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[ This message has been sent to you via the CASI-analysis mailing list ] My two questions are: Has there been legislation directly pertaining to the oil which the people of Iraq jealously regard as their birthright? What is the present situation with regard to euro vs dollar in Iraq? Thanks. pg ----- Original Message ----- From: "k hanly" <firstname.lastname@example.org> To: "Colin Rowat" <email@example.com>; <firstname.lastname@example.org> Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2003 2:20 PM Subject: Re: [casi-analysis] Op-ed on privatisation in Iraq > [ This message has been sent to you via the CASI-analysis mailing list ] > > > While Colin does note that according to international law the CPA is not > authorised to make radical economic changes this is exactly what Bremer has > done. As Colin remarks this creates legal uncertainty. However Colin does > not fill out the details of the reforms. They are quite radical and would > have the efffect of alienating assets to foreign capital. Against the Iraq > constitution, foreign ownership can be up to one hundred per cent; also > total repatriation of profits is allowed. Bremer as well initiated a flat > tax regime rather than a progressive system. The US economic penetration of > Iraq is already pervasive with huge contracts won uncompetitively by > Halliburton, Bechtel and Dyncorp. Bremer's changes are probably > irreversible.While the successor to the present Iraqi Provisional Govt. may > not be chosen through quite the same US dominated processes any attempt by > a new Iraqi government to repeal Bremers changes would be very costly in > terms of discouraging capital investment even further What is more likely > is that former Iraqi business elites will jump on the bandwagon and attempt > to obtain their share of privatised state assets. The US intends to keep > troops in Iraq for some years to come, a reminder perhaps that a relapse > into any form of socialised production might not be welcomed > Privatisation should be considered not in terms of efficiency but in > terms of making available new outlets for private investment and hence > profits for private capital. In the USSR under US tutelage former elites and > others were able to appropriate state assets for their own private profit, > creating a society basically run as a managed democracy by an elite of > wealthy oligarchs. While to some extent the economy is finally turning > around the result has been a horrendous disaster with steep declines in life > expectancy, and disastrous increases in prices making it almost impossible > for the elderly on fixed incomes to survive. Similarly in China the > transition to a market capitalist economy is accompanied by widespread > looting of public assets, often by those within the higher echelons of the > Communist Party. > > Cheers, Ken Hanly > > > ----- Original Message ----- > The former > > Soviet bloc countries now in transition are often cited as the closest > > parallels to Iraq, having also experienced simultaneous political and > > economic change. In 2000, economists Jeffrey Sachs, Clifford Zinnes and > > Yair Eilat published an analysis of privatization in these countries. > > They distinguished between two types of privatization reforms: First, > > "change of title" (COT) reforms - the actual sale of SOEs; and, second, > > deeper institutional reforms to reduce incentive problems, harden budget > > constraints, increase competition and strengthen state regulation. COT > > reforms were vigorously conducted throughout the transition countries. > > Institutional reform was patchier, suggesting it is more difficult to > > carry out. > > The paper's main finding was that COT reforms alone are "not enough to > > > These general results cannot be applied automatically to Iraq. Unlike > > Iraq, the former Soviet bloc countries remained sovereign throughout > > their turbulent reforms. If sovereignty makes a difference, then even > > these countries may be poor guides for Iraq. Worse, the rarity of > > foreign occupations leaves Iraq with few close recent parallels. > > One way forward may be to regard foreign occupations as "normal" > > dictatorships, but with two twists. First, occupying powers have fewer > > legal rights than do sovereign governments. As Britain's attorney > > general advised Prime Minister Tony Blair, the law of belligerent > > occupation "imposes an obligation to respect the laws in force in the > > occupied territory 'unless absolutely prevented.' ... wide-ranging > > reforms of governmental or administrative structures would not be lawful > > ... the imposition of major structural economic reforms would not be > > authorized by international law." > > A June report to the US Congress also took this view, claiming that "the > > establishment of a legitimate government" is the "second requirement" > > for Iraqi economic development. > > are archived on CASI's website at http://www.casi.org.uk > > > > _______________________________________ > Sent via the CASI-analysis mailing list > To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-analysis > All postings are archived on CASI's website at http://www.casi.org.uk _______________________________________ Sent via the CASI-analysis mailing list To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-analysis All postings are archived on CASI's website at http://www.casi.org.uk