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RE: [casi-analysis] A question for the experts at CASI



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> Hello, all. I am currently reading Richard Perle and David
> Frum's book, "An End to Evil," planning to review it (Frum is
> the guy who put the "axis of evil" line in Bush's 2002 State
> of the Union speech). ... So here are my questions:

Thank you Rahul.  I've put your questions to an insider, who answers as
follows:

<begin>
I interpret Perle and Frum's figures in the same way that Rahul does: they
added the uncommitted funds and the pipeline, and - hey presto!  The
majority of the uncommitted funds would have been funds not allocated to the
agencies and oil
spares and special allocation.  This sum also included the 2.2% account (UN
admin costs) and the interest payments.

The $6 billion shortfall was because the OIP decided to carry on approving
contracts for which there was no money.  It was an unreal situation - the
money was not there to start with.  There was no available revenue at the
time to fund 59% accounts for the South/Centre.  There was $13 billion in
the bank but the pipeline was being held against deliveries: as soon as they
reached Iraq/ met the authentication requirements they would be paid.  The
remaining funds could not be spent on 59% account goods.  Afterwards, of
course, the goalposts changed and the 13% and 59% accounts were lumped
together.  The implication that the UN was just sitting on that amount of
money is [untrue], to put it succinctly.

There is no means of double-checking: the UN's Office of the Iraq Programme
has been air-brushed into history, making comparison very difficult. <end>

Best,

Colin Rowat

work | Room 406, Department of Economics | The University of Birmingham |
Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK | web.bham.ac.uk/c.rowat | ( 44/0) 121 414 3754 |
(+44/0) 121 414 7377 (fax) | c.rowat@bham.ac.uk

personal | (+44/0) 7768 056 984 (mobile) | (+44/0) 7092 378 517 (fax) |
(707) 221 3672 (US fax) | c.rowat@espero.org.uk



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