Fw: Walker on U.S. Iraq policy

["adr1ano" <adr1ano@DELETETHISnetscapeonline.co.uk>]

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From: Iraq ListServ <i-gnea@EXCHANGE.USIA.GOV>
To: US-IRAQPOLICY@LISTS.STATE.GOV <US-IRAQPOLICY@LISTS.STATE.GOV>
Date: 23 March 2000 22:51
Subject: Walker on U.S. Iraq policy


>Walker Senate Testimony on U.S. Policy Towards Iraq
>(U.S. committed to containing Saddam Hussein; helping Iraqi people)
>
>"Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed and defiant.
>Saddam's record makes clear that he will remain a threat to regional peace
>and security as long as he remains in power," Edward S. Walker, Jr.,
>assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs testified March 22
>before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
>
>"He will not relinquish what remains of his WMD arsenal.  He will not live
>in peace with his neighbors.  He will not cease the repression of the Iraqi
>people.  The regime of Saddam Hussein cannot be rehabilitated or
>reintegrated as a responsible member of the community of nations," Walker
>asserted.
>
>Walker said the United States is committed to containing Saddam Hussein as
>long as he remains in power and to working to alleviate the suffering of
the
>Iraqi people.
>
>The U.S. policy of containment, Walker said, includes U.N. sanctions which
>deny Saddam the resources needed to reconstitute weapons of mass
>destruction, enforcing no-fly zones in the North and South of Iraq, and by
>maintaining a military presence in the region and a readiness to use force
>if necessary.
>
>Walker said the U.N. is moving ahead with U.N. Resolution 1284 which
>re-affirms that Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations under previous
>Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy its Weapons of Mass
>Destruction (WMD).
>
>The resolution establishes a new arms-control organization, the UN
>Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission, or UNMOVIC, to replace
>the previous monitoring group, UNSCOM.  The Secretary General has appointed
>Hans Blix of Sweden, former Director General of the International Atomic
>Energy Agency, as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and he took up his duties
>on March 1, Walker said.
>
>The condition for lifting sanctions on Iraq -- full compliance with UN
>Security Council resolutions -- remains unchanged, Walker said.  He added
>that "All members of the Security Council -- even the four that abstained
>from the resolution -- are committed to implementing the resolution;
>pressing Iraq to accept inspectors, and maintaining sanctions until Iraq
>complies with the terms of the resolution."
>
>"As long as sanctions remain in place, it is essential that we address the
>humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people," Walker said, pointing out that the
>oil-for-food program, which provides the Iraqi people with basic civilian
>and humanitarian goods while denying the regime access to the most
dangerous
>dual-use goods, serves both humanitarian interests and regional security."
>
>Walker noted that Iraqi per capita intake has risen from 1,300 calories
>before the program began to over 2,000 calories now provided by a UN ration
>basket which is augmented by locally grown produce.  Also, in the year
>before the program began, Iraq imported about $50 million worth of
>medicines, and since the program began, more than $1 billion worth have
been
>approved.  Ninety percent of essential drug needs in hospitals are now
being
>met and over a billion dollars worth of goods for the water, sanitation,
>electrical and agricultural sectors have been approved," he said.
>
>Following is the text of Walker's testimony:
>
>(begin text)
>
>Testimony of NEA Assistant Secretary Edward S. Walker Jr.
>Committee on Foreign Relations
>March 22, 2000
>
>Mr. Chairman:
>
>I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy towards
Iraq,
>a key foreign policy issue.
>
>Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed and defiant.
>Saddam's record makes clear that he will remain a threat to regional peace
>and security as long as he remains in power.  He will not relinquish what
>remains of his WMD arsenal.  He will not live in peace with his neighbors.
>He will not cease the repression of the Iraqi people.  The regime of Saddam
>Hussein cannot be rehabilitated or reintegrated as a responsible member of
>the community of nations.  Experience makes this conclusion manifest.  That
>is why the United States is committed to containing Saddam Hussein as long
>as he remains in power.  But at the same time, we are also committed to
>working to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people who are forced to
>live under a regime they did not choose and do not want, and to supporting
>Iraqis who seek a new government and a better future for Iraq.
>
>The first two elements of our policy, containment and the effort to
>alleviate conditions for the Iraqi people, were strengthened considerably
by
>the Security Council's adoption of resolution 1284 in December of last
year.
>Let me begin by reviewing the elements of containment.
>
>We contain Saddam through UN sanctions which deny him the resources needed
>to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction, by enforcing no-fly zones in
>the North and South, and by maintaining a military presence in the region
>and a readiness to use force if necessary.
>
>We have enforced a no-fly zone over northern Iraq since 1991, and over
>southern Iraq since 1992.  These zones were established to prevent Saddam
>Hussein from using his air force against the civilian populations of these
>areas, as he has done so brutally in the past.  We have been highly
>successful in this effort.  The zones also provide critical buffer zones to
>detect any Iraqi troop movements north or south.  Iraqi propaganda
denounces
>the no-fly zones as a pretext for ongoing military action against Iraqi
>forces, a charge which some others have repeated.  Let me just state, once
>again, that the no-fly zones are protective, not offensive, in nature.
>Since December 1998, following Operation Desert Fox, Saddam Hussein has
>mounted a sustained challenge to our patrols.  Iraqi forces have violated
>the no-fly zones over 600 times in 1999.  Our forces are fully prepared and
>authorized to defend themselves and we have responded to these challenges
>with strikes on Iraq's integrated air defense system.  Saddam Hussein will
>not deter us from our commitment to maintaining these zones which are a key
>element of containment.
>
>An effective disarmament and monitoring regime inside Iraq would strengthen
>containment by further limiting Iraq's efforts to rearm.  In the absence of
>inspectors on the ground, we must rely on national technical means which
>cannot provide the same level of assurance as monitoring on the ground.
>Resolution 1284 re-affirms that Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations
under
>previous Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy its WMD.  The
>resolution establishes a new arms-control organization, the UN Monitoring,
>Inspection and Verification Commission, or UNMOVIC, to replace UNSCOM.
>UNMOVIC retains UNSCOM's broad mandate and authorities.  It has the right
to
>conduct intrusive inspections into Iraq's past WMD programs, as well as to
>monitor to prevent future development of WMD.  It has the right to
>immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all sites,
>records and facilities.
>
>The UN is moving ahead with implementation of the resolution 1284.  The
>Secretary General has appointed Hans Blix of Sweden, former Director
General
>of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as Executive Chairman of
UNMOVIC,
>and he took up his duties on March 1.  We have met several times with Dr.
>Blix since his appointment, and he has made clear that he is committed to
>putting in place a robust, technically-proficient body which will accept
>nothing less than full Iraqi cooperation.  He has had extensive experience
>with the deceitfulness of Saddam's regime and the lengths it goes to in
>order to preserve its WMD programs.
>
>The Secretary General, in consultation with Dr. Blix and Security Council
>members, has also named a 16-member College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC to
>provide advice and guidance to the Executive Chairman.  They represent a
>technically expert group.  Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation
>Affairs, Robert Einhorn, has been appointed as a Commissioner.  Like
>UNSCOM's College of Commissioners, we expect that they will meet
>periodically so that Dr. Blix can draw on their collective expertise.  Dr.
>Blix is now embarked on drawing up an organizational plan for UNMOVIC which
>is scheduled to be completed by April 15.
>
>If weapons inspectors are allowed back into Iraq, the next step is for
>UNMOVIC and the IAEA to draw up the key remaining disarmament tasks to be
>completed by Iraq.  If Iraq fulfills these tasks, and cooperates with
>weapons inspectors for 120 days after reinforced monitoring is fully
>operational, the Council could act to suspend sanctions temporarily,
>provided appropriate financial controls are in place, and bearing in mind
>the humanitarian purposes of the Council's decisions.  The embargo on
>military imports would remain in place, and dual-use items would continue
to
>require prior approval.  If Iraqi cooperation ceased, sanctions would be
>re-imposed automatically.  Renewal of the suspension would require a
>positive Council decision every 120 days.
>
>The condition for lifting sanctions on Iraq -- full compliance with UN
>Security Council resolutions -- remains unchanged.
>
>Containment has been strengthened by the adoption of the resolution.  All
>members of the Security Council -- even the four that abstained from the
>resolution -- are committed to implementing the resolution; pressing Iraq
to
>accept inspectors, and maintaining sanctions until Iraq complies with the
>terms of the resolution.
>
>Sanctions are the most critical element of containment.  In the absence of
>the sanctions regime and a comprehensive international system of controls,
>Saddam Hussein would have sole control over Iraq's oil revenues --
estimated
>at $20 billion over the coming year -- to spend on priorities of his
regime,
>whether it be to rebuild his WMD capacity, produce chemical or biological
>weapons, bolster his oppressive security apparatus, or to build opulent
>palaces.  In the absence of comprehensive international controls -- even if
>a military embargo remained in place -- it is inevitable that Saddam would
>once again threaten the region and ignore the needs of the Iraqi people.
>
>As long as sanctions remain in place, it is essential that we address the
>humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.  An effective oil-for-food program,
>which provides the Iraqi people with basic civilian and humanitarian goods
>while denying the regime access to the most dangerous dual-use goods,
serves
>both humanitarian interests and regional security.  Not only is it right
for
>the international community to do all it can to assist the Iraqi people who
>are the pawns of Saddam Hussein, but doing so minimizes the risk of
>sanctions erosion and alleviates international pressure to ease or lift the
>controls which keep Iraq's revenue out of the hands of Saddam Hussein.
>
>UN sanctions have never targeted the Iraqi people and have never limited
the
>import of food and medicine for the Iraqi people.  In fact, the United
>States was an original sponsor of the first oil-for-food program, adopted
in
>1991.  Tragically, Baghdad rejected this program and it was not until 1996
>that it finally accepted oil-for-food.  Since the first oil-for-food
>supplies arrived in Iraq in 1997, the program has brought tremendous
>improvements in living conditions.  Iraqi per capita intake has risen from
>1,300 calories before the program began to over 2,000 calories now provided
>by a UN ration basket which is augmented by locally grown produce.  Food
>imports are now at about pre-war levels.  In the year before the program
>began, Iraq imported about $50 million worth of medicines.  Since the
>program began, more than $1 billion worth have been approved.  Ninety
>percent of essential drug needs in hospitals are now being met.  Over a
>billion dollars worth of goods for the water, sanitation, electrical and
>agricultural sectors have been approved.
>
>Saddam Hussein however, has abused the program to the detriment of the
Iraqi
>people, in an attempt to get sanctions lifted without compliance.  Since
the
>first delivery of oil-for-food supplies in March 1997, the government of
>Iraq has failed to work with UN authorities to maximize the benefit to the
>Iraqi population.  The needs of the most vulnerable groups, including
>children and the elderly, have been of particular concern.  The Secretary
>General reported earlier this month that Iraq has still not implemented the
>supplementary feeding programs, recommended for years by the UN, for
>malnourished children under five and for school children.  These programs
>have been very successful in the North, where oil-for-food is administered
>by the UN.  By contrast, vaccination levels in Baghdad-controlled areas are
>worse than they were in 1994.  Ordering remains slow and erratic, and the
>distribution of goods after they reach Iraq continues to be a problem.  A
>major reason for this suffering is Saddam's cynical manipulation.
>
>To get the clearest picture of the oil-for-food program and its potential,
>it is helpful to compare its operation in northern Iraq, where the UN
>controls distribution, and in southern and central Iraq, where Saddam
>controls the distribution of goods.  A UNICEF report on child mortality in
>Iraq conducted last year revealed a disturbing rise in child mortality
rates
>-- more than double pre-war levels -- in south/central Iraq, the parts of
>the country controlled by Saddam Hussein.  But the report also revealed
that
>child mortality rates in northern Iraq, where the UN controls distribution
>of the oil-for-food program, had dropped below pre-war levels.  What these
>numbers show is that oil-for-food can work to meet the needs of the Iraqi
>people if the government can be prevented from interfering, or can be
>compelled to manage the program efficiently with that priority in mind.
>
>Publicity surrounding the release of this survey last year led Baghdad to
>finally place orders for nutritional supplements -- something the UN had
>long advocated.  Early last year, the Secretary General reported that there
>were $275 million worth of medicines sitting in Iraqi warehouses
>undistributed.  As a result of the publicity generated by this report,
>stockpiles were eventually reduced.  We hope that the Secretary-General's
>latest report will generate pressure on the regime to introduce
>supplementary feeding programs, improve distribution of supplies and
>rationalize the Government's ordering.
>
>Even with the successes of the oil-for-food program, more can and should be
>done.  That is why the U.S. supported resolution 1284, adopted by the
>Security Council on December 17, which introduces further enhancements of
>the oil-for-food program.  The resolution permits Iraq to sell as much oil
>as needed to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.  We do not
>believe there should be any limit on the funds spent on the Iraqi people.
>As it has in the past, the UN will continue to monitor the program to
ensure
>that the regime spends these revenues only on humanitarian projects.  The
>resolution also streamlines the contract approval process to facilitate the
>supply of legitimate goods, and authorizes the use of oil-for-food funds to
>purchase local goods, such as wheat, to provide a boost to Iraq's
>agricultural sector.
>
>For our part, we are examining our own national procedures for reviewing
>oil-for-food contracts, to ensure that they are optimized to meet our
>priorities: maximizing assistance to the Iraqi people while denying the
>regime access to goods it could use to reconstitute its WMD programs.  The
>United States has been criticized by many for the numbers of holds we have
>placed on oil-for-food contracts.  We recognize that some of this criticism
>reflects humanitarian concern, and we are reviewing our procedures with
this
>concern in mind.  However, we must also be objective, as well as
>compassionate, in assessing the big picture.
>
>The regime of Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons against its own
>people and its neighbors, it has developed biological weapons and had an
>active nuclear program.  It has obstructed weapons inspectors for nine
years
>in an effort to conceal these programs.  This regime has the expertise and
>the will to produce weapons of mass destruction.  We can not hand it the
>goods it needs to turn those intentions into reality.  Particularly in the
>absence of weapons inspectors, we will continue to hold on dual-use goods
>which can be used in WMD development.
>
>At the same time, it is critical that we do all we can to ensure that the
>Iraqi people receive the goods they need.  Not only is it right for the
>international community to do all it can to assist the Iraqi people who are
>the pawns of Saddam Hussein, but doing so minimizes the risk of sanctions
>erosion and alleviates international pressure to ease or lift sanction in
>the absence of Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions.
>
>At the same time as we work in the UN to strengthen containment, we
continue
>to support Iraqis who are supporting the removal of the current Baghdad
>regime and its replacement by a new government in Baghdad under which Iraq
>can resume its rightful place in the Arab and international communities.
We
>continually tell the Iraqis that they alone must be the ones to determine
>the future of Iraq; we will assist them as we can, but we will not, indeed
>should not, be the ones to decide who will be the next leader of Iraq.
>
>Using funds appropriated by Congress, free Iraqis held a broad-based
>National Assembly in New York in October.  At the conference, the Iraqi
>National Congress elected a new leadership.  Frank Ricciardone has been
>working intensively with them to channel fresh U.S. support to the Iraqi
>opposition as they identify ad plan specific operational goals and
>activities:
>
>-- developing and broadcasting a vision for the restoration of civil
society
>in Iraq and for Iraq's reintegration as a responsible member of the
>international community.
>
>-- building the case for the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and key members
>of the regime for war crimes and crimes against humanity;
>
>-- channeling training, information and material support, under the Iraq
>Liberation Act, to the forces of change inside Iraq.
>
>-- channeling humanitarian assistance to Iraqis in need, in the face of
>Baghdad's obstruction and monitoring Saddam Hussein's performance in
>providing for the basic needs of the Iraqi people.
>
>-- building stronger ties to and between the internal resistance and with
>regional states.
>
>Using congressionally appropriated funds, the State Department and the INC
>will sign an initial grant worth over a quarter of a million dollars this
>week.  The grant will enable the INC to continue its efforts to reach out
to
>constituents and to establish the infrastructure necessary to accomplish
its
>objectives and to take advantage of other congressionally mandated
programs.
>
>In particular, we hope and expect that the INC will soon have the
>organization and staffing needed to take full advantage of training and
>material support that we will be ready to provide under the Iraq Liberation
>Act.  As you know, four INC members were invited to participate in a first
>military training course under the ILA in November at Hurlburt Air Force
>Base.  The Iraqis participated side by side with colleagues from other Arab
>countries for the first time in many years.  Now, the Defense Department is
>preparing a more extensive list of training options for free Iraqis.  We
>anticipate that by late spring, many more Iraqis will be in line for
>training enjoyed by other allied and friendly officers in areas related to
>logistics, civil reconstruction, management, and public relations.
>
>Another important area the INC will be working on is providing humanitarian
>assistance to Iraqis inside Iraq.  This is an important area that dovetails
>with our own national goals and we look forward to working with them on it.
>The INC would develop an infrastructure to deliver critically needed
>humanitarian goods to segments of the Iraqi population that Saddam Hussein
>has ignored.
>
>As a government, we are also stepping up our efforts to gather evidence to
>support the indictment of the top Iraqi leadership for crimes against
>humanity, genocide and war crimes.  We are gathering evidence from U.S.
>Government files.  We are also supporting the work of NGOs that make
>important contributions to this effort.  We have already provided $2
million
>in congressionally appropriated funds to four separate but related
>activities: making captured Iraqi documents available on the Internet;
>gathering videotape and imagery of Iraqi crimes against humanity; gathering
>witness statements to justify indictments of top Iraqi officials and
helping
>to generate the international public on the crimes committed by the Baghdad
>regime.  We expect the Iraqi Opposition to make a major contribution to the
>campaign to bring the Baghdad regime to justice.
>
>This heightened attention by NGO's to crimes of the Iraqi leadership has
>already borne fruit, as we saw by the precipitous departure of an Iraqi
>regime leader from Austria last September and with Tariq Aziz' decision
>shortly thereafter not to participate in a forum in Italy.  We have
>increased our diplomatic activity on the issue, discussing the
possibilities
>of a UN tribunal or committee of experts with other UN members and ensuring
>that documents in US control are available for use in any eventual legal
>action.
>
>I cannot predict with any certainty when this brutal regime will be gone.
>But by maintaining sanctions, enforcing the no-fly zones, committing to use
>force if Saddam Hussein crosses our red lines, and supporting the
>opposition, we increase the pressure on the regime and we contain the
threat
>it poses to the region and the Iraqi people.
>
>I welcome any questions you may have.
>
>(end text)
>
>(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
>Department of State.  Web site: usinfo.state.gov)
>
>============================================================
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