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[ This message has been sent to you via the CASI-analysis mailing list ] This is an automated compilation of submissions to newsclippings@casi.org.uk Articles for inclusion in this daily news mailing should be sent to newsclippings@casi.org.uk. Please include a full reference to the source of the article. Today's Topics: 1. Fwd: A New Course in Iraq (CharlieChimp1@aol.com) 2. Let's pretend it's a free and fair election (CharlieChimp1@aol.com) --__--__-- Message: 1 From: CharlieChimp1@DELETETHISaol.com Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 03:26:12 EST Subject: Fwd: A New Course in Iraq To: casi-analysis@lists.casi.org.uk [ Presenting plain-text part of multi-format email ] In a message dated 12/12/04 08:16:34 GMT Standard Time, kelebdooni@yahoo.c= om writes: By Erik Leaver | December 10, 2004 Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (_IRC_ (http://www.irc-online.org/) ) Foreign Policy In Focus As many members of Congress and President George W. Bush=E2=80=99s adminis= tration argue that it=E2=80=99s unacceptable to leave Iraq as a failed state, it b= ecomes clearer every day that U.S. operations and policies are fueling violence a= nd instability. It=E2=80=99s time for the government to directly confront the = question of how to fulfill U.S. obligations under international law, restore basic securit= y, and responsibly withdraw U.S. forces. Central to this point, Washington must not simply abandon the Iraqi people to the chaos it has created. But the U.S. needs to accept the fact that continued military occupation by the U.S. will only cause more casualties,= foster division in the country, and keep reconstruction from advancing. In the six months since the transition to Iraqi sovereignty officially got underway on June 28, 2004, the human cost of the U.S. occupation of that country has risen dramatically. U.S. military deaths have topped 1,200. A = study published in The Lancet has estimated that 100,000 Iraqis have died as a result of war and conditions under occupation. Norwegian researchers, the = United Nations, and the Iraqi government recently reported that malnutrition amon= g the youngest children in Iraq has nearly doubled since the U.S.-led invasi= on of that country. And soaring rates of disease and a crippled health system ar= e threatening to kill more than have died in the aftermath of the war. This dynamic is unlikely to change in the near term. The Bush administrati= on=E2=80=99 s stated two-pronged plan of staging elections and putting Iraqis in charg= e of their own security is clearly the right objective. But on the ground t= his is failing for a variety of reasons. Iraqi elections held under U.S. military occupation and under election rules written by the U.S will lack = legitimacy both inside and outside Iraq. Furthermore, the lack of UN election experts on the ground, coupled with continued fighting, and the fact that any poll= ing location guarded by U.S. troops will be a military target, means free and fair elections can=E2=80=99t take place as scheduled in January. Iraqis need to be in charge of their own security. But the Iraqi police an= d National Guard have largely failed to provide security for the Iraqi peopl= e and the situation appears to be only worsening. Iraq=E2=80=99s security fo= rces are fighting in a war that puts anyone who is physically near or associated wi= th the U.S. occupation at risk. At the same time, soldiers and police officer= s lack adequate training. One measure of the problem can be seen in their de= ath toll. Over 1,500 Iraqi security force recruits and 750 Iraqi police office= rs have been killed. Iraqi security forces can=E2=80=99t succeed as long as t= he U.S. is leading a war on the ground in Iraq. As Larry Diamond, who worked as a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority, has noted, =E2=80=9CThere are really no good option= s,=E2=80=9D at this point. But there are better options than the policies being currently pursued. Th= e following five steps would lessen the violence and insecurity in Iraq: 1) Decrease U.S. troops and end offensive operations: As a first step to withdrawal, the U.S. should declare an immediate cease-fire and reduce the number of troops deployed in Iraq. Instead, the Bush administration has do= ne the opposite, increasing the number of troops stationed there by 12,000. Increased offensive operations will only escalate the violence and make Ir= aq less secure and less safe. The U.S. should pull troops out of major cities so t= hat greater manpower can be directed to guarding the borders to stem the flow = of foreign fighters and money being used to fund the resistance. If Iraqi sec= urity forces need assistance maintaining order, they have the option of inviting in regional forces, as proposed by Saudi Arabia. They could also reinstate the former Iraqi army, which was well-trained, after purging upper-level S= addam supporters and providing additional counterinsurgency training to deal wit= h the current war. Once implemented, these measures would allow for total withdrawal of U.S. forces. 2) Declare that the U.S. has no intention to maintain a permanent or long-term military presence or bases in Iraq . Congress needs to make clea= r that it is committed to the principle of responsible withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq. By making this statement through a congressional resolution, th= e U.S. would openly acknowledge that it has no interest in controlling Middl= e Eastern oil or in suppressing Muslims, hence depriving insurgents of their central organizing message. Without such a resolution, Iraqis have little = reason to believe that our present actions are nothing greater than a plan to establish a long-term military presence in Iraq and make the occupation a = permanent feature of Iraqi life. 3) Do more to restore services: Moving control of reconstruction from the Defense Department to the State Department has been a positive step as it removes an agency designed to fight war from the much different task of na= tion building. But a much stronger statement to the Iraqi people would be to go= even further and give Iraqis direct authority over reconstruction funding. The U.S. government and its contractors have failed to restore public services= and public safety, strengthen institutions, or provide jobs. Meanwhile, billio= ns of appropriated dollars remain unspent. By giving Iraqis control over reconstruction funds more Iraqis will get jobs and projects will be better= targeted to the needs of Iraqis. And lowering the unemployment rate will weaken the potential for recruitment into the insurgency. 4) Postpone national elections and hold elections for provincial governments: Given that war is raging in most of Iraq=E2=80=99s Sunni regi= ons, prospects for free and fair elections in January are dim. Given the reality on the groun= d, the U.S. should call for a delay of national elections while helping Iraqi= s hold elections for local governments. Local governments should be given th= e power so far denied to Iraqis. They need budget oversight and dedicated fu= nding derived from the country's oil exports. Additionally, they need the author= ity to work with Iraqi ministries to assess local needs, decide which reconstruction efforts should get priority, and deliver services. They wou= ld also have an oversight role for expenditures. Once provincial elections are complete= d, illustrating that the U.S. is willing to cede power, and a guarantee that Sunnis will be included in the political process is in place, national ele= ctions will become more viable. 5) Impose conditions on U.S. spending for the Iraq War: To date the U.S. has spent $151 billion on the Iraq War. It=E2=80=99s important to support = the troops, but a recent exchange between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the troops illustrated the safety of the troops has not been Washington=E2=80= =99s primary concern. Congress should exercise its prerogative in shaping U.S. policy i= n Iraq by tying a forthcoming supplemental spending bill now rumored to be between $70-100 billion to the previous four points. At the same time, law= makers should put the brakes on the rampant war profiteering that has caused widespread waste, fraud, and abuse. To do this, the U.S. must stop awardin= g no-bid contracts and open-ended, =E2=80=9Ccost-plus,=E2=80=9D multi-billion dolla= r contracts such as those awarded to Halliburton and Bechtel and increase oversight over the military and its contractors. Finally, the U.S. should cancel previously a= warded contracts to companies whose workforces don=E2=80=99t have a majority of = Iraqis. The current U.S. approach in Iraq is too costly in human and financial ter= ms to Americans at home, our troops abroad, and to the very people this war w= as supposed to liberate. More importantly, it isn=E2=80=99t improving Iraq=E2= =80=99s stability or security. These five steps represent an ambitious new direction for the United States and for the Iraqi people. Erik Leaver is the policy outreach director for the Foreign Policy In Focu= s (_http://www.fpif.org/_ (http://www.fpif.org/) ) project at the Institute for Policy Studies (_http://www.ips-dc.org/_ (http://www.ips-dc.org/) ). He= 's one of the authors of a recently released IPS and FPIF report titled "A Fa= iled 'Transition': The Mounting Costs of the Iraq War." posted Saturday, 11 December 2004 _http://mparent7777.blog-city.com/read/954062.htm_ (http://mparent7777.blog-city.com/read/954062.htm) Comment: DomainKeys? See http://antispam.yahoo.com/domainkeys DomainKey-Signature: a=3Drsa-sha1; q=3Ddns; c=3Dnofws; s=3Ds1024; d=3Dyahoo.com; b=3DpvN5Ed489vpCSgGd07dKDNR68rkMyGE1gWazmmNDZcHX/HBt84gYvweG5khat+hnAFP= L77UOnkfJ1RdLKLkN7QziEhAflgb5v665LItUcr35FowC1b04xfVkHv3B/3AkczieYsS9Fj9/8P= jdebVoMXCypoWohf+FEI6RJeoNJ5g=3D ; To: anti-allawi-group@yahoogroups.com From: ahmed Al-Habbabi <kelebdooni@yahoo.com> Mailing-List: list anti-allawi-group@yahoogroups.com; contact anti-allawi-g= roup-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list anti-allawi-group@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 00:15:04 -0800 (PST) Subject: [anti-allawi-group] A New Course in Iraq Reply-To: anti-allawi-group@yahoogroups.com X-Plaintext: Presenting plain-text part of multi-format email [ Presenting plain-text part of multi-format email ] By Erik Leaver | December 10, 2004 Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) Foreign Policy In Focus As many members of Congress and President George W. Bush=92s administration= argue that it=92s unacceptable to leave Iraq as a failed state, it becomes= clearer every day that U.S. operations and policies are fueling violence a= nd instability. It=92s time for the government to directly confront the que= stion of how to fulfill U.S. obligations under international law, restore b= asic security, and responsibly withdraw U.S. forces. Central to this point, Washington must not simply abandon the Iraqi people = to the chaos it has created. But the U.S. needs to accept the fact that con= tinued military occupation by the U.S. will only cause more casualties, fos= ter division in the country, and keep reconstruction from advancing. In the six months since the transition to Iraqi sovereignty officially got = underway on June 28, 2004, the human cost of the U.S. occupation of that co= untry has risen dramatically. U.S. military deaths have topped 1,200. A stu= dy published in The Lancet has estimated that 100,000 Iraqis have died as a= result of war and conditions under occupation. Norwegian researchers, the = United Nations, and the Iraqi government recently reported that malnutritio= n among the youngest children in Iraq has nearly doubled since the U.S.-led= invasion of that country. And soaring rates of disease and a crippled heal= th system are threatening to kill more than have died in the aftermath of t= he war. This dynamic is unlikely to change in the near term. The Bush administratio= n=92s stated two-pronged plan of staging elections and putting Iraqis in ch= arge of their own security is clearly the right objective. But on the groun= d this is failing for a variety of reasons. Iraqi elections held under U.S.= military occupation and under election rules written by the U.S will lack = legitimacy both inside and outside Iraq. Furthermore, the lack of UN electi= on experts on the ground, coupled with continued fighting, and the fact tha= t any polling location guarded by U.S. troops will be a military target, me= ans free and fair elections can=92t take place as scheduled in January. Iraqis need to be in charge of their own security. But the Iraqi police and= National Guard have largely failed to provide security for the Iraqi peopl= e and the situation appears to be only worsening. Iraq=92s security forces = are fighting in a war that puts anyone who is physically near or associated= with the U.S. occupation at risk. At the same time, soldiers and police of= ficers lack adequate training. One measure of the problem can be seen in th= eir death toll. Over 1,500 Iraqi security force recruits and 750 Iraqi poli= ce officers have been killed. Iraqi security forces can=92t succeed as long= as the U.S. is leading a war on the ground in Iraq. As Larry Diamond, who worked as a senior adviser to the Coalition Provision= al Authority, has noted, =93There are really no good options,=94 at this po= int. But there are better options than the policies being currently pursued= . The following five steps would lessen the violence and insecurity in Iraq= : 1) Decrease U.S. troops and end offensive operations: As a first step to wi= thdrawal, the U.S. should declare an immediate cease-fire and reduce the nu= mber of troops deployed in Iraq. Instead, the Bush administration has done = the opposite, increasing the number of troops stationed there by 12,000. In= creased offensive operations will only escalate the violence and make Iraq = less secure and less safe. The U.S. should pull troops out of major cities = so that greater manpower can be directed to guarding the borders to stem th= e flow of foreign fighters and money being used to fund the resistance. If = Iraqi security forces need assistance maintaining order, they have the opti= on of inviting in regional forces, as proposed by Saudi Arabia. They could = also reinstate the former Iraqi army, which was well-trained, after purging= upper-level Saddam supporters and providing additional counterinsurgency t= raining to deal with the current war. Once implemented, these measures woul= d allow for total withdrawal of U.S. forces. 2) Declare that the U.S. has no intention to maintain a permanent or long-t= erm military presence or bases in Iraq . Congress needs to make clear that = it is committed to the principle of responsible withdrawal of all U.S. troo= ps from Iraq. By making this statement through a congressional resolution, = the U.S. would openly acknowledge that it has no interest in controlling Mi= ddle Eastern oil or in suppressing Muslims, hence depriving insurgents of t= heir central organizing message. Without such a resolution, Iraqis have lit= tle reason to believe that our present actions are nothing greater than a p= lan to establish a long-term military presence in Iraq and make the occupat= ion a permanent feature of Iraqi life. 3) Do more to restore services: Moving control of reconstruction from the D= efense Department to the State Department has been a positive step as it re= moves an agency designed to fight war from the much different task of natio= n building. But a much stronger statement to the Iraqi people would be to g= o even further and give Iraqis direct authority over reconstruction funding= . The U.S. government and its contractors have failed to restore public ser= vices and public safety, strengthen institutions, or provide jobs. Meanwhil= e, billions of appropriated dollars remain unspent. By giving Iraqis contro= l over reconstruction funds more Iraqis will get jobs and projects will be = better targeted to the needs of Iraqis. And lowering the unemployment rate = will weaken the potential for recruitment into the insurgency. 4) Postpone national elections and hold elections for provincial government= s: Given that war is raging in most of Iraq=92s Sunni regions, prospects fo= r free and fair elections in January are dim. Given the reality on the grou= nd, the U.S. should call for a delay of national elections while helping Ir= aqis hold elections for local governments. Local governments should be give= n the power so far denied to Iraqis. They need budget oversight and dedicat= ed funding derived from the country's oil exports. Additionally, they need = the authority to work with Iraqi ministries to assess local needs, decide w= hich reconstruction efforts should get priority, and deliver services. They= would also have an oversight role for expenditures. Once provincial electi= ons are completed, illustrating that the U.S. is willing to cede power, and= a guarantee that Sunnis will be included in the political process is in pl= ace, national elections will become more viable. 5) Impose conditions on U.S. spending for the Iraq War: To date the U.S. ha= s spent $151 billion on the Iraq War. It=92s important to support the troop= s, but a recent exchange between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and t= he troops illustrated the safety of the troops has not been Washington=92s = primary concern. Congress should exercise its prerogative in shaping U.S. p= olicy in Iraq by tying a forthcoming supplemental spending bill now rumored= to be between $70-100 billion to the previous four points. At the same tim= e, lawmakers should put the brakes on the rampant war profiteering that has= caused widespread waste, fraud, and abuse. To do this, the U.S. must stop = awarding no-bid contracts and open-ended, =93cost-plus,=94 multi-billion do= llar contracts such as those awarded to Halliburton and Bechtel and increas= e oversight over the military and its contractors. Finally, the U.S. should= cancel previously awarded contracts to companies whose workforces don=92t = have a majority of Iraqis. The current U.S. approach in Iraq is too costly in human and financial term= s to Americans at home, our troops abroad, and to the very people this war = was supposed to liberate. More importantly, it isn=92t improving Iraq=92s s= tability or security. These five steps represent an ambitious new direction= for the United States and for the Iraqi people. Erik Leaver is the policy outreach director for the Foreign Policy In Focus= (http://www.fpif.org/) project at the Institute for Policy Studies (http:/= /www.ips-dc.org/). He's one of the authors of a recently released IPS and F= PIF report titled "A Failed 'Transition': The Mounting Costs of the Iraq Wa= r." posted Saturday, 11 December 2004 http://mparent7777.blog-city.com/read/954062.htm --------------------------------- Do you Yahoo!? Meet the all-new My Yahoo! =96 Try it today! --__--__-- Message: 2 From: CharlieChimp1@DELETETHISaol.com Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 20:15:27 EST Subject: Let's pretend it's a free and fair election To: AlAwda@yahoogroups.com, newsclippings@casi.org.uk, Intelligentminds@yahoogroups.com [ Presenting plain-text part of multi-format email ] Controversial U.S. Groups Operate Behind Scenes on Iraq Vote Lisa Ashkenaz Croke and Brian Dominick, The NewStandard. Washington-funded organizations are hard at work providing assistance to political campaigns in the lead up to next month=E2=80=99s nationwide elec= tions, but critics suggest their participation is anything but benevolent. December 13, 2004 -- Even as the White House decries the ominous prospect = of Iranian influence on the upcoming Iraqi national elections, US-funded organizations with long records of manipulating foreign democracies in the direction of Washington's interests are quietly but deeply involved in ess= entially every aspect of the upcoming Iraqi elections. "As should be clear, the electoral process will be an Iraqi process conducted by Iraqis for Iraqis," declared United Nations special envoy, As= hraf Jehangir Qazi, in a September 14 statement to the Security Council. "It ca= nnot be anything else." But in actuality, influential, US-financed agencies describing themselves = as "pro-democracy" but viewed by critics as decidedly anti-democratic, have their hands all over Iraq's transitional process, from the formation of political parties to monitoring the January 30 nationwide polls and possib= ly conducting exit polls that could be used to evaluate the fairness of the ballot-casting. Two such groups -- the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) -- are part= of a consortium of non-governmental organizations to which the United States ha= s provided over $80 million for political and electoral activities in post-S= addam Iraq. Both groups publicly assert they are nonpartisan, but each has extremely close ties to its namesake American political party, and both are deeply p= artial to the perceived national interests of their home country, despite substantial involvement in the politics of numerous sovereign nations worl= dwide. NDI is headed by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, who took ove= r the chair from former president Jimmy Carter. Republican Senator John McCa= in chairs IRI. Both groups have highly controversial reputations and are described throughout much of the world as either helpful, meddlesome, or d= ownright subversive, depending on who you ask. In some places their work has earned praise from independent grassroots democracy advocates, but in many Third = World republics, both groups have been tied to alleged covert plans to install US-favored governments. The groups' separate but overlapping mandates in Iraq include educating Iraqis on the democratic process, training Iraqi organizations to monitor = the elections and deal with electoral conflicts, and providing impartial advic= e and training to political parties, according to the US Agency for Internationa= l Development (USAID), the official governmental organ funding the consortiu= m's operations in Iraq. USAID contracts with and provides grants to private organizations that uphold its objectives, which include, according to the = Agency's own literature, "furthering America's foreign policy interests in expandin= g democracy and free markets while improving the lives of citizens in the developing world." Far from the United Nations' mission to oversee the election process itsel= f, the American groups are actively engaged in cultivating political parties, and IRI appears to be working most heavily with parties and politicians favored by Washington. Critics have expressed alarm, if not surprise, that policies carried out i= n other countries over the past two decades appear to be repeating in occupi= ed Iraq. "USAID has learned that 'legitimat=C3=A8 leaders are not just found, they're made," wrote Herbert Docena, a research associate specializing in = Iraq at the Bangkok-based activist think tank, Focus on the Global South. "Before = the US withdraws from the scene, it first has to ensure that its Iraqis will k= now what to do." According to Docena, USAID's activity in Iraq, as carried out by non-governmental proxies, is drawn straight out of the Agency's handbook, = which advocates "capitalizing on national openings" and "[taking] advantage of national-level targets of opportunity" as they emerge, all while looking f= or a "strategic doorway" -- called an "entry point" -- that enables an Agency project to "anchor its program and optimize overall impact" in a target area. "In Iraq, the 'entry point' was the invasion," Docena explained. "The 'national opening' was the collapsed state left in its wake." In October, Reuters obtained documents from the US State Department suggesting that the parties benefiting from US support of the Iraqi politi= cal process would be limited to those considered by the US to be "democratic o= r moderate," and that the Department was spending $1 million on polling to d= etermine "which candidates and parties are attracting the most support from the Ira= qi people." According to the documents, Washington will provide "strategic advice, technical assistance, training, polling data, assistance, and other forms = of support" to "moderate, democratically oriented political parties." Such US-backed groups, including the Islamic Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI), which now dominate the 100-mem= ber National Council selected amid controversy last August, participated in a = series of six "training conferences" hosted by IRI this June. According to IRI's website, the prominent parties were joined at the training by dozens of small and medium-sized organizations. "Topics ranged= from candidate leadership skills to platform development," reads the group's re= port, "thus offering emerging Iraqi civic and political organizations a chance t= o learn a full array of successful campaign techniques. Results were promisi= ng -- participants expressed great enthusiasm during the proceedings and many actively pursued closer working relationships with the Institute." Representatives of IRI would not speak with TNS on the record, but the group's website page on Iraq -- which does not appear to have been updated= since early summer -- suggests IRI was involved in organizing last August's Nati= onal Conference, purportedly held to elect an interim assembly that would overs= ee Iraq's current interim government. That event was widely viewed as a calamity, not least because no vote ever took place. IRI would not comment= on its involvement in the Conference or even evaluate its success on the record. Other IRI programs have employed a "top-down approach," the group's websit= e states, providing instruction specifically for Iraq's interim governing bodies, from the original Governing Council to the present administration.= Such a policy would appear to offer those already in power, mostly US-backed parties, a disproportionate share of IRI's resources and a precedent of in= volvement not shared with Iraq's fledgling opposition parties. IRI's relationship with parties dominating Iraq's interim government begs the question of how much influence the American group has had in determini= ng the makeup of current coalitions being formed to vie for the 275-seat Nati= onal Assembly come January 30, which will in turn select a new government and write Iraq's permanent constitution. Unlike its counterpart, NDI spoke at length with The NewStandard. Insistin= g that NDI's advice does not favor any of Iraq's numerous political parties over any others, Les Campbell, the organization's regional director for th= e Middle East and Africa, said, "We work with all the parties, including the = big and well-known ones, but we actually =E2=80=A6 spend special efforts to fin= d, for example, Sunni parties -- ones that might represent the Sunni population." Campbell estimated that NDI's contributions are probably disproportionatel= y helpful to the more obscure, less experienced Iraqi parties -- the ones th= at need assistance at nearly every level. "We have spent special effort tryin= g to find people and parties that might reflect the views of the urban, sort= of secular intellectuals," Campbell said, "because we think that they are disadvantaged." Nevertheless, Campbell was careful to point out that NDI officially has no interest in the outcome of the Iraqi elections. "I have no idea, and nor d= o we ever really worry about whether or not our assistance has any affect on th= e [elections'] outcome," he said. "We're not even slightly outcome-oriented.= " Both NDI and IRI say they are maintaining low profiles in Iraq primarily f= or the security of their staff and the Iraqis to whom they provide political assistance. But Campbell said there are other reasons, at least for NDI, t= hat they do not stand out as a defining feature of the transition to democracy= in Iraq. "We're not an organization that generally seeks credit," Campbell insisted. "We always perceive ourselves to be standing behind and supporti= ng people. We're not trying to lead the parade anywhere; and we're certainly = not trying to lead the parade in Iraq." Critics of the work carried out elsewhere by NDI and IRI are concerned tha= t the groups' low profiles in Iraq are not driven just by security or institutional modesty. Professor and author William I. Robinson of the Glo= bal and International Studies Program at the University of California, Santa Barba= ra calls groups like NDI and IRI "extensions" of the US State Department. Robinson agrees with Campbell that groups like NDI are in danger in Iraq t= o the extent they are identified with the United States government. But according to Robinson, who has researched and written extensively on US fo= reign political and economic policies, the perception of an alignment between th= e US government and private organizations it funds is well deserved. "I suspect that [NDI and IRI] are =E2=80=A6 trying to select individual le= aders and organizations that are going to be very amenable to the US transnational project for Iraq," Robinson said. He described those actors as willing to = engage in "pacifying the country militarily and legitimating the occupation and t= he formal electoral system." Robinson added that developing relationships wit= h "economic, political and civic groups that are going to be favorable to Ir= aq's integration into the global capitalist economy" would prove even more important for US-based organizations in the long run. This would include, Robinson said, altering Iraq's political and economic infrastructure to be more open to international trade and investment, as w= ell as more favorable to global financial lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Robinson sees the Middle E= ast as one of the few viable areas of the world yet to be drawn into the US's sph= ere of economic influence, and concludes that, more than a way to exploit oil,= the US-led invasion and occupation serve as potential doorways into broader, more advantageous economic engagement in the region. NDI and IRI are two out of four core organizations of the National Endowme= nt for Democracy (NED), a self-described "nonprofit, non-governmental, bipartisan, grant-making organization" the stated purpose of which is "to = help strengthen democratic institutions around the world." Created during Ronal= d Reagan's first term as president to enhance overseas political influence w= eakened by Jimmy Carter's 1977 ban on CIA democracy front groups, NED's reputation as= a promoter of democracy never truly thrived outside the United States. The organization and its affiliates regularly encounter allegations that they have supported opposition candidates and promoted subversive movement= s in countries where governments -- some democratically elected -- are seen as threatening to US interests. According to Campbell of NDI, both his group and its Republican counterpar= t originally became involved with political party formation and civil societ= y efforts in Iraq shortly after the Spring 2003 invasion, using NED funds wh= ile getting their feet wet. By the next winter, administrators at the US-run Coalition Provisional Authority, along with others at the State Department= and the National Security Council, began showing interest, Campbell explained. Then, in early 2004, the US government allocated $25 million to the NED to= spread among its affiliate groups. Finally, in preparation for the 2005 vote, USA= ID gave more than $80 million to NDI, IRI and others involved in the consorti= um set up to provide technical and political assistance to the electoral process. In Robinson's view, ulterior motives of US groups aside, the idea that Western advisors can help democratize a society like Iraq also appears shortsighted. In reference to NDI's stated practice of providing advice to= politically vulnerable groups, Robinson said: "It's not at all clear that Iraqi women = need the advice of people from the US telling them how to organize -- or that students do, or so forth. And it's not clear what value that advice could possibly have, other than trying to create a political bloc inside the cou= ntry which will conform to the larger US vision for Iraq." Robinson also says that US-based organizations, serving as private proxies for the government, will back numerous political parties in Iraq, just as = IRI and NDI say they do; but Robinson says there will be stricter limits on th= at assistance than such organizations would lead the public to believe. "It wouldn't be that the US would put its eggs behind one party, but [rather] = a number of parties within a political spectrum -- representing different constituencies, but all within boundaries. "What remains outside of those boundaries," Robinson continued, "is an alternative vision for Iraq -- a completely different vision which might w= ell be the vision a majority of Iraqis would have." Right wing critics have also questioned the record of National Endowment f= or Democracy and its affiliate organizations. In an analysis written for the conservative libertarian CATO Institute, Barbara Conry wrote that the NED'= s "mischief overseas" has amounted to US taxpayers funding "special-interest groups to harass the duly elected governments of friendly countries, inter= fere in foreign elections, and foster the corruption of democratic movements." Last year, Representative Ron Paul (R-Texas) took aim at the Endowment -- particularly the roles of NDI and IRI -- writing that the purposes for whi= ch both organizations are utilized elsewhere in the world "would be rightly illegal in the United States. The apparently impromptu public protest in the Ukraine following the now-rescinded win by Russia's favored candidate, Victor Yanukovich, is bel= ieved to have been at least partly orchestrated by the National Endowment for Democracy. According to reports in The Guardian, both NDI and IRI were inv= olved in developing extremely active popular campaigns in support of Victor Yushche= nko, the opposition candidate favored in the West whose defeat was immediately followed by condemnations of vote fraud in the US, by both the State Depar= tment and the mass media. Further, the Associated Press reported on December 10 that the Bush Administration spent $65 million over the past two years to support opposi= tion candidates in Ukraine. Other recent examples of NED-affiliated groups meddling in the affairs of sovereign nations include political upheavals in both Venezuela and Haiti. An article in the current edition of Mother Jones specifically ties IRI to the 2002 armed coup that briefly removed populist President Hugo Chavez fr= om power in Venezuela. According to Mother Jones, IRI was also involved in sponsoring parties that led to last January's violent uprising against democratically elected Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which its= elf culminated in Aristide's exile and the dissolution of his government on February 29. Haiti is currently ruled by the county's chief Supreme Court Justice, who replaced Aristide. Haiti currently has no functioning parliament and new e= lections have yet to be held. One of the mechanisms US-backed groups typically use to challenge unfavorable election results is exit polls and other tracking methods, whi= ch almost invariably show Washington's preferred candidates to have edged out their opponents. It is unclear whether IRI will engage in any exit polling or ot= her verification methods on January 30, but Campbell said NDI will not, citing "security and logistical" concerns that would render such activity impossi= ble. There remains more to learn and report about the activities of these and other US-based non-governmental organizations in Iraq and the relations be= tween the US State Department and various Iraqi political actors. The NewStandar= d has filed a Freedom of Information Act request for documents pertaining to= the involvement of US-based organizations in Iraq's upcoming elections. Regardless of how the January 30, 2005 elections turn out, US-backed nongovernmental organizations are likely to be involved in Iraq well into = the future. "We're digging in for the long haul," said Campbell. "I would full= y anticipate NDI being in Iraq five years from now or ten years from now." =C2=A9 2004 The NewStandard. 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