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[iac-disc.] Powerful Scott Ritter inforamtion! (fwd)

Dear friends,

As promised, please find enclosed below an excerpt from Scott Ritter's
latest -- and most detailed and thus most powerful -- article on Iraq's
disarmament. The article is called "The Case for Iraq's Qualitative
Disarmament." It is currently in press, and will be published by "Arms
Control Today."

The reference for the article is:  Scott Ritter, "The Case for Iraq's
Qualitative Disarmament,"  Arms Control Today, Volume 30, Number 5, June
2000, pg. __

The URL for the article is:

Included below are the most powerful excerpts from his article. These
statements should be used in the discussion with Butler. My apologies for
the delay in sharing this with you -- please note that Butler will be
on-line at 5 pm EST!

I STRONGLY recommend reading this article by Scott Ritter. It is an
excellent and very powerful resource for us to use in our struggle to end
the war against the people of Iraq.

Once again, the article can be viwed

- Rania Masri


"Given the comprehensive nature of the monitoring regime put in place by
UNSCOM, which included a strict export-improt control regime, it was
possible as early as 1997 to determine that, from a qualitative
standpoint, Iraq had been disarmed. Iraq no longer possessed any
meaningful quantities of chemical or biological agent, if it possessed any
at all, and the industrial means to produce these agents had either been
eliminated or were subject to stringent monitoring. The same was true of
IRaq's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. As long as monitoring
inspections remained in place, iraq presented a WMD-based threat to no

"THrough its extensive investigations, UNSCOM was able to ensure that the
vast majority of IRaq's WMD arsenal, along wth the means to produce such
weaponry, was eliminated.  Through monitoring, UNSCOM was able to
guarantee that Iraq was not reconstituting that capability in any
meaningful way."

Ballistic Missiles:

"In his Dec. 1992 report to the SC, then-Executive Chairmain Rolf Ekeus
noted, "All ballistic missiles and items related to their production and
development, identified as requiring destruction ... have been

Chemical Weapons (CW):

"There was absolutely no evidence that Iraq was trying to hide CW
production equipment. In its monitoring capacity, UNSCOM carried out
extensive inspections of all of Iraq's civilian chemical manufacturing
infastructure and found no evidence of illicit stores of CW precursor
chemicals. Precursor chemicals are difficult to hide from inspectors
because the minimum amount required for any viable CW-agent production run
is several hundred tons. Inspections of dozens of Iraq munitions depots by
UNSCOM also failed to turn up any illicit unfilled munitions."

"However, the key to the qualitative argument is that individual pieces of
CW production equipment are worthless unless they are assembled in a
specific configuration, a unique combination that would be readily
discernible to weapons inspectors. ... THe point is that all of UNSCOM's
speculative fears concerning reconstitution of an Iraqi CW capability can
be laid to rest as long as viable monitoring regime... is in place -- the
kind of regime that existed prior to the withdrawal of inspectors in
Dec. 1998." {NOTE: Butler removed the inspectors w/o permission from the

Biological Weapons (BW):

"...The biologists responsible for monitoring Iraqi compliance found
exactly that --- compliance.  In all their inspections, the monitors could
find no meanginful evidence of Iraqi circumvention of its committment not
to reconstitute the BW program."

"One of the conclusions drawn from the extensive monitoring of Iraq's
biological capbilities carried out by UNSCOM was that the overall level of
Iraq's biolgoical capability, in terms of available infrastructure, was
very low. ... The reality of the situation was that, regardless of
UNSCOM's ability to verify Iraq's declarations regarding its past BW
programs, the major BW production facility at AL Hakim had been destroyed,
together with its associated equipment, and extensive monitoring of Iraq's
biological infrastructure could find no evidence of continued proscribed
activity.  If weapons inspectors were once again allowed back into Iraq to
resume monitoring along the lines carried out by UNSCOM, there is no
reason to doubt that similar findings would be had, with the same level of

Nuclear Weapons

"Often overloked in the debate about Iraq's nuclear capabilities is just
how effective the IAEA was at destroying, dismantling, or rendering
harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability.  Despite every attmpt by Iraq
to retain some level of nuclear weapons capability, the massive
infrastructure Baghdad had assembled by 1991 to produce a nuclear bomb had
been eliminated by 1995."

"There has been no evidence provided of any attempt by Iraq to acquire a
nuclear weapon or major related components since 1991."


"No one knows for sure what has transpired in Iraq since the last
inspectors were withdrawn. Conjecture aside, however, there is absolutely
no reason to believe Iraq could have meaningfuly reconstituted any element
of its WMD capabilities in the past 18 months."

"By the end of 1998, Iraq had, in fact, been disarmed to a level
unprecedented in modern history, but UNSCOM and the Security Council were
unable-and in some instances, unwilling-to acknowledge this

"Unfortunately, the quantitative standards for Iraqi compliance set forth
in Resolution 687 are still in place today in the form of Resolution 1284,
which emphasizes verifying material balance over resuming viable
monitoring activities. This is a formula for disaster, perpetuating the
cycle of conflict with Iraq that led to the discrediting of UNSCOM in
December 1998. UNMOVIC will meet with the same fate unless the Security
Council takes measures to refocus the inspection regime on disarmament
issues related to viable weapons and weapons production capability,
instead of engaging in a never-ending effort to account for every last
vestige of Iraq's former WMD programs."


"One serious obstacle to the reformulation of Iraq's disarmament
obligation by the Security Council is the current U.S. policy of removing
Saddam Hussein from power, codified in the Iraqi Liberation Act of
1998. That law has so far failed to threaten Saddam Hussein in any
meaningful way, but it has succeeded in precluding any meaningful
diplomatic initiative by locking the United States into a unilateral
policy that makes cooperation with Iraq impossible. If the United States
is serious about disarming Iraq, it should repeal the Iraqi Liberation Act
and work within the framework of the Security Council to formulate a
policy that results in the rapid reintroduction of meaningful,
monitoring-based weapons inspections into Iraq. That will require the
lifting, not simply the suspension, of sanctions. While it is true that
the sanctions have retarded Iraq's ability to acquire technology that
could aid any WMD reconstitution effort, Resolution 687 stated that a
finding of compliance would trigger the lifting of sanctions. Sanctions
are thus not an open-ended option. At some point, they will need to be
lifted, and if a finding of qualitative disarmament backed with the
implementation of viable monitoring-based inspections can be had, then
there is no reason to keep sanctions in place. The Security Council must
also follow through on the promise it made in paragraph 14 of Resolution
687, which speaks of regional disarmament. While monitoring-based
inspections in Iraq must be expected to last indefinitely, they cannot be
expected to last in a vacuum. Unless arrangements are made to address WMD
programs in Iran and Israel, as well as the regional proliferation of
advanced conventional weaponry, Iraq will never accept perpetual
disarmament. What is needed is a Security Council resolution that
concludes Resolution 687, supercedes Resolution 1284, and redefines the
disarmament obligations of Iraq to meet more realistic qualitative
benchmarks. In addition to verifying Iraqi compliance with these new
benchmarks, the resulting inspectorate, whether a revamped UNMOVIC or a
new agency, would be tasked with implementing a monitoring regime similar
to the one UNSCOM had in place prior to its withdrawal from Iraq. Once
Iraq's disarmament along clearly defined qualitative standards had been
verified by weapons inspectors, and after a viable monitoring regime was
in place to detect and deter any attempt at reconstituting its WMD
programs, the Security Council would lift, not suspend, economic

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