Iraq in 1991 with limited success, though the blast was awesome. The hot air rose rapidly, taking a column of smoke and dust with it, until it reached a layer of cooler air in the atmosphere and flattened out to make a mushroom cloud. The partial vacuum at ground level sucked in more air - hence the name 'vacuum bomb' sometimes given to these weapons. An SAS patrol is reported to have mistaken the cloud for a nuclear attack, and nearby Iraqis probably thought the same. The US Air Force capitalised on the morale effect by showering the Iraqis with leaflets with a picture of the BLU-82 and the message "You're next - flee or die". According to one source, a BLU-82 was even used to mask a chemical weapons strike. The high temperature and rising cloud would have dispersed the chemical agent completely, while the blast destroyed any signs on the ground. A lthough the blast from a thermobaric weapon is very powerful, blast is not a very effective way of killing people. Some 200 years ago, Henry Shrapnel, an English artillery officer, invented a shell that scattered musket balls when it burst. This made it far more lethal than those which relied on gunpowder alone. The same principle has been used ever since, leading to fragmentation grenades and the horribly effective nail-bomb. The stun grenade, on the other hand, is designed with a cardboard casing so as not to throw out any dangerous fragments and cause concussion only. Shrapnel is indiscriminate; a grenade is lethal to a range of three metres or so, but there is still a risk of injury 60 metres away. Fuel-air weapons which produce little shrapnel are less likely to cause "collateral damage" in this way. The ultimate development of the fragmentation weapon is the cluster bomb. A hundred small bombs give more deadly coverage than one big one, creating an intermeshing pattern of deadly metal shards over a wide area. The problem is that fuses are not entirely reliable, leaving several unexploded but dangerous bomblets scattered about every time one is used. If a fuel-air bomb does not detonate, the explosive cloud blows away and disperses on the wind. The weapon that the Ministry of Defence is developing would be carried and fired by a single soldier. It is intended for use in an urban environment, where soldiers are often faced with snipers holed up in buildings. The only choices are to storm the building or use enough explosives to virtually demolish it. A thermobaric weapon may be able to break through a brick wall. It may not need to: the cloud from a fuel-air weapon will permeate open windows and doors, and the blast inside a closed space is greatly magnified. The only real defence is a hermetically sealed bunker. The injuries caused by blast are as unpleasant as anything on the battlefield. Most damage is caused when the shockwave passes from tissue to fluid or air, resulting in collapsed lungs and multiple internal haemorrhages. Anyone inside the cloud when it is detonated will probably be killed instantly. The drive to gain hard currency means that many of these weapons are already on the open market. These include the 11kg disposable Shmel rocket, and a new fuel-air warhead for the venerable RPG rocket launcher favoured by guerrillas around the world. So although the British Army may never have a thermobaric weapon, their opponents might be able to pick from an arsenal of them. http://www.wn.com/?action=display&article=5359685&template=worldnews/search. txt&index=recent * ANALYSIS: KHALILZAD AND BUSH'S AFGHANISTAN POLICY UPI, Thu 18 Jan 2001 While not attracting the level of attention as the Middle East peace process, a national missile defense system or even the crumbling U.N. sanctions regime against Iraq, the Bush administration will have to make several key decisions quickly on Afghanistan. With a group of militant clerics controlling 95 percent of a country that is one of the world's leading exporters of Heroin and Islamic fundamentalism, Afghanistan presents one of the thorniest foreign policy dilemmas for the incoming team of advisers that will shape U.S. policy in Central Asia and the Middle East for the next four years. To start, President-elect George W. Bush will have to decide whether to pursue the Clinton administration's policy of working indirectly through Moscow with the Northern Alliance, the government officially recognized for Afghanistan at the United Nations and a group likely to benefit from the one sided arms embargo against the Taliban adopted by the U.N. last month at the urging of U.S. policy makers. Bush will also have to decide whether the apprehension of Osama Bin Laden, the man the State Department believes masterminded the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa, will dominate policy towards Afghanistan the way it has under Clinton. And if so, does engagement with the Taliban, which have suggested in meetings with State Department officials that Bin Laden be tried in a third Islamic country, represent the best chance for shutting down the man's notorious terrorism network. One man who will likely be at the center of the next administration's policy is Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghani-American who served under President Reagan's State Department and President Bush's Pentagon and influenced the last American adventure in region when the CIA helped ship surface-to-air missiles to the Mujahideen, the holy warriors who fought against the Soviets. Khalilzad now finds himself in a position to influence the next administration's policy for cleaning up the mess created by the Mujahideen's struggle in the 1980s, as the man in charge of staffing the Pentagon for the Bush-Cheney transition team. The last person to hold that position was Anthony Lake, who went on to become President Clinton's National Security Adviser. Khalilzad is rumored to be a leading candidate for a top position in the Defense Department, a place where his close friend and old boss Paul Wolfowitz is likely be the deputy to Secretary of Defense-designate, Donald Rumsfeld. And Khalilzad has not been quiet in his years out of government about the problem in Afghanistan. The trouble is, as an analyst for the Rand Corporation and before that the chief consultant for Unocal, the oil company that sought to build a pipeline through Afghanistan, maybe he has said too much. In an article in the Winter 2000 edition of the Washington Quarterly, published by the Center for Strategic International Studies, Khalilzad argues in no uncertain terms for supporting the Pashtun majority in Afghanistan to roll back the Taliban government and working "discreetly" with Iran and Russia to destabilize the government in Kabul. "Facts on the ground, rather than U.N. resolutions and international conferences, are what determine the behavior of the Taliban and other factions in Afghanistan Preventing the Taliban from consolidating control over all of the country is a necessary precondition toward moderating its policies," he wrote in the Washington Quarterly. The Taliban (which means "students" in Arabic) are so called because they emerged from religious seminaries set up in the refugee camps in Pakistan to which many Afghans fled as their country disintegrated during the 1980s and '90s. Much of the rigid moral code the sect imposes on its people stems from Pashtun traditions. . Frederick Starr, the chairman of the Central Asia Caucus Institute at Johns Hopkins University, said in an interview Thursday that supporting the Pashtun would exacerbate problems in a country that has sizeable Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara minorities that feel the Taliban favors the Pashtun majority. "We should be struggling after this misstep in the U.N. to regain our position as an arbitrator. Any attempt to manipulate the power relationship in Afghanistan would be a mistake." And Starr is not alone. Charles Santos, who worked with Khalilzad on a Unocal advisory group in 1996 and 1997 is also critical of his pro-Pashtun stance. "Afghanistan is a complex balance of different ethnic groups all of which must be represented in any kind of effort of solving the problem, any effort which over emphasizes a particular ethnic group over another such as the Pashtuns is bound to perpetuate the conflict and create more problems." Khalilzad did not always advocate weakening the Taliban government per se. As recently as 1999, he supported a gradual kind of engagement with the theocracy in Kabul. In a draft white paper presented to staff members of the House International Relations Committee, Khalilzad recommended "U.S. policy toward Afghanistan should follow two parallel and complementary tracks, one of which extends a hand to the Taliban and the other of which prepares for a much tougher policy should the Taliban reject U.S. overtures." In that paper, Khalilzad recommends the United States recognize the Taliban regime only if it cooperates on narcotics exports; agrees to reform its political system; reduce human rights abuses and end any support for terrorism. According to three sources in the meeting where Khalilzad presented this paper, he was roundly rebuked by House staff for advocating what was considered an unrealistic and soft approach towards the Taliban government that was not interested in engagement. Indeed, only months later, Khalilzad seemed to come around to this view. In the Washington Quarterly he wrote, "There is little reason to expect to expect the Taliban to renounce radicalism in exchange for ties to Washington. As have other Islamic radicals in the past, the Taliban have shown little regard for Washington." -- http://www.vny.com/cf/News/upidetail.cfm?QID=153682 * DIVERSE FAITH GROUPS AT PRAYER LUNCH by Tobin Beck WASHINGTON, Jan. 20 (UPI) -- People representing many conservative Christian denominations but also a spectrum of religious and ethnic groups gathered for an Inaugural prayer luncheon Friday, hearing speakers ranging from Attorney General-designate John Ashcroft to the Revs. Robert Schuller, Jerry Falwell and Sun Myung Moon call for people of faith to work together. Ashcroft, grilled by the Senate Judiciary Committee during confirmation hearings this week, told the gathering of some 1,700 people that "the last few weeks there have been some things said that weren't too encouraging." He went on to tell a story of walking in downtown Washington after getting off the Metro subway and hearing the strains of the hymn "Amazing Grace." He said he saw a man sitting on a milk crate, wearing an old high school band jacket, playing the hymn on a trumpet. Ashcroft said he was walking past when the man put down the trumpet. "The fellow said, 'I just want to thank you for what you stand for and I wanted to wish you well," Ashcroft said. He said he started to walk away and then heard the trumpet playing the hymn, "Love Lifted Me." "I thought to myself, sometimes we get inspiration and values from places we least expect," he said. The Rev. Walter E. Fauntroy, former congressman and pastor of New Bethel Baptist Church, was a master of ceremonies for the event at the Hyatt Regency Hotel. Fauntroy, who worked with the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. during the civil rights movement of the 1960s and was District of Columbia coordinator for the 1963 March on Washington, quoted from King: "We must all learn to live together as brothers or perish together as fools." Falwell told the group the new administration could go a long way to bringing God's blessings by bringing about a ban on partial birth abortions. He also called for moving the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and rebuked Senate Democrats for "their attempt at religious profiling" of Ashcroft during the confirmation hearing. Falwell also talked about the Rev. Jesse Jackson, who acknowledged fathering a daughter outside his marriage. He said Jackson apologized for the hurt he caused his loved ones, said he was supporting the child, and asked for prayers. Falwell said it was a time for understanding. "It's not a time to put our foot on the neck of anyone," he said. Entertainer Pat Boone, who sang "In America," told the group that while the United States includes people of many faiths, faith in God has made the country strong. "We are one nation under God," he said. He also said: "To those who are not Christian, whatever your faith is, we love you, we cherish you, we respect you." And he went on to add: "The Constitution did not ordain freedom from religion, but open freedom of religion for all." Schuller complimented participants on attending even though they might not agree with each other on theology. "This couldn't be a more mixed group ... and yet there is a spirit of unity," he said. Imam Hassan Qazwini, director of the Islamic Center of America, based in Detroit, called on Allah to bring enlightenment in place of prejudices and partisanship, and prayed that Allah would "bring smiles to the suffering children around the world -- especially the children of Iraq and Palestine." Qazwini also told the group that before the luncheon, people seeing him in his Muslim clerical garb had assumed he was from Iran and wished him well during his stay in the United States. He said he responded: "Actually, I'm from Michigan," where Muslims comprise 4 percent of the population. Stephen Goldsmith, senior adviser to President-elect George W. Bush for Faith-Based Initiatives and former mayor of Indianapolis, told the group about the desire for a government that is not hostile to faith-based initiatives to improve people's lives. He said the administration would "work across religious and ethnic lines ... to bring opportunities to those who prosperity has left behind." Moon, a North Korean native who founded the Unification Church, was introduced by Washington Times Editor in Chief Wes Pruden, who praised Moon for his fight against communism despite imprisonment and persecution, and for founding the Washington Times as a secular newspaper. "I am determined that this newspaper will always be faithful to the values that bind God's children together," Pruden said. He said while the Cold War against communism had been won, "we now are on a battlefield just as dear -- for families." Moon called for prayers "that our new president lives up to the challenges of this prestigious office and commands the respect of all Americans and people the world over." In a speech of about 15 minutes, Moon also spoke of the husband and wife relationship as a cornerstone of families and God's plan for overcoming the struggle between mind and body. He said the various faiths emerged to cultivate the human spirit, which he said "is why religions tell us to fast, to serve others, to be sacrificial." Moon was presented an award by an ecumenical group of ministers for his work on behalf of family values. The luncheon was sponsored by the Washington Times Foundation. The Washington Times is owned by News World Communications Inc., which also owns United Press International. -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq For removal from list, email email@example.com Full details of CASI's various lists can be found on the CASI website: http://www.casi.org.uk