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----- Original Message ----- From: tim buckley <firstname.lastname@example.org> To: pbrooke <email@example.com> Sent: Friday, January 19, 2001 1:36 AM Subject: Re: 10 years ago ≠ How America Destroyed the Peace > Hi, > > "In order to force Iraq to join in this war, Britain and America > relentlessly > taged every effort by Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait on terms which would > have permitted the government of Iraq to survive. The crucial acts of > sabotage occurred between August 2 and August 10, 1990. These acts were > entirely successful, and established a state of affairs which made war > inevitable" > > This is a quote from pbrooke's interesting post. I have included text from > an article by Noam Chomsky below which suggests, by contrast, that serious > offers were still emerging from Iraq as late as two weeks before the start > of the war. To me this rings true, I mean Saddam must have known he was > going to get hammered in the event of war. > > (Full text at http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/index.cfm ) > > Rejection of diplomacy was explicit from the outset. New York Times chief > diplomatic correspondent Thomas Friedman (in effect, the State Department > voice at the Times) attributed the Administration's rejection of "a > diplomatic track" to its concern that negotiations might "defuse the crisis" > at the cost of "a few token gains in Kuwait" for the Iraqi dictator, perhaps > "a Kuwaiti island or minor border adjustments" (August 22). Anything short > of capitulation to U.S. force is unacceptable, whatever the consequences. > > Diplomatic options opened shortly after Saddam Hussein realized the nature > of the forces arrayed against him, apparently with some surprise, though we > cannot evaluate their prospects because they were barred at once by > Washington's rigid rejectionism. On August 12, Iraq proposed a settlement > linking its withdrawal from Kuwait to withdrawal from other occupied Arab > lands: Syria and Israel from Lebanon, and Israel from the territories it > conquered in 1967. Two weeks later, about the time that Friedman warned of > the dangers of diplomacy, the Times learned of a considerably more > far-reaching offer from Iraq, but chose to suppress it. A similar (or > perhaps the same) offer was leaked to the suburban New York journal Newsday, > which published it very prominently on August 29, compelling the Times to > give it marginal and dismissive notice the next day. The Iraqi offer was > delivered to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft by a former > high-ranking U.S. official on August 23. It called for Iraqi withdrawal from > Kuwait in return for the lifting of sanctions, full Iraqi control of the > Rumailah oil field that extends about 2 miles into Kuwaiti territory over a > disputed border, and guaranteed Iraqi access to the Gulf, which involves the > status of two uninhabited islands that had been assigned by Britain to > Kuwait in the imperial settlement, thus leaving Iraq virtually landlocked. > Iraq also proposed negotiations on an oil agreement "satisfactory to both > nations' national security interest," on "the stability of the gulf," and on > plans "to alleviate Iraq's economical and financial problems." There was no > mention of U.S. troop withdrawal or other preconditions. An Administration > official who specializes in Mideast affairs described the proposal as > "serious" and "negotiable." > > Like others, this diplomatic opportunity quickly passed. Where noted at all > in the media, the offer was dismissed on the grounds that the White House > was not interested; surely true, and sufficient for the offer to be written > out of history, on the assumption that all must serve the whims of power. > Iraqi proposals continued to surface, along with others. As of January 15, > the last known example was made public on January 2, when U.S. officials > disclosed an Iraqi offer "to withdraw from Kuwait if the United States > pledges not to attack as soldiers are pulled out, if foreign troops leave > the region, and if there is agreement on the Palestinian problem and on the > banning of all weapons of mass destruction in the region" (Knut Royce, > Newsday, Jan. 3). Officials described the offer as "interesting" because it > dropped any claims to the islands in the Gulf and the Rumailah oil field, > and "signals Iraqi interest in a negotiated settlement." A State Department > Mideast expert described the proposal as a "serious prenegotiation > position." The U.S. "immediately dismissed the proposal," Royce continues. > It passed without mention in the Times, and was barely noted elsewhere. > > The Times did however report on the same day that Yasser Arafat, after > consultations with Saddam Hussein, indicated that neither of them "insisted > that the Palestinian problem be solved before Iraqi troops get out of > Kuwait." According to Arafat, the report continues, "Mr. Hussein's statement > Aug. 12, linking an Iraqi withdrawal to an Israeli withdrawal from the West > Bank and Gaza Strip, was no longer operative as a negotiating demand." All > that is necessary is "a strong link to be guaranteed by the five permanent > members of the Security Council that we have to solve all the problems in > the Gulf, in the Middle East and especially the Palestinian cause." > > Two weeks before the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, then, the possible > contours of a diplomatic settlement appeared to be these: Iraq would > withdraw completely from Kuwait with a U.S. pledge not to attack withdrawing > forces; foreign troops leave the region; the Security Council indicates a > serious commitment to settle other major regional problems. Disputed border > issues would be left for later consideration. Once again, we cannot evaluate > the prospects for settlement along these -- surely reasonable -- lines, > because the offers were flatly rejected, and scarcely entered the media or > public awareness. The United States and Britain maintained their commitment > to force alone. > > The strength of that commitment was again exhibited when France made a > last-minute effort to avoid war on January 14, proposing that the Security > Council call for "a rapid and massive withdrawal" from Kuwait along with a > statement that Council members would bring their "active contribution" to a > settlement of other problems of the region, "in particular, of the > Arab-Israeli conflict and in particular to the Palestinian problem by > convening, at an appropriate moment, an international conference" to assure > "the security, stability and development of this region of the world." The > French proposal was supported by Belgium, a Council member, and Germany, > Spain, Italy, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and several non-aligned nations. > The U.S. and Britain rejected it (along with the Soviet Union, > irrelevantly). U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering stated that the proposal was > unacceptable, because it went beyond previous U.N. resolutions on the Iraqi > invasion. > > The Ambassador's statement was technically correct. The wording of the > proposal is drawn from a different source, namely, a Security Council > decision of December 20, adjoined to Resolution 681, which calls on Israel > to observe the Geneva Conventions in the occupied territories. In that > statement the members of the Security Council called for "an international > conference, at an appropriate time, properly structured," to help "achieve a > negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict." The > statement was excluded from the actual Resolution to prevent a U.S. veto. > Note that there was no "linkage" to the Iraqi invasion, which was > unmentioned. > > We do not, again, know whether the French initiative could have succeeded in > averting war. The U.S. feared that it might, and therefore blocked it, in > accord with its zealous opposition to any form of diplomacy, and, in this > case, its equally strong opposition to an international conference that > might lead the way towards a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli > conflict that the U.S. has long opposed. In this rejectionism, George Bush > was joined by Saddam Hussein, who gave no public indication of any interest > in the French proposal, though doing so might possibly have averted war. > > > Best wishes, Tim > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: pbrooke <firstname.lastname@example.org> > To: casi + <email@example.com> > Sent: Sunday, January 14, 2001 7:29 PM > Subject: 10 years ago ≠ How America Destroyed the Peace > > > The tenth anniversary of the launching of the Gulf Massacre on January 16th > has prompted a rash of reminiscence in the newspapers. Like the original > newspaper reports, these reminiscences are mainly impressionistic, personal > observations from a rather low level vantage point. There is very little > hard information and much less attempt at political understanding. > > I therefore thought this would be a good time to circulate the following > article, originally published in the March-April 1991 of an obscure left > wing journal, the Labour and Trade Union Review. It gives an account (far > from complete) of the diplomacy that led up to the massacre we are all at > present busy celebrating, arguing that the unanimous consensus of Arab > opinion against the occupation of Kuwait could have brought about a peaceful > resolution, but that this possibility was sabotaged by very speedy and > effective US intervention. > > The article also makes a distinction which I think is important between > OsanctionsĻ and OblockadeĻ. It is the confusion between these two concepts > that enables P.Hain to think there is some sort of parallel between his > efforts against South Africa and his efforts against Iraq. South Africa was > subjected to trade sanctions; Iraq has been subjected to a blockade, or, if > you prefer, a siege, which is an act of war. For a parallel we may look to > something like the Serb siege/blockade of Sarajevo, which, even though it > occurred in a situation of outright war, is generally regarded as having > been morally reprehensible. > > Hugh Roberts, author of the article (who has given his permission for its > circulation), is the founder-secretary of the SOAS-based Society for > Algerian Studies. > > > How America Destroyed the Peace > > by Hugh Roberts > > 'We had to destroy it in order to save it." (American saying, dating from > Vietnam, where it originally referred to some hapless Vietnamese village, > since when it has become applicable to virtually everything.) > > In his broadcast to the nation on January 18 explaining why British forces > had gone into action in the Gulf, John Major declared that "In the patient > diplomacy of the last five months leaders from around the world have sought > peace, and then sought it again. But unfortunately, Saddam Hussein has > chosen war. He has rejected every attempt to reach a peaceful solution" (The > Times, January 18, 1991). > > The first sentence of this statement is formally true. Numerous 'leaders > from around the world' had indeed sought peace and had done so repeatedly. > They included King Hussein of Jordan, Yassir Arafat of the PLO, King Hassan > of Morocco and President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria, not to mention former > European leaders of the stature of ex-prime minister Edward Heath and ex > chancellor Willy Brandt. But this sentence is only formally true, in the > Jesuitical sense of truth. For it was unquestionably intended to suggest > that the British and American leaders who were now waging war had previously > sought peace. This is the opposite of the truth. It was they who > consistently acted to thwart the peace-seeking initiatives of everyone else. > > The second sentence is quite untrue. In uttering it, the British prime > minister simply lied to the British people. And he lied in the full > knowledge that this lie would be echoed and endorsed by the leaders of the > Labour Party. Three days later, Gerald Kaufman declared in the House of > Commons that "What is quite clear is that this is a war that no one wanted, > except for Saddam Hussein...it has to be said that, in the end, Iraq > rejected diplomacy." > > There had been an enormous amount of diplomacy between August 2, 1990 and > January 15, 1991. There was the diplomacy, in which Iraq was vigorously > involved, which sought a peaceful solution. And there was the > Anglo-American diplomacy which sought to consolidate the anti-Iraq military > alliance and frustrate the efforts of the peacemakers. What Britain and > America have called diplomacy in respect of Iraq has been an affair of > ultimatums issued in the full knowledge that Saddam Hussein could not > possibly comply with them without subverting the Iraqi state, backed up by > an economic blockade. This, as Edward Heath has rightly pointed out, has > been the negation of diplomacy. > > The economic blockade has been described throughout by official British and > American spokesmen as "sanctions". In his broadcast on January 18, John > Major declared that "We applied sanctions to make our point clear. We > refused to trade with Iraq." That was another lie told to the British > people. What Britain and America did went far beyond refusing to trade. > > Sanctions would indeed have involved a refusal to sell goods to Iraq and to > buy goods from Iraq. Sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia and on South > Africa. They damaged the economies of these two countries, and exercised > some long-term influence on the evolution of the political situation there, > without bringing either country to its knees. But what the British and > Americans organised from early August was a full-scale land, sea and air > blockade of Iraq to prevent any goods leaving or reaching the country. The > Shorter Oxford Dictionary(Third revised edition, 1977) defines 'blockade' as > "the shutting up of a place, blocking of a harbour, line of coast, frontier, > etc. by hostile forces or ships, so as to stop ingress or egress." The > critical word in this definition is 'hostile'. Hostility implies a state of > war. And in the conventional terminology of what is fondly referred to as > 'International Law', an economic blockade is indeed considered to be an act > of war, a belligerent act. > > The only western government to state the truth of this last August was > France. France initially took the position of agreeing that UN sanctions > should be imposed on Iraq, as they had been on South Africa, but that it did > not support a blockade. But having, in a passing moment of integrity, > reaffirmed this vital distinction, it allowed itself to be induced by > Anglo-American pressure to forget all about it. > > By mounting a blockade on Iraq last August, Britain and America, under the > UN cover, made war on Iraq. This was an extraordinary thing to do. Iraq > had not gone to war with either Britain or America, and had no intention of > doing so. It suddenly found itself on the receiving end of a major act of > war by the strongest military powers in the world. It reacted by making > strenuous proposals for a peaceful settlement, and when these were rejected, > by interning enemy aliens, as is normal in time of war, and was roundly > denounced for taking 'hostages' in consequence. > > The interning of enemy aliens was the only hostile action undertaken by Iraq > towards Britain and America and the other members of the military alliance > ranged against it before January 16. And it was 'hostile' only in the > technical sense of the word. In substance it was unquestionably an entirely > defensive act, only taken on August 16, that is a full fortnight after > all-out economic warfare had been launched against Iraq, eight days after > American and British troops had begun arriving on its doorstep in > preparation for a possible military campaign against it, and four days after > Iraq's proposals for a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement had been > rejected out of hand by President Bush. > > In such circumstances there was every reason for the Iraqi government to > fear that British and American and other western nationals in Iraq might > become the target of spontaneous acts of violence from ordinary Iraqis, as > Egyptian migrant workers in Iraq had already become, and that western > nationals in Kuwait might be involved in embarrassing and possibly > disastrous incidents with Iraqi troops there unless taken into protective > custody without further delay. It should be noted that western nationals > had had a fortnight to get out of both Iraq and Kuwait by this stage, and > had been deliberately discouraged by their own governments from doing so. > > On the day of Major's broadcast, Douglas Hurd stated that "we have now > joined in the war which Saddam Hussein started on August 2, 1990" (The > Times, January 18, 1990). There can be no doubt that British public opinion > has sincerely believed in the truth of this statement, and that its support > for the war has been in large part premised on this belief. Had Douglas > Hurd said that "Saddam Hussein has now been forced to join in the war which > we declared on him on August 2, 1990" the British people might have viewed > the business of killing a hundred thousand Iraqis in a different light. > > In order to force Iraq to join in this war, Britain and America relentlessly > sabotaged every effort by Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait on terms which would > have permitted the government of Iraq to survive. The crucial acts of > sabotage occurred between August 2 and August 10, 1990. These acts were > entirely successful, and established a state of affairs which made war > inevitable. > > The entire Arab world was united in condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of > Kuwait. While many Arab governments agreed that Iraq had substantial > grievances against Kuwait, they could not accept that these justified the > use of force by one Arab state against another. Their own self-interest as > states required them to ensure that the invasion was reversed, and there can > be little doubt that they would have united to ensure this, had they been > given time to do so. > > The first Arab state to condemn the invasion was Algeria, which did so on > August 2. At a meeting of the council of ministers of the Arab League on > August 3, a resolution was carried with a two-thirds majority. This was in > three parts: > > (i) condemning the invasion; > > (ii) convoking an extraordinary Arab summit to find an Arab solution to the > crisis; > > (iii) rejecting any foreign intervention, whether direct or indirect, in > Arab affairs. > > The second and third parts of this resolution were proposed by Algeria, > which clearly had a shrewd idea of what was in the offing. The fourteen > countries which supported this resolution were Algeria, Bahrein, Djibouti, > Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, > Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. It is important to note that the four > major Arab states which subsequently joined the US-led military alliance > against Iraq ≠ Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Syria ≠ all supported this > resolution. > > At this stage in the crisis the situation was wide open. The Arab world was > united in condemning Iraq and there was every prospect of the Arab League > organising effective pressure to persuade it to withdraw. For its part, > Iraq had not yet dug itself into an impossible position. It had not annexed > Kuwait, and was making clear to Arab and western governments that it was > willing to withdraw without further ado if given satisfaction on its border > dispute and financial claims. What then happened was a massive escalation > of the crisis engineered wholly and entirely by the United States, which > split the Arab world down the middle, destroyed the credibility and > influence of the Arab League and scotched all chance of a peaceful > settlement. On August 4 Saddam Hussein was supposed to go to Jeddah in Saudi > Arabia to negotiate a settlement with King Fahd, as had been arranged by > King Hussein of Jordan in talks in Baghdad on August 2 and 3. Saddam was so > confident that a deal was possible with Fahd that Baghdad radio announced > that Iraq was ready to pull out of Kuwait by August 5. But a crucial > participant in the planned Jeddah mini-summit was Egypt's President Hosni > Mubarak. Saddam and King Hussein both believed they had secured Mubarak's > agreement to the summit. But in the event Mubarak decided not to go to > Jeddah after all. According to Pierre Salinger, once President Kennedy's > Press Secretary and now ABC News' chief foreign correspondent, Mubarak > changed his mind under American pressure. > > On August 5, Yassir Arafat, who had been strenuously trying to promote Arab > peace negotiations, saw Saddam in Baghdad."As Arafat walked into Saddam's > office, the Iraqi leader opened the conversation by saying: Who sabotaged > the summit?' Arafat didn't really know then but he pushed Saddam, saying > that an early political solution was absolutely necessary. Saddam replied > immediately: 'Go and see the Saudis. We are ready to discuss,' Heading for > Saudi Arabia, Arafat stopped in Cairo for another talk with Mubarak. He told > him that Saddam is ready to discuss withdrawal from Kuwait but found the > Egyptian President very antagonistic, possibly due to increasing pressure > from the US. When Arafat arrived in Saudi Arabia on August 7, he was told he > could not see King Fahd, who was heavily involved in discussions with US > Defence Secretary Dick Cheyney" (Pierre Salinger, 'Faltering steps in the > sand', The Guardian, February 4, 1991). > > Also on August 7, President Bush ordered the immediate despatch of 4,000 > American combat troops and aircraft to Saudi Arabia. > > It was only after these developments, which made clear that the American > government was actively intervening to prevent an Arab solution and had > already effectively suborned the Egyptian and Saudi governments to that end, > that the Iraqi government declared the annexation of Kuwait, on August 8. > This did not mean that Iraq was no longer willing to consider a withdrawal. > On the contrary, it was clearly only a holding operation on Saddam's part, > for his next move was to ask Arafat to attend the Arab League summit > scheduled for August 9-10 in Cairo and put forward fresh proposals for a > settlement there. > > According to some sources, a joint PLO-Libyan proposal, which significantly > made no reference to any wider Middle East issues, but concentrated on the > matters at issue between Iraq and Kuwait and urged serious negotiations > between the two parties (in line with one of the clauses in UN Security > Council Resolution 660 which everyone except Edward Heath subsequently > forgot about) was put forward, but its inclusion on the summit agenda was > vetoed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, so that it was not even discussed. > According to Salinger, Arafat's proposal was simply that five key leaders > (whom Salinger does not specify, but who were presumably Mubarak, King Fahd, > the Emir of Kuwait, King Hussein of Jordan and Arafat himself) should go to > Baghdad to thrash out a deal which would then be submitted to the rest of > the Arab League in Cairo for its approval. "But when Arafat ... proposed the > five-nation delegation, it was immediately vetoed by Egypt and Syria" > (Salinger, loc.cit.). > > Instead, a very different resolution was proposed and voted. This not only > differed from Arafat's conciliatory motion. It also differed profoundly > from the three-part resolution passed by the Arab League Council of > Ministers on August 3. The new resolution > > (i) verbally reaffirmed the decisions of the Arab League Council of > Ministers meeting of August 3 (while actually ignoring the second and third > of those decisions); > > (ii) affirmed the Arab League's obligation to respect the decisions of the > UN Security Council contained in resolutions 660 and 662; > > (iii) condemned Iraqi aggression and resolved not to recognise the Iraqi > decision to annex Kuwait; > > (iv) called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops > from Kuwait; > > (v) affirmed Kuwaiti sovereignty and independence and called for the > restoration of the lawful government of Kuwait; > > (vi) agreed to respond positively to the requests of Saudi Arabia and other > Gulf states to send Arab forces to their defence. > > According to Salinger, 'Arafat was stunned ... when he sat down at the Arab > League conference table and found before him a communique already written. > He immediately came to the conclusion that it was written in English and > translated into Arabic. Four other delegates to that conference whom I have > talked to came to the same conclusion."(Salinger, loc.cit.) According to > other sources whom I have spoken to, the communique actually was in English. > > This 'communique' ≠ in fact, a draft resolution ≠ was presented to the > conference by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It was supported in addition by 10 > other states: Bahrein, Djibouti, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, > Somalia, Syria, United Arab Emirates. This gave the resolution a majority, > with 12 votes out of a total of 21. > > Of these 12, only four are substantial states: Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia > and Syria, The remainder am of no mili®@Ņ`,‹fe and their > ŖŘÍreignty in foreign affairs has long been a polite fiction. Djibouti and > Somalia have long been notorious for voting with Egypt on virtually all > matters; the Lebanese government is controlled by Syria; Oman is a British > client, and Bahrein, Qatar and the UAE were in the Saudis' pocket in foreign > affairs. > > None of the other substantial Arab states voted for this resolution. Libya > and the PLO voted against; Mauritania and the Sudan expressed reservations; > Algeria, Jordan and the Yemen abstained; Iraq and Tunisia were absent. > > American and British propaganda after August 10 repeatedly claimed that th e > entire Arab world was united in condemning Iraq and supporting the > UN-sponsored Operation Desert Shield. In reality, the unity which had > existed within the Arab world on August 3 had been shattered by August 10. > It had been shattered by the way Egypt and the Gulf states railroaded the > Arab League summit to force through an American-inspired resolution which > destroyed the possibility of a negotiated Arab solution in order to provide > the most transparent of fig leaves for the establishment of a massive > western military presence in the Gulf. > > On August 10 the possibility of a peaceful, negotiated, Arab solution to the > Gulf crisis was dead, killed by US pressure. It was made clear to Iraq that > it would not be allowed to secure a negotiated withdrawal from Kuwait on > terms which would enable the Iraqi government to survive. It was made clear > to Saddam Hussein that his main enemies in the Arab world, Syria's Hafez el > Assad, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, and the Gulf monarchies, were all aboard the > American-led military coalition ranged against him, and that, having chosen > their camp, they could not possibly be expected to modify their positions. > It was made clear that the American and British attitude was that something > called 'International Law' was going to be enforced on Iraq, despite the > fact that numerous previous acts of aggression by other states had gone > unpunished. > > His reaction was to put forward proposals on August 12 for a comprehensive > settlement of all outstanding territorial conflicts in the Middle East. This > proposal took the Anglo-American position at face value. If negotiations > were ruled out because it was a matter of enforcing the law, let the law be > enforced properly, that is, equitably; let all transgressions be dealt with. > Saddam made it clear that Iraq would agree to abide by International Law if > it was demonstrated that International Law actually existed and was being > taken in earnest by those who claimed to be upholding it. The way to > demonstrate this was to make clear that International Law applied to other > states as well as Iraq, notably Israel and Syria, to name but two. > > This proposal was immediately rejected by the United States. From that > moment on, the Anglo-American and UN position lacked all legal and moral > authority in the eyes of the vast majority of the Arab and Muslim world. > > From that moment on, Iraqi diplomacy was essentially concerned to highlight > the double standards of the American-led alliance and weaken this alliance > by playing the Palestinian and Islamic cards. It had not tried to play > either of these cards before it was made to understand that neither a > negotiated compromise nor an equitable legal outcome were to be allowed it. > > From that moment on, the diplomacy of other states was essentially concerned > either to reassure their own public opinions that their governments were > trying to avoid the war that was already virtually inevitable (France, > Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, etc.) or to justify and sustain their own > participation within the anti-Iraq alliance and extract the greatest > advantages in cash and other benefits from staying 'on board'. > > According to Saudi military sources, between 85,000 and 100,000 Iraqis have > been killed since January 16 because the United States refused to > countenance either a diplomatic or a legal solution to the Gulf crisis and > acted between August 2 and August 10 last year to make both impossible. The > true number of Iraqis who have been slaughtered in the greatest act of > western folly and murderous arrogance in living memory may well be very much > higher than this, of course. > > This is what the British Labour Party has been implicated in by Gerald > Kaufman and Neil Kinnock. > > -- > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq > For removal from list, email firstname.lastname@example.org > Full details of CASI's various lists can be found on the CASI website: > http://www.casi.org.uk > > -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq For removal from list, email email@example.com Full details of CASI's various lists can be found on the CASI website: http://www.casi.org.uk