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Some of what you see below has already been posted, but is reproduced below to assist with responses to Peter Hain, IT IS AS IMPORTANT AS EVER TO KEEP SADDAM HUSSEIN IN HIS CAGE http://www.independent.co.uk/argument/Commentators/hain070800.shtml Hain: >Our pilots do not fly day after day over Iraqi territory for >the hell of it. They do not take >action for the sake of it. >They are there to stop Saddam Hussein using his aircraft >against the >Kurds and the Shia - his own people, whom he has >attacked in the past. * For documentation of the Gulf War ceasefire terms that barred Iraqi fighters and bombers but permitted military helicopters (these gunships were instrumental in the Iraqi army successfully putting down the 1991 rebellion) see Graham-Brown, “Sanctioning Saddam,” pg. 18 and pg. 47 notes 6-8 * To my knowledge, the Iraqi military or security forces have not for some time initiated an attack on a village or individual family with a fixed wing aircraft or helicopter. Rather, they travel by truck or armored personnel carrier, fan out into a targeted area and/or implement tanks. * When NATO bombed Serbia and parts of Kosovo, some military analysts clearly stated that it was almost impossible to stop from substantial aerial heights on-the-ground actions carried out by groups not taveling in large columns. The same principle applies to Iraq. * No UN Security Council resolution authorizes the "no-fly" zones Hain: >Britain worked hard in the Security Council to secure the >adoption of Resolution 1284 last year, >which removes the >ceiling on the amount of oil Iraq is allowed to export. * Why did Iraq have an oil revenue cap until 1284? * After leading an evaluation mission to Iraq, Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General included in his 15 July 1991 report the following estimates: 1) To restore Iraq's power, oil, water, sanitation, food, agriculture, and health sectors to pre-Gulf War levels will cost $22 billion 2) To restore full health services, 50% of pre-Gulf War electrical capacity and 40% of pre-Gulf War of water and sanitation services; to rehabilitate the agricultural sector; to perform limited repairs on the northern oil facilities; and to provide enough food for subsistence rations for the whole population will cost $6.9 billion for one year 3) The initial oil sale ought to be $2.65 billion over four months (in the words of Sarah Graham-Brown--"a third of the total amount plus a small sum for start-up costs) to address immediate emergency needs" (Sarah Graham-Brown, "Sanctioning Saddam", (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pg. 74) Because of the sure-to-come political opposition in the Security Council, the Aga Khan proposed sums lower than the actual repair needs. Resolution 706 (S/Res/706, 15 August 1991), the UNSC's first document that allowed Iraq to sell its oil since Resolution 661 (6 August 1990), authorized Iraq to not exceed $1.6 billion in oil sales over a six month period (para. 1). Remove 30% for the Compensation Fund (in a 30 May 1991 the S-G recommended that the Compensation Fund figure not exceed 30% <http://www.unog.ch/uncc/introduc.htm> On 15 August 1991, in UNSC Resolution 705, S/Res/705, para. 2, the UNSC approved the 30% sum) and Iraq can sell $1.12 billion over six month. Adjust this sum to the Aga Khan's four month time period, and the amount is $750 million dollars (for four months). Without accounting for miscellaneous UN (including UNSCOM) expenses, this figure is $1.9 billion less than the Aga Khan's proposal to begin to meet the aforelisted needs. And if 706's $1.12 billion sum per six months is doubled for a year's worth of oil revenue, it is $4.66 billion short of the Aga Khan's recommended $6.9. Before UNSC Resolution 712's 19 September 1991 passage, the UN Secretary-General "unsuccessfully argued that the six-monthly ceiling should be raised to $2.4 billion" (Graham-Brown, pg. 75) ($1.68 after Compensation Fund deduction) The Aga Khan suggested that Iraq use its existing oil-related U.S. bank accounts, that payments would be made only for goods approved by the Sanctions Committee, and that account would be fully transparent to the Committee (Graham-Brown, pg. 74). NDH: It is worth noting that Iraq rejected Resolution 706 and 712 (the original "oil-for-food" resolutions) on grounds of sovereignty. The Iraqi Government's rejecting might have far more justifiable if it rejected the resolutions because they fell so far short of the Aga Khan's estimates (themselves short of actual infrastructural need) and not because they infringed upon Iraq's sovereignty. However, the Security-Council's oil cap is even more inexcusable. If Iraq's oil revenue were to be subject to UN control from the outset, why should there ever have been a cap? Given Iraq's health, nutritional, etc. and infrastructural needs, and UN monetary control as the primary revenue use control, there is no justification for oil caps. Many UNSC members were publicly concerned that the Government of Iraq would use its oil revenue for nefarious purposes, but UN fund control would have eliminated cause for such concern. Once control was addressed, quantity should not have been an issue or negotiation point, and yet despite the Aga Khan's assessment (see <http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/undocs/s22799.html> for excerpted findings) and the Martti Ahtisaari report (see <http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/undocs/s22366.html> for excerpted findings) I also have a hard copy if you have specific follow-up questions. The Aga Khan's Report is entitled "Report to the Secretary-General dated 15 July 1991 on humanitarian need in Iraq by a mission led by Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the Secretary General," S/22799, 17 July 1991 For information on US/UK bombing please see: http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2000/msg00750.html From: Nathaniel Hurd <email@example.com> Subject: U.S. and Sortie/Bombing Statistics Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2000 13:13:04 -0400 (EDT) For information on U.S. air activities in Iraq, please go to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Website's Iraq section: <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/iraq_orbat.htm> An excerpt: "Although Operation Desert Fox ended in December 1998, as of 01 November 1999 the US and its allies have flown a total of 28,000 sorties, and expended over 1,800 bombs and missiles in strikes against 450 separate targets in Iraq." For the FAS's updated information, further analysis, methodology, and sourcing, contact: John Pike Tel.: 202-675-1023 (this is his direct line at FAS) FAS general tel.: 202-546-3300 Operation Northern Watch Homepage: <http://www.eucom.mil/operations/onw/> Operation Southern Watch Homepage: <http://www.eucom.mil/operations/osw/index.htm> United States European Command Homepage: <http://www.eucom.mil/> See also: The UNOHCI Security Section’s report on airstrikes <http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/undocs/airstrikes1.html> I also suggest that you consult Graham-Brown, Sarah, “Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq,” (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999) The topic is indexed under “no-fly zones” on pg. 377. For documentation of the Gulf War ceasefire terms that barred Iraqi fighters and bombers but permitted military helicopters (these gunships were instrumental in the Iraqi army successfully putting down the 1991 rebellion) see Graham-Brown, “Sanctioning Saddam,” pg. 18 and pg. 47 notes 6-8 Source Note: If you do not own Graham-Brown, Sarah, “Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq,” (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999) and wish to read her sourced quotes from U.S. officials who discussed why the "no-fly zones" were actually set up (e.g., "According to a Pentagon spokesman, 'The purpose of establishing the no-fly zone -- and I would emphasis it's a no-fly zone, not a security zone -- is to ensure the safety of coalition aircraft monitoring compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688'". (Graham-Brown, pg. 109. Graham-Brown quotes Marine Lt.-Gen. Martin Brandtner, Director of Operation for the Join Staff, quoted in Washington Post, "Allies Declare 'No-Fly Zone' in Iraq, 27 August 1992) please contact me via E-mail at firstname.lastname@example.org and email@example.com or telephone (617-492-4570, USA) and I will fax the appropriate pages to you. ----------------------------------------------- FREE! The World's Best Email Address @email.com Reserve your name now at http://www.email.com -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq For removal from list, email firstname.lastname@example.org Full details of CASI's various lists can be found on the CASI website: http://welcome.to/casi