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-----Original Message----- From: Iraq ListServ <i-gnea@EXCHANGE.USIA.GOV> To: US-IRAQPOLICY@LISTS.STATE.GOV <US-IRAQPOLICY@LISTS.STATE.GOV> Date: 23 March 2000 22:51 Subject: Walker on U.S. Iraq policy >Walker Senate Testimony on U.S. Policy Towards Iraq >(U.S. committed to containing Saddam Hussein; helping Iraqi people) > >"Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed and defiant. >Saddam's record makes clear that he will remain a threat to regional peace >and security as long as he remains in power," Edward S. Walker, Jr., >assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs testified March 22 >before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. > >"He will not relinquish what remains of his WMD arsenal. He will not live >in peace with his neighbors. He will not cease the repression of the Iraqi >people. The regime of Saddam Hussein cannot be rehabilitated or >reintegrated as a responsible member of the community of nations," Walker >asserted. > >Walker said the United States is committed to containing Saddam Hussein as >long as he remains in power and to working to alleviate the suffering of the >Iraqi people. > >The U.S. policy of containment, Walker said, includes U.N. sanctions which >deny Saddam the resources needed to reconstitute weapons of mass >destruction, enforcing no-fly zones in the North and South of Iraq, and by >maintaining a military presence in the region and a readiness to use force >if necessary. > >Walker said the U.N. is moving ahead with U.N. Resolution 1284 which >re-affirms that Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations under previous >Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy its Weapons of Mass >Destruction (WMD). > >The resolution establishes a new arms-control organization, the UN >Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission, or UNMOVIC, to replace >the previous monitoring group, UNSCOM. The Secretary General has appointed >Hans Blix of Sweden, former Director General of the International Atomic >Energy Agency, as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and he took up his duties >on March 1, Walker said. > >The condition for lifting sanctions on Iraq -- full compliance with UN >Security Council resolutions -- remains unchanged, Walker said. He added >that "All members of the Security Council -- even the four that abstained >from the resolution -- are committed to implementing the resolution; >pressing Iraq to accept inspectors, and maintaining sanctions until Iraq >complies with the terms of the resolution." > >"As long as sanctions remain in place, it is essential that we address the >humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people," Walker said, pointing out that the >oil-for-food program, which provides the Iraqi people with basic civilian >and humanitarian goods while denying the regime access to the most dangerous >dual-use goods, serves both humanitarian interests and regional security." > >Walker noted that Iraqi per capita intake has risen from 1,300 calories >before the program began to over 2,000 calories now provided by a UN ration >basket which is augmented by locally grown produce. Also, in the year >before the program began, Iraq imported about $50 million worth of >medicines, and since the program began, more than $1 billion worth have been >approved. Ninety percent of essential drug needs in hospitals are now being >met and over a billion dollars worth of goods for the water, sanitation, >electrical and agricultural sectors have been approved," he said. > >Following is the text of Walker's testimony: > >(begin text) > >Testimony of NEA Assistant Secretary Edward S. Walker Jr. >Committee on Foreign Relations >March 22, 2000 > >Mr. Chairman: > >I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy towards Iraq, >a key foreign policy issue. > >Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed and defiant. >Saddam's record makes clear that he will remain a threat to regional peace >and security as long as he remains in power. He will not relinquish what >remains of his WMD arsenal. He will not live in peace with his neighbors. >He will not cease the repression of the Iraqi people. The regime of Saddam >Hussein cannot be rehabilitated or reintegrated as a responsible member of >the community of nations. Experience makes this conclusion manifest. That >is why the United States is committed to containing Saddam Hussein as long >as he remains in power. But at the same time, we are also committed to >working to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people who are forced to >live under a regime they did not choose and do not want, and to supporting >Iraqis who seek a new government and a better future for Iraq. > >The first two elements of our policy, containment and the effort to >alleviate conditions for the Iraqi people, were strengthened considerably by >the Security Council's adoption of resolution 1284 in December of last year. >Let me begin by reviewing the elements of containment. > >We contain Saddam through UN sanctions which deny him the resources needed >to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction, by enforcing no-fly zones in >the North and South, and by maintaining a military presence in the region >and a readiness to use force if necessary. > >We have enforced a no-fly zone over northern Iraq since 1991, and over >southern Iraq since 1992. These zones were established to prevent Saddam >Hussein from using his air force against the civilian populations of these >areas, as he has done so brutally in the past. We have been highly >successful in this effort. The zones also provide critical buffer zones to >detect any Iraqi troop movements north or south. Iraqi propaganda denounces >the no-fly zones as a pretext for ongoing military action against Iraqi >forces, a charge which some others have repeated. Let me just state, once >again, that the no-fly zones are protective, not offensive, in nature. >Since December 1998, following Operation Desert Fox, Saddam Hussein has >mounted a sustained challenge to our patrols. Iraqi forces have violated >the no-fly zones over 600 times in 1999. Our forces are fully prepared and >authorized to defend themselves and we have responded to these challenges >with strikes on Iraq's integrated air defense system. Saddam Hussein will >not deter us from our commitment to maintaining these zones which are a key >element of containment. > >An effective disarmament and monitoring regime inside Iraq would strengthen >containment by further limiting Iraq's efforts to rearm. In the absence of >inspectors on the ground, we must rely on national technical means which >cannot provide the same level of assurance as monitoring on the ground. >Resolution 1284 re-affirms that Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations under >previous Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy its WMD. The >resolution establishes a new arms-control organization, the UN Monitoring, >Inspection and Verification Commission, or UNMOVIC, to replace UNSCOM. >UNMOVIC retains UNSCOM's broad mandate and authorities. It has the right to >conduct intrusive inspections into Iraq's past WMD programs, as well as to >monitor to prevent future development of WMD. It has the right to >immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all sites, >records and facilities. > >The UN is moving ahead with implementation of the resolution 1284. The >Secretary General has appointed Hans Blix of Sweden, former Director General >of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, >and he took up his duties on March 1. We have met several times with Dr. >Blix since his appointment, and he has made clear that he is committed to >putting in place a robust, technically-proficient body which will accept >nothing less than full Iraqi cooperation. He has had extensive experience >with the deceitfulness of Saddam's regime and the lengths it goes to in >order to preserve its WMD programs. > >The Secretary General, in consultation with Dr. Blix and Security Council >members, has also named a 16-member College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC to >provide advice and guidance to the Executive Chairman. They represent a >technically expert group. Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation >Affairs, Robert Einhorn, has been appointed as a Commissioner. Like >UNSCOM's College of Commissioners, we expect that they will meet >periodically so that Dr. Blix can draw on their collective expertise. Dr. >Blix is now embarked on drawing up an organizational plan for UNMOVIC which >is scheduled to be completed by April 15. > >If weapons inspectors are allowed back into Iraq, the next step is for >UNMOVIC and the IAEA to draw up the key remaining disarmament tasks to be >completed by Iraq. If Iraq fulfills these tasks, and cooperates with >weapons inspectors for 120 days after reinforced monitoring is fully >operational, the Council could act to suspend sanctions temporarily, >provided appropriate financial controls are in place, and bearing in mind >the humanitarian purposes of the Council's decisions. The embargo on >military imports would remain in place, and dual-use items would continue to >require prior approval. If Iraqi cooperation ceased, sanctions would be >re-imposed automatically. Renewal of the suspension would require a >positive Council decision every 120 days. > >The condition for lifting sanctions on Iraq -- full compliance with UN >Security Council resolutions -- remains unchanged. > >Containment has been strengthened by the adoption of the resolution. All >members of the Security Council -- even the four that abstained from the >resolution -- are committed to implementing the resolution; pressing Iraq to >accept inspectors, and maintaining sanctions until Iraq complies with the >terms of the resolution. > >Sanctions are the most critical element of containment. In the absence of >the sanctions regime and a comprehensive international system of controls, >Saddam Hussein would have sole control over Iraq's oil revenues -- estimated >at $20 billion over the coming year -- to spend on priorities of his regime, >whether it be to rebuild his WMD capacity, produce chemical or biological >weapons, bolster his oppressive security apparatus, or to build opulent >palaces. In the absence of comprehensive international controls -- even if >a military embargo remained in place -- it is inevitable that Saddam would >once again threaten the region and ignore the needs of the Iraqi people. > >As long as sanctions remain in place, it is essential that we address the >humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. An effective oil-for-food program, >which provides the Iraqi people with basic civilian and humanitarian goods >while denying the regime access to the most dangerous dual-use goods, serves >both humanitarian interests and regional security. Not only is it right for >the international community to do all it can to assist the Iraqi people who >are the pawns of Saddam Hussein, but doing so minimizes the risk of >sanctions erosion and alleviates international pressure to ease or lift the >controls which keep Iraq's revenue out of the hands of Saddam Hussein. > >UN sanctions have never targeted the Iraqi people and have never limited the >import of food and medicine for the Iraqi people. In fact, the United >States was an original sponsor of the first oil-for-food program, adopted in >1991. Tragically, Baghdad rejected this program and it was not until 1996 >that it finally accepted oil-for-food. Since the first oil-for-food >supplies arrived in Iraq in 1997, the program has brought tremendous >improvements in living conditions. Iraqi per capita intake has risen from >1,300 calories before the program began to over 2,000 calories now provided >by a UN ration basket which is augmented by locally grown produce. Food >imports are now at about pre-war levels. In the year before the program >began, Iraq imported about $50 million worth of medicines. Since the >program began, more than $1 billion worth have been approved. Ninety >percent of essential drug needs in hospitals are now being met. Over a >billion dollars worth of goods for the water, sanitation, electrical and >agricultural sectors have been approved. > >Saddam Hussein however, has abused the program to the detriment of the Iraqi >people, in an attempt to get sanctions lifted without compliance. Since the >first delivery of oil-for-food supplies in March 1997, the government of >Iraq has failed to work with UN authorities to maximize the benefit to the >Iraqi population. The needs of the most vulnerable groups, including >children and the elderly, have been of particular concern. The Secretary >General reported earlier this month that Iraq has still not implemented the >supplementary feeding programs, recommended for years by the UN, for >malnourished children under five and for school children. These programs >have been very successful in the North, where oil-for-food is administered >by the UN. By contrast, vaccination levels in Baghdad-controlled areas are >worse than they were in 1994. Ordering remains slow and erratic, and the >distribution of goods after they reach Iraq continues to be a problem. A >major reason for this suffering is Saddam's cynical manipulation. > >To get the clearest picture of the oil-for-food program and its potential, >it is helpful to compare its operation in northern Iraq, where the UN >controls distribution, and in southern and central Iraq, where Saddam >controls the distribution of goods. A UNICEF report on child mortality in >Iraq conducted last year revealed a disturbing rise in child mortality rates >-- more than double pre-war levels -- in south/central Iraq, the parts of >the country controlled by Saddam Hussein. But the report also revealed that >child mortality rates in northern Iraq, where the UN controls distribution >of the oil-for-food program, had dropped below pre-war levels. What these >numbers show is that oil-for-food can work to meet the needs of the Iraqi >people if the government can be prevented from interfering, or can be >compelled to manage the program efficiently with that priority in mind. > >Publicity surrounding the release of this survey last year led Baghdad to >finally place orders for nutritional supplements -- something the UN had >long advocated. Early last year, the Secretary General reported that there >were $275 million worth of medicines sitting in Iraqi warehouses >undistributed. As a result of the publicity generated by this report, >stockpiles were eventually reduced. We hope that the Secretary-General's >latest report will generate pressure on the regime to introduce >supplementary feeding programs, improve distribution of supplies and >rationalize the Government's ordering. > >Even with the successes of the oil-for-food program, more can and should be >done. That is why the U.S. supported resolution 1284, adopted by the >Security Council on December 17, which introduces further enhancements of >the oil-for-food program. The resolution permits Iraq to sell as much oil >as needed to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. We do not >believe there should be any limit on the funds spent on the Iraqi people. >As it has in the past, the UN will continue to monitor the program to ensure >that the regime spends these revenues only on humanitarian projects. The >resolution also streamlines the contract approval process to facilitate the >supply of legitimate goods, and authorizes the use of oil-for-food funds to >purchase local goods, such as wheat, to provide a boost to Iraq's >agricultural sector. > >For our part, we are examining our own national procedures for reviewing >oil-for-food contracts, to ensure that they are optimized to meet our >priorities: maximizing assistance to the Iraqi people while denying the >regime access to goods it could use to reconstitute its WMD programs. The >United States has been criticized by many for the numbers of holds we have >placed on oil-for-food contracts. We recognize that some of this criticism >reflects humanitarian concern, and we are reviewing our procedures with this >concern in mind. However, we must also be objective, as well as >compassionate, in assessing the big picture. > >The regime of Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons against its own >people and its neighbors, it has developed biological weapons and had an >active nuclear program. It has obstructed weapons inspectors for nine years >in an effort to conceal these programs. This regime has the expertise and >the will to produce weapons of mass destruction. We can not hand it the >goods it needs to turn those intentions into reality. Particularly in the >absence of weapons inspectors, we will continue to hold on dual-use goods >which can be used in WMD development. > >At the same time, it is critical that we do all we can to ensure that the >Iraqi people receive the goods they need. Not only is it right for the >international community to do all it can to assist the Iraqi people who are >the pawns of Saddam Hussein, but doing so minimizes the risk of sanctions >erosion and alleviates international pressure to ease or lift sanction in >the absence of Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. > >At the same time as we work in the UN to strengthen containment, we continue >to support Iraqis who are supporting the removal of the current Baghdad >regime and its replacement by a new government in Baghdad under which Iraq >can resume its rightful place in the Arab and international communities. We >continually tell the Iraqis that they alone must be the ones to determine >the future of Iraq; we will assist them as we can, but we will not, indeed >should not, be the ones to decide who will be the next leader of Iraq. > >Using funds appropriated by Congress, free Iraqis held a broad-based >National Assembly in New York in October. At the conference, the Iraqi >National Congress elected a new leadership. Frank Ricciardone has been >working intensively with them to channel fresh U.S. support to the Iraqi >opposition as they identify ad plan specific operational goals and >activities: > >-- developing and broadcasting a vision for the restoration of civil society >in Iraq and for Iraq's reintegration as a responsible member of the >international community. > >-- building the case for the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and key members >of the regime for war crimes and crimes against humanity; > >-- channeling training, information and material support, under the Iraq >Liberation Act, to the forces of change inside Iraq. > >-- channeling humanitarian assistance to Iraqis in need, in the face of >Baghdad's obstruction and monitoring Saddam Hussein's performance in >providing for the basic needs of the Iraqi people. > >-- building stronger ties to and between the internal resistance and with >regional states. > >Using congressionally appropriated funds, the State Department and the INC >will sign an initial grant worth over a quarter of a million dollars this >week. The grant will enable the INC to continue its efforts to reach out to >constituents and to establish the infrastructure necessary to accomplish its >objectives and to take advantage of other congressionally mandated programs. > >In particular, we hope and expect that the INC will soon have the >organization and staffing needed to take full advantage of training and >material support that we will be ready to provide under the Iraq Liberation >Act. As you know, four INC members were invited to participate in a first >military training course under the ILA in November at Hurlburt Air Force >Base. The Iraqis participated side by side with colleagues from other Arab >countries for the first time in many years. Now, the Defense Department is >preparing a more extensive list of training options for free Iraqis. We >anticipate that by late spring, many more Iraqis will be in line for >training enjoyed by other allied and friendly officers in areas related to >logistics, civil reconstruction, management, and public relations. > >Another important area the INC will be working on is providing humanitarian >assistance to Iraqis inside Iraq. This is an important area that dovetails >with our own national goals and we look forward to working with them on it. >The INC would develop an infrastructure to deliver critically needed >humanitarian goods to segments of the Iraqi population that Saddam Hussein >has ignored. > >As a government, we are also stepping up our efforts to gather evidence to >support the indictment of the top Iraqi leadership for crimes against >humanity, genocide and war crimes. We are gathering evidence from U.S. >Government files. We are also supporting the work of NGOs that make >important contributions to this effort. We have already provided $2 million >in congressionally appropriated funds to four separate but related >activities: making captured Iraqi documents available on the Internet; >gathering videotape and imagery of Iraqi crimes against humanity; gathering >witness statements to justify indictments of top Iraqi officials and helping >to generate the international public on the crimes committed by the Baghdad >regime. We expect the Iraqi Opposition to make a major contribution to the >campaign to bring the Baghdad regime to justice. > >This heightened attention by NGO's to crimes of the Iraqi leadership has >already borne fruit, as we saw by the precipitous departure of an Iraqi >regime leader from Austria last September and with Tariq Aziz' decision >shortly thereafter not to participate in a forum in Italy. We have >increased our diplomatic activity on the issue, discussing the possibilities >of a UN tribunal or committee of experts with other UN members and ensuring >that documents in US control are available for use in any eventual legal >action. > >I cannot predict with any certainty when this brutal regime will be gone. >But by maintaining sanctions, enforcing the no-fly zones, committing to use >force if Saddam Hussein crosses our red lines, and supporting the >opposition, we increase the pressure on the regime and we contain the threat >it poses to the region and the Iraqi people. > >I welcome any questions you may have. > >(end text) > >(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. >Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov) > >============================================================ >Additional Information available: >Policies and Statements: >http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/iraq.htm > >TO GET OFF THIS LIST: >Send a message that says SIGNOFF US-IRAQPOLICY >to >LISTSERV@LISTS.STATE.GOV > > -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq For removal from list, email firstname.lastname@example.org Full details of CASI's various lists can be found on the CASI website: http://welcome.to/casi