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[ This message has been sent to you via the CASI-analysis mailing list ] On 7 April, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on "A Review of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program" (OFF). (1) The context was alleged OFF-related corruption. Among the witnesses was US Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador John Negroponte. Below is selective analysis, and later urls and select excerpts. Negroponte's statements should be placed in the context of US/UK officials in the post-invasion period aggressively distorting the history of economic sanctions (hereafter "sanctions") on Iraq. This history included the US/UK role in maintaining sanctions in the face of the credibly, overwhelmingly documented primary role that sanctions had played in Iraq's humanitarian crisis. Comments on the oil pricing dimension are welcome. In both his oral and written statement, Negroponte 1. Misidentified OFF as a "humanitarian relief operation". As the CASI "Guide to Sanctions" (prepared prior to the end to sanctions) states, [begin] The 'oil for food' programme, which commenced in December 1996, allows Iraq to export oil and use part of the money raised, which is kept in a UN bank account, to buy basic goods from other countries. Iraq is using its own money to buy these goods: the 'oil for food' programme is not "humanitarian aid" as some US and UK politicians have claimed on occasion. [end] (2) 2. Clearly stated that the ostensible US priority (especially on the 661 Committee) to "ensure that no items be permitted for import which could in any way contribute to Iraq's WMD programs or capabilities" was "an even greater goal/priority" than "the flow of humanitarian and civilian goods to Iraq". In his written statement, Negroponte 1. Deemphasized the impact of sanctions on Iraqi civilians by stating that the sanctions "were thought by many in the international community to impose extreme hardships on the Iraqi people", rather than e.g. sanctions "did impose extreme hardships on the Iraqi people". In his next sentence however he acknowledged that the hardships were real rather than perceptions, stating "The Oil-for-Food program was created to relieve those hardships." 2. Attempted to de-legitimize Security Council member arguments regarding "the humanitarian impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people". He did so by stating that the members "complained" and that their "national firms would derive economic benefit from the lifting of sanctions". It is certainly true that Chinese, French and Russian (especially French and Russian) firms stood to potentially gain financially, as would US firms (although the former GoI didn't give US firms the same preference (and indeed reduced business with them as compared to the pre-sanctions era) as non-US firms, during the sanctions period US firms (notably Halliburton) still did business with the GoI), although perhaps to a less extent (at least short-term). Moreover, the China, France, and Russia's unwillingness to use all of their clout inside/outside the Security Council to adequately challenge the US over the humanitarian consequences of sanctions made it clear that Iraqi civilians were not those three countries' bottom line. Nevertheless, by including the commercial angle as he does in the same sentence as a reference to arguments regarding "the humanitarian impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people", Negroponte seems to suggest that the humanitarian arguments in and of themselves were baseless, and were created to cover commercial interests. In his oral statement, Negroponte 1. Acknowledged that in and of themselves "comprehensive, multilateral sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council on Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990" "caused hardships" for "the Iraqi people", although he blamed the consequences of Security Council policy on "Saddam Hussein's regime's refusal to comply with its obligations" and omitted reference to Security Council responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of its policy. 2. Claimed that the OFF "system" as devised by the Security Council "largely met" the "objective" "to address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi civilian population while maintaining strict sanctions enforcement on items that Saddam Hussein could use to re-arm or reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction program." One might argue that Negroponte is technically accurate about addressing humanitarian needs, for he makes no claims that OFF "adequately"/"sufficiently" etc. addressed "humanitarian needs". Narrowly speaking, OFF did "address" "humanitarian needs". It would be very easy to interpret his statement though to mean that the OFF system, if properly implemented by the former GoI, would have allowed a normal humanitarian situation and prevented non-conventional military development. In this interpretation, unmet "humanitarian needs" stemmed exclusively from former GoI implementation of the "system", rather than inherently from the system itself, compounded by elements of former GoI implementation/non-implementation. Negroponte's audience was Congressional, and less informed than an audience familiar with the full context/details of the Gulf War damage to Iraq's infrastructure, the resulting public health crisis, sanctions and sanctions' impact on Iraq's economy/civilian population. That Congressional audience seemed likely to take from his remarks that the OFF system was adequate to fully meet "humanitarian needs". 1. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearing, "A Review of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program", 7 April 2004, http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2004/hrg040407a.html 2. Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (CASI), "What is 'oil for food' and isn't it enough?", in Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (CASI), "Guide to Sanctions", http://www.casi.org.uk/guide/off.html Source: US Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador John Negroponte, written statement to US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 April 2004, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/NegroponteTestimony040407.pdf * The below excerpts from Negroponte's written statement are transcribed, and are not a replacement for the original. For quotation, use the original. Excerpts [begin] Sanctions on Iraq continued after the Gulf War and were thought by many in the international community to impose extreme hardships on the Iraqi people. The Oil-for-Food program was created to relieve those hardships. [end] (pg. 1-2) [begin] Although the flow of humanitarian and civilian goods to Iraq was a matter of strong interest to the U.S. government, is should be emphasized that an even greater preoccupation throughout the period of sanctions was to ensure that no items be permitted for import which could in any way contribute to Iraq's WMD programs or capabilities. Thus, at USUN we concentrated our efforts on this aspect of the sanctions. [end] (pg. 2) [begin] U.S efforts to keep the comprehensive sanctions regime in place repeatedly were challenged by Council members who complained about the humanitarian impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people, and whose national firms would derive economic benefit from the lifting of sanctions. [end] (pg. 3) Source: US Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador John Negroponte, oral statement to US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 7 April 2004, http://www.un.int/usa/04_047.htm Excerpts [begin] The Oil-for-Food program, as you indicated, was created to alleviate the hardships faced by the Iraqi people, hardships caused by Saddam Hussein's regime's refusal to comply with its obligations and the resulting comprehensive, multilateral sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council on Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990. The Oil-for-Food Program allowed for the import of humanitarian goods using the proceeds from authorized Iraqi oil sales while maintaining sanctions on imports other than food and medicine. It represented the largest humanitarian relief operation ever launched by the international community. [end] [begin] The United States supported the program's general objective of creating a system to address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi civilian population while maintaining strict sanctions enforcement on items that Saddam Hussein could use to re-arm or reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction program. We believe the system the Council devised largely met those objectives. [end] [begin] Although the flow of humanitarian and civilian goods to Iraq was a matter of strong interest to the United States government, an even greater goal throughout the period of sanctions was to ensure that no items were imported, which could in any way contribute to Iraq’s WMD programs or capabilities. At the United States Mission to the United Nations we concentrated our efforts on this aspect of the sanctions. [end] Nathaniel Hurd Consultant on Iraq policy Tel. (Mobile): 917-407-3389 Fax: 718-504-4224 E-mail: nathaniel_hurd@hotmail.com 777 1st Avenue (E. 44th St./1st Ave.) Suite 7A New York, NY 10017 _________________________________________________________________ MSN Toolbar provides one-click access to Hotmail from any Web page – FREE download! http://toolbar.msn.com/go/onm00200413ave/direct/01/ _______________________________________ Sent via the CASI-analysis mailing list To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-analysis All postings are archived on CASI's website at http://www.casi.org.uk