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Milan Rai
1 Hertford Road
London
N2 9BX
14 November 1998
Dear Prime Minister,
I am shocked and horrified to learn that both you and President Clinton
have rejected out of hand the Iraqi offer to allow UN weapons inspectors
to return to work. I ask you to bear in mind the following statements
by UN officials:
1) The Secretary-General's envoy, Prakash Shah, said at a press conference
this evening that Iraq had agreed to resume cooperation with UNSCOM
'without conditions'. ['Iraq backs down and agrees to allow arms
inspections', New York Times on the Web, 14 November 1998]
2) UN spokesperson Fred Eckhard said tonight that the set of proposals
put forward in the annex to the Iraqi letter 'does not constitute
conditionality': 'This is what the Iraqis would like the council
to consider - but we don't say that they're saying that they will
have to consider these things or respond to them before the cooperation
can resume.' Eckhardt said that the Secretary-General's reading of the
letter and annex is that it 'does not have any conditionality attached
to it.' ['Iraq to allow inspections to resume', AP report, filed at
3:06 EST, 14 November 1998]
3) Kofi Annan himself called the letter 'positive' ['Iraq to allow
inspections to resume', AP report, filed at 3:06 EST, 14 November 1998]
and said that the annex 'was for our consideration and there were no
conditions.' When he was asked whether the letter met UN requirements,
he said, 'Yes, in my judgement it does.' [Both quotes from 'Iraq says
UN inspectors may work again, Annan agrees', Reuters, 14 November 1998]
I have read the texts of the letter and of the annex, and I cannot see
how the proposals contained the annex can be described as 'conditions'.
The Iraqi letter to the Secretary-General says, 'On the basis of what was
stated in your letter, and in appreciation of the content of the letter
of President Boris Yeltsin the President of the Russian Federation and
Mr Yevgeny Primakov the prime minister of the Russian Federation, and
the positive positions expressed and conveyed to us by China, France,
Brazil, and other States, and in order to give a further chance to
achieve justice by lifting sanctions commencing with the implementation
of paragraph (22) of resolution 687 (1991), the Leadership of Iraq decided
to resume working with the Special Commission and the IAEA and to allow
them to perform their normal duties in accordance with the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council and on the basis of the principles
which were agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding signed with
you on 23 February 1998.' No conditions are attached to this change of
policy.
The Iraqi letter says, in relation to the annex, 'Excellency, we rightly
believe that if the comprehensive review were not to be a mere formality
and to be free from the influences of the tendentious purposes, the
adoption of the points we conveyed yesterday, 13/11/1998, to the
Ambassadors
of Russia, France and China, a copy of which I enclose herewith, will
render
the review serious, fair and fruitful.' It categorically does not say that
these 'points' must be adopted before inspectors are allowed to resume
their work.
I urge you to give the inspectors a chance to resume their work, and to
test the new offer in practice rather than rejecting it out of hand. The
fate of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people are in your
hands.
The loss of civilian life from bombing itself, the dire effects caused by
the destruction of civilian infrastructure, and the possibility that
bombing will spell an end to the 'oil-for-food' deal (which is the only
thing standing between Iraq and famine) are all considerations that should
stay your hand at this moment.
Yours faithfully,
Milan Rai
TEXT OF IRAQ'S LETTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
by the Associated Press
Saturday, November 14, 1998; 2:01 pm EST
Text of the letter from Iraqi government to UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan regarding agreement to allow resumption of weapons inspections:
H.E. Mr Kofi A. Annan
The Secretary General of The United Nations
New York
Excellenecy:
Your letter dated 13/11/1998 addressed to President Saddam Hussein was
presented to a joint meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council and the
National Command of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party presided over by His
Excellency the President. I was entrusted with the task of coonveying to
you
the following:
1. The goal sought by Iraq from its decisions of 5 August and 31 October
was not to
sever the relationship with UNSCOM and the IAEA and to cease
implementation
of its obligations ... under section C of SCR 687. The objective of Iraq
is to end the suffering of its embargoed people and to see the
implementation of paragraph 22 of SCR 687 as a first step for lifting the
other sanctions.
2. Due to its trust in you and your good faith, the Government of Iraq has
dealt with your initiative regarding the comprehensive review. But
unfortunately, the deliberations of the Council on the procedures for
carrying out the review did not result in a clear picture which ensures
fairness and objectivity in reaching the implementation of Paragraph (22)
of resolution 687, which represents the declared objective of the
comprehensive review according to your proposal. It is well known that the
main reason for that was the American position, which does not represent
the prevailing opinion of the Council. That position, contrary to your
initiative, objected continuosuly to the presentation of any clarity
in regard to the objective of the comprehensive review.
3. Despite the assurances that we have received from you and from many
members of the Council that supported the main objective of the
comprehensive review, and despite the confidence we have in you and in the
majority of the Council members and our belief in your good faith and
sincerity, those assurances were not satisfactory because they did not
meet the basics from our point (of) view.
On the basis of what was stated in your letter, and in appreciation
of the content of the letter of President Boris Yeltsin the President
of the Russian Federation and Mr Yevgeny Primakov the prime minister
of the Russian Federation, and the positive positions expressed and
conveyed to us by China, France, Brazil, and other States, and in
order to give a further chance to achieve justice by lifting sanctions
commencing with the implementation of paragraph (22) of resolution 687
(1991), the Leadership of Iraq decided to resume working with the Special
Commission and the IAEA and to allow them to perform their normal duties
in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council
and on the basis of the principles which were agreed upon in the
Memorandum of Understanding signed with you on 23 February 1998.
We offer this chance not out of fear of the aggressive American campaign
and the threat to commit a new aggression against Iraq, but as an
expression of our feeling of responsibility, and in response to your
appeal and those of our friends. We affirm that the people of Iraq
would not relinquish their legitimate right in having the iniquitous
embargo lifted and to live normally like other nations of the world.
We will be looking forward to seeing the outcome of your efforts and the
review.
Excellency, we rightly believe that if the comprehensive review were
not to be a mere formality and to be free from the influences of
the tendentious purposes, the adoption of the points we conveyed
yesterday, 13/11/1998, to the Ambassadors of Russia, France and
China, a copy of which I enclose herewith, will render the review
serious, fair and fruitful.' It categorically does not say that
these 'points' must be adopted before inspectors are allowed to
resume their work.
We expect that you will continue with your efforts to lay down the basis
and the correct procedures for the review and so as to commence with as
soon as possible.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
(signed)
Tariq Aziz
Baghdad, 14 November 1998.
Text of Annex to Iraqi Letter
Filed at 2:30pm EST
by the Associated Press
Text of the annex attached to a letter from the Iraqi government
to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding agreement to allow
resumption of weapons inspections:
First, the goal sought by Iraq from its decisions of 5 August
and 31 October was not to sever the relationship with UNSCOM
and the IAEA and to cease the implementation of its obligations
under section C of SCRs 687 and 715.
Second, the objective of Iraq is to end the suffering of its
embargoed people and to see the implementation of paragraph (22)
of SCR 687 as a first step for lifting the other sanctions.
Third, Iraq expressed its readiness to engage in the comprehensive
review which had been proposed by the Secretary-General. But, as
a result of American pressure, the results brought about by the
consultations of the Council do not ensure an honest and objective
review with the aim of implementing paragraph (22).
Fourth, the position of Iraq on the comprehensive review is:
1. The comprehensive review be carried out within a very short time,
(seven days for example), after the resumption of UNSCOM and the
IAEA of their normal duties. This is to be without conditions
(like those mentioned formerly in regard to what is called the
confirmation of Iraq's cooperation).
2. The comprehensive review fundamentally concentrates on paragraph
(3) of the concept paper of the Secretary General of 5 October
(the three Iraqi questions of 3 August) and emphasizes the question
of evidence.
3. The Council be ready to implement paragraph (22) if the fulfilment
of the requirements of section C of SCR 687 is established.
4. If the Council sees, through an objective study, that there are
matters which need to be done, a short period be determined for their
completion. Until that completion is reached, the Council implements
measures for lifting or reducing sanctions in proportion to what has
been fulfilled of the requirements of paragraph (22). Thereafter, the
commencement with the implementation of paragraph (22) immediately upon
the completion of the required work.
5. The Council assures the legal interpretation of section C of SCR 687
and that none of its members should impose additional conditions or
restrictions on the implementation of paragraph (22).
Fifth, the second phase of the review commences after completing the
conclusions of the first phase.
Sixth, the second phase of the review only encompasses the obligations
determined by clear provisions of the resolutions and no matters be
raised contrary to the legal interpretation of the resolutions.
Seventh, the members of the Council and specially the permanent members
abide by international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council
in respect of all matters pertaining to Iraq.
Eighth, the question of Butler and the structure of UNSCOM and its
practices are important matters. The Council is to consider them
seriously in order to ensure a good relationship in the future.
We hope that this will be done as soon as possible.
Ninth, it is necessary that these assurances be communicated directly
to the leadership in Baghdad either by the Secretary-General or by a
delegation from the Council.
--
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