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I attach some notes on the new SCR in the event that they might be of use. Colin Rowat *********************************************** Coordinator, Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq http://welcome.to/casi *********************************************** 393 King's College www.cus.cam.ac.uk/~cir20 Cambridge CB2 1ST tel: +44 (0)468 056 984 England fax: +44 (0)870 063 4984 INITIAL COMMENTS ON SCR 1284 [C. Rowat 18/12/99] The following remarks on SCR 1284 are made on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis. Occasionally comparisons are drawn to the July draft of the UK-Dutch resolution and to the UN Humanitarian Panel Report (Annex II, S/1999/356, 30/3/99). PREAMBLE The preamble re-iterates the Security Council’s commitment to “establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons”. It also reaffirms the “commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait, Iraq and the neighbouring States”. A: PARA. 1 - 12: UNMOVIC REPLACES UNSCOM The gist of these paragraphs is to replace Unscom with Unmovic. The only apparent change is the recommendation that the new Executive Chairman of Unmovic incorporate “as appropriate the recommendations of the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues”. As a result, it is not clear that any of the issues that led to Unscom’s corruption and demise have been addressed. As the disarmament panel’s report made specific recommendations this disinterest in acting upon them when establishing Unscom’s successor is peculiar. The timetable envisaged by SCR 1284 for weapons inspection is described in paragraphs 5 - 7. Within 30 days of 1284’s passage, an Executive Chairman of Unmovic will be appointed; no more than 45 days later, the Chairman will present an organisational plan for approval to the Security Council. Work programmes will then be presented no later than 60 days after work has started in Iraq (which, presumably, could not occur before approval of the organisational plan, as that is necessary for Unmovic’s operations). Supposing everything to go smoothly, this is a 135 day programme [one could compare this to the 120 programme of SCR 687 in 1991]. While the wording of paragraph 33 (governing sanctions’ suspension) is unclear, it is possible that Iraq’s 120 days of cooperation cannot begin until after these 135 days, lengthening to 255 days the period before which sanctions could be suspended. B: PARA. 13 - 14: KUWAITI CLAIMS AND IRAQ Nothing new: Iraq has to cooperate, return property and people C: PARA. 15 - 32: LOTS OF LITTLE CHANGES Paragraph 15 lifts the cap on Iraqi petroleum sales. The 661 committee still approves imports and revenues are still paid into the UN escrow account. Paragraph 16 suggests that additional export routes might be considered to allow Iraq increased exports. The UK-Dutch proposal had (in its paragraphs 17 - 19) explicitly mentioned Turkey, and had called for the establishment of a second escrow account for the proceeds of oil sales by road through Turkey. Those funds would be used to purchase goods of Turkish origin. These recommendations seemed very strange to me and felt rather like a bribe for Turkey’s political support, including continued support of US bombing of Iraq from the Incirlik airforce base. The Humanitarian Panel report did suggest that “petroleum and other oil products presently exported outside” of oil-for-food (i.e. smuggled) could be brought within in (paragraph 54 (iv)); this would fit with the Turkey recommendation. Paragraph 17 authorises a ‘green list’ of humanitarian items to be imported into Iraq without Sanctions Committee involvement. The Sanctions Committee would draw up the list. It seems to me that this is a point at which lobbying can occur: require the Committee to adopt a broad list. None of the categories of goods listed are infrastructural (except “standard educational items”). At first glance, paragraph 18 seemed to authorises creation of a ‘green oil parts list’. At second glance, the Sanctions Committee still needs to approve every part; the technical experts are merely present in an advisory capacity. Paragraph 20 is more involved yet; it implements Paragraph 54 (vii) of the Humanitarian Panel report. Under SCR 778 (1992) anybody with ‘illegal’ Iraqi oil revenues was to pay those into the UN escrow account to be established. The funds thus received would be returned with interest; I don’t know whether these payments were to be on-going as funds allowed or merely once sanctions were lifted. Under SCR 986, funds were to be set aside explicitly to address the interest payments envisaged in 778. Paragraph 20 of SCR 1284 allows these set aside funds not to be set aside, and therefore useful to the humanitarian programme; this provision lasts for six months and is renewable. This paragraph will not make more than $40 million / year available to Iraq. Remember that the Humanitarian Panel report stated that: The question of securing additional funding to finance humanitarian efforts is of paramount importance, as virtually all submissions to the panel underlined the insufficiency of present levels of revenue to deal with pressing humanitarian needs. [paragraph 54] Paragraph 54 (vi) of the Panel Report recommended loaning payments into the Compensation Fund for humanitarian aid. This recommendation was adopted by the UK-Dutch proposal (paragraph 24), which called for a temporary and reimbursable loan of 1/3 of the funds intended for the Compensation Fund. As Iraq pays 30% of its exports into the Compensation Fund, this recommendation could have made available an additional $1.6 billion / year (Iraq exported about $7.5 billion in the last 6 months, thus paying about $2.5 billion into the Compensation Fund. One third of this is $800 million). Paragraph 24 asks the Secretary-General to draw up plans for the purchase of Iraqi goods under oil-for-food and for a cash component. The Council will need to approve those plans. These are both steps in the right direction. The previous inability to purchase Iraqi goods meant that, for example, Iraqi farmers (with increased costs due to the sanctions) had to compete with the free produce from abroad provided in the food basket. Under these circumstances, Iraqi farmers had a perverse incentive to sell their own produce abroad. Paragraph 28 asks the Secretary-General for a report on “progress made in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues necessary to meet those needs”, with an interest especially in whether the current allocation [of $300 / phase] of oil spare parts should be increased. As the Secretary-General has repeatedly called for a doubling of this to $600 / phase (most recently in S/1999/1162 on 12/11/99) this recommendation seems simply an attempt to stall. The Humanitarian Panel report called for “lifting the ceiling of allowable oil exports” (paragraph 54 (i)) but recognised that this would have little immediate effect. Paragraph 29 expresses a willingness to act on the Secretary-General’s recommendations. Paragraph 30 calls for the Secretary-General to establish a group of oil experts who can recommend steps to increase Iraq’s capacity, including through foreign firms’ involvement. This, and other private investment, was recommended by the Humanitarian Panel report. The foreign funds could immediately free up $300 million / 180 days (the amount that Iraq spends on oil spare parts) for humanitarian purchases. Other paragraphs make minor requests, of the sort made by the Secretary-General in his 90 and 180 day reports on oil-for-food. Recommendations of the Humanitarian Panel that do not appear in SCR 1284, and have not been mentioned above, include: - the deposit of frozen Iraqi assets held abroad into the escrow account, increasing the amount available for humanitarian purchases; - attempts to ensure contractors’ timely delivery of goods to Iraq, reducing blockages in the escrow account; D: 33 - 39: SANCTIONS’ SUSPENSION Paragraph 33 expresses the Council’s “intention” to suspend sanctions once Unmovic and the IAEA report 120 days of cooperation “in all respects”. This meaning of this was deliberately kept vague by Britain. The “fundamental objective” of the suspension is “improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq”, recognising a link between the sanctions and that situation. The sanctions will be suspended “subject to the elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures”, also left undefined. It is therefore unclear what the form of the suspension might be, even should it occur. Paragraph 36 promises that these will be defined no later than at the end of the 120 day cooperation period. As the French government presented detailed proposals for these measures in August 1284’s ambiguity is likely intentional. The result is that the government of Iraq is being asked to cooperate in an undefined sense for 120 days when as yet undefined benefits may then be realised. Paragraph 35 allows sanctions to be re-imposed upon the word of Unmovic’s Executive Chairman or the IAEA’s Director General. This will occur within five working days unless the Security Council objects. Paragraph 37 says that the Council might adopt the oil experts’ recommendations if sanctions are suspended. This suggests that the possibility of foreign investment in Iraq will not be allowed without the 120 days of cooperation -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq For removal from list, email email@example.com Full archive and list instructions are available from the CASI website: http://welcome.to/casi