The following is an archived copy of a message sent to a Discussion List run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
Views expressed in this archived message are those of the author, not of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.
[Main archive index/search] [List information] [Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Homepage]
Dear all: The claim that SCR 706 was designed to be rejected must be handled with care. A lot of people have speculated that it was designed to be rejected. However, this is itself is not strong evidence. It is just as plausible that the US would have been happy for Iraq to accept it as it would have given the US through the UN lots of access in Iraq and might have reduced the mortality rate while still keeping the Iraqi economy under great pressure. If anyone has any quotes (eg from former State Dept people) that it was designed to be rejected, I'd be keen to hear it. Cheers Eric On Mon, 11 Oct 1999 18:09:36 +0100 (BST) Colin Rowat <cir20@cus.cam.ac.uk> wrote: > > does anyone know when the UNSC first proposed the oil-for-food deal to > > Iraq? > > In August 1991 the UNSC passed SCR 706, which was a proto-oil-for-food > resolution. It would have allowed Iraq (under September's SCR 712) to > sell $1.6 billion of oil every 180 days. This cap, for which there was no > humanitarian reason given that all funds were to be paid into a UN > controlled account, would have left less money available for Iraq's > humanitarian needs than what the UN Secretary General had just > reported to the SC as being the minimum consistent with Iraq's most basic > humanitarian needs. > > There is therefore strong evidence that the original oil-for-food deal was > designed to be rejected, which it was. David Fine wrote in the Middle > East Report (Jan/Feb 1992) that > > UN officials were convinced ... that the US intention was to > present Saddam Hussein with so unattractive a package that Iraq > would reject it and thus take on the blame, at least in Western > eyes, for continued civilian suffering. > > Denis Halliday explained in January that Iraq tried to go it alone by > devoting more resources to agriculture but, by 1995, it was clear that > this had failed: the mortality rate were too high and agriculture wasn't > producing. > > In 1995, SCR 987 was passed; it then took two years for it to be > implemented, partly due to Iraq's continued suspicion that it was > designed primarily to ease political pressure for the lifting of the > sanctions. > > [some details taken from Mil Rai's letter to the editor of the > Independent, 3 September 1999] > > Colin Rowat > Coordinator, Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq > http://welcome.to/casi > > *********************************************** > * Support the: * > * NATIONAL PETITION AGAINST SANCTIONS ON IRAQ * > * http://go.to/iraqpetition * > * or: 12 Trinity Road, London N2 8JJ * > * or: iraqpetition@email.com * > *********************************************** > King's College > Cambridge CB2 1ST tel: +44 (0)468 056 984 > England fax: +44 (0)1223 335 219 > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. > To be removed/added, email soc-casi-discuss-request@lists.cam.ac.uk, NOT > the whole list. Please do not send emails with attached files to the list > *** Archived at http://linux.clare.cam.ac.uk/~saw27/casi/discuss.html *** > ---------------------- Dr. Eric Herring Department of Politics University of Bristol 10 Priory Road Bristol BS8 1TU England, UK Tel. +44-(0)117-928-8582 Fax +44-(0)117-973-2133 http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/Politics eric.herring@bristol.ac.uk -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To be removed/added, email soc-casi-discuss-request@lists.cam.ac.uk, NOT the whole list. Please do not send emails with attached files to the list *** Archived at http://linux.clare.cam.ac.uk/~saw27/casi/discuss.html ***