Fw: Welch/Jones on U.S. Iraq policy

["adr1ano" <adr1ano@DELETETHISnetscapeonline.co.uk>]

-----Original Message-----
From: Iraq ListServ <i-gnea@EXCHANGE.USIA.GOV>
To: US-IRAQPOLICY@LISTS.STATE.GOV <US-IRAQPOLICY@LISTS.STATE.GOV>
Date: 23 March 2000 22:53
Subject: Welch/Jones on U.S. Iraq policy


>State's Welch and Jones Congressional Testimony on Iraq
>(Stress importance of sanctions in containing Saddam Hussein)
>
>"Containment remains a cost-effective and successful policy.  U.N.
sanctions
>are extremely important and must continue until Iraq complies" with all of
>the relevant U.N. resolutions, say U.S. officials.
>
>C. David Welch, assistant secretary of State for International Organization
>Affairs, and Beth Jones, principal deputy assistant secretary for Near
>Eastern Affairs at the Department of State, testified March 23 at a House
>International Relations Committee hearing on U.S. policy toward Iraq.
>
>"Let me state, for the record, that we do not expect Iraq to meet that
>standard anytime soon.  In fact, we doubt that Iraq will take the sensible
>steps necessary to obtain the lifting, or the suspension, of sanctions as
>long as Saddam Hussein remains in power," said Welch.
>
>He said U.N. sanctions do not target the civilian population and have never
>restricted the importation of basic medicines and food under the U.N.'s
>oil-for-food program.
>
>"Some critics are attempting now to portray oil-for-food as part of the
>humanitarian problem in Iraq.  In fact, it is a solution whose
>implementation was long delayed by the Iraqi regime, and whose full
>potential is only now being approached," said Welch.  He said the United
>States sponsored several U.N. resolutions to expand the program until
>finally a ceiling on what Iraq could spend from its oil revenues was
removed
>last December.
>
>"Sanctions were imposed for valid reasons, have been in place for nine and
a
>half years, and are likely to continue for some time," said Welch, noting
>that Iraq still refuses weapons inspectors back into the country to check
on
>its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs.
>
>"Sanctions are not aimed at the Iraqi people, and the bottom line is this:
>we believe that oil-for-food, properly managed, can effectively mitigate
the
>impact of sanctions on Iraq's civilian population," Welch said.
>
>"Oil-for-food is having a clear and measurable impact on the ground in
Iraq.
>Nutrition has improved," he said, pointing out that the per capita intake
is
>up from 1,300 calories per day before the program began to over 2,000 now.
>
>Food imports are now at about pre-war levels, he said.  And over the past
>three years more than $1 billion worth of medicines have been approved for
>delivery to Iraq.  Similarly, over a billion dollars' worth of goods for
the
>water, sanitation, electrical and agricultural sectors have been approved.
>
>The lifting of economic sanctions on Saddam Hussein would "not mean relief
>for the Iraqi people," according to Welch.  "Saddam Hussein's perennial
>spending priority is military development and WMD rather than civilian
>wellbeing," he said.
>
>Welch's testimony also centered on WMD inspections in Iraq.  By mid-April,
>he said, the new and reconstituted United Nations inspections program,
>UNMOVIC will have its organizational structure outlined.
>
>"Baghdad has publicly rejected (UN) resolution 1284 and ruled out the
return
>of UN-mandated weapons inspection teams, but that is unlikely to be the
>final word," he said.
>
>Following is the text of Welch's testimony:
>
>(begin text)
>
>TESTIMONY
>IO Assistant Secretary C. David Welch
>NEA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Beth Jones
>House International Relations Committee
>March 23, 2000
>
>Mr. Chairman:
>
>Thank you for inviting us to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy
>toward Iraq.  I shall open with a brief statement on behalf of us both.  As
>Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, I deal
primarily
>with aspects of Iraq policy that involve the Security Council.  This
>includes the oil-for-food program and UNMOVIC.  My colleague, Deputy
>Assistant Secretary Jones, represents the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau,
which
>manages overall policy toward Iraq.  This includes the over-arching policy
>of containment and our efforts to foster regime change by supporting the
>Iraqi opposition.
>
>We will be glad to address questions on any aspect of U.S. policy toward
>Iraq, but I will focus in these introductory remarks primarily on two
areas:
>
>First, the humanitarian situation in the country, including the balance
>between the impact of sanctions and the benefits of the oil-for-food
>program;
>
>Second, a few words on what we expect from UNMOVIC over the next few
months.
>
>The humanitarian situation in Iraq is a complex subject, and we are
>concerned that the recent flow of misinformation and biased assertions from
>various sources has made it difficult to maintain sight of what U.S. policy
>really is and what really is happening on the ground in Iraq.  I hope we
can
>provide some clarification today.
>
>U.S. policy toward Iraq has followed a consistent course since the
>liberation of Kuwait in January 1991; and whatever you might have read in
>the papers lately, there is no sea-change in the offing.  Our policy is
>based on the objective judgment that the regime of Saddam Hussein poses a
>continuing threat to regional peace and security, which must be contained.
>And, again, despite what you might have seen in the press, containment
>remains a cost-effective and successful policy.  UN sanctions are extremely
>important and must continue until Iraq complies with its obligations under
>the Security Council resolutions.
>
>Let me state, for the record, that we do not expect Iraq to meet that
>standard anytime soon.  In fact, we doubt that Iraq will take the sensible
>steps necessary to obtain the lifting, or the suspension, of sanctions as
>long as Saddam Hussein remains in power.
>
>Those sanctions do not target the civilian population, however, and in fact
>have never restricted the importation of basic medicines and food.
>Moreover, the United States has focused on addressing humanitarian needs in
>Iraq since the immediate aftermath of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when
>brutal military repression displaced tens of thousands of civilians in
>northern Iraq.  We responded with Operation Provide Comfort, an U.S.-led
>coalition effort that provided food, shelter and other forms of disaster
>assistance on a massive scale.
>
>The coalition also instituted a no-fly zone in the north in 1991, and
>another in southern Iraq in 1992.  That policy has contained the Iraqi
>military and prevented any repetition of large-scale use of force against
>civilians.
>
>In the Security Council, we have championed the humanitarian interests of
>the Iraqi people and continue to do so today.  Let me cite a few examples:
>
>In April 1991, we helped shape Security Council resolution 688, which
>demanded an end to Iraqi repression of civilians and provided part of the
>rationale for the no-fly zones.
>
>In August 1991 we played a leading role in drafting resolution 706, which
>included the original oil-for-food program -- a program Iraq promptly
>rejected.
>
>In May 1995 we co-sponsored resolution 986, which expanded and fleshed out
>the oil-for-food concept.  You will recall the tragically slow evolution of
>that concept: Iraq rejected it outright for four years, and then
slow-rolled
>it for another year and a half, so that the first delivery of humanitarian
>goods did not occur until March 1997.  Some critics are attempting now to
>portray oil-for-food as part of the humanitarian problem in Iraq.  In fact,
>it is a solution whose implementation was long delayed by the Iraqi regime,
>and whose full potential is only now being approached.
>
>In February 1998 we supported resolution 1153, which expanded the program
to
>$5.2 billion in oil export revenues during each six-month phase.
>
>In December 1999 we supported resolution 1284, which removed the ceiling on
>the value of oil exports authorized to meet humanitarian needs in Iraq.
>That resolution also included numerous provisions to improve the efficiency
>of oil-for-food.
>
>I want to emphasize that the need to balance the impact of sanctions and
the
>benefits of the oil-for-food program is not a new challenge for U.S.
policy.
>Sanctions were imposed for valid reasons, have been in place for nine and a
>half years, and are likely to continue for some time.  Oil-for-food has
been
>in place almost exactly three years, during which oil prices have
fluctuated
>and the program itself has been constantly reassessed and adjusted.  That
>process of assessment and adjustment is ongoing, as reflected in resolution
>1284, and will certainly continue.
>
>Sanctions are not aimed at the Iraqi people, and the bottom line is this:
we
>believe that oil-for-food, properly managed, can effectively mitigate the
>impact of sanctions on Iraq's civilian population for as long as sanctions
>on the Iraqi regime remain in effect.  Success will require the UN to do
the
>best possible job of administering the program.  Similarly, Iraq will have
>to be pressed to do its part -- cooperating with the program rather than
>seeking to discredit it, to circumvent it, and eventually to eliminate it.
>Maintaining the proper balance will never be easy; but we believe it is an
>achievable result, and certainly a result worth the utmost effort over the
>long haul.
>
>Criticism of sanctions is understandable, but we believe much of the recent
>criticism has been misplaced.  In particular, those who see negative
>consequences from sanctions and advocate lifting sanctions as the only
>solution overlook at least three important points:
>
>First, the regime headed by Saddam Hussein is among the most brutal and
>systematic violators of human rights on the face of the earth.  The most
>recent report of the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights noted that the
>gravity of the human rights situation in Iraq has few parallels since the
>end of World War II.
>
>Second, sanctions deprive Saddam Hussein of the financial wherewithal to
>pursue his manifest goal of acquiring, and using, weapons of mass
>destruction (WMD).  Saddam deploying WMD would be the worst imaginable
>humanitarian outcome for the Iraqi people and for all the peoples of the
>region.
>
>Third, lifting sanctions would enable Saddam to rebuild his military and
put
>his WMD programs on the fast-track, but would not guarantee a better life
>for the average Iraqi.  On the contrary, conditions for many Iraqis --
>especially in the north -- would deteriorate dramatically if oil-for-food
>and the UN presence disappeared.
>
>Providing resources to Saddam Hussein would not mean relief for the Iraqi
>people.  Conversely, providing relief to the people is not the same as
>helping Saddam.  Let me explain.
>
>First, Saddam Hussein's perennial spending priority is military development
>and WMD rather than civilian well being.  Lifting sanctions would simply
>enrich Saddam and enable him to pursue his spending priorities.  Therefore,
>lifting sanctions would not help the Iraqi people.
>
>Second, we also hear criticism from the other side, from those who say
>oil-for-food is in fact helping Saddam Hussein.  Just as providing more
>resources to the Iraqi regime -- e.g. by lifting sanctions -- would not
>benefit the Iraqi people, oil-for-food resources provided to the people do
>not benefit the Iraqi regime.  On the contrary, providing humanitarian
>assistance to the Iraqi people is essential to maintaining international
>support for sanctions on the regime.
>
>Oil-for-food is having a clear and measurable impact on the ground in Iraq.
>Nutrition has improved.  Per capita intake is up from 1,300 calories per
day
>before the program began to over 2,000 now, thanks to a UN ration basket,
>which is augmented by locally grown food.  Food imports are now at about
>pre-war levels.  In the year before the program began, Iraq imported about
>$50 million worth of medicines.  Over the past three years more than $1
>billion worth of medicines have been approved.  Similarly, over a billion
>dollars worth of goods for the water, sanitation, electrical and
>agricultural sectors have been approved.
>
>The impact has been greatest in the three northern provinces, where the UN
>manages the program without interference from the regime.  For example, an
>UNICEF study last year showed that infant mortality in the north had fallen
>below pre-war levels.  Yet in south/central Iraq, where the Iraqi
government
>handles distribution of oil-for-food goods, the study revealed a disturbing
>rise in child mortality -- to more than double the pre-war level.  These
>numbers show that oil-for-food can meet the needs of the Iraqi people if
the
>regime's cynical manipulation can be overcome.
>
>Finally, let me say a few words about the U.S. approach to making the
>oil-for-food program more effective.  We have been accused recently of
>having too many holds, or of having the wrong holds, on contracts proposed
>under this program.  Of course there are those in Baghdad, and in the
>Security Council, who seem to believe that neither the United States nor
any
>other member of the Iraq Sanctions Committee should put any contract on
hold
>for any reason.
>
>Our goal is to help the oil-for-food program succeed.  With that in mind,
we
>want to approve every contract we can and do it as quickly as we can.
>
>But there is another goal which is equally important: to deny Saddam
Hussein
>inputs for his WMD programs.  That goal makes a heavy demand on us, as it
>can mean the painstaking review of each and every contract.  We take this
>responsibility seriously.
>
>Our rigorous and responsible approach has won plaudits from some smaller
>countries in the UN's Iraq Sanctions Committee -- countries which lack the
>resources and the expertise which the United States can apply to the
>process.  It has also elicited criticism from some larger members of the
>Committee which have the resources and expertise, but have chosen to turn a
>politically, or commercially, blinded eye to possible dual-use items
>included in oil-for-food contracts.  Three Security Council member states
>have about one-third of all oil-for-food contracts.  They orchestrate the
>complaints about holds, often joined by others who are motivated by
>commercial gain.
>
>Our holds now involve about 10% of all oil-for-food contracts.  The number
>has mounted over the past year for a variety of reasons.  Some contracts
>lack adequate information, and we are unable to act on them until we
receive
>further details from the submitting companies.  More broadly, program
>revenue has grown as oil prices have risen over the past year, and the
>accelerating flow of incoming contract and crowded our review pipeline.
>However, we believe our holds have had a minimal impact on the humanitarian
>bottom line to date.
>
>Nonetheless, while we must be vigilant, we must also strike a balance with
>legitimate humanitarian concerns.  We are currently examining our contract
>review procedures to ensure that they appropriately reflect our twin
>priorities: maximizing assistance to the Iraqi people while denying the
>Iraqi regime access to goods it could use to reconstitute its WMD programs.
>We are also seeking to enhance the UN's capacity to monitor potentially
>sensitive items -- such as electricity generating equipment or water
>purification plants -- to ensure that such items, once approved, are
>installed in the approved location and used for the approved purpose.
>
>A major portion of resolution 1284 deals with the creation of UNMOVIC --
the
>UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission -- as a subsidiary
>body of the Security Council and successor to UNSCOM.  After consultation
>with Council members, the UN Secretary General appointed Hans Blix to serve
>as Executive Chairman of the new body.
>
>Robert Einhorn, Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation, and I had the
>opportunity to meet with Dr. Blix shortly before he took up his duties on
>March 1.  As former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr.
Blix
>is fully qualified for the sizeable task he faces, and he has adopted a
>serious and methodical approach which seems well suited to that task.
>
>Dr. Blix is currently structuring the organization and assembling his
staff,
>and will submit an organizational plan to the Security Council in
mid-April.
>He will then proceed with lining up potential inspectors with the requisite
>technical expertise to resume inspection and monitoring activities on the
>ground in Iraq.  Baghdad has publicly rejected resolution 1284 and ruled
out
>the return of UN-mandated weapons inspection teams, but that is unlikely to
>be the final word.  Should Iraq reconsider -- as it has on several previous
>resolutions -- and allow UNMOVIC in, we expect Dr. Blix and his teams to be
>robust, in carrying out the mission it has inherited from UNSCOM.  The
>United States will, of course, provide all possible support.
>
>We await your questions on any aspect of U.S. policy toward Iraq.
>
>(end text)
>
>(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
>Department of State.  Web site: usinfo.state.gov)
>
>============================================================
>Additional Information available:
>Policies and Statements:
>http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/iraq.htm
>
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