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Below is a transcript for several Q & A responses given by Rolf
Ekeus, former UNSCOM Executive Director, 1991-1997, during his 23 May 2000
presentation at Harvard University. Most notably, Ekeus states that "I
would say that we felt that in all areas we have eliminated Iraq's capabilities
fundamentally." Ekeus also seems to support re-defining Iraq's disarmament
obligations from "100% quantitative" to "qualitative." To read an
excellent elaboration on how Iraq has been qualitatively disarmed as well as a
argument for re-defining Iraq's disarmament obligations (vis-a-vis the Security
Council) see Scott Ritter, "The Case for Iraq's Qualitative Disarmament," Arms
Control Today, June 2000 <http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/june00/iraqjun.htm>.
Nathaniel Hurd
Research Analyst, Boston Research Group Title: "Sanctions in Iraq: Is the Policy
Defensible?"
Speaker: Rolf Ekeus, former UNSCOM Executive Chairman, 1991-1997; Current Swedish Ambassador to the United States Venue: Starr Auditorium, John F. Kennedy School of Government <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/>, Harvard University Date: 23 May 2000 Presenter/Moderator: Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Co-Sponsors: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Managing the Atom Project; Institute of Politics Student Advisory Committee. All co-sponsors are attached to the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Questioner Transcribed Below ("Q"): Nathaniel Hurd, Research Analyst, Boston Research Group Audio Recording: Audio and Video Services, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Transcription: Boston Research Group 2161 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02140 USA Tel.: 617-492-4570 E-mail: brg1@bellatlantic.net Q: While I would love to have a conversation about the historical record regarding the exemption of food and medicine and the effectiveness of the "oil-for-food" program, your field of expertise is disarmament and so I will confine my questions to that. In the 30 March 1999 report put out by the specially commissioned
Disarmament Panel, the Panel concluded in paragraph 27 that "both UNSCOM and
IAEA have...been adopting a pragmatic approach which assumes that 100% of
verification may be an unattainable goal." [S/1999/356, 30 March 1999, para.
27]
As of right now, Iraq is held to a standard of 100% quantitative
disarmament. Quantitative, not qualitative. That means that a lot of
these very well publicized incidents of UNSCOM inspectors banging on doors
asking to be let in...they were not actually looking for fully assembled
weapons. They were looking for nuts, they were looking for bolts, the
equivalent thereof, blueprints, etc., etc.. Given that Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction infrastructure was largely destroyed by, or its destruction was
verified by, UNSCOM; Given that UNSCOM had a very rigorous monitoring program in
place that Iraq was actually being relatively compliant with; Do you not think
that the time has come to change the criterion so that Iraq is now held up to a
criterion of qualitative disarmament as opposed to quantitative
disarmament? And if I can add an amendment to that, do you think that
changing the criterion will make it far more likely that Iraq would accept
future monitoring? They accepted it before. They accepted the
resolutions that laid out monitoring. They accepted resolution 1051 which
laid out the import/export regime. If that change takes place, will we
see, in your estimation, a break in the impasse that we currently see because,
again, Iraq is held up to that standard of 100% quantitative disarmament.
Ekeus: I like that question. I agree practically with
everything that you say. Maybe on the philosophical issue of 100%...if you
say "not 100%" what do you mean? You open up...but it's only a little
philosophical quarrel. It is not a substantive quarrel. It opens up
for 0. So the question is simply: How should one be reasonable? And I
think that you are right, one should be reasonable here. And I think that
one cannot absolutely guarantee total...and one shouldn't if one put into place
what you refer to: The import/export mechanism which will control things.
But the good news in that sense is that the new resolution, 1284, which started
with...if you know the other resolutions.....
Q: I know them well.
Ekeus: Is not really taking this 100% issue as 687 talked about all
their capabilities. It is not for an individual to say "it should not be
all, it should be almost all." It has to do with political sense.
And I agree with you. I think that one cannot demand full...but I wouldn't
like to say 100 per...I don't want to use the word, philosophically. But
1284 now says, indicates, it doesn't speak about remnants at all. The
resolution just refers to the old 687 and indirectly you can say that it refers
to...1284 talks about what you indicated: Monitoring of Iraq's
capabilities. That they don't activate. That there is no import
which is used for prohibited items. So I am on the same track as
you. I think that it is a reasonable approach and I think that one
shouldn't go too far. One must have a sense of what is possible and
reasonable.
Q: Could I follow-up please? Very briefly. Thank
you. Then do you think that, as far as breaking the impasse is concerned
and re-inserting monitors into Iraq, the important thing to do is to on one hand
explain very clearly and carefully that Iraq has been qualitatively disarmed,
that the means of mass producing weapons of mass destruction with any sort of
quality have already been taken care of by the UNSCOM inspectors and that
therefore the next step is to there re-implement on-going monitoring and
verification. But it's very important to lay out how Iraq has been
qualitatively disarmed and then supplement that by changing the criterion for
disarmament. That was the heart of my question.
Ekeus: I think that it is a very wise approach and I hope that it was
something that I outlined in the end of my presentation, stating that the deal
that I talked about was precisely that. That one should establish a
control system which guarantees that the export/import regime - I didn't mention
that but you were good enough to mention that - specifically is the key element
in that and Iraq indeed went along with that. I negotiated every aspect
myself with Iraq and there was full agreement between our two sides. Even
if some members of the Council were suspicious, it entered into force.
Q: Do you think that Iraq has been qualitatively disarmed?
Qualitatively, not quantitatively.
Ekeus: I don't want to....
Q: As you are no longer a weapons inspector...
Moderator: Only three questions per customer.
Ekeus: Well I don't want to answer the pointed question as
such. I would say that we felt that in all areas we have eliminated Iraq's
capabilities fundamentally. There are some question marks left.
That's why I think that we should take a new track like the one that I proposed:
Which is to establish a short controlling regime which prevents the build-up of
new weapons. I think that it is according to the line that you were
speaking of. So I think that we were in agreement.
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