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UN Conclusions that the "Oil-for-Food" Program Was: 1) Never Designed to Meet All Needs 2) Temporary 3) Will Always be Insufficient-Please Note the Quote from the S-G's 2 Year Program Review: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/sgr-2-180.html S/1997/935 28 November 1997 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 1111 (1997) VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 87. I am conscious of the extent to which initial hopes of resolution 986 (1995) have created expectations that are difficult, if not impossible, to meet. With the benefit of almost a year's experience in implementing the programme, it may be timely to re-emphasize the importance of realism and pragmatism. Even if all supplies arrived on time, what is being provided under resolutions 986 (1995) and 1111 (1997) would be insufficient to address, even as a temporary measure, all the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/01feb98.html S/1998/90 1 February 1998 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF RESOLUTION 1143 (1997) 7. I should like to reiterate, as I have stated in my previous reports to the Council, the exceptional and unprecedented complexity of the humanitarian programme being carried out pursuant to Council resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995 and that it should not, therefore, be confused with a development programme and the requirements of such a programme. It is a unique programme, established by the Council as a TEMPORARY measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, which is being implemented within the context of a sanctions regime with all its attendant political, psychological and commercial dimensions, until the fulfillment by Iraq of the relevant resolutions, including notably resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991. http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/twoyearreview.html S/1999/481 28 April 1999 REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 986 (1995) (DECEMBER 1996-NOVEMBER 1998) VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ***************************************************************** 115. This is a programme established by the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter, as a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until fulfillment by Iraq of the relevant Council resolutions. The programme pursuant to resolution 986 (1995) cannot - and was never meant to - meet all the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, nor can it restore Iraq's economic and social infrastructure to pre-1990 levels. ***************************************************************** http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/phase6-90day.html S/1999/896 19 August 1999 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUAN TO PARAGRAPH SIX OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1242 (1999) V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 102. Notwithstanding the fact that resolution 986 (1995) was never intended to meet all the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, I remain confident that the programme continues to provide essential support in the current situation. http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/panelrep.htm Humanitarian Panel Report S/1999/356, Annex II 20 March 1999 IV. Observations and recommendations 46. But even if all humanitarian supplies were provided in a timely manner, the humanitarian programme implemented pursuant to resolution 986 (1995) can admittedly only meet but a small fraction of the priority needs of the Iraqi people. Regardless of the improvements that might be brought about in the implementation of the current humanitarian programme - in terms of approval procedures, better performance by the Iraqi Government, or funding levels - the magnitude of the humanitarian needs is such that they cannot be met within the context of the parameters set forth in resolution 986 (1995) and succeeding resolutions, in particular resolution 1153 (1998). Nor was the programme intended to meet all the needs of the Iraqi people. http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/s-2000-208.htm S/2000/208 10 March 2000 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 28 AND 30 OF RESOLUTION 1284 (1999) AND PARAGRAPH 5 OF RESOLUTION 1281 (1999) 10. It is also essential to bear in mind that, despite the great increase in the range of resources available to meet humanitarian needs throughout Iraq, with a very substantial quantity of inputs to be delivered, the programme was never intended to meet all the humanitarian needs and must be assessed in that context. >A Security Council resolution removed limits on the amount of oil Iraq may pump to finance imports >of humanitarian goods and streamlined the UN process for ordering and approving those goods. Kofi Annan on Lifting the Cap: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/s-2000-208.htm S/2000/208 10 March 2000 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 28 AND 30 OF RESOLUTION 1284 (1999) AND PARAGRAPH 5 OF RESOLUTION 1281 (1999) VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 205. By its resolution 1284 (1999) the Council also lifted the ceiling on revenues earned by oil exports which, coupled with the present substantial increase in the price of oil, will make more funds available for the implementation of the programme. However, lifting the ceiling and authorizing improvements in programme implementation alone will not suffice. The effectiveness of the programme has suffered considerably, not only because of shortfalls in the funding level but also because of the very large number of applications placed on hold, in particular those concerning electricity, water and sanitation, transport and telecommunications, which impact all sectors. The total value of applications placed on hold as at 31 January was over $1.5 billion. NDH: Because of the consistent and repeated holds by the 661 Committee, particularly for infrastructural items, and less than snail paced speed in responding to pleas from the Secretariat and former Humanitarian Coordinators, it seems highly unlikely that the Program's decision-making and effectiveness (an effectiveness that various UN officials acknowledge in earlier clipped quotations that, at peak capacity and efficiency, will always be insufficient) will suddenly become de-politicized. Benon Sevan on Holds: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/latest/benonsc20apr00.htm Briefing by Benon Sevan, Executive Director of the Iraq Programme, on Thursday, 20 April 2000 As stated in the latest report of the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council on 10 March 2000 (S/2000/208), the effectiveness of the humanitarian programme has suffered considerably, not only because of shortfalls in the funding levels for earlier phases of the programme but also because of the very large number of applications placed on hold, in particular those concerning electricity, water and sanitation, transport and telecommunications, which impact all sectors. The same applies also for the very large number of holds placed on applications for spare parts and equipment in the oil sector which is the only source of revenues for the programme. As at 14 April, the total number of holds was 1,180 with a total value of $1,726,891,635. As stated by the Secretary-General at the meeting of the Security Council on 24 March, many of the holds on contract applications do have a direct negative impact on the humanitarian programme, and on efforts to rehabilitate Iraq's infrastructure, most of which is in appalling disrepair. Koffi Annan on Holds: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/latest/sg000324.htm 24 March 2000 THE SECRETARY-GENERAL STATEMENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN IRAQ "...many of the "holds" on contract applications, imposed by members of the 661 Committee, do have a direct negative impact on the humanitarian programme, and on efforts to rehabilitate Iraq's infrastructure, most of which is in appalling disrepair. On 23 October 1999 the Secretary-General released a document exclusively devoted to the problem of holds <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/sg991086.pdf>. Otherwise, the S-G reports on cross-sectoral holds so frequently that all occasions should not be listed here. For the S-G's own words, do a keyword search for "hold" in Secretary-General Reports (both general and oil-focused). Find S-G reports at <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports.html> and other S-G documents at <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/chron.html> ----------------------------------------------- FREE! The World's Best Email Address @email.com Reserve your name now at http://www.email.com -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq For removal from list, email email@example.com Full details of CASI's various lists can be found on the CASI website: http://welcome.to/casi