The following is an archived copy of a message sent to the CASI Analysis List run by Cambridge Solidarity with Iraq.
Views expressed in this archived message are those of the author, not of Cambridge Solidarity with Iraq (CASI).
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[ This message has been sent to you via the CASI-analysis mailing list ] Dear all The present dispute as to whether, prior to the emergence of a democratically elected government, Iraq should be ruled by technocrats or by a body in which the different peoples are represented proportionately seems to me to miss the main point - that whatever happens it WON'T be a sovereign government. It won't have control over security or over economic policy. And it will only advance to a democratically elected government if the problem of Kurdish autonomy is sorted out. And no-one yet has a solution for that (I certainly don't. But I do think, with Sistani, that the democratically elected government should come first, before agreement on a final constitution). Even when and if something that could be called a democratic government emerges it is still highly questionable if it will be able to regain control over its own security or economy. Debt and reparations will be enough to keep it in tutelage for the foreseeable future - which is why Justin Alexander's Jubilee Iraq is such a good idea. I wasn't able to go along with it because of the anti-Saddam rhetoric but the issue of the debt is nonetheless fundamental, and relates to what ought to be 'our' issue: the historical effect of sanctions. The world ought to be compensating Iraq for the effect of sanctions. It is difficult to see how Iraq could restore sovereignty without taking a 'revolutionary' path, whether revolutionary nationalist or revolutionary Islamist, Shi'i or Sunni ie repudiating the debt and thus putting itself outside the framework of 'international law'. That is of course a nightmare scenario (think Myanmar and North Korea) but it is the only logical implication of the rhetoric and actions of Moqtada al-Sadr or indeed of Jabbar al-Kubaysi, whom I take to be representative of the nationalist side of the equation. In any case I continue to believe that the 'handover of power' on June 30 should be rejected - the 'international community' should refuse to recognise it as an end to the occupation. The legal status of occupation should continue until such a time as there is a democratically elected and truly sovereign government with the power, whether they choose to exercise it or not, to close US bases, instruct the US to leave the country and bring essential industries under public control. Best Peter www.politicsandtheology.co.uk _______________________________________ Sent via the CASI-analysis mailing list To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-analysis All postings are archived on CASI's website at http://www.casi.org.uk