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[casi-analysis] casi-news digest, Vol 1 #82 - 4 msgs

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   1. =?windows-1252?Q?on_uruknet=2Einfo=3A_Indians_claim_they?=
       =?windows-1252?Q?s?= (
   2. when did you last visit (


Message: 1
Date: Tue, 04 May 2004 13:20:26 +0200
From: "" <>
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject: =?windows-1252?Q?on_uruknet=2Einfo=3A_Indians_claim_they?=

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>         Indians claim they were abused in Iraq=92s US military camps
>         Kaleej Times (DPA)
> NEW DELHI - A group of 20 Indians who ran away from a United States
> military camp in Iraq, where they worked in the kitchen, claim they
> were abused for nine months, it was reported on Tuesday.
> The men from southern Kerala state paid 75,000 rupees (1,700 US
> dollars) each for visas to Kuwait last August. They were cheated by
> employment agents and landed in Baghdad.
> One man, Hameed, said they were taken to a US military camp in Mosul
> where they were told that they had been bought to work in the kitchen,
> the Hindustan Times newspaper reported.
> =93We were slaves in the American kitchens. We barely got two hours of
> sleep. Any slip-ups and we were tortured for days,=94 Hameed said.
> While Hameed alleged they were often used as shields when Iraqi
> militia attacked their camp, his brother Shahjahan said they were
> forced to cook pork despite being Muslim.
> The men said they were not allowed to call or write home, but were
> told 12,000 rupees (268 US dollars) would be sent to India every
> month. They got their chance to escape when their camp was attacked at
> the end of April. An Iraqi truck driver took them to Baghdad from
> where they travelled to Fallujah, Jordan, Doha, finally arriving in
> Bombay on April 28.
> In a separate incident, two Indians died and another was injured in an
> attack on a US base, where they were working as security guards, the
> Indian Express newspaper reported.
> The Indian government has expressed concern about the estimated 1,500
> Indian ex-servicemen who were sent to Iraq through private security
> agencies, and is considering a law to regulate the agencies.
> External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha has said the government would
> probe how these men were sent to Iraq, despite a ban on people going
> to Iraq .
> <
> :: notizia n. 2372 postata il 04-may-2004 13:04 ECT

courtesy of: <>: a site gathering daily
information concerning occupied Iraq: news, analysis, documents and
texts of iraqi resistance available in Italian and English.
Any link will be greatly appreciated: you can get our banner or link
coordinates from our homepage. Please let us know about new links, so
that we can recall them in our link-page. <>: finalmente, un sito dove
trovare informazione aggiornata sull'iraq occupato: notizie, analisi,
documenti e testi sulla resistenza in italiano e in inglese, aggiornate
ogni giorno.
Un grazie fin d'ora per ogni link al ns. sito: potrete scaricare il
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Message: 2
Date: Tue, 04 May 2004 22:57:58 +0200
From: "" <>
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject: when did you last visit

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        Dear comrades, dear readers...

        Abu Nicola al Yunani (Free Arab Voice)

This message was prompted by messages by Baath Simpson and Hazem Biqaen,
who have, respectively, asked for information and offered their opinions
on the current situation in Iraq in general and al Fallujah in particular.
I wrote this message yesterday, but for technical reasons have not been
able to post it. It is interesting that in the 1 day that passed, new
evidence is coming in to support the positions elaborated herein.

On Al Fallujah and Jassem Mohamed Salah

I would submit that few people outside Fallujah (and a few American
high-ranking officials) know what Jassem Muhammad Salah intends to do.

But his intentions count for little, actually. Under the appropriate
circumstances, individuals can influence the course of history. But when
bigger historic forces are in motions, individuals are forced - often
against their will - to act in accordance with those forces

 > I have a question about that general who should control al Faludja:
 > Jassem Mohamed Salah. I heard via TV he wa general of the republican
 > guard. But how US can accept him?

The question is, did they have a choice?

When US troops entered Baghdad little more than a year ago, they were
under the delusion that they had won the war (in fact, the real war had
NOT been waged, and they only "won" due to the defection of a group of
people in the Iraqi leadership - the actual war was lying ahead of them,
not behind them). Acting arrogantly under the influence of this
delusion, they dissolved the army and security services, and fired all
baathists from state positions. At that time, placing a former
republican guard general in charge of a city would have been unthinkable.

Only a calendar year has passed since then - but in the political sense
this year is equivalent to ages.

Nowadays, the resistance has driven some sense into the empty heads of
even the most arrogant and stupid neocons. They are no longer in a
position to choose.

Could they have acted more intelligently a year ago?

I believe yes. Hitler, to name just one case, was much more intelligent.
He knew he would need whatever local help he could get. He placed
general Petain (the hero of WWI) in charge of France. In Greece, the
general Tsolakoglou, who had led the army corps that resisted the
invasion by Italian and later German troops, was placed at the head of
the occupation government. In both cases, the people selected had proven
their ability, and had (initially) some prestige in the occupied
country. Even in the zionist state, we see that some of the less idiotic
rulers have chosen to use people like Arafat and Rajoub to control the
Palestinians - people, once again, who had proven ability and enjoyed
prestige. In the case of Iraq, it would have been much more intelligent
to use the old security services and army, gradually purging them from
patriotic elements, and in combination with new puppet forces of
informers etc. One would assume that the British, who are more subtle,
experienced and intelligent, would have acted thus if they had a choice.
But well-trained dogs don't raise objections against their masters, and
Blair was not in a position to influence the neo-cons, of course.

Would the situation be significantly better for the U.S. if they had
acted differently from the beginning?

Hitler was more intelligent than Bush, but he too was defeated in the
end. Even a genious can not do in an intelligent way something that is
inherently stupid. If the occupiers of Iraq had acted more prudently,
they might have won a couple of months, but I doubt if it would be more.
They would, of course, have been faced with another set of problems in
that case (those arising from the inevitable infiltration of the
resistance into "their" Iraqi forces). Anyway, their half-hearted
attempt to use the Baath NOW is "too little, too late".

 > Is he one of the traitors.
 > It woud be very useful if you could tell me about that general.

I doubt any personal information would be of any use. There are at least
three possible explanations for this "deal", when viewed from a vantage
point that concentrates on general Salah:

a) That the general would like to be a collaborator, to control al

b) That the general would like to play his own game, BETWEEN the
Americans and the resistance, balancing each against the other.

c) That the general is acting in the name of, and for the interests of,
the resistance, and that the Americans have in essence recognised their
defeat, only attempting to paint it as a victory.

Let's examine each case in turn:

*** Case A:

If this is the case, then Jassem Mohamed Salah must be a very stupid
man, indeed. It is evident to everyone, even people without military
training and without direct experience of the Fallujah situation, that
the strongest party there is the resistance. Even the puppet "governing
council" members are beginning to squirm and to display an image of
independence from the US. Ditto for the members of the puppet "Iraqi
Army" and security forces. If a general who lives in Fallujah is
suicidal enough to try to impose American rule, let him try. The
resistance will use him for dog food.

However, there are additional indications that this is not the case.
 >From the news dispatches of the previous 4 days, a split between
American decision-makers in Baghdad and Washington was evident. The
generals in place arrived at the "solution", and began evacuating the
marines from al Fallujah, while Rumsfeld and others in Washington were
declaring that "no deal has been struck, discussions are ongoing, and
there is just a POSSIBILITY of a deal - otherwise we will strike and
re-occupy al Fallujah". If the deal was what the US are trying to
present it for: an Iraqi traitor ready to (attempt to) pacify al
Fallujah on behalf of the US, I can hardly see why the government would
object to it.

*** Case B:

Again, it would take a very stupid general to try and do this under the
present circumstances. Balancing two opposing forces against each other
and attaining power in this way is a very delicate game. Under the best
circumstances, it can be successful, even for an extended time period.
But there are preconditions to the success of such a game,the first of
which is that both real powers must be too weak to win the game on their
own. Otherwise, the dictator is not needed, and can be shoved aside.

This is not how things are in al Fallujah. If the "1500 terrorists"
inside Fallujah were feeling unable to defeat the occupation forces, If
they had grown tired by the siege and were terrified by the enemy
"superior firepower", they would have accepted the previous "deal", and
surrendered at least some of their weapons. Instead, the only weapons
they reportedly surrendered were WW1-vintage.

If the deal involves an attempt by the general to gradually disarm the
resistance, he will inevitably come into conflict with it. With the
Americans having decided NOT to fight any longer in al Fallujah, he will
either have to surrender, and "govern" according to the dictates of the
resistance, or to be shoved aside and cede his place to genuine
resistance figures.

*** Case C:

In this case, the general is representing the resistance. The "deal" to
leave him in control of al Fallujah then means that the US admitted
defeat and left the city.

Whatever the case, the end result is more or less the same: The US have
been defeated in al Fallujah, which is now liberated and under the
control of the resistance. Whether the general will represent the
resistance, oppose it or defer to its power will have little importance.

On the US decision to re-hire baathists, and on the perspectives of the
future Iraqi state

Let us examine the possibilities for the post-occupation Iraq, beginning
with the best for the US and ending with the worst. This will give us an
indication for the meaning of the offer to baathists to become
collaborators (by using this word I do not mean, of course, that a
baathist teacher returning to his work will by this token become a
collaborator - but the INTENTION of the US in extending this offer was
obviously to gain collaborators, not to improve the efficiency of public

A) Civil war.
This WOULD be the best possible option for the US. They are actively
working toward this direction, of course. Among others, the
provocatorial bombings of Karbala and Baghdad, as well as the later
attack in al Basrah, must be seen within this framework, as are the
attempts to help Kurdish separatism.

These efforts have little chances to succeed. The Shi'a and Sunni
populations, with every passing day, are more united in the resistance.
As for the Kurds, with the generals of Ankara threatening to intervene,
Iran and Syria equally hostile, and their morale broken after the defeat
of their masters, I doubt they will dare try anything - and if they do,
they will be crushed. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the US
will try to play the "Kurdish paper", and we should have our eyes open
in this respect (for example, we should always be alert regarding the
power struggle between the nationalist generals and the US-oriented
government of Turkey.)

B) A relatively stable puppet government, under a "constitution" written
under the auspices of the US, and with possible UN involvement.

I never believed this to be a viable option. Nowadays, it is obvious it
only exists in the realm of fantasy.

C) A relatively compliant, genuinely Iraqi government, like the ones of
other Arab states.

This, among the realistic options, is the best possible outcome for the
US. It would need to be based on elements and political groups that have
NOT discredited themselves by openly cooperating with the US. A defanged
Baath party, purged of the most radical elements within it, seems to be
about the only credible candidate for this solution - hence the attempts
from the US side to "open bridges" to it. The new power should appear to
be based on popular resistance forces, but act against their wishes and
interests - Something along the lines of the PA, for example. In order
to have a chance to succeed, however, the overtures should come at the
last possible moment, in order to avoid discrediting the "Iraq=EC party to
the deal. The fact that the overtures are now openly declared indicates
one of two things: Either that Americans understand that the end
approaches fast, and are preparing for a quick exit (perhaps coincident
or following quickly the "pasing of sovereignty"?) - or that, as usual,
they are acting stupidly and undermining their own future in Iraq.

D) A genuinely nationalist authoritarian Iraqi government resembling the
past "Saddam regime".

One year ago, this option would look like a nightmare for the U.S.
Nowadays, it seems a possible outcome of the current struggle. Again,
the Baath (or a clone thereof) is the most plausible candidate for such
a role.

E) A nationalist government based on institutions of popular power.

THIS is the American's worst nightmare - and not only theirs. In this
case, Iraq will indeed prove to be, to use the neo-cons' vocabulary, "a
genuine democracy, a model for the entire Middle-East". Of course, by
"institutions of popular power" I mean something more than western-style
governments elected once every four or five years, and governing against
the will and interests of their peoples in between. I genuinely doubt
that the victorious Iraqi people, after having defeated the world's only
superpower, will be ready to step aside and cede the right to speak in
its name and govern it to one or more political parties. What is needed,
and highly likely, is a state where all powers - executive, legislative,
judicial, as well as the so-called "fourth power" of the press - will
have to emanate from the people in deed, not just in words. It is to
have state power increasingly exercised by organisations where the
people will actively participate. There is a need for popular militias
to patrol the cities and be charged with defense. Officials at all
levels (including military officers) must be elected and subject to
recall at any time by the electors. These officials should be
remunerated with salaries consistent with the salaries of working people
in Iraq, not with the $340000/month of Ahmad Chalabi - this would, more
than anything else, guarantee that the government would be (to use
american terminology) "of the people and for the people".

Iraq before the occupation had a government with pretty good nationalist
credentials. But the course of the war proved that more than that was
needed. In the last Iraqi state, a gulf larger than the Arabian
separated the people from power. Power was exercised in the name of the
people, supposedly in its interests - but it was far from being
exercised BY the people. At the decisive moment, this proved to be the
Achilles' heel of the regime. A few men in positions of power were able
to betray the country, and cause the state to collapse with hardly a
shot (and this AFTER it had become obvious that it was possible for the
resistance to be victorious). In general, whenever a stratum of people
exercises power outside popular control, this stratum inevitably begins
to look at its own interests. The Iraqi people can NOT afford to build
anew a state where power will rest in few hands, where people in high
places can betray the country for personal profit.

The precursors of such a state already exist in liberated Fallujah as
well as in quasi-occupied Baghdad. As the revolution develops further,
they will gain strength. It should be our aim to struggle for the
realisation of this perspective.

Abu Nicola al Yunani <>

------------------------------------------------------------------------ <>: a site gathering daily
information concerning occupied Iraq: news, analysis, documents and
texts of iraqi resistance available in Italian and English.
Any link will be greatly appreciated: you can get our banner or link
coordinates from our homepage. Please let us know about new links, so
that we can recall them in our link-page. <>: finalmente, un sito dove
trovare informazione aggiornata sull'iraq occupato: notizie, analisi,
documenti e testi sulla resistenza in italiano e in inglese, aggiornate
ogni giorno.
Un grazie fin d'ora per ogni link al ns. sito: potrete scaricare il
banner e trovare le coordinate sulla testata della ns. homepage.
Informateci di ogni nuovo link, in modo da poter contraccambiare e
segnalarlo. grazie!

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